US Foreign Influence OPS in Greenland

🔎 Welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where intelligence meets real-world events, hosted by Neil Bisson, retired CSIS intelligence officer, former front-line CBSA officer, and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. With 25+ years of intelligence and law enforcement experience, Neil cuts through the noise to deliver unbiased, unfiltered analysis.

This week’s episode takes a deep dive into U.S. covert foreign influence operations in Greenland — a shocking development that could serve as a warning call for Canada, NATO, and other Western allies. If the U.S. is accused of interfering in the sovereignty of Denmark’s Arctic territory, what does that mean for alliance trust, Canadian sovereignty, and the future of Arctic security?

We also cover:

✔️ Iran’s covert role in an Australian synagogue attack
👉 How is Iran using criminal networks and cut-outs to strike Western targets far from the Middle East?

✔️ U.S. foreign influence operations in Greenland
👉 What happens when a NATO ally is accused of meddling in another ally’s sovereignty — and what lessons does this hold for Canada?

✔️ Greenland deep dive
👉 Could the Arctic become the next major geopolitical flashpoint, and how vulnerable is Canada’s North to similar interference?

✔️ Trump’s Section 232 tariffs and the weaponization of trade
👉 How is “national security” being used as a shield for economic coercion — and what impact could this have on Canada’s economy?

✔️ Espionage case in Germany involving China
👉 What does this case reveal about insider threats, and how exposed are Canada’s own military contractors and allies?

✔️ CSIS poll: Canadians feel less safe than 5 years ago
👉 Why does public perception of insecurity matter just as much as real-world crime statistics for national security planning?

✔️ CSIS & CBSA morale crisis
👉 How do low morale and lack of trust inside Canada’s intelligence and border agencies weaken our national security?

🌍 These aren’t just headlines — they’re global intelligence lessons with direct implications for Canada and its allies.

📢 If you care about foreign interference, espionage, terrorism, national security, and intelligence operations, this is the podcast for you.

👉 Don’t forget to like, share, and subscribe to help grow this independent, listener-supported show. And check the transcript and show notes for links to Neil’s Substack articles for deeper analysis.

Chapters

⏱️ Total length: 23:50

• 0:00 – Intro (1:30)
• 1:30 – Iran’s covert funding of Melbourne synagogue attack
• 5:40 – U.S. foreign influence operations in Greenland: NATO shaken
• 10:40 – Greenland deep dive: What it means for Canada’s sovereignty
• 14:20 – Trump’s Section 232 tariffs and the weaponization of trade
• 16:40 – Espionage case in Germany: insider threat and China’s reach
• 19:10 – CSIS poll: Canadians feel less safe than 5 years ago
• 21:00 – CSIS & CBSA morale crisis: Canada’s intelligence soft underbelly
• 22:40 – Outro (1:10)

Transcript

2025 08 29 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

INTRO:

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where intelligence meets real-world events.

This week, Neil Bisson — retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, former front-line Canada Border Services Agency officer, and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — brings over 25 years of intelligence and law enforcement experience to break down the stories shaping our security today.

We’ll start in Australia, where investigators uncovered how Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps covertly funded a violent attack on a Melbourne synagogue. Then, we move to Denmark and Greenland, where allegations of U.S. influence operations are rattling NATO unity in the Arctic.

We’ll also examine the latest U.S.–Canada trade clash over softwood lumber, the indictment of an American accused of offering military secrets to China, and a new poll showing most Canadians now believe their country is more dangerous than it was five years ago.

And, drawing on Neil’s own experience inside both CSIS and CBSA, we’ll dig into a revealing survey that exposes serious morale challenges in Canada’s intelligence and border agencies — and what that means for our national security.

Stay tuned as Neil connects the dots, offers his insights, and explains what these developments mean for Canada, its allies, and the world.

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

I’m your host Neil Bisson, a retired Intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Every week I take the Intelligence and national security news stories from around the globe and provide you with the analysis, insight and intelligence you need to understand how the shadow world of spies and covert actions have a real and lasting effect on your day to day. 

