Foreign Intelligence: What is Canada Missing?

🇨🇦🔥 Foreign Intelligence: What is Canada Missing? | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up

This week on Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — examines a series of global intelligence developments that raise a critical question:

👉 Is Canada missing a key piece of the foreign intelligence puzzle?

From espionage targeting Europe’s defence industry, to Beijing’s evolving influence strategy in Taiwan, to a growing debate inside Canada about the future of foreign intelligence collection—this episode highlights how modern threats are no longer confined to traditional domains.

They are embedded in industry, infrastructure, political systems, and global networks.

🌍 This week’s key questions:

🇩🇪 Germany & Defence Industry
👉 Are private sector companies now the frontline targets of foreign intelligence operations—and is industry prepared to defend itself?

🇹🇼 China & Taiwan
👉 Is Beijing shifting from overt political pressure to more subtle legislative and structural influence—and how effective is that strategy over time?

🇨🇦 Canada & Foreign Intelligence
👉 Should Canada expand its intelligence capabilities to include a dedicated foreign HUMINT service—or is the current model sufficient?

🌊 North Atlantic & Undersea Infrastructure
👉 Why are Russian submarines operating near critical undersea cables—and what risk does this pose to global communications and national security?

🇬🇧 London Arson Attacks
👉 Are we seeing the growing use of proxy actors and deniable tactics by foreign states—and how does that blur the line between terrorism and intelligence operations?

🎙️ In this episode, Neil also reflects on his recent appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology, where he provided insight into the national security risks associated with Chinese electric vehicles in Canada.

⏱️ CHAPTERS
00:00 – Introduction
01:48 – Welcome & Episode Overview
03:00 – Germany: Espionage & Sabotage Targeting Defence Industry
08:30 – Taiwan: Beijing’s Shift to Legislative Pressure
13:30 – Canada: CSIS Memo & Foreign Intelligence Debate
18:30 – North Atlantic: Russian Submarine Activity & Undersea Infrastructure
22:00 – London: Arson Attacks & Proxy Operations
24:00 – House of Commons Testimony & Closing Remarks
25:00 – Outro

🎓 Learn More
Sabotage and Proxy Operations in Modern Intelligence (University of Ottawa):
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/Sabotage-and-Proxy-Operations/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0245

🏛️ Watch Neil’s House of Commons Testimony:
https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20260416/-1/44749?gefdesc=&startposition=20260416110225

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If you value independent intelligence analysis and weekly breakdowns of global threats, consider supporting the podcast:
https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/support

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Your support helps grow the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and brings critical national security conversations to a wider audience.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:08

This week on the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up, Neil Bisson, a retired CSIS intelligence officer and director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, examines a series of stories that highlight how modern intelligence threats are increasingly targeting not just governments but industries, infrastructure, and the systems that underpin national security. The episode begins in Germany, where intelligence officials are warning that foreign actors are actively targeting the country's defense industry through espionage, sabotage, and COVID operations. Reinforcing a growing trend of private sector companies becoming frontline targets in geopolitical competition. We then turn our attention to Taiwan, where analysts are raising concerns about Beijing's evolving strategy. Shifting from traditional political engagement to more subtle legislative and structural pressure designed to influence decision-making and shape long-term outcomes. That theme continues in Canada, where a newly revealed internal CSIS memo has sparked debate about whether the country should expand its foreign intelligence capabilities, and whether the current model is sufficient in an increasingly complex and competitive global environment. From there, the episode moves to the North Atlantic, where a joint UK and Norwegian operation tracked Russian submarine activity near critical undersea infrastructure, highlighting the growing strategic importance and vulnerability of the systems that carry global communications. And finally, we examine a series of arson attacks in London targeting Jewish link sites and an Iranian opposition-affiliated media outlet. A case that may point to the increasing use of proxy actors and deniable tactics in modern intelligence and national security operations. Are you ready? Let's get started.

