Chinese Espionage Targets Hydro Quebec

🔍 Chinese Espionage Targets Hydro-Québec | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up

This week on Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS intelligence officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — examines how espionage, secrecy, and accountability are colliding across the intelligence world.

🇨🇦 In Canada, the Hydro-Québec espionage trial exposes how foreign states target innovation in clean energy and battery technology — echoing earlier breaches at Winnipeg’s National Microbiology Lab.

🇬🇧 In the U.K., MI5’s frustration grows after the collapse of the China spy prosecutions, raising questions about whether Western legal systems can handle modern espionage.

🇺🇸 In the U.S., the arrest of strategist Ashley Tellis for unlawfully holding top-secret defence files blurs the line between academia and national security responsibility.

🌎 And globally, President Trump confirms he authorized CIA covert operations in Venezuela — reigniting debate about the limits of executive power and covert action.

Each story underscores a critical truth: foreign interference, espionage, and secrecy are redefining global security.

🎧 Chapters
0:00 – Intro
1:45 – Ashley J. Tellis charged with holding U.S. top-secret files
8:15 – MI5 frustration after collapse of China spy trial
14:20 – UK releases witness statements amid espionage fallout
19:00 – NSIRA slams CSIS over secret surveillance technology
22:30 – CSIS commits to “ongoing review” following watchdog report
25:15 – Chinese espionage targets Hydro-Québec
28:30 – Hydro-Québec testimony reveals unauthorized publications
30:00 – Trump confirms CIA covert operations in Venezuela
31:10 – Outro

🧠 Learn More
📘 Register for Neil’s upcoming University of Ottawa Professional Development Institute course:

“The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection”

👉 https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

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Transcript

2025 10 17 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

INTRO:

MUSIC

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where open-source reporting meets expert analysis.

This week, Neil Bisson, Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and retired CSIS intelligence officer, examines a series of espionage cases that expose how secrecy, oversight, and state competition are colliding on a global scale.

In Canada, the Hydro-Québec espionage trial reveals how cutting-edge research can become a target for foreign intelligence — echoing earlier breaches at Winnipeg’s National Microbiology Lab.

Across the Atlantic, Britain faces a political storm after the collapse of its China spy case, prompting frustration from MI5 and new warnings to Parliament about ongoing Russian and Chinese interference.

In Washington, an Indian-origin strategist and longtime U.S. policy insider is charged with unlawfully holding top-secret defence documents — one of the most significant counter-intelligence arrests of the year.

And to close, President Trump confirms he authorized CIA covert operations in Venezuela, reigniting debate about the limits of executive power and the shadow world of clandestine action.

Each story this week underscores a central truth: in intelligence, accountability is as vital as secrecy.

Are you ready?

Then let’s dive in.

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to another episode of the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. I’m your host Neil Bisson, a retired Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Each week, I take the top news stories from reliable media outlets and provide the insights and analysis to go behind the headlines, to give you the intelligence you need to understand the threats from espionage, sabotage, foreign interference and terrorism that affect your career, your country and your safety. 

This week’s stories all have a lot in common, they show how espionage and oversight collide, from Washington to London to Ottawa.

We’ll discuss the controversy in the UK on a recent decision to not go ahead with a Chinese spying trial, as well as NSIRA’s report concerning CSIS’s need to provide better policies and procedures when managing new technologies for national security investigations.

There’s a lot to cover, so let’s get started. 

We start this week in the United States, where a U.S. foreign policy strategist, Ashley J. Tellis, has been arrested and charged with unlawfully retaining over a thousand pages of top-secret U.S. defence documents. 

Tellis, a well-known expert on Asian strategic affairs and a senior adviser at the U.S. State Department, allegedly stored classified materials in his Virginia home — a serious breach under the U.S. Espionage Act.

According to the U.S. Justice Department, FBI agents found the documents during a search of his residence, with many marked “Top Secret” and “Secret.” 

Prosecutors allege that he accessed and printed restricted files related to U.S. military aircraft and intelligence operations from both the State Department and the Pentagon. 

Surveillance footage reportedly showed him leaving federal buildings carrying a briefcase or bag on multiple occasions.

