Canadian ISIS Terrorist Convicted

🇨🇦🔥 Canadian ISIS Terrorist Convicted | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up
This week on Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS intelligence officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — breaks down a dramatic week of national-security developments that span espionage, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and intelligence oversight.

From collapsed spy cases in the U.K. 🇬🇧… to Russian hybrid attacks sweeping across Europe 🌍… to Canada’s conviction of a returning ISIS fighter 🇨🇦 — this episode shows how Western democracies are confronting fast-moving, multi-domain threats.

🎧 Before you hit play, consider these questions:

❓ What does the collapse of one of the U.K.’s biggest China-related espionage prosecutions mean for democratic accountability and hostile-state intelligence operations?

❓ How did a former British military instructor end up accused of spying for Russia — and what does this reveal about insider threats in modern conflict zones?

❓ Are humanitarian organizations now being used as covert platforms for Kremlin influence operations in Europe?

❓ How serious is Russia’s escalating hybrid-warfare campaign targeting European infrastructure, politics, and civil society?

❓ Why is Canada’s national-security watchdog warning that federal budget cuts will weaken oversight at the worst possible moment?

❓ And most importantly: what do the convictions of Jamal and Hussien Borhot tell us about Canada’s ongoing ISIS returnee problem — and the national-security risks posed by Canadians who fought for terrorist groups abroad?

All of these questions — and many more — are answered with intelligence-driven analysis, operational context, and real-world insight throughout the episode.

If you value informed, independent national-security commentary, please consider supporting the show on Buzzsprout. 🙏🎙️

⏱️ Chapters

00:00 — Intro
01:35 — Segment 1: Collapse of Major China Spy Case in the U.K.
05:07 — Segment 2: British Military Instructor Accused of Spying for Russia
08:45 — Segment 3: Kremlin-Linked Humanitarian Front Exposed in France
12:40 — Segment 4: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Intensifies Across Europe
15:55 — Segment 5: NSIRA Warns Budget Cuts Will Limit Intelligence Oversight
18:40 — Segment 6: Canadian ISIS Terrorist Convicted — The Borhot Case
21:45 — Segment 7: Inquiry Confirms Putin Authorized 2018 Novichok Attack
22:25 — Outro

🎓 Course Mentioned in This Episode

Sabotage and Proxy Operations in Modern Intelligence
University of Ottawa – Professional Development Institute

https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/Sabotage-and-Proxy-Operations/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0245

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If GIWW helps you understand and navigate today’s rapidly evolving threat environment, please consider supporting the show:

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Every contribution helps sustain the research, analysis, and independent reporting that make this podcast possible. Thank you. 🙏🎙️

Transcript

2025 12 05 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

INTRO: 

Welcome to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where open-source reporting meets informed, expert analysis.

This week, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS intelligence officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — breaks down a series of cases showing how foreign intelligence services are sharpening their operations across Europe and North America.

In the United Kingdom, one of the country’s most significant China-related espionage prosecutions has collapsed, raising tough questions about how governments define and communicate hostile-state threats.

In Ukraine, authorities have arrested a 40-year-old former British military instructor on suspicion of spying for Russia — a stark reminder that hybrid warfare thrives on insider access and contested loyalties.

In France, a dual French Russian national and two alleged accomplices are accused of running a Kremlin-aligned influence network under humanitarian cover, reinforcing how civil-society fronts are exploited for foreign operations.

Across Europe, Russian hybrid attacks are intensifying, targeting infrastructure, political stability, and strategic systems.

And here at home, Canada’s intelligence watchdog warns that federal budget cuts will weaken oversight at the very moment national-security powers are expanding — while a major terrorism conviction in Alberta highlights the long-term risks posed by Canadians who travelled abroad to fight with ISIS.

Together, these stories illustrate a clear trend: the threat landscape is evolving quickly, and Western democracies must adapt just as fast.

Let’s get started.

