Russian Spies Arrested in England

Russian Spies Arrested in England | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up—the podcast where intelligence meets real-world events.

This week, Neil Bisson, Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and a retired CSIS Intelligence Officer, takes you inside the latest developments in espionage, terrorism, and foreign interference that are shaping global security.

🇨🇦 Canada is moving to dissolve Samidoun, a Vancouver-based group already listed as a terrorist entity—raising questions about how extremist organizations exploit legal loopholes.

🇬🇧 Britain drops high-profile charges against two men accused of spying for China, while MI5 faces dual scandals: unlawful surveillance of a BBC journalist and a new investigation into false evidence given in court in the Agent X case.

🇨🇳 In New York, a Chinese dissident who founded a democracy group pleads guilty to spying for Beijing, exposing how the CCP continues to target activists abroad.

🇷🇺 In Essex, England, three people are arrested under the UK’s new National Security Act for allegedly working with Russian intelligence—an operation that may extend beyond espionage into sabotage.

🌍 In Lithuania, fifteen suspects are charged with terrorism over a parcel bomb plot linked to Russian military intelligence, confirming warnings about Moscow’s sabotage tradecraft.

🇺🇸 In the United States, President Donald Trump says he’ll push to designate Antifa as a “major terrorist organization,” igniting fierce debate over domestic extremism and constitutional limits.

Each story reveals how espionage, sabotage, and extremism are not distant threats but active challenges with real-world consequences for Canada, its allies, and democratic societies worldwide.

If you find value in the insights and analysis in this podcast, please consider supporting us on Buzzsprout—your contributions help sustain the work and expand our reach to a wider audience.

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⏱️ Chapters
00:00 – Intro
01:47 – Canada moves to dissolve Samidoun terrorist entity
07:25 – UK drops espionage charges against two men accused of spying for China
11:50 – MI5 admits to unlawful surveillance of BBC journalist
16:35 – Chinese dissident in New York pleads guilty to spying for Beijing
20:40 – MI5 investigated for false evidence in Agent X case
24:55 – Russian spies arrested in Essex under UK National Security Act
28:10 – Lithuania charges 15 suspects over Russia parcel bomb plot
31:15 – Trump calls for Antifa to be designated a terrorist organization
32:11 – Outro

Transcript

2025 09 19 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

INTRO:

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up—the podcast where intelligence meets real-world events.

This week, Neil Bisson, Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and a retired CSIS Intelligence Officer, brings you sharp insights on a series of cases that test the limits of oversight, accountability, and foreign interference.

We begin in Canada, where the government is moving to dissolve Samidoun, a Vancouver-based organization already listed as a terrorist entity, raising urgent questions about how extremist groups exploit legal loopholes to maintain legitimacy.

Across the Atlantic, UK authorities have dropped high-profile charges against two men accused of spying for China, even as MI5 faces a double scandal—admitting it unlawfully accessed the data of a BBC journalist while also being investigated for providing false evidence to the courts in the Agent X case.

The spotlight then shifts to Essex, where three people have been arrested under the UK’s new National Security Act for allegedly assisting Russian intelligence. 

Early reports suggest these weren’t just spies, but potential saboteurs—part of a wider European pattern that includes Lithuania’s newly revealed parcel bomb plot, now leading to terrorism charges for fifteen suspects.

And in the United States, President Donald Trump has announced plans to designate Antifa as a “major terrorist organization,” igniting a fierce debate over domestic terrorism, political expression, and the limits of government power.

Stay with us as we break down what these stories mean for intelligence, democracy, and the security challenges facing Canada and its allies.

Let’s get started.

MUSIC

Hello everyone and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

The podcast that gives you the same insights, analysis and intelligence you’d find in highly classified government documents. 

I’m your host Neil Bisson, the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 

Each week, I take the latest open-source media stories relating to National Security, Espionage, Sabotage, Foreign Interference and Terrorism to provide you with the analysis and insights you need to better prepare for the threats to your country, your career and your safety. 

It's been a busy week of captured spies, loss faith in UK intelligence and a call to label left wing ideologies, terrorist groups. 

So, without further delay, let’s dive in. 

For our first story this week, we start right here in Canada, where the federal government has announced an urgent move to strip Samidoun, a Vancouver-based organization, of its not-for-profit status. 

