MI6 Goes Dark with Recruiting Spies

MI6 Goes Dark with Recruiting Spies | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up

Espionage is evolving fast — and this week’s episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up takes you inside the latest threats and innovations shaking the intelligence world.

From MI6’s bold leap into the dark web with its Silent Courier spy recruitment portal, to CSIS and RCMP’s warning that outdated Canadian laws are undermining counterterrorism and espionage investigations, this episode breaks down the global intelligence landscape you need to know about.

Neil Bisson — retired CSIS intelligence officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — analyzes this week’s most urgent cases of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and foreign interference.

🔎 Key questions answered in this episode:

• How could a massive telecom network near the UN General Assembly have been weaponized?
• Why did Britain’s outgoing spy chief call out Russia, China, Iran, and Islamist extremism?
• What does MI6’s Silent Courier portal mean for the future of spy recruitment?
• Why was an Austrian energy executive fired over Russian espionage links?
• How is China infiltrating Taiwan’s democratic institutions?
• What does the indictment of an American and Israeli spying for Iran reveal about global HUMINT?
• Why are Canada’s laws leaving it vulnerable to foreign interference?

👉 If you value deep analysis of today’s security threats, don’t forget to subscribe, like, comment, and share. Support the show on Buzzsprout and explore more insights on Neil’s Substack.

⏱️ Chapters

00:00 – Intro
01:45 – Secret Service busts illicit telecom network near UN
05:40 – MI6 Chief Richard Moore’s farewell: Russia, China, Iran & Islamist terror
10:15 – Main Story: MI6 launches Silent Courier dark web portal
15:40 – Austria fires energy executive over Russian espionage ties
18:45 – Taiwan convicts four ex-officials for spying on China’s behalf
21:40 – American & Israeli indicted for spying for Iran
24:15 – CSIS & RCMP warn Parliament on outdated “lawful access” laws
26:00 – Outro

⚠️ Espionage. Sabotage. Foreign interference. These aren’t distant threats — they’re happening now, shaping our world and affecting your life. Stay curious. Stay informed. Stay safe.

Transcript

2025 09 26 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

INTRO:

MUSIC

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where open-source reporting meets expert analysis.

This week, Neil Bisson, Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and retired CSIS intelligence officer, takes you through a series of cases that highlight how espionage, sabotage, and foreign interference continue to evolve in an increasingly complex world.

We begin in New York, where the U.S. Secret Service dismantled a sprawling illicit telecom network near the United Nations General Assembly — a system capable of sending tens of millions of texts per minute, raising serious concerns about how digital infrastructure can be weaponized during high-stakes diplomatic events.

From there, we turn to the United Kingdom, where Sir Richard Moore, outgoing head of MI6, delivered a pointed farewell speech naming Russia, China, Iran, and Islamist terrorism as Britain’s greatest intelligence threats.

We’ll also dive into MI6’s bold launch of a dark web portal called Silent Courier — a digital walk-in office designed to attract new sources from around the globe. It’s an innovation that could change recruitment forever,  but also carries significant risks.

In Austria, an energy executive has been fired over alleged links to Russian intelligence, a case that raises troubling questions about insider threats within critical industries.

Then to Taiwan, where four former ruling party officials were convicted of spying for China, a reminder of how deeply Beijing seeks to penetrate democratic institutions.

We also cover the indictment of an American and an Israeli accused of espionage on behalf of Iran — a rare case that underscores how human intelligence operations are becoming increasingly transnational.

And finally, here in Canada, CSIS and the RCMP are warning Parliament that outdated laws on lawful access are undermining their ability to investigate terrorism, espionage, and foreign interference — an urgent call for reform.

Stay with us as we break down these stories and explore what they mean for intelligence, democracy, and national security in Canada and beyond.

Are you ready? Then let’s dive in!

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to another episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

I’m your host, Neil Bisson, a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Each week, I take open-source information from reputable news outlets concerning national security, espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and terrorism. 

I then analyse, assess, and corroborate this information to provide you with the intelligence you need to understand the threats that shape our world and affect your life. 

As usual, we’ve had another busy week filled with arrested spies, new recruitment methods and threats to critical communications.

So, without further ado, let’s get started. 

We start with the United Nations General Assembly in New York, for our first segment this week, where the U.S. Secret Service broke up a sprawling illicit telecommunications network located approximately 56 kilometers from Manhattan. 