Tellis, 64, has a long history of service in U.S. national security circles. 

He previously served on President George W. Bush’s National Security Council and currently holds a contractor role with the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment.

His clearance level provided access to some of the United States’ most sensitive defence information.

Court filings also reference meetings Tellis allegedly held with Chinese officials, including one in Fairfax, Virginia, in 2022, where he was observed arriving with a manila envelope but leaving without it. 

While prosecutors have not directly accused him of espionage, the circumstantial evidence points to troubling lapses in security and oversight.

Ashley Tellis is not an obscure figure. 

He is widely respected as a scholar on South and East Asian security issues and currently serves as the Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

He has been a prominent voice on U.S.-India relations, strategic deterrence, and China’s rise, often advising policymakers and appearing in the media.

This case echoes other recent incidents involving U.S. officials or contractors retaining classified information, an issue that has become a recurring concern for American intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. 

This case, however, carries geopolitical sensitivity given his deep expertise on India and the Indo-Pacific, regions central to Washington’s strategic posture against Beijing.

Tellis’s legal team insists that he will “vigorously contest” the charges, calling him a “widely respected scholar” who has never operated on behalf of any foreign adversary. 

National security analysts, however, suggest that even inadvertent mishandling of such a volume of classified material poses grave risks. 

The FBI’s mention of multiple meetings with Chinese officials — and the nature of his access to U.S. defence data — ensures this case will draw intense attention in both Washington and New Delhi.

Observers point out that this incident could strain bilateral trust at a sensitive time when the U.S. and India are deepening defence and intelligence cooperation as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

Ashley Tellis’s arrest is a seismic moment in the intersection of academia, diplomacy, and intelligence. 

Whether the charges result in conviction or exoneration, the case underscores a growing dilemma in the national security world: how to reconcile open intellectual exchange with the absolute necessity of protecting classified information.

For intelligence professionals, the lesson is clear — access is privilege, and in the wrong circumstances, that privilege can quickly become liability.

MUSIC

We head to the United Kingdom for our next segment. 

MI5 Director General Ken McCallum has expressed deep frustration that two individuals accused of spying for China — Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry — were never brought to trial. 

He framed the collapse of the case as a “setback,” underscoring his belief that the intelligence was solid enough to support prosecution, but that legal and procedural barriers prevented it from moving forward.

McCallum argued that when MI5 detects activity threatening Britain’s national security, the goal should always include pursuing convictions — and he lamented the fact that in this instance, that objective was not realized. 

He emphasized, though, that the security service had succeeded in disrupting the alleged espionage operations, even if the prosecutorial path failed.

He also reaffirmed MI5’s stance that Chinese state actors pose a daily threat to UK interests, underscoring that his comment was not about foreign policy but about safeguarding national security. 

He was careful to delineate that while MI5’s mission is to detect, disrupt, and deter such threats, decisions about prosecutions lie with the Crown Prosecution Service or CPS and the courts.

The collapse of this case has ignited debate around legal norms tied to espionage prosecutions, notably the requirement under the Official Secrets Act that a government witness must clearly frame a foreign state as an “enemy.” 

That framing proved elusive in the statements submitted by the deputy national security adviser, leading the Crown Prosecution Service to conclude the evidence did not satisfy statutory thresholds.

McCallum disclosed that MI5 has observed a sharp uptick in state-based threat investigations — up roughly 35% in the past year — and cited ongoing disruptions of plots from China, Russia, and Iran. He said that despite institutional frustrations, MI5 would persist in confronting threats wherever they emerge.

Some legal observers interpret McCallum’s comments as a rebuke to the prosecution system — a public airing of tension between intelligence agencies and legal institutions. 

Others caution that the internal dynamics of evidence, secrecy, and statutory requirements constrain what prosecutors can do, regardless of how compelling the intelligence may appear.

Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence veterans note that agencies often collect far more than can ever be safely exposed in open court — meaning the decision to prosecute often turns on how much of that material can be legally and ethically presented under disclosure obligations.

McCallum’s frustration is telling, it reveals that even when intelligence services believe they have acted correctly, the justice system’s checks and thresholds can block accountability. 