Samidoun was listed as a terrorist entity, by Canada, in 2024 for its open support of Hamas, including organizing rallies that glorified its attacks and fundraising activities tied to the group.

Despite being listed as a terrorist entity under Canadian law, Samidoun has continued to exist as a federally registered corporation, raising serious concerns about gaps in Canada’s counterterrorism regime.

Industry Minister Mélanie Joly made the announcement on social media, calling it “completely unacceptable” that an organization formally designated as a terrorist entity is still enjoying legal recognition as a not-for-profit. 

Samidoun has been active in anti-Israel protests and is linked to individuals already sanctioned by both Canada and the United States.

From an intelligence and national security perspective, this situation illustrates a troubling disconnect between policy and practice. 

While the Criminal Code prohibits providing financial services or property to Samidoun, the organization’s legal registration has provided it with a veneer of legitimacy. 

This inconsistency undermines the credibility of Canada’s counterterrorism framework and opens the door for exploitation by other groups.

Once Samidoun was designated as a terrorist entity, that should have curtailed its ability to operate openly in Canada. 

Yet, nearly a year later, the group still maintained its not-for-profit status, a fact that Jewish advocacy groups, such as B’nai Brith Canada, described as a “mockery” of the country’s efforts to combat terrorism.

Experts note that Canada has long been criticized as a permissive environment for terrorist financing and extremist organizing. 

Advocacy groups have highlighted the way organizations exploit loopholes in Canada’s charitable and non-profit systems to raise funds and mobilize support. 

The Samidoun case is a vivid example of how legal structures can lag behind security realities.

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Casey Babb described the situation as “long overdue,” noting that for decades hostile actors have used Canada like an ATM to fundraise and mobilize. 

B’nai Brith Canada also praised the government’s announcement, stating that every day Samidoun continued to exist as a registered corporation was a “blight” on Canadian society.

The government’s move to dissolve Samidoun’s not-for-profit status is both necessary and symbolic. 

It demonstrates that legal frameworks must match the seriousness of terrorist designations. 

The broader implication is clear: Canada cannot afford to be perceived as a safe haven for groups that exploit loopholes to operate despite being formally identified as security threats.

Moving forward, the government may need legislative reform to prevent similar cases in the future.

MUSIC

For our next story we head the U.K. where two men, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who were accused under the UK’s Official Secrets Act of spying for China, have had all charges dropped. 

Prosecutors announced they would offer no evidence, stating the case failed to meet the threshold for trial. 

The decision has triggered outrage from senior members of the UK government.

Cash, a former parliamentary researcher with ties to the Conservative Party’s China Research Group, and Berry, a teacher from Oxfordshire, were accused of providing information “useful to an enemy” between December 2021 and February 2023. 

Their arrests in March 2023, following a counterterrorism investigation, brought intense scrutiny and headlines about Chinese infiltration of Westminster.

The Crown Prosecution Service ultimately concluded the evidence was insufficient. 

This outcome has sparked a strong reaction from the Home Office and Downing Street, both of which called the allegations “gravely concerning” and expressed disappointment that the case could not proceed.

The case unfolded against a backdrop of increasing warnings about Chinese espionage in the UK. 

In 2021, MI5 publicly identified Christine Lee as an alleged Chinese agent who had cultivated relationships in Parliament. 

More recently, businessman Yang Tengbo was barred from entering the UK over alleged spying activities. 

Beijing has consistently rejected these claims, calling them “fabricated” and “political manipulation.”

Parliamentarians such as Alicia Kearns voiced disbelief that the case was dropped, alleging clear links between Cash, Berry, and China’s United Front Work Department. 

Meanwhile, Cash’s defenders, including his legal team and colleagues, described the past two years as a “nightmare” and stressed the personal toll of the allegations.

This case demonstrates both the challenges and the stakes of prosecuting espionage in open democracies. 

On one hand, prosecutorial thresholds and evidentiary requirements protect civil liberties; on the other, the inability to bring cases to trial may embolden adversaries and leave security gaps.

For Canada and other Western countries, the message is clear: accusations alone are not enough — governments need airtight, admissible evidence to counter state-backed espionage.

MUSIC

We’ll be staying in the UK for the majority of this episode as with our next story where we discuss how MI5 has admitted to illegally obtaining communications data from the phone of former BBC Northern Ireland journalist Vincent Kearney. 

The acknowledgment, made to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, revealed that the security service accessed his phone data on two occasions in 2006 and 2009. 