This week, like most others, has been a busy one. 

From allegations of covert foreign influence operations from the US against Denmark, to a report on the survey that shows dissatisfaction and a morale problem at CSIS. 

There’s a lot to cover, so let’s dive in. 

We start of this week in Australia, where Australian intelligence uncovered that the December 2024 arson attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne was connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

The plot was carried out by local individuals who were unknowingly funded through a covert financial chain traced back to Tehran.

From an intelligence perspective, this represents a serious escalation: a foreign state actor covertly using intermediaries and criminal proxies to carry out violence on Australian soil. 

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation or ASIO, was able to unravel the funding trail that linked offshore transfers back to the IRGC, demonstrating sophisticated counterintelligence capability. 

Politically, this has already led to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese expelling Iran’s ambassador—Australia’s first such action since World War II—and officials are now considering designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization.

The synagogue attack was one of at least two antisemitic incidents in Australia in 2024, the other being an attack on a kosher restaurant in Sydney. 

Investigators believe that neither group of perpetrators fully understood who was behind their actions, highlighting how Iran manipulates intermediaries to maintain plausible deniability. 

This mirrors tactics Iran has employed elsewhere in the world, including Europe, where covert operations often rely on criminal networks and cut-outs to disguise state involvement.

Prime Minister Albanese praised ASIO’s work, calling the investigation “extraordinary” in its ability to track and expose the hidden funding pipeline. 

Australia’s Home Affairs Minister also emphasized that the attackers likely had no idea they were serving the interests of a foreign government, which underscores the insidious nature of proxy operations.

The continued use of proxies by the IRGC clearly signifies that this is a tactic that they will continue to employ.

Iranian dissidents, and others who speak out against the Iranian regime could be targeted by the IRGC’s proxies in what may appear as a random act of violence or criminal act. 

The fact that ASIO was able to “follow the money” and identify the links between these proxy agents and the IRGC is a significant accomplishment that other western intelligence and law enforcement organizations should be looking to mimic. 

Australia’s ability to reveal this hidden chain of influence highlights both the threat posed by foreign state adversaries and the resilience of its intelligence services. 

Looking ahead, we can expect greater scrutiny of Iranian networks, stronger protections for vulnerable communities, and renewed debate about designating proxies of the IRGC as terrorists. 

The broader lesson is clear: hostile states will increasingly use covert methods to destabilize Western democracies, and only rigorous intelligence work will bring these plots to light.

MUSIC

For our next segment we’re going to take a deeper dive into a story that making tsunami size waves throughout the intelligence and national security organizations of NATO. 

I’m of course talking about Denmark publicly summoning the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Copenhagen following reports that three U.S. citizens with connections to President Donald Trump had allegedly conducted covert influence operations in Greenland. 

These activities reportedly targeted Greenlandic opinion and sentiments toward Danish rule, raising alarms from Danish intelligence and prompting swift diplomatic action.

From an intelligence and diplomacy standpoint, this incident marks a serious escalation—credibly reported foreign actors, linked to a U.S. leader, influencing politics in a semi-autonomous territory of a NATO ally. 

Danish authorities viewed this as an unacceptable intrusion into internal affairs and responded by calling in the diplomat and expressing strong disapproval. 

The episode underscores Greenland’s strategic value—rich in resources and sovereignty-sensitive—and Denmark’s resolve to protect its territorial integrity.

This is not the first time the U.S.–Greenland dynamic has triggered diplomatic flare-ups. 

In 2019, Donald Trump floated the idea of acquiring Greenland, prompting exasperated replies of "Greenland is not for sale" from Danish and Greenlandic leaders. 

More recently, a report revealed U.S. intelligence had been directed to monitor Greenland’s independence movement and resource development—a move Denmark deemed especially distrustful. 