MUSIC

Hello everyone and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

I’m your host Neil Bisson, a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Every week, I take the latest news stories from around the world on espionage, sabotage, foreign interference and terrorism and look at them through the lens of a former intelligence professional. 

Providing you with the analysis and insight on why these stories have an effect on your country, your career and your safety.

It’s been another busy week, from convicted ISIS terrorists in Canada, to Russian spies in the Ukraine and France. 

There’s a lot to cover so let’s get into it. 

For our first segment this week, we examine the collapse of a high-profile espionage prosecution in the United Kingdom, where two men accused of spying for China saw their case unexpectedly dropped just weeks before trial. 

This development has triggered a political storm, exposed weaknesses in the UK’s national security framework, and raised significant questions about how governments define and prosecute threats from hostile states.

The case involved Christopher Cash, 29, a former parliamentary researcher and Christopher Berry, 32, an academic who were charged under the Official Secrets Act for allegedly gathering and providing sensitive information to individuals linked to Chinese intelligence. 

Both men denied the allegations from the outset.

The prosecution collapsed when authorities could not secure evidence establishing that the UK government had formally designated China as a national security threat during the period of the alleged offences. 

New legal precedent required prosecutors to demonstrate such a designation, and despite months of requests, officials could not produce material meeting the required threshold.

This raises an important intelligence concern: if prosecutions depend not on actual hostile activity but on official government language, then definitional ambiguity risks undermining national security cases.

The fallout quickly turned political. 

Government officials insisted they did not interfere in the prosecution, while opposition figures accused the government of withholding key evidence. 

Disagreement emerged over whether earlier government statements about China constituted a formal designation of threat status.

A parliamentary committee later concluded there was no deliberate sabotage but identified systemic failures between the government and the Crown Prosecution Service, citing poor communication and inconsistent expectations. 

The report warned that similar collapses could occur unless processes for handling sensitive material improve.

The case comes at a time of heightened concern about Chinese espionage efforts in the UK, including attempts to cultivate political influence and recruit insiders.

Several former senior security officials expressed concern that the case collapsed not due to lack of threat, but due to procedural ambiguity. 

They noted that intelligence assessments have long identified China as one of the UK’s most significant espionage challenges. 

Legal experts questioned whether a strict interpretation of the precedent was necessary, suggesting that prosecutors may have been overly cautious.

From a professional intelligence perspective, this case reveals a critical vulnerability: when legal outcomes depend on political phrasing rather than operational reality, prosecutions will struggle to keep pace with evolving threats.

The collapse of the China spy case exposes gaps in how the UK handles sensitive national security prosecutions. 

Without clearer definitions, stronger coordination, and consistent messaging, the country risks further failures in cases involving hostile state actors. 

As espionage and foreign interference intensify, legal frameworks must adapt to support—not hinder—national security operations.

MUSIC

For our next story we head to Ukraine, where we examine the arrest of a former British military instructor in Ukraine who is accused of espionage on behalf of Russia. 

Ukrainian authorities allege he provided sensitive information about military positions and personnel, highlighting significant concerns about insider threats in conflict zones.

The suspect, Ross David Cutmore, a 40-year-old, former British soldier, travelled to Ukraine as an instructor supporting Ukrainian training efforts. 

Ukrainian officials claim he was recruited by Russian intelligence and compensated for providing sensitive information, including locations of Ukrainian units, photographs of facilities, and identities of personnel.

Authorities further allege that he attempted to access weapons caches and was instructed to construct an explosive device. 

If confirmed, these activities indicate potential planning for sabotage or targeted attacks.

The case underscores how hostile intelligence services exploit individuals with military experience—especially those operating outside formal oversight structures.

Ukraine has relied heavily on foreign instructors, volunteers, and contractors since the beginning of the war. 

While their support is valuable, intelligence services across Europe have warned that Russia actively targets these individuals for recruitment.