The admission has raised alarm among journalists, human rights organizations, and politicians, with many calling for stronger accountability mechanisms.

Kearney, who spent 17 years at the BBC and is now northern editor of RTÉ News, described the intrusion as “deeply concerning.” 

His legal team, supported by the BBC, is seeking to uncover the full scope of the surveillance.

This case follows broader concerns about surveillance of journalists in Northern Ireland, including legal battles involving reporters Barry McCaffrey and Trevor Birney.

The case illustrates the risks posed when intelligence agencies overstep their legal authority. 

For MI5, the admission of unlawful action is unprecedented and potentially damaging to its credibility, particularly in an environment where public trust in both government and media is already fragile.

Journalists’ ability to protect confidential sources is considered a cornerstone of press freedom.

Amnesty International called MI5’s actions “particularly alarming,” warning of a chilling effect on investigative reporting. 

Political leaders across Northern Ireland echoed the sentiment, with Sinn Féin’s Gerry Kelly demanding greater accountability and SDLP leader Claire Hanna urging a forensic review of surveillance practices.

This incident also highlights broader debates around surveillance powers in the UK, particularly following the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, which was designed to provide oversight of intelligence collection but has itself been criticized as overly permissive.

Trevor Birney welcomed MI5’s admission but warned it may be “only the tip of the iceberg.” 

Amnesty International and others argue that without a transparent public inquiry, the true scale of surveillance against journalists may never be known.

The MI5 admission underscores the delicate balance between national security and democratic accountability. 

Intelligence services require secrecy to operate effectively, but when those powers cross into illegal surveillance of journalists, they undermine the very freedoms they claim to protect. 

For Canada and other democracies, this case is a stark reminder that even trusted institutions must face robust oversight to safeguard press freedom and public trust.

MUSIC

We head to New York for our next story, as we look at a striking case: a longtime Chinese dissident and human rights activist has admitted to acting as a spy for Beijing, targeting his own community of exiles & activists while publicly maintaining a pro-democracy posture.

68-year-old Yuanjun Tang, founded a pro-democracy nonprofit in Flushing, Queens, and has been vocal in protest movements — including those commemorating Tiananmen Square. 

However, according to his guilty plea, while he publicly criticized the Chinese Communist Party, he was also gathering intel on fellow activists, recording protests, monitoring immigration attorneys working with dissidents, and more, all while under the direction from a Chinese intelligence officer. 

His motivation reportedly included securing permission from China to visit family there.

What’s especially notable here is the dual role: the overt activism was used as cover; he was covertly acting for foreign intelligence. 

This confirms patterns seen in what U.S. law enforcement terms “transnational repression,” where states like China try to monitor, intimidate, and suppress dissident voices abroad by leveraging diaspora networks and trusted insiders.

In recent years, U.S. federal agencies have brought more cases under statutes aimed at acting as agents of foreign governments, particularly involving China. 

Many of these cases involve individuals who are part of the diaspora or activist communities, including academic, nonprofit, or immigration law circles. 

This should be a red flag for Canada’s Intelligence Community. 

A large amount of attention has been placed on foreign interference within diaspora communities in Canada. 

This opens up an opportunity for foreign states, like China, to place agents into perceived dissident organizations to spy on the activities of those groups, while simultaneously attracting the attention of Canada’s Intelligence Community to identify members of CSIS, and the RCMP who are mandated to work on national security files.

As a former intelligence officer, this is yet another example of the requirement for constant validation against sources and contacts. 

Tang’s case follows others like Shujun Wang, both in profile (activism + dissent) and in the way trust is weaponized.

There is also growing concern among homeland security, intelligence, and civil-liberties experts: how to balance the protection of dissent (speech, advocacy) with detecting covert foreign influence. 

Cases like Tang’s raise questions about how visible activism can obscure hidden roles, how diaspora communities are vulnerable, and how law enforcement can build cases without inhibiting legitimate dissent.

Legal analysts point out that Tang’s guilty plea underscores how foreign intelligence services exploit emotional levers (like family connections or pressure) to recruit assets inside exile communities. 

Others say the case serves as a warning: activism alone doesn’t guarantee immunity from being manipulated. 

Community leaders are reportedly shocked and feel betrayed, both because Tang was a visible critic of Beijing and because of what his case means for trust within dissident networks.