Greenland’s strategic importance—location-wise and resource-wise—continues to attract external interest, but both Danish and Greenlandic leaders jointly reaffirm that the island’s future must remain in the hands of its people.

Denmark’s Foreign Minister emphasized that any effort to meddle in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark would be met with firm resistance. 

Greenlandic leaders have consistently reaffirmed that their island is not for sale and should determine its own path. 

Observers note that such influence campaigns, even if subtle, can erode trust between allies—and that Greenland is particularly vulnerable to external manipulation given its geopolitical standing.

This episode spotlights a broader emerging trend: geopolitical competition spilling into the Arctic, where democratic allies must defend not just geography but democratic norms. 

Denmark’s decisive response signals to other states that such actions will not be tolerated. 

I had the opportunity to discuss this topic on CTV’s Your Morning, with Lindsey Deluce, when the video becomes available I will share it on social media. 

The United States is no stranger to foreign influence operations and has used them since the second world war. 

In the 1940s and 1950s US intelligence agencies focussed on stemming any progression of communism in Europe. 

In the 70’s and 80’s South America became the target of foreign influence operations including funding separatist militias, spreading propaganda against leaders who didn’t share similar ideals to the American Administration and funding unions. 

Going forward, we can anticipate increased vigilance around Greenlandic governance, sharper intelligence cooperation within NATO, and perhaps renewed efforts to safeguard public discourse from foreign interference.

MUSIC

Sticking with this week’s main story, our next segment follows the reports that at least three U.S. citizens with ties to President Donald Trump were attempting covert influence operations in Greenland, aiming to sway public opinion and potentially promote secessionist sentiments.

This incident represents a serious intelligence and diplomatic concern—foreign actors reportedly infiltrating a semi-autonomous territory to shape its political trajectory. 

Denmark’s response—calling in the highest-ranking U.S. diplomat—signals profound alarm over what it views as unacceptable interference.

Greenland’s strategic significance—vast mineral wealth, Arctic position, and geopolitical value—has long attracted U.S. interest. 

Trump’s repeated public overtures about acquiring Greenland have heightened vigilance in Copenhagen.

Danish broadcaster DR reported that the individuals allegedly compiled lists of Greenlandic citizens favorable to Trump, while also monitoring critics, suggesting a deliberate effort to map sympathies and influence networks. 

Greenland’s and Denmark’s leaders swiftly condemned the meddling, emphasizing that internal affairs must remain sovereign.

This heightened scrutiny in August follows earlier diplomatic friction: in May, Denmark previously summoned the U.S. envoy amid revelations of U.S. intelligence monitoring Greenland’s independence movement and resource sector.

Denmark’s Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen condemned the actions as “totally unacceptable,” stressing that any influence campaign—especially one that undermines Greenland’s autonomy—violates international norms. 

Covert foreign influence actions against a fellow NATO member is a clear indication that the term ally is being loosely interpreted by the current US Administration. 

As we have previously seen, US President Donald Trump has made similar comments about annexing Canada for similar reasons to those of Greenland. 

Specifically, access to Artic trade routes, that due to climate change are opening up new routes to the rest of the world, as well as access to critical minerals and vast reserves of oil and gas. 

Let’s be real here for a minute, there is absolutely no reason for Canada to mislead itself in thinking that the same foreign influence operations happening against Denmark and Greenland are not happening against Canada. 

But potentially with a higher level of effectiveness and momentum. 

A porous border, the sheer number of dual Canadian / American citizenships and renewed discussions surrounding Alberta’s potential separation are all reasons to consider that US foreign influence operations will take root and potentially flourish if our intelligence apparatus is not focussed on identifying, disrupting and reporting on these efforts. 

Canada’s Intelligence Community would do well to coordinate with the PET, the Danish national security and intelligence service on their efforts and findings in regard to these foreign influence attempts. 

It will remain to be seen if the United States is added to the growing list of countries that Canada has identified as using foreign interference among diaspora communities and influence campaigns of mis and disinformation to try and achieve goals of annexation. 