For intelligence watchers, this is another reminder that success in espionage operations is measured not just by disruption, but by whether the legal system can transform covert findings into public justice.

MUSIC

Since the political fallout over the collapse of the China spy case continues to dominate headlines in the United Kingdom, I’ll be taking a deeper dive into the implications of this case going forward. 

Two men, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, were accused of spying for China, but the case unexpectedly fell apart — raising questions about the government’s handling of sensitive intelligence and its relationship with the Crown Prosecution Service. 

The story, reported by the BBC, reveals how confusion and miscommunication between government departments have created a serious credibility issue at the highest levels of British leadership.

At the heart of this controversy is a dispute over the release of witness statements connected to the case. 

The government initially suggested that the CPS was preventing publication of the documents, only for the CPS to deny this. 

That contradiction forced Prime Minister Keir Starmer to pledge that the statements would indeed be published. 

The prime minister reportedly saw the documents for the first time just hours before making the announcement.

From an intelligence perspective, this raises significant operational questions. 

When espionage cases collapse, it is rarely due to a single point of failure — rather, it often reflects a breakdown in communication between intelligence agencies, prosecutors, and political leaders. 

The handling of sensitive evidence, especially when it involves a foreign state like China, must be done with a high level of precision. 
Any suggestion that intelligence was “toned down” or inadequately presented in court undermines public trust and could chill cooperation between agencies in future cases.

This incident comes amid growing scrutiny of Chinese espionage activities in the United Kingdom. 

Both Cash and Berry were accused of providing sensitive information to Beijing — allegations that, if they had been proven, would have represented one of the most significant espionage breaches in modern British history. 

Yet, with the case’s collapse on September 15, questions now focus on whether political considerations influenced judicial proceedings.

Adding complexity to the issue, internal government records reveal that the Deputy National Security Adviser submitted final evidence on August 4, while the National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell and senior Foreign Office official Sir Oliver Robbins held a meeting on September 1 to discuss the “bilateral handling” of the case with China. 

Although the government insists that this meeting did not touch upon the evidence, opposition parties argue that it suggests political interference, or at least poor judgment, given the case’s sensitivity and its ultimate outcome.

Security experts note that even the perception of political influence over an espionage case can damage the integrity of the intelligence and judicial systems. 

Former intelligence officials have emphasized that once such cases move from intelligence collection to courtroom proceedings, the evidentiary threshold becomes much higher — and intelligence agencies often struggle to balance source protection with public accountability.

The collapse of this case mirrors similar incidents in other countries where espionage prosecutions have failed due to evidentiary or diplomatic sensitivities — highlighting the challenge of prosecuting foreign spies in open court without exposing classified methods or intelligence partners.

The fallout from this case will likely continue for weeks, if not months. 

Calls for the release of the meeting minutes between senior officials and the National Security Adviser will keep the pressure on the government, while Beijing will undoubtedly watch closely for signs of discord within the UK’s security establishment.

For intelligence professionals, this case underscores the fragile intersection between national security, politics, and law — where even a minor misstep can unravel years of investigative work.

MUSIC

Sticking with this story, in a bid to defuse mounting criticism over the collapse of the China spy case, Downing Street has publicly released three key witness statements from Matthew Collins, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser. 

The move follows weeks of pressure about why charges against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry were dropped. 

According to the Crown Prosecution Service, the statements fell “5% short” of what was needed to proceed.

The release of these statements is a high-stakes gamble by the government. 

It signals a willingness to be more transparent — but also exposes some internal vulnerabilities. 

Collins’ final August statement describes China’s intelligence operations as “highly capable” and accuses Beijing of large-scale espionage targeting the UK, yet it still failed to meet prosecutorial standards.

The CPS has defended its decision by stating that the evidence lacked a clear articulation that China constituted a “threat to national security” at the time of the alleged offenses — a requirement under the relevant law. 

Ministers, in turn, maintain that they had no role in shaping Collins’ submissions. 

Labour insists that all statements were produced independently of ministers or political advisers.

That said, the timing and circumstances of the disclosures remain politically loaded. 

The Prime Minister reportedly only saw the statements the same morning they were published, and only after the CPS indicated no objection to their release.