The Tang case is a vivid example of foreign intelligence operations reaching beyond borders — into diaspora communities, using legitimate advocacy as a cover, and advancing a state’s interest by digitally surveilling, photographing, and reporting on dissidents. 

It should force us to think about several policy implications: more robust outreach + protection for dissident networks; better tools to identify covert influence; and legal frameworks that balance civil rights with state security.

MUSIC


We head back to the UK, where Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has ordered a new investigation into how MI5 provided false evidence to three courts. 

The case involves “Agent X,” a neo-Nazi informant who used his role as an MI5 source to abuse his girlfriend, culminating in a machete attack. 

The scandal raises serious questions about transparency, accountability, and the duty of candour owed by intelligence services to the courts.

The High Court and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal rejected MI5’s explanations regarding the false evidence. 

Judges concluded that earlier inquiries into the matter “suffered from serious procedural deficiencies” and could not be relied upon. 

Starmer has now directed Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, to oversee a fresh investigation, led by Deputy Commissioner Sir John Goldring.

At the heart of the issue: MI5 told the courts it had not revealed Agent X’s informant status, in line with policy. 

Yet BBC recordings revealed that MI5 had in fact disclosed this information in conversations with journalists, while simultaneously trying to suppress reporting. 

The contradiction undermined MI5’s credibility and raised suspicion of deliberate contempt of court.

The controversy began with a BBC investigation in 2022 into Agent X’s violent and abusive behavior. 

When journalists pressed MI5, officials attempted to dissuade reporting by confirming his informant status off the record, while later denying such disclosures in court.

The scandal only grew as official inquiries initially absolved MI5 of deliberate wrongdoing, chalking the matter up to poor memory and mistakes.

But when senior judges revisited the case this summer, they concluded that prior investigations were inadequate. 

Their concern extended beyond whether MI5 officers committed contempt of court—it touched on the broader issue of whether the duty of candour, a legal requirement for public bodies to be open and honest, had been breached.

Kate Ellis of the Centre for Women’s Justice, who represents Agent X’s former partner, welcomed the new investigation, describing reliance on false evidence in court as “profoundly serious.” 

Legal experts stress that if intelligence agencies cannot be trusted to provide accurate information to courts, it strikes at the foundation of accountability and oversight in a democratic system.

This case places MI5 under a harsh spotlight. 

At stake is not only its credibility with the judiciary, but the broader principle of candour and trust between intelligence agencies, government, and the courts. 

If the investigation uncovers systemic failures or deliberate misrepresentation, it could have lasting implications for oversight mechanisms in the UK and for public trust in intelligence services.

MUSIC

For the next few segments, we move onto this week’s main story. 

Three people have been arrested in Essex, England on suspicion of assisting Russian intelligence. 

As Western democracies tighten laws on foreign interference, this case is one of the first high-profile instances under the 2023 UK National Security Act, illustrating how the legal tools meant to guard against espionage are now being used.

Two men—a 41-year-old and a 46-year-old—and a 35-year-old woman were arrested in Grays, Essex. 

Searches were conducted at their residences, and they were taken to a London police station before being released on bail. 

Authorities allege these individuals were somehow acting as proxies—local actors recruited or co-opted to facilitate Russian intelligence operations. 

This has become a recurring pattern: rather than foreign agents themselves on the ground, security agencies are increasingly concerned about nationals who assist from within.

Because the 2023 National Security Act includes new offenses targeting actions such as aiding foreign intelligence services and foreign interference, these arrests carry penalties of up to 14 years. 

As such, this case may become a benchmark for how the UK enforces these new powers, especially when it comes to prosecuting “proxy helpers”—those individuals who operate on behalf of intelligence services without holding formal roles.

The arrests reflect growing anxieties in the UK about Russian espionage since the invasion of Ukraine. 

Intelligence services have repeatedly warned that hostile states are doubling down on efforts to cultivate sources, recruit informants, and use legal loopholes to operate in allied countries. 

The UK’s counterterrorism command has also pointed to previous cases involving the Wagner Group and attempts to influence or destabilize through non-kinetic means. 

Laws like the National Security Act are recent but seen as necessary countermeasures in this evolving threat environment.

Security analysts say this case proves that new legislation is more than symbolic—it’s increasingly being used in practice. 

Some have cautioned, however, that public trust depends on how transparent these investigations can be, given their sensitivity and the risks of overreach.