MUSIC

Foreign Influence campaigns aren’t the only tool used by the current US administration to cause mayhem. 

In our next segment I’m discussing reports that confirmed U.S. President Donald Trump has initiated a Section 232 national-security investigation into softwood lumber imports, particularly targeting Canadian products. 

The move reflects heightened U.S. concerns over whether these imports pose risks to US domestic industries.

From an intelligence and economic-safety standpoint, the use of Section 232—a legal provision tied to national security—to scrutinize lumber imports, signals a strategic framing of trade war actions. 

For Canada, which supplies a significant portion of U.S. softwood, this raises the stakes considerably. 

If the investigation results in extra tariffs, it could exacerbate tensions and be seen as economic coercion masked under national-security rationales. 

This is a repeat of mostly false allegations of fentanyl pouring over the Canadian border into the US. 

President Donald Trump has been using unfounded national security concerns to sanction higher tariffs against Canada since he took office. 

This latest mockery of national security issues will result in US Intelligence and trade authorities needing to track not just material flows, but the strategic narratives around national supply chains as instruments of pressure.

This move deepens a decades-long lumber spat between Canada and the U.S., rooted in accusations of unfair subsidies in the Canadian forestry sector. 

In 2024, the U.S. had already imposed combined anti-dumping and countervailing duties of approximately 14.5%, and those rates surged in mid-2025, nearing 35% on key products. 

Trump's latest investigation could tack on further tariffs, potentially pushing total duties even higher. 

It's part of a broader U.S. strategy—under his direction—to target imports under the guise of national security, including sectors like copper, wind turbines, and furniture.

Analysts warn that leveraging national-security tools like Section 232 for trade disputes sets a dangerous precedent—one that blurs lines between genuine defense concerns and protectionist policy. 

Canadian industry stakeholders are watching closely, aware that any further escalation could pressure mills, drive job losses, and destabilize housing markets in both countries.

This Section 232 probe marks an escalation in the U.S.–Canada lumber conflict. 

Beyond just economics, it underscores the strategic weaponization of trade mechanisms. 

Looking ahead, we can expect Canadian officials to push back—possibly through legal means or WTO challenges—while the forestry sector braces for volatility. 

It also signals to allies that national-security rationales can be used to justify tariffs, a troubling trend for trade and diplomacy.

As I’ve noted in the last segment, the actions demonstrated by the current US Administration are coming at Canada from various fronts. 

By attempting to destabilize major Canadian industries, the current US administration is helping to sow discourse among Canadians who affected by issues.
 
Canadians who lose jobs and industries that begin to shut down will be looking to the Canadian Federal and Provincial Governments to do something. 

If they feel that the issues aren’t being dealt with in a manner they feel is beneficial it can result in strife and disenfranchisement with the government. 

Going back to foreign influence campaigns, this mindset is what leads to further talk of separation and annexation. 

MUSIC

We head to Germany for our next segment where prosecutors announced the indictment of an American man, known only as Martin D., who worked at a U.S. military facility in Germany. 

He is accused of repeatedly contacting Chinese authorities in the summer of 2024 and offering sensitive U.S. military information—though authorities say he did not succeed in transferring any data before his arrest.

From an intelligence and counterespionage perspective, this case underscores some critical threat vectors relating to insider exploitation and threat. 

The accused worked for a civilian contractor of the U.S. Department of Defense from 2017 until early 2023 and was stationed at the facility at least as early as 2020. 

His outreach to Chinese intelligence during the summer of 2024 marked a clear insider threat, exposing vulnerabilities within civilian support networks attached to military operations. 

That German authorities detained him before any transmission, underscores the effectiveness of allied intelligence collaboration. 

The case now lies before a state court in Koblenz, where a decision will be made on whether it proceeds to trial.

This incident joins a growing list of espionage or attempted espionage cases linked to China, involving both military personnel and civilian staff. 