Conflict zones create fertile environments for espionage: overstretched oversight, porous volunteer pipelines, and the presence of individuals with operational experience but varying levels of vetting. 

This case demonstrates the strategic advantage Russia gains by exploiting these vulnerabilities.

Security experts note that this case fits a growing pattern of Russian intelligence exploiting Western volunteers and contractors operating in Ukraine. 

Counterintelligence professionals have long warned that recruitment opportunities expand dramatically in conflict zones, where financial pressures, ideology, and personal grievances can be leveraged by hostile actors.

Professionally, this incident highlights the urgent need for coordinated vetting, ongoing monitoring, and intergovernmental intelligence-sharing regarding foreign nationals working in high-risk environments.

The arrest of a British military instructor in Ukraine for alleged cooperation with Russian intelligence illustrates the increasingly complex nature of insider threats in modern conflict zones. 

As Russia continues to adapt its hybrid-warfare strategy, Western nations must strengthen oversight and counterintelligence measures to mitigate these risks.

MUSIC

We head to France now where we examine the arrest of a French Russian national who stands accused of espionage and collusion with Kremlin-linked networks. 

Anna Novikova is a 40-year-old dual French Russian national who has emerged as the central figure in this unfolding espionage investigation. 

Novikova is the founder of an organization called SOS Donbass, which publicly claims to provide humanitarian aid to civilians in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine. 

Behind that façade, however, French authorities allege she was leveraging the group as a cover platform to build networks, travel freely, and establish contact with individuals linked to Kremlin-aligned proxy organizations.

The case sheds light on how hostile states blend civil-society activities, humanitarian fronts, and social-media networks to conduct covert influence operations.

The suspect is accused of using a humanitarian organization as a cover to approach French corporate executives and obtain sensitive economic information. 

Investigators found extensive connections between her and multiple Russian proxy organizations, including nationalist groups and individuals linked to pro-Moscow movements.

Authorities report that she made repeated trips to Russia and occupied regions of Ukraine and maintained relationships with figures known to work with Russian influence networks. 

Two alleged co-conspirators, Vyacheslav P. 40, and Vincent Perfetti, 63, were also detained. 

All face charges related to espionage and acting on behalf of a foreign state.

Across Europe, intelligence services have seen an increase in hybrid-warfare tactics involving NGOs, cultural organizations, and diaspora groups being exploited for covert influence or intelligence-gathering activities. 

These networks provide plausible deniability for hostile states and can operate without attracting the scrutiny typically directed at diplomatic channels.

In France, this case follows several years of heightened concern about Russian influence operations targeting political institutions, economic infrastructure, and civil society.

Intelligence analysts note that the blending of activism, humanitarian work, and covert influence is now a hallmark of Russian hybrid strategy in Europe. 

Former counterintelligence officials emphasize that such networks are difficult to detect and disrupt because they operate in the grey space between legitimate civic activity and covert operations.

Professionally, this case reinforces a trend: modern espionage increasingly relies on plausibly deniable proxies who operate outside formal intelligence channels but serve strategic state objectives.

The arrest of a French Russian national tied to Kremlin-linked networks highlights the evolving nature of espionage in Europe. 

As hostile states integrate social, economic, and civil-society spheres into their intelligence operations, Western governments must expand their counterintelligence focus beyond traditional targets.

MUSIC

For our next segment, we explore the growing wave of hybrid-warfare incidents across Europe attributed to Russia. 

From sabotage and cyberattacks to influence operations, the scale and frequency of these activities suggest a significant escalation in Russia’s shadow-war strategy.
   
European governments report that Russia has intensified a campaign targeting critical infrastructure, communications networks, and transportation systems. 

These operations are designed to destabilize societies, weaken political cohesion, and undermine support for Ukraine.

Simultaneously, disinformation and influence operations have expanded across social-media platforms, diaspora communities, and proxy organizations. 

These activities aim to polarize public opinion, intimidate activists, and shape political outcomes.