The operation uncovered over 300 SIM servers and more than 100,000 SIM cards—equipment capable of mass communications with potentially disruptive intent.

Authorities found the SIM servers and cards spread across multiple vacant properties. 

The network had the capacity to send tens of millions of texts per minute and was assessed as capable of disrupting cellular communications, including emergency services, by overloading networks or even disabling cell towers. 

Investigators also discovered encrypted communications being routed through the system, possibly linking foreign threat actors with individuals already known to U.S. law enforcement.

The proximity to the UN event raised concerns about potential interference with protective operations and public safety during a high-visibility diplomatic gathering.

SIM farms, which are large operations using many SIM cards to generate large volumes of texts and calls, are increasingly recognized globally as a risk vector for fraud, harassment, disinformation, and cyber-attacks. 

High-stakes events, like the UN General Assembly, tend to draw increased scrutiny of security vulnerabilities. 

Digital infrastructure has become a frontier in national security, with telecommunications and mass messaging platforms forming new terrain for threats. 

Similar operations have been uncovered in other parts of the world, often tied to organized crime and state actors.

Cybersecurity analysts have described the New York network as well-funded and sophisticated. 

Observers stress that while modern telecom networks incorporate resilience measures, the potential to overwhelm systems with mass messages or attacks is real. 

Experts argue that the ability to send large anonymous, encrypted communications makes detection and prevention harder.

Legal scholars and policy makers highlight the tension between surveillance for security and privacy rights, especially with no arrests announced yet and many open questions about who is behind the network.

The dismantling of this illicit telecom network near New York stands as a reminder that physical and digital infrastructures converge in national security. 

Threats no longer only come through traditional espionage or digital hacks but through mass communications capabilities capable of undermining both everyday safety and major diplomatic events. 

As the investigation proceeds, its outcomes will likely inform how security agencies guard against telecommunications-based threats in public safety and crisis moments.

Imagine if a coordinated cyber-attack on critical infrastructure was followed up by a massive shut down of major telecommunications. 

The combined effect could potentially cripple needed rescue and emergency operations sent to assist with whatever disaster or outage may have occurred. 

Multiplying the panic and fear exponentially to the targeted population.

These are the types of scenarios that the Canadian Intelligence Community needs to prepare for in a potential scenario where a foreign enemy state tries to cripple our critical infrastructure and communications systems simultaneously. 

MUSIC

We head to the United Kingdom for our next segment, as Sir Richard Moore prepares to step down as head of MI6. 

In his recent speech in Istanbul, he cast a clear spotlight on what Britain views as its most pressing foreign intelligence and security threats: Russia, China, Iran, and Islamist terrorism.

Moore’s address outlines both existing dangers and those evolving in a more complex geopolitical landscape.

Richard Moore named Russia the foremost threat, noting the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Russia’s efforts to sustain the war effort through international supply chains. 

China was described as a dual-natured power: offering opportunity yet also posing a threat when it fails to observe established norms, engages in non-interference violations, or aids adversarial actors. 

Regarding Iran, Moore underscored concerns around Tehran’s destabilizing regional role, its ambitions in nuclear technology, and coordination with Russia. 

When it comes to Islamist terrorism, Moore acknowledged that groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, while degraded, are seeking to rebuild, using technology to amplify radical ideologies, especially in online spaces. 

Moore also called for strong international cooperation and better strategies to counter root causes of radicalization and to hold destabilizing actors accountable.

Moore delivered the remarks as his tenure at MI6 draws to a close, a period in which global power competition has increasingly sharpened. 

His warnings reflect long-standing concerns in western capitals about China's technological reach, Iran's nuclear trajectory, and Russia's revisionist aggression. 

The emphasis on Islamist extremism revives discussions about the enduring threat of ideological radicalization in the digital age, particularly with the weakening or fragmentation of terror groups that may make them harder to predict. 

The speech also sets a kind of “final word” from Moore, framing the priorities that MI6 will need to carry forward under new leadership.

Policy analysts concur that Moore’s assessment is aligned with current western intelligence consensus: 

1) Russia remains London’s primary revisionist adversary. 

2) China features both as a partner and competitor in diplomatic and commercial spheres. 

3) Iran continues to destabilize via both direct and proxy means.

4)  Islamist terror groups persist as threats especially through online radicalization, despite battlefield setbacks. 