To understand why this matters, we must consider the burdens of evidence in espionage prosecutions. 

It is not sufficient to show that foreign intelligence operations are active; prosecutors must tie those activities to specific threats within the relevant temporal and legal framework. 

In this case, the authorities assert that Collins’ statements did not cross that threshold.

Moreover, critics note that the government’s prior reluctance to classify China as a “threat” — instead calling it a “strategic competitor” — may have constrained how far Collins could go in his statements, limiting his ability to make claims that would satisfy a prosecutor’s standard.

Security analysts have responded with some caution. 

On one hand, publication demonstrates commitment to accountability; on the other, the fact that even these statements fell short suggests deeper structural or legal shortcomings in the original case. 

Some former intelligence figures argue that the CPS may have erred in dropping the case when there was credible material, while others warn that judicial standards and source protections often constrain what can be disclosed.

This tension — between operational secrecy and prosecutorial clarity — is a recurring challenge in espionage litigation globally.

By releasing these statements, the government hopes to draw a line under the controversy. 

But the disclosures may instead open up fresh lines of inquiry. 

Such as: 
Did Collins truly act independently? 
Were ministers or advisers ever consulted? 
And what internal conversations preceded the collapse?

In the end, releasing the documents does not resolve the fundamental question: why, despite the alleged magnitude of the threat from China, was the case not legally tenable? 

For intelligence observers, the answers may lie in the gap between national security policy and criminal evidentiary standards.

MUSIC

We head to Canada for our next segment where a recent review by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Review Agency or NSIRA has delivered a scathing evaluation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 

According to the watchdog, CSIS failed to implement adequate policies and procedures when managing a novel secret technology — a lapse that may have violated internal legal constraints and oversight norms.

The NSIRA report contends that CSIS mischaracterized a new technical capability as merely an extension of existing systems, thereby sidestepping more rigorous scrutiny and required consultation with senior oversight bodies. 

Because CSIS treated it as a “known quantity,” it delayed engaging with Public Safety Canada and did not fully document its authority for retaining data collected through the technology.

One particularly troubling finding was that CSIS retained information without clearly establishing the legal basis for its retention. 

In some cases, the watchdog flagged that the agency operated in a gray area — testing or deploying technology without the formal approvals or governance that such sensitive tools demand.

Intelligence agencies around the world face escalating pressure to innovate — developing new sensors, surveillance platforms, and analytic techniques. 

But when the legal frameworks, internal controls, and oversight mechanisms lag behind technical capability, the risk of perceived overreach or unauthorized activity rises sharply.

For Canada, this is especially significant in light of the CSIS Act, which mandates certain consultations and ministerial directions when deploying intrusive methods. 

NSIRA’s judgment suggests that CSIS may have stretched or misinterpreted its authority when dealing with these new tools.

Civil liberties advocates and privacy scholars argue that this case highlights the essential role of accountability in intelligence work: new tools require new checks, not just reclassification of old ones. 

Former intelligence officials warn that if agencies routinely re-describe cutting-edge methods as “extensions” to avoid oversight, the public trust and institutional legitimacy of security services erode.

Some insiders, however, caution that secrecy and operational urgency sometimes force agencies into judgment calls. 

The question is whether those calls are defensible under law, or whether they create precedents that loosen discipline across the board.

The NSIRA report serves as an ongoing reminder: technological superiority in intelligence means little without the institutional integrity to govern it. 

CSIS now faces a choice — overcorrect and become mired in red tape or responsibly rebuild its frameworks to match its ambitions. 
Either way, the consequences of getting it wrong are high — from eroded public confidence to potential legal challenge.

MUSIC

Sticking with this story, in response to the scathing intelligence review by NSIRA, CSIS has pledged to undertake an “ongoing review and improvement” of its management of a secret surveillance technology. 

The agency is accepting some criticisms from the watchdog organization— while rejecting others — as it navigates greater scrutiny over legal compliance and oversight.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency report found that CSIS lacked adequate policies and procedures to manage the new capability. 

Among the criticisms: CSIS treated the technology as merely an extension of existing tools, delaying engagement with Public Safety Canada and not clearly documenting the authority for retaining collected data.