Intelligence officials warn that the variety and coordination of recent incidents indicate a shift toward sustained, multi-domain grey zone tactics rather than isolated operations.
  
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has increasingly relied on asymmetric tactics as a way to impose costs on European states without triggering direct military confrontation. 

Undersea cables, energy grids, and transportation corridors have all been recently targeted.

These grey zone tactics exploit gaps in infrastructure resilience and regulatory oversight, particularly in sectors where public and private responsibilities overlap. 

The strategy appears aimed at stretching European security resources and testing alliance cohesion.
  
Experts in European security describe the current situation as a turning point. 

Former intelligence officials warn that Russia’s hybrid operations now function as an extension of its warfighting doctrine, with clear strategic objectives.

Professional analysis indicates that Western security frameworks—built around traditional kinetic threats—must adapt quickly to meet the demands of multi-domain, persistent hybrid aggression.

Europe faces a growing challenge as Russia intensifies its hybrid-warfare campaign. 

Strengthening infrastructure resilience, enhancing intelligence-sharing, and updating national-security frameworks will be critical to countering these threats.

MUSIC

For this next segment, we return to Canada and look at concerns raised by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA, after federal budget cuts threatened its capacity to oversee intelligence activities. 

The timing of these reductions comes as national-security powers expand, prompting warnings about the risks of oversight gaps.

NSIRA has been directed to propose reductions amounting to 15 percent of its budget over the next three years. 

With a relatively small budget compared to major security agencies, these cuts could significantly limit this oversight body’s ability to conduct reviews, investigate complaints, and ensure accountability.

The agency warns that it may have to scale back or delay oversight of operations involving CSIS, the RCMP, and other intelligence-related activities. 

The situation is particularly concerning as new legislation expands national-security powers, meaning oversight is shrinking precisely when it should be expanding.

Canada created its modern oversight framework after past controversies involving intelligence operations. 

NSIRA, along with NSICOP and the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, is designed to ensure transparency and compliance with the law.

Historically, reductions in oversight capacities have led to public distrust, legal challenges, and political fallout. 

Experts in intelligence governance warn that reducing oversight during a time of heightened threat is counterproductive. 

They argue that robust review mechanisms protect both national security and civil liberties by ensuring agencies operate lawfully and effectively.

From a professional standpoint, oversight does not need to be viewed as hinderance. 

In reality it can help ensure that the Canadian Intelligence Community is acting ethically, retaining credibility and confidence from the legal system and with the Canadian public. 

Diminishing the budgets, and thus the capabilities of oversight bodies like NSIRA, potentially increases risks to the public, risks to intelligence professionals, and risks to Canada’s democratic institutions.

The proposed cuts to NSIRA poses a significant overarching risk to Canada’s intelligence-oversight system in general. 

At a time when national-security threats are increasing, maintaining strong and independent review mechanisms is essential to protect Canada’s democratic values and the public’s trust.

MUSIC

We stay in Canada for our next segment, where we examine the conviction of Calgary resident Jamal Borhot, a 35-year-old man who travelled to Syria in 2013 to join ISIS, and the earlier conviction of his cousin, Hussien Borhot, 36, who travelled with him. 

These two cases highlight the enduring risks posed by Canadian foreign fighters who participated in terrorist activity abroad and later returned home. 

They also reveal the challenges Canada faces in prosecuting, monitoring, and managing individuals who engaged with extremist groups overseas.

The court found that Jamal Borhot knowingly joined ISIS after entering Syria illegally through Turkey. 

Evidence showed that he adapted to the group’s ideology, engaged with its armed wing, and supported its operations. 

A judge ruled he was “prepared to kill for his beliefs,” and that he accepted and used weapons in line with ISIS’s objectives.

Hussien, who accompanied him during the same 2013 trip, was convicted earlier and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. 

Together, the cases represent two of the rare full convictions of ISIS returnees in Canada.