Observers also note that the next MI6 chief, Blaise Metreweli, will inherit an agenda heavily shaped by these priorities, with particular pressure to enhance technological capabilities and intelligence partnerships.

Richard Moore’s speech solidifies Britain’s current threat perception: a blend of state-based rivalry, regional destabilization, and non-state ideological violence. 

The clarity and urgency of his warnings leave little doubt about the direction MI6 will follow in its coming chapter. 

As Moore hands over the reins, the challenges are defined — what remains is how the UK adapts strategy, tools, and alliances to meet them.

MUSIC

We now dive into the main story this week concerning, how MI6 has taken a bold step into the digital world of espionage with the launch of a new dark web portal called Silent Courier. 

The platform is designed to allow people from around the world to securely and anonymously provide information to MI6, signaling a major modernization of how Britain collects intelligence in the digital age.

At its core, Silent Courier is about lowering the risk for those who might want to share information but fear exposure. 

The dark web site is accessible only through secure VPNs and devices unconnected to a person’s identity. 

By providing these instructions publicly, MI6 is encouraging potential whistleblowers, insiders, and informants to reach out in ways that protect their safety. 

It’s a recognition that traditional recruitment methods — face-to-face meetings, embassy walk-ins — are not always viable in authoritarian states with aggressive counterintelligence services.

But this innovation comes with significant risks. 

For every legitimate source who might use the system, there’s also the possibility of hostile actors submitting disinformation, or even trying to compromise the platform itself. 

Verifying the credibility of anonymous tips becomes a constant challenge, and MI6 will have to walk a fine line between accessibility and operational security.

This move builds on a wider intelligence collection global trend. 

I have previously discussed on the podcast how the CIA experimented with digital recruitment campaigns in 2023, using social media videos in Russian to encourage disaffected officials to come forward. 

Given how entangled our daily lives have become with social media and communication via cellular and internet connections, this evolution is not only understandable but required. 

Intelligence organizations need to recruit in the ways that allow them to most likely identify and communicate with potential contacts and sources, while maintaining a high level of confidentiality and protecting the safety of the operation and the source. 

As such, European intelligence services have leaned heavily on open-source collection in recent years.

Silent Courier pushes things further, by moving into the anonymity of the dark web to broaden MI6’s pool of potential assets.

The UK government has framed the project as a proactive modernization of national security. 

Outgoing MI6 Chief Sir Richard Moore stressed the need for intelligence agencies to adapt to a world where threats are diverse, and technology driven. 

Analysts say the system could provide valuable insights, but they caution about the dangers of misinformation and exploitation. 

But any intelligence officer knows that these are concerns in potential recruitment and source management operation. 

Silent Courier represents the future of espionage — a digital “walk-in office” that underscores how intelligence collection is changing. 

It offers both enormous opportunity and significant risk, as are all things in espionage and intelligence collection. 

How MI6 manages this balance will determine whether it becomes a groundbreaking success or a potential cautionary tale for modern intelligence agencies.

MUSIC

I’m keeping with this story in the next segment as we look at it from a different angle.

This segment will focus on the political and strategic context behind the launch of Silent Courier. 

While the platform itself is a technical innovation, the way it was announced, and the messaging around it, shows how MI6 is using this tool as much for public signaling as for recruitment.

In his final public speech as MI6 Chief, Sir Richard Moore unveiled Silent Courier from Istanbul. 

He wasn’t just appealing for potential spies to come forward — he was also sending a message to the UK’s adversaries. 

Moore directly criticized Vladimir Putin, accusing him of dragging out the war in Ukraine and warning that Russia’s economy and demographics are in long-term decline. 

He also accused China, Iran, and North Korea of sustaining Putin’s war effort by providing both diplomatic cover and dual-use goods like chemicals and electronic components for weapons.

By linking the launch of Silent Courier to this speech, MI6 positioned the initiative not only as a recruitment tool, but as part of a broader strategy of psychological pressure and public diplomacy. 

Recruitment is a constant mission, but this was about making a statement: MI6 is adapting, it’s innovating, and it’s targeting authoritarian regimes head-on.

The BBC highlights the risks as well. 

The CIA’s earlier digital initiatives showed the potential, but also the vulnerabilities, of using online channels. 

China’s counterintelligence services successfully breached CIA’s dark web communications in the past, exposing and dismantling networks of agents. 