SPEAKER_01 2:10

Each week I break down the top stories from around the world dealing with espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, and terrorism, and provide you with the analysis, insights, and intelligence to understand how the shadowy world of spies affects your career, your country, and your safety. It's been another busy week from foreign actors trying to infiltrate Germany's defense industry to more debates surrounding how Canada is dealing with foreign intelligence collection. There's a lot to cover, so let's get into it. For our first segment this week, we head to Germany, where we're taking a look at a warning issued by German intelligence services to the defense industry. A warning that highlights the growing threat of espionage, sabotage, and covert attacks targeting critical infrastructure. The article outlines how German authorities are increasingly concerned about foreign intelligence operations directed at defense companies, particularly in the context of ongoing geopolitical tensions. This is an important story because it reinforces a broader trend we're seeing across Europe and among Western allies. The targeting of industry, not just government, by hostile state actors. According to the report, Germany's domestic intelligence agency has raised concerns about espionage and sabotage activities directed at companies within the defense sector. This includes both traditional intelligence collection, such as gathering sensitive information, and more aggressive actions, including potential sabotage and disruption. One example highlighted involves a German drone manufacturer that was allegedly targeted in an espionage operation, leading to arrests of individuals suspected of acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. This is significant as it clearly demonstrates that modern intelligence operations are no longer confined to government institutions or military targets. Instead, they are increasingly focused on the private sector, particularly companies involved in defense, technology, and innovation. These companies often hold highly sensitive information related to capabilities, supply chains, and emerging technologies. And importantly, they may not always have the same level of security awareness or counterintelligence postures as government agencies. This development fits into a broader pattern of what we describe as hybrid or gray zone activity. State actors, particularly Russia, but also others, are combining traditional espionage with cyber operations, influence campaigns, and physical attacks of sabotage. We've seen similar activity across Europe with recruitment of individuals to act as low-level or disposable agents, cyber targeting of defense sector employees or contractors, attempts to infiltrate supply chains rather than just primary targets. This reflects a shift in strategy. Rather than targeting the most heavily protected systems directly, foreign intelligence services are looking for weaker points of access, smaller companies, subcontractors, or individuals with indirect access to sensitive information. From an intelligence standpoint, this is a classic approach. Identify vulnerability, establish access, access that access over time. What stands out in this case is the emphasis on industry as a frontline target. For decades, intelligence services have understood that economic and industrial espionage can provide strategic advantage, whether military, technological, or economic. What we're now seeing is an evolution of that concept. It's not just about stealing information anymore, it's about disrupting production, undermining supply chains, and creating uncertainty within critical industries. In other words, the objective is not just intelligence collection. It is strategic impact. And that raises important questions. If this is happening in Germany, one of Europe's most advanced industrial economies, then what does that mean for other Western countries, including Canada? This story highlights a clear and growing reality. The defense industry is no longer just a support structure for national security. It is now a direct target. Espionage, sabotage, and covert operations are being directed not only at governments, but at the companies that design, build, and sustain national defense capabilities. For intelligence professionals, this reinforces a key point. Threats are no longer confined to traditional domains. They are disrupted across networks, industries, and individuals, often in ways that are difficult to detect until the damage is already done. As this trend continues, we can expect to see increased pressure on both governments and private industry to strengthen their security posture and improve coordination. In this next segment, we're turning our attention to Taiwan, where analysts are raising concerns about a shift in Beijing's approach, from traditional political outreach to what is being described as legislative and structural pressure. The article highlights how China's strategy towards Taiwan is evolving, combining political engagement with more subtle, long-term methods of influence. This is significant because it reflects a broader trend in how state actors pursue strategic objectives not just through military or overt political means, but through systems, institutions, and governance structures. According to the report, experts in Taiwan are observing a shift in Beijing's tactics, moving away from softer engagement and towards efforts that exert pressure through political and legislative mechanisms. This includes attempts to shape narratives, influence political actors, and create conditions that favor Beijing's long-term objectives. What is particularly notable is that this strategy does not rely on overt coercion alone. Instead, it blends political engagement, influence operations, and structural pressure. This represents a more sophisticated and sustained approach. Rather than forcing immediate outcomes, the objective appears to be shaping the environment over time, which influences the decision-making processes, public perception, and institutional behavior. This approach aligns with what I've often described as gray zone activity. China has consistently demonstrated a preference for operating below the threshold of open conflict using a combination of diplomatic, economic, informational, and political tools to achieve its objectives. In Taiwan, this has historically included political outreach to opposition parties, economic incentives, and information campaigns targeting public opinion. What appears to be evolving is the integration of these efforts into more formal or institutional channels. By applying pressure through legislative or political systems, the influence becomes less visible, more difficult to attribute, and potentially more effective over time. This is not a single action or event. It's about shaping the long-term trajectory of a political environment. What stands out in this case is the dual-track strategy. On one hand, Beijing continues to present itself as open to dialogue and engagement, and on the other, it maintains consistent pressure, political, military, and informational, to influence outcomes in its favor. From an intelligence standpoint, this is a classic influence model. You