Despite the severity of the allegations, Borhot remained on bail for years after being charged in 2020. 

His ability to remain in the community pending trial illustrates the difficulties and delays inherent in foreign-fighter prosecutions, where evidence is spread across conflict zones, encrypted communications, and transnational networks.

The convictions reinforce that Canada’s courts are willing to hold foreign fighters accountable. 

But they also expose the practical limits of Canada’s counterterrorism framework — including how long dangerous individuals may remain unsupervised while awaiting trial.

During the peak of ISIS’s influence, dozens of Canadians travelled abroad to join the group. 

Some were killed overseas, others remained abroad, and many quietly returned home without immediate charges.

Prosecuting terrorist returnees is exceptionally difficult. 

Investigators must collect credible battlefield evidence from war zones; establish intent, membership, and participation; and corroborate travel and communications data from unstable regions. 

These challenges often cause years-long delays — as seen in Borhot’s timeline, stretching from 2013 travel to a 2025 conviction.

Foreign-fighter returnees are not just a historical issue. 

Their presence in Canada continues to create risks, including:

• The potential retention of extremist ideology

• Combat experience that may translate into terrorist acts of violence

• Connections to international extremist networks

• Ability to radicalize others within Canada

• Challenges for intelligence agencies tasked with ongoing monitoring

The Borhot cousins are emblematic of this broader problem.

Counterterrorism experts note that cases like these underscore the lasting security implications of foreign-fighter travel. 

Even if years pass, individuals who joined terrorist groups abroad may still pose significant threats — ideological, operational, terrorist financing or recruitment-related.

From a professional intelligence perspective, this case reveals several systemic issues:

• Resource limitations: Foreign-fighter investigations require intensive, long-term intelligence collection.

• Legal constraints: Gathering admissible evidence from war zones is difficult.

• Monitoring gaps: Prolonged bail conditions allow unmonitored or lightly monitored individuals to remain in the community.

These weaknesses create vulnerabilities that hostile actors can exploit — and leave communities exposed to potential harm.

The convictions of Jamal Borhot, and his cousin Hussien, are a significant development in Canada’s long-running effort to address foreign-fighter threats. 

They serve as a reminder that Canadians who travelled abroad to join ISIS remain a current and ongoing national-security concern.

These cases underscore the need for Canada to strengthen its investigative capacity, refine its legal tools, and ensure that individuals who engaged in terrorism overseas are effectively monitored and rightfully prosecuted.

MUSIC

For our last segment this week we head to the UK and examine the conclusion of a long-running public inquiry into a 2018 nerve-agent attack. 

The investigation determined that the poisoning of a former Russian spy and the subsequent death of an innocent British woman were authorised at the highest level in Moscow — a finding that dramatically underscores the reach and brazenness of state-sponsored chemical warfare.

The attack targeted former Russian double-agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England. 

The nerve agent, Novichock, was delivered using a disguised container — a counterfeit perfume bottle.

Although the Skripals survived the assassination attempt, months later a British woman, Dawn Sturgess, died after unwittingly contacting the discarded poison container.

The recent inquiry, chaired by a former top British judge, concluded there is “overwhelming evidence” that the operation was carried out by operatives from the Russian military-intelligence agency, the GRU, under direct orders from Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

The report found the use and disposal of the nerve agent in a public space was “astonishingly reckless,” illustrating a willingness to sacrifice innocent lives to achieve strategic objectives.

As a result, the UK government has imposed new sanctions on the GRU and publicly summoned the Russian ambassador, calling the attack part of a continuing campaign of hostile action.

The 2018 poisoning in Salisbury shocked the world and triggered a global diplomatic crisis, with multiple countries expelling Russian diplomats. 

At the time, the focus was on the immediate victims — the Skripals — and on holding Russia accountable for a blatant state-sponsored assassination attempt on foreign soil.

But this new inquiry brings renewed attention to the long-term consequences and collateral victims. 