For MI6, Silent Courier could provide unprecedented access — or open the door to unprecedented counterintelligence challenges.

The Foreign Secretary described the launch as part of a national security modernization plan, keeping the UK ahead of adversaries. 

From an intelligence perspective, this shows the merging of traditional HUMINT recruitment with the cyber domain. 

The tool is both practical and symbolic: it might bring in valuable intelligence, but it also signals to adversaries that Britain is prepared to innovate in ways that are difficult to counter.

Taken together, the technical details and political framing of Silent Courier reveal a multi-layered strategy. 

This is recruitment, deterrence, and signaling all at once. 

MI6 is embracing the digital age of espionage, while making sure that Putin, Xi, Khamenei, and Kim Jong Un know that the UK is actively looking to reach inside their regimes. 

It’s a gamble, but it’s also a bold step forward in the evolution of global intelligence tradecraft.

MUSIC

We head to Vienna, Austria for our next segment where energy giant OMV has dismissed a senior executive following allegations that he was involved in espionage for Russia. 

The move has triggered diplomatic repercussions and raised questions about risk management in critical sectors of the energy and chemicals industry.

The executive was terminated immediately after an internal and intelligence-led investigation uncovered meetings with a Russian diplomat suspected of affiliation with the FSB, Russia’s domestic intelligence service. 

Austrian counterintelligence agencies had monitored the individual for months. 

OMV confirmed it is fully cooperating with authorities. 

Meanwhile, the Austrian Foreign Ministry summoned the chargé d’affaires of the Russian embassy, asking for the diplomat’s immunity to be waived; failing which, he may be declared persona non grata. 

The executive had recently been seconded to AD-NOC in the UAE, giving him access to both OMV and its chemical partner Borealis, which are merging parts of their business in a major deal valued at around 60 billion US.

It is alleged that the executive relayed information to the diplomat during meetings in Vienna about both OMV’s own operations and those upcoming under the merger.

OMV is a major player in oil, gas, and chemicals, with business ties stretching globally. 

The merger between OMV’s and AD-NOC’s polyolefins operations (Borealis / Borouge) represents a large-scale industrial and commercial partnership, making sensitive business and technical data potentially valuable.

Austria’s history of neutrality and its energy dependence have long made it a focal point for Russian interests. 

This incident adds to a growing pattern in Europe of concerns over industrial espionage, especially in the energy sector, where technical know-how, resource flows, and supply chain information are critical. 

It also reflects how diplomatic protections and intelligence oversight are being tested in cases involving suspected espionage.

Industry analysts see the termination as a strong signal that European energy firms are under heightened scrutiny.

Intelligence experts point out the difficulty of balancing commercial collaboration with national security, particularly in joint ventures involving strategic materials and technology. 

Diplomats and international law scholars emphasize the challenge posed by diplomatic immunity, which can shield individuals alleged to be involved in intelligence operations.

Corporate governance specialists warn that companies like OMV must reinforce internal vetting, monitoring, and information security in high-stakes partnerships.

The dismissal of the OMV executive over alleged links to Russian intelligence underscores the growing interconnection between commerce, diplomacy, and espionage. 

For Austria, and for companies operating in strategic industries globally, this episode highlights the importance of robust oversight, vigilance against insider risk, and the diplomatic tightrope when intelligence and industry intersect.

MUSIC

we turn our attention to Taiwan, for this next segment, where four former officials from the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, have been convicted of spying for China. 

The Guardian reported this week, that the individuals were found guilty of providing sensitive political and military information to Beijing, underscoring the persistent threat of Chinese espionage on the island.

The convictions highlight the ongoing struggle Taiwan faces in countering China’s intelligence operations. 

By targeting former political insiders, Beijing gains access to both classified material and political strategies, which can weaken Taiwan’s defenses and influence its democratic institutions. 

For China, this isn’t just about intelligence collection — it’s about long-term infiltration to shape Taiwan’s political future and undermine its sovereignty.

Espionage cases in Taiwan have been on the rise in recent years, with dozens of convictions involving military officers, academics, and government employees. 

This trend reflects Beijing’s broader strategy of leveraging human sources to fill intelligence gaps on Taiwan’s military readiness and political decision-making. 

The timing is also important, given heightened cross-strait tensions and Beijing’s increasing military activity around the island. 