CSIS, however, disputes some of NSIRA’s conclusions. 

Specifically, it rejects the idea that the new technology represented a major expansion of collection or operational risk, and challenges assertions that it retained information without a clearly defined legal basis. 

Nonetheless, CSIS has agreed to draft standard operating procedures and is developing a policy requiring that any novel technology be subjected to review by an oversight committee going forward.

This is a follow-up to earlier reporting that NSIRA had flagged structural weaknesses in how CSIS handles advanced technical programs. 

The fact that the agency is now publicly responding suggests a shift from internal deliberation to external accountability. 

The broader issue here is the perennial tension in intelligence work: how to keep pace with rapid technological change while preserving transparency, legality, and ministerial oversight.

CSIS also acknowledged that consultation with Public Safety Canada should have occurred earlier and committed to strengthening internal mechanisms for review and accountability, seeking to close gaps in how technical tools are vetted and governed.

Analysts say that CSIS’s response is necessary — no matter how forcefully an agency pushes back, public confidence demands visible steps toward reform. 

Some experts warn, though, that procedural changes alone won’t prevent future overreach unless there is a genuine cultural shift in how intelligence programs view compliance, documentation, and accountability.

Others caution that agencies can pay lip service to oversight while still operating in gray areas. 

The public posture CSIS is taking now shows it understands the reputational stakes. 

But the real measure will lie in implementation — whether the new policies and procedures become binding, enforceable, and transparent, rather than optional fixes.

This speaks to the larger issue of whether oversight results in a hinderance of national security efforts or ensures that needed transparency occurs and overreach by Canada’s Intelligence Community does not. 

MUSIC

We stay in Canada for our next segment where a former researcher at Hydro-Québec, Yuesheng Wang, is now on trial for allegedly spying for China. 

According to court testimony, Wang published academic work without authorization — some under just his own name, others using Hydro-Québec affiliations — raising serious questions about research transparency, intellectual property, and national security.

The court heard that in March 2022, Hydro-Québec became aware of the unauthorized publications. 

Investigators later found additional papers that tied the individual’s research to sophisticated battery and energy storage technology — fields with major commercial and strategic importance. 

The accused is now facing charges under Canada’s Security of Information Act, including economic espionage, breach of trust, unauthorized computer use, and providing information to a foreign entity, namely the People’s Republic of China.

What makes this case particularly challenging from an intelligence standpoint is the overlap of scientific research and national security. 

The accused was working in a high-value technology sector. 

If foreign actors gain even indirect access via published research, they might reverse engineer or integrate insights into domestic programs.

Canada rarely prosecutes economic espionage cases, especially in advanced industry sectors such as energy storage. 

Wang is the first person charged under the Security of Information Act in this domain. 

Hydro-Québec says the espionage not only breached internal policy but risked revealing proprietary methods or data tied to national infrastructure priorities.

This case sits at the intersection of academic openness and security constraints — a tension felt in many countries where innovation competes with confidentiality. 

In nations with advanced Research and Development sectors, the leak of key technical findings can be just as harmful as traditional espionage.

Security professionals point out that research institutions must build stronger compliance systems, especially when their work has potential dual use. 

Controls over publications, collaboration vetting, and author attribution must be tightened.

This prosecution will serve as a bellwether for Canada’s ability to safeguard high-tech research from foreign exploitation. 

Whether the courts can effectively adjudicate such a case — without compromising secrecy or scientific integrity — remains to be seen.

But one thing is clear: in an era where knowledge itself is a battleground, the line between academia, industry, and espionage continues to blur.

MUSIC

Let’s dive a little deeper into this story in our next segment where in court testimony this week, Hydro-Québec confirmed that it first became aware back in March 2022 of academic papers published without its permission by a former employee now on trial for alleged espionage.

During the trial, manager Patrick Phan revealed that a colleague flagged an unauthorized publication, prompting questions about whether the utility’s intellectual property committee had been informed. 

Further investigation by Hydro-Québec revealed additional papers — some listing only the former employee’s name, others referencing his affiliation with Hydro-Québec and co-researchers from its energy storage research group.