create incentives, you apply pressure, and then you shape the perception. This strategy is not designed for immediate results. It is designed for gradual, cumulative effect. And importantly, it operates in a space where it can be difficult for governments to respond without appearing to overreact. This story highlights a key reality in modern intelligence and geopolitics. Influence is no longer exercised only through force or direct intervention. It is increasingly embedded in political systems, legislative processes, and public discourse. For Taiwan, this presents a complex challenge. How to maintain diplomatic resilience while facing sustained and evolving external pressure. For other countries, including Canada, the takeaway is clear. Foreign interference and influence operations are not always overt. They can be subtle, long-term, and integrated into the various systems we rely on to govern and make decisions. Understanding this shift is critical to identifying and responding to these threats effectively. We head back to Canada for our next segment, where we're turning our attention to a debate that has surfaced within Canada's intelligence community, whether Canada should expand its foreign intelligence capabilities to move more closely to something that resembles agencies like the CIA or MI6. The article outlines details from an internal CESIS memo that examines the potential benefits and risks of expanding Canada's intelligence mandate to include a more robust foreign intelligence collection role. This is a significant discussion because it goes directly to how Canada collects intelligence and whether the current model is sufficient in an increasingly complex and competitive global environment. According to the report, the internal memo explores several possible pathways forward, including the idea of creating a standalone foreign intelligence service, expanding CSS's existing mandate, or developing a hybrid approach within the current system. At its core, the discussion reflects a growing recognition that Canada's current intelligence posture may not fully align with the reality of today's threat environment. Canada has traditionally relied heavily on its intelligence sharing partnerships, particularly within the Five Eyes Alliance for Foreign Intelligence. While that relationship remains strong, there is an increasing awareness that reliance on partnerships can create limitations, particularly when national interests diverge or when access to specific intelligence is constrained. From an intelligence perspective, foreign intelligence collection, particularly human intelligence, provides insight that cannot always be obtained through technical means or through partnerships alone. It allows governments to better understand intent, anticipate developments, and make more informed decisions. Canada's intelligence model has long differed from that of its closest allies. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, Canada does not maintain a dedicated foreign human intelligence service equivalent to the CIA or MI6. Instead, CESIS operates primarily as a security intelligence service, focused on threats to Canada with a more limited role in collecting intelligence abroad. This model has functioned effectively within the framework of allied cooperation. However, it also reflects a different strategic posture, one that places greater emphasis on domestic security intelligence than on proactive foreign intelligence collection. As global competition intensifies, that distinction becomes more relevant. Other countries are investing heavily in both human and technical intelligence capabilities to better understand and influence the global environment. This raises questions about whether Canada's current approach provides the level of insight required to navigate increasingly complex geopolitical challenges. What stands out in this discussion is the balance between capability and risk. Expanding foreign intelligence collection is not simply a matter of increasing resources or adjusting mandates. It introduces a range of considerations, including oversight, legal authorities, and the potential implications of operating in foreign jurisdictions. There is also a fundamental distinction between security intelligence, which focuses on identifying and understanding threats to Canada, and strategic foreign intelligence, which is aimed at understanding the intentions and capabilities of other states. Bridging the gap would require more than structural change. It would require a broader conversation about Canada's role on the global stage and how it chooses to pursue and protect its interests. This story highlights an important and ongoing debate about the future of Canada's intelligence community. As the global environment becomes more competitive and uncertain, the demand for timely, accurate, and independent strategic intelligence will only increase. The question is not whether Canada should simply replicate agencies like the CIA or MI6. It is whether Canada can develop an intelligence model that reflects our values and priorities while ensuring it has the capabilities necessary to understand and respond to the political, economic, and military challenges ahead. According to the report, this was a week-long operation involving naval and air assets focused on monitoring Russian vehicles operating near critical undersea infrastructure. This is an important story because it highlights growing concerns among NATO allies about the vulnerability of undersea cables and pipelines, infrastructure that is essential to global communication and economic stability. According to the UK officials, British and Norwegian forces tracked a Russian attack sub along with two specialized vehicles associated with deep sea operations. These vehicles were operating in proximity to undersea cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic, prompting concerns about potential surveillance activity or positioning that could support future disruption. The operation involved a Royal Navy frigate, surveillance aircraft, and hundreds of personnel, and it continued for more than a month. Importantly, no damage to infrastructure was reported. However, from an intelligence perspective, the absence of damage does not diminish the significance of the activity. What matters here is the presence, the positioning, and the capability. The operation demonstrated that Russian forces are able to operate near critical infrastructure, potentially mapping and monitoring systems that underpin global communications. That kind of access, even without immediate action, can provide strategic advantage over time. This development fits into a broader pattern that NATO countries have been increasingly concerned about over the past several years. Undersea cables carry the vast majority of global internet and communications traffic, making them a critical and often overlooked component of national and economic security. Russian capabilities in this domain are well established. Specialized units linked to deep-sea operations have long been associated with activities such as seabed mapping and infrastructure reconnaissance. These capabilities raise concerns not only about surveillance but also about the potential to interfere with or disrupt