Observers also suggest that monitoring how these arrests develop—whether charges stick, evidence is disclosed, and whether courts can handle the burden of proof—is essential for establishing legal precedent.

These arrests in Essex are a signal: laws enacted to counter foreign interference are now tools in action. 

For defence contractors and companies operating internationally, this underscores how critical it is to understand national security laws, due diligence obligations, and how seemingly peripheral actors, or “proxies” can become liabilities. 

I will be teaching a new online course for the University of Ottawa, Professional Development Institute this winter entitled, “Sabotage and Proxy Operations”. 

This is a new and evolving tactic for foreign state adversaries, and the course will take a deep dive into the tactics, techniques and focus of foreign enemy states, like Russia, in their use of proxy agents and sabotage techniques. 

I’ll leave a link in the transcript and show notes. 


MUSIC

We stay with this story for our next segment. 

While the first reports highlighted that this was one of the earliest applications of the UK’s new National Security Act, additional details now shed light on Russia’s growing reliance on local “proxies” to carry out covert operations.

As previously mentioned, the three suspects were arrested under Section 3 of the National Security Act 2023, which criminalizes assisting a foreign intelligence service. 

The arrests followed searches of two separate addresses in Grays, Essex, part of an operation that illustrates how Russian intelligence seeks to exploit individuals within the UK to advance its aims.

What is particularly significant is the way this case reflects a shift in Russian tradecraft. 

Instead of deploying officers with diplomatic cover, Russian intelligence has increasingly turned to criminal groups, private operatives, and UK-based nationals. 

This approach allows Moscow to blur responsibility, complicate attribution, and expand its operational reach without the risks that come with traditional espionage.

MI5’s Director General, Sir Ken McCallum, has previously warned that Russian state actors are relying on proxies for their “dirty work.” 

He specifically highlighted the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, as being on a mission to generate chaos on British and European streets through sabotage and arson. 

These comments were reinforced earlier this year when a group of men recruited by the Wagner Group—a Russian private military organization—carried out an arson attack on a Ukraine-linked warehouse in London. 

While the Essex arrests are not directly connected to that case, both illustrate the same trend: Russia is outsourcing operations to cutouts who are easier to recruit and harder to trace back.

UK counterterrorism officials, including Commander Dominic Murphy, have emphasized the rising number of people in Britain being recruited by foreign intelligence services. 

Analysts note that such tactics serve two purposes: they extend Moscow’s reach while also sowing fear and distrust within local communities. 

By leveraging criminals and private contractors, Russia creates a murkier operational picture that challenges both law enforcement and intelligence oversight.

The Essex arrests are not just an isolated case—they are part of a broader evolution in Russian intelligence strategy. 

Instead of relying solely on career spies or “illegals,” Moscow is increasingly using ordinary citizens, criminals, and front organizations to wage a shadow war on European soil. 

For policymakers and defence contractors alike, the lesson is clear: vigilance must extend beyond embassies and official channels to the broader environment where proxies can be recruited and activated.

MUSIC

While researching this story, fresh details emerged that shift the narrative somewhat — showing that what once seemed like espionage and foreign‐interference may also involve sabotage, coordinated logistics, and methods designed to lower detection.

The Al Jazeera media outlet provided an update that frames the suspects not merely as willing collaborators in intelligence collection, but as “suspected saboteurs.” 

This suggests potential destructive or disruptive operations — not just spying. 

One particular point of note: Al Jazeera reports that similar sabotage-plots across Europe (in places like Lithuania and Poland) have involved incendiary devices hidden in everyday items — cosmetics, vibrating cushions — and shipped via courier networks. 

Those cases, while not proven to be connected, mirror the kind of tradecraft states like Russia may be refining: low-signature methods, using proxies, and exploiting logistical vulnerabilities.

Earlier accounts focused on “proxies” and helping foreign intelligence services under the new UK National Security Act. 

Now we see the possibility that the functionality of those proxies extends into active sabotage — which raises legal, operational, and countermeasures questions. 

It isn’t just about being compromised or passing information; it’s about actively enabling damage through covert means.

This expansion makes sense considering recent trends: European intelligence and law enforcement have documented multiple sabotage incidents involving Russia and its agents — arson attacks, explosive devices, and disruption of supply chains. 

Authorities in Lithuania and Latvia have foiled plots involving devices sent through couriers, and shared concerns over how private operatives, mail/transport networks, and third-party couriers are being used. 