For example, other recent cases include U.S. service members convicted of selling secrets to China, and individuals providing military-related data and technology—highlighting persistent interest from Chinese intelligence in U.S. defense capabilities. 

This case in Germany highlights that threat extends beyond U.S. borders, and that foreign-based assets remain a key battleground.

While the report does not include direct expert commentary, prosecution by German authorities points to serious intent and credible threat. 

The indictment alone sends a clear signal: Even attempts at espionage whether successful or not, will trigger legal consequences and raise alarm among NATO allies. 

It also reinforces the importance of security vouching for civilian contractors operating within military or strategic environments.

Although no classified information was transferred, the case demonstrates the critical need to monitor not just uniformed personnel but also civilian contractors who may have access to sensitive infrastructure. 

With the judiciary now addressing the case, it sets a precedent for prosecuting attempted espionage on allied soil. 

Looking ahead, we can expect intensified screening, stricter oversight of contractor networks, and deeper collaboration among NATO intelligence channels to mitigate such cross-border insider threats.

MUSIC

Our next story brings us back to Canada, where a new CSIS-commissioned poll revealed that approximately six in ten Canadians now feel their country is more dangerous than it was five years ago, while around 38 percent believe the level of safety remains unchanged, and only a small minority view Canada as safer today.

From an intelligence angle, perception matters almost as much as reality. 

Public sentiment about growing insecurity can lower trust in institutions and affect the public’s willingness to cooperate with national security efforts. 

Notably, this marks a sharp increase in perceived danger—up from only about a quarter of respondents in 2021 expressing similar concerns—highlighting a significant shift in mood that intelligence agencies must account for when communicating and conducting operations.

Despite rising perceptions of danger, objective crime indicators paint a nuanced picture. 

Canada remains among the world’s safer nations, ranking 11th on the Global Peace Index. 

While the Crime Severity Index inched up by 2 percent in 2023—the third annual increase since 2015—homicide rates remain significantly lower than in past decades, and many violent crime metrics are stable or improving. 

Trends such as increased fraud and hate crimes are part of the uptick, but the overall safety environment has not deteriorated drastically.

Although this coverage doesn’t include quotes from security experts, analysts argue that growing anxiety—even if overstated—can degrade institutional trust and fuel calls for policy shifts. 

Mounting public pressure may push intelligence agencies to be more transparent or potentiate calls for stronger security measures. 

It also underscores the need for balanced public messaging: acknowledging concerns without inflating threat levels.

This perception shift matters—from a policy standpoint, sentiment drives political pressure and resource allocation. 

Intelligence agencies will need to both monitor emerging threats and better engage the public about what is real and what is perceived. 

Looking forward, expect efforts to improve public trust, perhaps through educational initiatives, clearer communication of trends, and collaboration between law enforcement and media to contextualize safety data.

MUSIC

More survey information on intelligence and national security out of Canada for this week’s final segment. 

A new federal public service survey has revealed troubling results: Canada’s border and spy agencies are among the worst-rated workplaces in government. 

Employees at the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, reported some of the lowest morale, trust, and overall satisfaction across the federal public service.

From an intelligence and national security perspective, these findings are significant. 

Low morale and workplace dissatisfaction within frontline border and intelligence agencies can directly impact operational effectiveness, recruitment, and retention. 

For agencies tasked with safeguarding Canada from espionage, terrorism, and transnational crime, weakened internal culture poses risks that go beyond HR concerns, it can erode resilience, reduce mission focus, and open vulnerabilities adversaries may seek to exploit.

This survey is part of an annual evaluation of workplace culture within the federal public service. 

While many departments showed stable or improving results, CBSA and CSIS stood out for negative trends. 

Employees cited issues such as lack of trust in senior management, limited career progression, and stress related to high operational demands. 

For CBSA, staff shortages and pressures at Canada’s borders are longstanding challenges. 

For CSIS, the secretive nature of its work can highten feelings of isolation, stress, and disconnect between leadership and employees.