Comparisons can also be drawn with similar cases worldwide, where China has used insider access to conduct political warfare, from Australia to the United States.

According to reports, Taiwanese prosecutors emphasized that the actions of the convicted officials threatened national security by compromising sensitive defense and diplomatic information. 

Analysts have long warned that Beijing sees Taiwan not only as a political target but also as a testing ground for espionage tactics it could replicate elsewhere. 

This is a theme that I have revisited several times on this podcast. 

China’s attempts at influencing not only Europe and Asia, extends well into North America. 

The tactics and techniques used to infiltrate, influence and interfere in Taiwan’s political, economic and military structures are the same as those being used against Canada and other Western allies. 

From my professional perspective, this case demonstrates how insider threats remain one of the most difficult challenges to detect and disrupt. 

This is why they are major and often used tools in the Chinese Communist Party’s toolbox. 

The conviction of these four former officials is a significant victory for Taiwan’s counterintelligence efforts. 

However, it also serves as a reminder that Chinese espionage activities are deeply entrenched and adaptive. 

Moving forward, Taiwan will need to further invest in counterintelligence and security vetting to protect its institutions. 

For allies watching closely, this case underscores the scale of the espionage challenge posed by Beijing globally.

MUSIC

Our next segment comes from a CNN report concerning both an American and Israeli citizen who have been charged with espionage on behalf of Iran. 

The charges allege that the pair provided sensitive information to Tehran, highlighting Iran’s expanding reach and its willingness to recruit individuals far beyond its borders.

The case underscores the risks posed when Iranian intelligence successfully recruits nationals from countries outside its traditional sphere of influence. 

By targeting Americans and Israelis, Tehran gains not only intelligence but also an operational advantage — individuals with access, mobility, and potential cover in allied nations. 

From a counterintelligence perspective, this demonstrates how adversarial states exploit ideological, financial, or coercive levers to turn individuals into assets.

Iran has long been active in intelligence operations across the Middle East, but this case illustrates a more globalized approach. 

Recruiting foreign nationals allows Tehran to bypass many of the security filters that might catch agents with more obvious ties to Iran. 

It also mirrors broader patterns seen in Cold War espionage, where adversaries cultivated diaspora communities or sympathetic foreigners to penetrate sensitive institutions abroad.

CNN reports that prosecutors emphasized the seriousness of the charges, noting that espionage on behalf of Iran could compromise both U.S. and Israeli national security. 

Intelligence analysts have also pointed out that these cases are difficult to investigate and prosecute, since evidence often involves classified information and sensitive intelligence-sharing arrangements. 

For Western counterintelligence services, this case highlights the challenge of spotting ideological or financial vulnerabilities among their own citizens.

The indictment of an American and an Israeli citizen for spying on behalf of Iran highlights how espionage is increasingly transnational and adaptive. 

The day of the human source as a viable intelligence asset is far from over, despite the increased emphasis on cyber operations and cyber espionage. 

Human source recruitment is not limited to state rivals operating within their own regions but involves the recruitment of foreign nationals with valuable access. 

For Western governments, this case serves as a warning: adversaries like Iran will continue to test defenses, making vigilance and strong counterintelligence capabilities essential.

My University of Ottawa online course – The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection – deals specifically with the motivations used in identifying and recruiting sources, spies, assets and agents, I’ll leave a link in the transcript for anyone interested in joining the course. 

MUSIC

For our last segment this week we end at home in Canada, where key security and law enforcement agencies are raising concerns that outdated laws are preventing them from fully doing their jobs. 

The CBC has reported that CSIS and the RCMP told the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians that gaps in “lawful access” are limiting their ability to investigate terrorism, foreign interference, and serious criminal threats.

The core issue is the lack of clear, modernized legislation to ensure investigators can access digital communications and encrypted platforms under judicial authorization. 

CSIS and the RCMP have both stressed that criminals, extremists, and foreign actors are increasingly exploiting technology that shields their activities from surveillance and evidence gathering. 

Without these lawful access provisions, Canada risks falling behind its allies in detecting and disrupting national security threats.

This isn’t a new concern. 

Canadian security and law enforcement agencies have raised alarms for years about the growing “going dark” problem. 

Wherein surveillance targets use encrypted apps and digital tools that prevent authorities from monitoring activity even with warrants. 

The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have all grappled with similar debates, balancing privacy rights with national security needs. 