Under the National Security Act, the UK now has stronger tools to go after not just espionage but these broader sabotage and foreign interference threats.

Security analysts are flagging this development as serious, because sabotage introduces higher stakes: physical damage; potential risk to human life; threats to infrastructure; and broader disruption. 

Some warn that the legal definitions around “assisting foreign intelligence services” will increasingly be tested — does aiding sabotage count under those definitions? 

Experts also note that supply chain security, package screening, logistics oversight become just as important as counterespionage in this environment.

What started as a high-profile application of counter-espionage law is now evolving into a case that could redefine what foreign interference looks like: including sabotage by proxies, low-signature attacks, and use of everyday logistics channels. 

For defence contractors, industry partners, and governments, this means one must prepare for threats that are not merely informational or cyber-based but physical, logistical, and covert.

MUSIC

Last year on the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, I highlighted a disturbing Russian operation uncovered in Lithuania: explosive devices disguised as consumer goods and shipped across Europe through courier networks. 

At the time, I noted that this wasn’t just a failed plot—it was a warning sign of how Moscow was innovating its sabotage tradecraft, outsourcing operations to proxies and exploiting everyday logistics to strike targets far from the battlefield. 

This week, that warning has been confirmed. Lithuanian prosecutors have now charged fifteen people with terrorism over what has become known as the “Russia bomb plot.”

Authorities revealed that four packages were dispatched from Vilnius in July 2024, hidden inside items like cosmetics and electronic devices, and sent through major courier services DHL and DPD. 

Three of these packages ignited or exploded in logistics hubs in Germany, Poland, and the UK, while a fourth failed to detonate. 

The suspects—drawn from Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine—are accused of working under the direction of Russian military intelligence. 

The indictments transform what was initially viewed as a foiled sabotage attempt into a fully recognized terrorism case.

In my analysis last year, I warned that this was more than just a one-off stunt: it represented a shift in Russian tradecraft, using proxy networks and civilian supply chains to carry out operations with plausible deniability. 

The arrest of the 3 Russian operatives in Essex and the new charges here validate that assessment. 

Prosecutors have confirmed this was not opportunistic or amateur, but a coordinated Russian military intelligence operation—a textbook example of state-directed sabotage executed through cutouts.

When I first reported on this case, I stressed that the use of ordinary logistics channels—courier services, warehouses, and airport cargo hubs—posed a unique challenge. 

Unlike traditional espionage, these methods target infrastructure in ways that are harder to detect and easier to replicate. 

The charges in Lithuania prove that concern was well-founded: these devices made it across multiple borders, caused real damage in Europe, and exposed vulnerabilities in critical supply chain security.
This also ties into a broader pattern I’ve tracked repeatedly on the podcast: Russia’s reliance on proxies and unconventional methods—whether through Wagner operatives torching warehouses in London, or nationals in the UK recruited to spy or sabotage. 

The Lithuanian indictments show that the same pattern holds across Europe, reinforcing the consistency of Moscow’s approach.

Officials in Lithuania have underscored the seriousness of these charges, and analysts across Europe see this case as setting legal precedent. 

What stands out to me is how it proves the evolution of “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone attacks.” 

Russia isn’t just hacking networks or spreading disinformation—it’s planting bombs in delivery trucks, exploiting the global economy’s arteries, and testing Western resilience. 

That’s exactly the type of low-signature sabotage I cautioned about last year, and now it has been confirmed in court documents.

This follow-up underscores an important point: when we flagged this case last year, it was already clear it wasn’t an isolated event. 

The formal charges against fifteen suspects confirm that Russia is pursuing a deliberate sabotage strategy using proxies and everyday logistics systems. 

For policymakers, defence contractors, and industry leaders, this isn’t just a headline—it’s proof that supply chains are battlefields, and that vigilance must extend far beyond traditional intelligence targets.

MUSIC

For our last segment this week, we turn to the United States, where President Donald Trump has announced his intention to designate Antifa as a “major terrorist organization.” 

He called it “sick, dangerous, radical left disaster,” and said he will “strongly recommend” that those funding Antifa be investigated. 

The move comes amidst growing political polarization and debate about how to define domestic groups when it comes to terror designations.

The challenge is legal and conceptual: Antifa isn’t a centralized organization, but a loose coalition of anti-fascist and far-left activist groups, many of them autonomous, with no formal hierarchy. 