It exposes the broader danger posed by chemical-weapon deployments masquerading as assassination attempts — operations that can kill innocent bystanders long after the initial target is missed.

The findings come at a time of escalating geopolitical tension between Russia and Western states, and at a moment when chemical-weapon diplomacy, sanctions, and counter-intelligence frameworks are under intense pressure.

Government and judicial voices leading the inquiry described the attack as an intentional act of state-sponsored terrorism that disregarded public safety. 

The failure to safely dispose of the nerve agent and the choice to use a widely available container demonstrated a calculated willingness to accept civilian casualties.

Security experts note that this case exemplifies a new model of hybrid aggression: a mix of covert operations, chemical weapons, and deniable murder plots — designed to send a message not only to a target, but to entire societies.

From an intelligence-community perspective, the verdict confirms what many analysts have long suspected — that chemical agent operations are deliberate, state-level tools employed to project power, disrupt adversary societies, and sow uncertainty.

The UK’s inquiry into the 2018 Novichok poisonings has delivered a stark verdict: 

when states deploy chemical weapons on allied soil, shielded by plausible deniability and diplomatic conflict, innocent lives are collateral damage — and the moral as well as political responsibility lies squarely at the top.

The case is now part of the historical record of Russian covert aggression and serves as a warning to all Western nations: chemical-weapon use remains a live threat, and deterrence requires clarity, resolve, and coordinated action.

Well, that’s going to do it for this week. 

As always, the links to the stories discussed are available in the transcript. 

I want to remind my audience that I am teaching a new online course for the University of Ottawa on Proxy and Sabotage Operations in Modern Intelligence. 

The course is part of the National Security and Intelligence Certificate for the Professional Development Institute. 

I’ll leave a link in the transcript and show notes for anyone interested. 

Hope to see on this fascinating course. 

Until next week. Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC 

OUTRO:
 
That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

Thank you for listening.

Every story we covered today — from collapsed espionage prosecutions in the UK, to hybrid attacks across Europe, to terrorism convictions and oversight concerns here at home — reveals how quickly the threat environment is shifting, and how essential it is to stay informed.

Producing this podcast requires extensive research, daily monitoring of open-source reporting, and careful analysis to bring you clear, accurate, and timely intelligence each week. If you find value in this work, please consider supporting the show through Buzzsprout.

Your one-time or ongoing donation directly sustains the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up and helps ensure we can continue providing independent, high-quality intelligence insight without interruption.

Don’t forget to subscribe, share the podcast with others, and leave a review — it helps more listeners discover the show.

And as Neil always says: stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

Links:

Sabotage and Proxy Operations in Modern Intelligence: 
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/Sabotage-and-Proxy-Operations/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0245


Segment 1) The controversy over the collapsed China spy case explained
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gn23ygv1eo

Segment 2) British military instructor arrested in Ukraine on suspicion of spying for Russia
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/02/british-military-instructor-arrested-ukraine-spying-russia

Segment 3) Woman suspected by France of spying has ties to Kremlin proxies
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/woman-suspected-by-france-spying-has-ties-kremlin-proxies-social-media-posts-2025-12-03/

Segment 4) Europe braces as Russia’s hybrid-attacks intensify across the continent
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/03/world/europe/europe-russia-hybrid-attacks.html

Segment 5) Canada’s national-security watchdog warns cuts will reduce oversight of intelligence agencies
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nsira-funding-cut-9.7001484

Segment 6) Canada’s ISIS Returnee Problem — What the Borhot Convictions Reveal
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/jamal-borhot-guilty-terrorism-isis-syria-rcmp-9.6999395
https://globalnews.ca/news/11555019/calgary-man-found-guilty-of-three-terrorism-related-charges-tied-to-isis/

Segment 7) UK report finds Putin authorised 2018 Novichok poisoning that killed an innocent woman
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-report-womans-death-after-2018-novichok-poisoning-ex-russian-spy-2025-12-04/