The ex-employee, Yuesheng Wang, was dismissed in 2022 from Hydro-Québec’s research institute focused on advanced battery and energy storage systems. 
He is now facing multiple charges under Canada’s Security of Information Act, including economic espionage, breach of trust, unauthorized computer use, and providing information to a foreign entity — in this case, China.

This case provides another in a number of examples where China has successfully attempted to gain access to Canadian research and technology. 

In 2019, two Chinese scientists working at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg — Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng — were escorted out of the facility after an RCMP and CSIS investigation found they had transferred sensitive virus samples and research data to China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology. 

These actions demonstrate a noticeable pattern, from a microbiology lab in Winnipeg to a research institute in Montreal, Canada’s cutting-edge science continues to attract foreign intelligence attention and infiltration.

Both were later fired in 2021, and declassified intelligence reports concluded they had provided scientific information to the Chinese government without authorization, raising serious national security and biosecurity concerns.

Wang is the first person in Canadian history to be charged with economic espionage under the Security of Information Act. 

The utility’s revelations about the publications underscore the challenge for scientific institutions operating in sensitive sectors: how to protect proprietary research when publication is a norm. 

The trial also places strain on Hydro-Québec’s internal controls and oversight mechanisms.

Legal analysts note that this case will set a precedent for how future prosecutions of economic espionage are handled, especially in advanced-tech industries. 

Experts warn that research institutions must be vigilant in maintaining governance over publication, author attribution, and internal review. 

Otherwise, they risk enabling technology transfer under the guise of academic freedom.

Hydro-Québec’s disclosure offers fresh insight into how the alleged espionage unfolded, but many questions remain.

1) Were there earlier indications of his activities? 
2) Did peer review or conference processes help mask the unauthorized outputs? 
3) And will the courts be able to balance transparency, academic norms, and national security?

Canada’s technology is being exploited by foreign adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and India.
 
Yet politicians continue to debate what actions need to be taken.
 
This is an extreme wake up call for any corporation, company or government department dealing with advanced technology and innovation. 

Screening of employees has to be paramount to access to information and every employee must be screened and rescreened to ensure that they aren’t walking out the front door with the cutting-edge technology that will ensure Canada remains a viable competitor on the world stage. 

MUSIC

For our last segment this week we head back to the United States, where President Donald Trump has confirmed that he authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations in Venezuela. 

This move significantly escalates American pressure on President Nicolás Maduro’s regime — and opens up serious questions about legality, oversight and geopolitical risk.

Trump justified the authorization by pointing to the flow of drugs from Venezuela into the U.S. 

He said that maritime interdiction had largely succeeded and that attention was now turning to land-based routes. 

When pressed about whether the CIA might target Maduro directly, Trump declined to clarify.

By openly admitting to consenting covert action, Trump is shifting what had been speculative reporting into the realm of confirmed policy. 

This confirmation also raises thresholds of accountability: 

1. What are the actual objectives of these covert operations — narcotics interdiction, regime change, or something broader?

2. How will oversight be maintained to ensure these actions remain within legal and ethical boundaries?

3. And could this admission invite retaliation or proxy responses from Venezuela’s allies, including Russia, China, or Iran?

The U.S. has conducted multiple strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels near Venezuela in recent weeks. 

Some of those operations resulted in deaths, sparking debate over their legal justification. 

The Trump administration has increasingly framed drug cartels and related Venezuelan actors as national security or counterterrorism threats, giving broader leeway for military and intelligence agencies.

This leads to the next question; will this provide the justification for covert actions against other countries that have been identified as a national security risk because of drug importation. 

Canada and Mexico have both been identified by the Trump administration as national security risks due to the importation of fentanyl. 

And the Trump administration has included softwood lumber as national security concern as well. 

These claims by the Trump administration could lead to potential justification of covert action on Canadian soil. 

Trump’s decision also comes amid mounting tensions between the U.S. and Russia, both with interests in Latin America. 

Venezuela has long been a strategic partner of Beijing and Moscow, making any U.S. operation there not just a law enforcement action, but a high-stakes geopolitical gambit.

Legal and intelligence experts suggest that Trump’s admission forces courts, Congress, and oversight bodies to reckon with the parameters of covert authority. 