In Canada, though, progress has been slow, leaving gaps that adversaries are aware of and continue to exploit.

According to the NSICOP report, the inability to lawfully access key communications is undermining Canada’s response to foreign interference, espionage, and terrorism. 

From a professional intelligence perspective, this highlights a dangerous vulnerability: Canada cannot counter threats it cannot see. 

But more importantly, state and non-state actors are aware of these vulnerabilities and continue threaten Canada’s national security and safety. 

If hostile states or extremist groups are able to operate in the shadows without detection, the risks to our democracy, economy, and safety increase substantially.

The call for lawful access is not about blanket surveillance; it’s about ensuring that CSIS and the RCMP can act effectively with judicial oversight in an evolving digital environment.

The longer Canada delays updating its laws, the wider the gap grows between threat actors and those tasked with protecting our country. 

As my listeners know, I have and will continue to advocate for more resources and funding for our Intelligence and Law enforcement communities. 

Without providing these institutions with the tools and resources they need to do their jobs effectively; we risk all that honest Canadians work so hard to achieve and maintain. 

Expect this debate to intensify, especially as foreign interference and terrorism threats continue to rise.

Well, another week, another intelligence wrap up. 

As always, the links to the stories discussed in this podcast are available in the transcript. 

This podcast is proudly produced entirely in Canada. 

The information, analysis, insights and assessments provided here are for you to be better aware of the threats to your country, your career, and your safety. 

Every foreign intelligence adversary prefers that you don’t pay attention to what is provided to you by this podcast. 

Because if you become aware of the threats, you may be able to spot them and potentially have a hand and preventing them. 

Which is a danger to their goals of undermining our national security, economy, and sovereignty. 

So, I say, become a threat to these threats by being aware and share the podcast with others. 

Until next week: Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe.  

MUSIC

OUTRO: 

That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up. 

Thank you for joining us.

We explored the dismantling of a massive telecom network near the UN General Assembly in New York, Richard Moore’s final speech as MI6 Chief, and the bold launch of the Silent Courier dark web portal. 

We examined the firing of an Austrian energy executive over alleged Russian espionage links, the conviction of four former Taiwanese officials for spying on behalf of China, and the indictment of an American and an Israeli charged with working for Iran. 

We closed with CSIS and the RCMP’s warnings that outdated laws are undermining Canada’s ability to counter foreign interference, terrorism, and espionage.

Each of these cases illustrates how espionage, sabotage, and foreign interference are no longer distant problems — they shape our world today and demand constant vigilance.

Producing this podcast takes significant research, assessment, and analysis to provide you with a clear intelligence perspective. 

If you find value in this work, please consider supporting the channel through Buzzsprout. Your contributions help sustain the effort and expand our reach.

Don’t forget to subscribe, share the show, and leave a review — it’s the best way to grow our community of informed listeners. 

And if you’d like to dive deeper into intelligence topics, head over to my Substack page where I post additional insights and analysis.

Until next week — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

LINKS:

The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection:

https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

 Segment 1) Secret Service Dismantles Telecom Network Threat Around U.S. UN General Assembly

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15125643/Secret-Service-new-york-cellphone-network-crash.html

 Segment 2) Britain’s outgoing spy chief highlights Russia, China and Iran as threats

https://halifax.citynews.ca/2025/09/19/britains-outgoing-spy-chief-highlights-russia-china-and-iran-as-threats/

 Segment 3) UK’s MI6 spy agency launches dark web portal, seeks out foreign spies

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/19/uks-mi6-spy-agency-launches-dark-web-portal-seeks-out-foreign-spies

 Segment 4) MI6 launches dark web portal to attract spies in Russia

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gzy0nngnro

 Segment 5) Austrian Energy Executive Fired Over Alleged Russian Spying Links

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/austrian-energy-executive-fired-over-alleged-russian-spying-links-magazine-2025-09-20/

 Segment 6) Taiwan convicts four former ruling party officials of spying for China
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/25/taiwan-convicts-four-former-ruling-party-officials-of-spying-for-china

 Segment 7) American, Israeli charged with spying for Iran
https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/25/middleeast/american-israeli-espionage-charges-iran-intl

 Segment 8) CSIS, RCMP say lack of ‘lawful access’ hinders counterterrorism, foreign interference probes

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csis-rcmp-lawful-access-nsicop-1.7640075