That raises immediate questions about how you categorize and enforce a terrorist designation in U.S. domestic law, especially given strong protections for free speech under the First Amendment.

Trump’s statement didn’t include clear details on which statutes or legal mechanisms he intends to use, or how he will differentiate between protected protest activity and violent or illegal action. 

He also pledged to target financial supporters of antifa groups, signaling that allegations of material support could become a tool of enforcement.

This isn’t the first time Antifa has been floated as a target for legal sanction. 

Former FBI Director Christopher Wray, in 2020, called Antifa more an ideology than an organization—something without fixed structure, which complicates any attempt at formal designation. 

The U.S. does not have a single domestic “terrorist organization list” similar to those used for foreign groups, which makes it legally murky to label domestic organizations or movements in this way.

The announcement also follows the fatal shooting of conservative activist Charlie Kirk, which has amplified calls from Trump and some Republicans for stronger action against political violence — especially from groups perceived as radical left.

Legal scholars warn that this kind of designation risks overreach, given constitutional protections for political expression and assembly. 

There is widespread concern that branding a broad ideology as terrorist could chill legitimate protest or dissent, and that such moves may be challenged in court. 

Some analysts argue that instead of blanket labels, the focus should be on prosecuting specific violent acts, material support for violence, or planning/criminal conspiracies.

Trump’s announcement marks a significant escalation in the rhetoric around political violence in the U.S. Whether this becomes a legal reality depends on how the administration navigates constitutional constraints and defines what constitutes terrorist activity. 

For those in the security and defence sphere, it underscores how volatile the concept of “domestic terrorism” has become, and how laws and definitions continue to shift depending on political winds.

Well, that’s another week and another intelligence wrap up. 

As always, the links to the stories discussed in this podcast are available in transcript.  

This podcast isn’t about influencing your decisions or opinions, it’s about providing you with the information, insights and analysis to make choices in response to the national, and international security threats we face more and more.

Until next week, stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

OUTRO: 

That concludes this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up. Thank you for tuning in.

We examined Canada’s urgent move to dissolve Samidoun, MI5’s twin crises of false evidence and unlawful surveillance, the Essex arrests under the UK’s new National Security Act, Lithuania’s parcel bomb plot tied to Russian intelligence, and President Trump’s push to label Antifa a terrorist organization.

Each of these stories reinforces a crucial point: espionage, sabotage, and extremist movements aren’t abstract—they directly affect our security, our institutions, and the democratic values we depend on.

Every episode requires significant research and careful analysis to bring you the clearest intelligence picture possible. If you find value in this work, I encourage you to support the podcast on Buzzsprout. 

Your contributions help sustain the effort and expand our reach to a wider audience.

And don’t forget to subscribe, share the show, and leave a review—it’s the best way to grow this community of informed listeners.

Until next week, and as Neil always reminds us, stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

Links: 

Sabotage and Proxy Operations in Modern Intelligence: https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/Sabotage-and-Proxy-Operations/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0245

Story 1) Federal government is 'urgently' trying to dissolve B.C.-based terror group Samidoun, Joly says
https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/federal-government-trying-to-dissolve-samidoun-terror-group-joly

Story 2) Charges dropped against two men accused of spying for China
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpd94le39e7o

Story 3) MI5 'illegally obtained data' from ex-BBC journalist's phone
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8xrglyxy12o

Story 4) Chinese dissident who led pro-democracy group in NYC pleads guilty to spying for Beijing
https://apnews.com/article/9a19aeeed01ce3dafc7bcfda2f91f8c2

Story 5) PM orders investigation into MI5 over false evidence
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn834zwe83lo

Story 6) UK police arrest three people on suspicion of spying for Russia
https://www.ft.com/content/c4c0981f-8e5a-40da-bfb9-b77c2fe917ea

Story 7) Three arrested on suspicion of spying for Russia (Update: Sabotage angle emerges)
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/18/britain-arrests-trio-of-suspected-russian-saboteurs

Story 8) Lithuania charges 15 with terrorism over ‘Russia bomb plot’
https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/lithuania-charges-15-with-terrorism-over-russia-bomb-plot/

Story 9) Trump says he’ll seek to designate antifa as ‘major terrorist organization’
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-hell-seek-designate-antifa-major-terrorist-organization/story?id=125693568