As someone who has worked for both CBSA and CSIS, I can confirm that these issues are ones that affect many in these departments. 

The lack of understanding and focus on a strong national security and intelligence culture in Canada, from politicians and populace alike are driving factors for why these issues go unanswered and fester. 

I have advocated for more resources and financing of CSIS and CBSA since I started the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Now more than ever Canada needs to rely on national security and law enforcement to maintain levels of safety we have all become associated to. 

This issue is not unique to Canada. 

Across the Five Eyes intelligence community, similar workforce strains have been reported—particularly after years of heightened operational tempo and public scrutiny. 

The challenge lies in balancing secrecy and accountability with the need for organizational transparency and employee well-being.

Labour experts point out that workplace dissatisfaction in critical security agencies often leads to higher turnover, burnout, and difficulty attracting the next generation of talent. 

Former officials have noted that morale issues at CSIS and CBSA, if left unresolved, could hinder Canada’s ability to respond to increasingly complex national security threats.

The survey results are a reminder that effective national security starts with a resilient workforce. 

Agencies like CSIS and CBSA cannot perform at their best if their employees lack trust, motivation, or a supportive environment. 

The government will need to address these cultural issues quickly to prevent operational decline. 

Looking ahead, expect calls for greater investment in workplace support, leadership training, and renewed efforts to recruit and retain skilled professionals in Canada’s frontline intelligence and security roles.

Well, that’s gonna do it for the wrap up this week. 

As always, the links to the articles are in the transcripts so you can read the stories for yourself and form your own conclusions. 

The purpose of this podcast is to cut through the noise and give you the insight from a former intelligence professional. It is not intended to influence your opinion or try to steer in anyone in a certain direction. 

My analysis and the intelligence derived from it, are based on recognizing the global patterns, collaborating the information, and providing the likely potentials going forward. 

Until next week, stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC

OUTRO: 

That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

Every story you hear on this show comes from hours of research, analysis, and preparation — to make sure you get the clearest, most accurate, and most relevant open-source intelligence possible.

Neil Bisson brings over twenty-five years of experience in intelligence and law enforcement to cut through the noise. 

This podcast is unfiltered, unbiased, and independent — and that’s only possible because it’s supported by listeners like you.

If you value this work and want to help keep it free from corporate influence, visit Buzzsprout to become a sponsor or make a donation. 

Your support is what keeps this show going.

And don’t forget — like, subscribe, and share this podcast with others who care about national security and intelligence. Every share helps us grow and reach more listeners who need these insights.

You can also read Neil’s Substack articles for deeper dives into these issues — the link is in the transcript and the show notes.

Thank you for tuning in.

And as Neil always reminds us — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

MUSIC

LINKS

Substack page: 
https://substack.com/@neilbisson1?utm_source=user-menu

Story 1: Iran link to Australian synagogue attack uncovered via funding trail, spy agency says
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-link-australian-synagogue-attack-uncovered-via-funding-trail-spy-agency-2025-08-27/

Story 2: Denmark summons U.S. diplomat over alleged influence campaign in Greenland
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/denmark-us-greenland-diplomatic-row-1.7618702

Story 3: Denmark summons US diplomat over alleged Greenland influence campaign
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/27/denmark-summons-us-diplomat-over-alleged-greenland-influence-campaign

Story 4: Trump says imports of wood products may pose national security threat to U.S. — raising fears in B.C.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/donald-trump-section-232-investigation-softwood-lumber-1.7616425

Story 5: American accused of offering sensitive information on US military to China indicted
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/american-accused-offering-sensitive-information-us-military-china-124944856


Story 6: Majority of Canadians say Canada is more dangerous than five years ago: CSIS poll
https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/majority-of-canadians-say-canada-is-more-dangerous-than-five-years-ago-csis-poll/ar-AA1LiEE1

Story 7: Canada’s federal employees ranked the worst places to work in a new survey
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/border-spy-agencies-among-worst-federal-workplaces-survey/