Some will argue that this crosses into undeclared warlike activity if operations expand beyond drug interdiction. 

Others point out that covert action by definition lacks transparency, so the admission may be as much token signaling as substantive constraint.

Diplomatic analysts observe that this confirmation may provoke retaliation — whether direct or indirect — from actors aligned with Maduro. 

Once the U.S. openly claims permission for covert activity, adversaries often respond with asymmetric or hybrid countermeasures.

With this confirmation, what was speculative now becomes doctrine. 

The United States has elevated its confrontation with Venezuela from maritime interdiction to a full intelligence and operational posture. 
The question now is: how far will the covert actions go — and will Washington own the diplomatic and legal consequences?

From covert action abroad to espionage at home, this week underscores how the boundaries between security, secrecy, and accountability are being redrawn in real time.



Well, that’s going to do it for this week’s wrap up. 

As always, the links to the segments discussed are in the transcript. 

I want to remind my audience that I will be teaching a one day online course for the Professional Development Institute of the University of Ottawa next month on “The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection” as was seen in todays episode, espionage, whether corporate or state on state is not going away anytime soon. 

As such I highly recommend this course for any corporate security investigator or officer who wants a better understanding of why people spy, to familiarize themselves with the telltale signs. 

Until next week. Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC

OUTRO: 

That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

Thank you for joining us.

This week, we examined Canada’s Hydro-Québec espionage trial and its unsettling parallels with the Winnipeg microbiology lab case — both reminders that scientific innovation remains a prime target for foreign intelligence.

We explored the fallout from Britain’s failed China spy prosecutions, MI5’s growing frustration, and the broader question of whether Western legal systems are equipped to handle modern espionage.

We looked at the arrest of U.S. strategist Ashley Tellis for unlawfully holding top-secret defence files, a story that blurs the line between academic expertise and national security responsibility.

And we closed in Washington, where President Trump confirmed that he authorized CIA covert operations in Venezuela — reigniting the global debate about legality, oversight, and the limits of executive power.

Each of these stories highlights a deeper truth: the threats to our national security are evolving faster than the systems built to contain them.

Producing this podcast takes extensive research, analysis, and open-source verification to bring you a clear intelligence perspective.

If you find value in this work, please consider supporting the podcast through Buzzsprout — your contributions help sustain independent intelligence reporting and expand our reach.
Don’t forget to subscribe, share the show, and leave a review — it’s the best way to grow our community of informed listeners.

And if you’d like to explore the psychology behind human sources in intelligence collection, Neil’s upcoming course with the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute is now open for registration.

Until next week — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

LINKS:

University of Ottawa “The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection” 
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

Segment 1) India-origin strategist charged with keeping secret US defence files
🔗 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-article-ashley-tellis-charged

Segment 2) MI5 chief ‘frustrated’ at failure to put men accused of spying for China on trial
🔗 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/16/mi5-chief-frustrated-at-failure-to-put-men-accused-of-spying-for-china-on-trial

Segment 3) What more do we know about the collapsed China spy case?
🔗 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-article-china-spy-case-collapse

Segment 4) No 10 publishes key witness statements in China spy row
🔗 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/oct/15/no-10-publishes-key-witness-statements-in-china-spy-row

Segment 5) CSIS lacked proper policies, procedures to manage new secret technology, spy watchdog says
🔗 https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/csis-lacked-proper-policies-procedures-to-manage-new-secret-technology-spy-watchdog/

Segment 6) CSIS commits to ‘ongoing review’ after critical watchdog report on spy tech
🔗 https://globalnews.ca/news/11479836/csis-response-watchdog-spying-technology-report/

Segment 7) Ex-Hydro-Québec employee accused of spying for China secretly published research, court hears
🔗 https://globalnews.ca/news/11479429/rcmp-china-arrest/

Segment 8) Espionage trial: Hydro-Québec says it learned of unauthorized publications in 2022
🔗 https://toronto.citynews.ca/2025/10/15/espionage-trial-hydro-quebec-publications/

Segment 9) Trump confirms CIA authorization in Venezuela
🔗 https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-confirms-cia-authorization-venezuela-2025-10-15/