communication systems if required. At the same time, the nature of the environment complicates response. These activities often occur in international waters and within legal boundaries, and even when infrastructure is damaged, determining intent can be extremely difficult. This creates a space where states can operate in a way that is strategic and deliberate but avoids triggering a direct military response. What stands out in this case is the role of visibility and signaling. By publicly acknowledging the operation, the United Kingdom is making it clear that this type of activity is being monitored and taken seriously. That serves as a form of deterrence. It communicates awareness and capability, and it signals that actions in this domain are not going unnoticed. At the same time, it highlights the broader challenge faced by intelligence and defense communities. Much of this activity exists in what I previously described as the gray zone, below the threshold of conflict but clearly aligned with strategic objectives. It is persistent, difficult to attribute, and designed to create long-term advantage rather than immediate impact. This story highlights a critical vulnerability in modern national security. The infrastructure that supports global communications and economic systems is largely out of sight, but it remains exposed to those with the capability and intent to access it. The tracking of Russian submarines under undersea cables reinforces the importance of monitoring and understanding these environments, not just in response to incidents, but as part of a broader effort to anticipate and mitigate potential threats. As geopolitical tensions continue to evolve, activity in this domain is likely to increase, placing greater emphasis on both intelligence collection and international cooperation. For my listeners who would like to learn more about sabotage and proxy operations of modern intelligence, I am teaching a one-day online course at the University of Ottawa's Professional Development Institute in this very domain. I'll leave a link in the transcript for those who want to register for the course. For the last segment this week, we stay in the UK, where a counterterrorism police are investigating a series of coordinated arson attacks targeting both Jewish-linked sites and an Iranian opposition-affiliated media outlet in London. Authorities have made multiple arrests, and while the full details are still emerging, investigators are examining the possibility that these attacks may be linked to a foreign state, interest, or proxy operators acting on their behalf. At first glance, these incidents may appear to be isolated acts of vandalism or politically motivated violence. However, when examined through an intelligence lens, the pattern becomes far more concerning. We are seeing multiple targets selected with clear symbolic and strategic value. Jewish sites represent a long-standing target set for ideologically motivated actors, while Iranian opposition media outlets are frequently targeted by Tehran due to their role in shaping narratives and exposing regime activities. The fact that counter-terrorism police are leading the investigation is significant. This indicates that authorities are not treating this simply as criminal acts, but rather as potential acts of politically motivated violence, possibly linked to a broader national security concern. From an intelligence perspective, this raises the possibility of proxy operations. States like Iran have a well-documented history of leveraging intermediators, whether criminal networks, sympathetic individuals, or loosely affiliated groups to conduct operations abroad. These proxies provide plausible deniability while still allowing the state to achieve its objectives. The use of arson is also noteworthy. It's a low-cost, low sophistication tactic that can create outside psychological and societal impact. It does not require advanced training, makes it an ideal method for proxy actors or individuals operating with minimal direct oversight. This incident fits into a broader and increasingly visible trend across Europe and Western countries. We have seen repeated examples of foreign states targeting diasporic communities, dissidents, journalists, and public opponents beyond their borders. Iranian intelligence services, in particular, have been linked to plots and activities in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere, often focusing on individuals or organizations critical of the regime. At the same time, Jewish communities continue to face threats from a range of actors, including ideologically motivated extremists and those influenced by geopolitical conflicts. The difference here is the convergence of these targets within a single series of incidents. That convergence suggests a potential overlap between ideological extremism and state-linked objectives, which is a hallmark of modern gray zone conflict. While the investigation is ongoing, officials have emphasized the seriousness of the incidents and the need to examine all possible motivations, including foreign interference. From my perspective, this is a textbook example of how modern intelligence threats are evolving. We are no longer dealing solely with traditional espionage or clearly defined terrorist organizations. Instead, we are seeing a blending of tactics, where elements of terrorism, foreign interference, and covert state activity are intersecting. This creates significant challenges for intelligence and law enforcement agencies as attribution becomes more difficult and responses must be carefully calibrated to avoid escalation while still protecting national security. What we are seeing in London is more than a series of arson attacks. It is a potential indicator of how foreign actors may be willing to operate within Western societies using indirect, deniable methods. These types of incidents are likely to continue, particularly as geographical tensions remain high and states look for ways to project influence without crossing the threshold into open conflict. For intelligence professionals, the key takeaway is clear. The threat landscape is becoming more complex, more decentralized, and more difficult to attribute. Well, that's it for this week. I want to inform my listeners that I was given the opportunity to be a witness for the House of Commons on Thursday last week. The discussion related to the importation of Chinese EVs and the potential national security risks surrounding the importation of 49,000 of these vehicles into Canada and their access to our transportation, communication, and critical infrastructure. I would like to thank Industry and Technology Canada for inviting me to attend and provide commentary on this critical issue surrounding Canada's national security. I will leave a link in the transcript for anyone interested in hearing my opening statement and the answers to the questions put forth by the committee. Until next week, stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

SPEAKER_00 22:06

That wraps up this week's Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up. Thank you for listening. From Germany's warning about espionage and sabotage targeting its defense industry, to Beijing's evolving strategy of applying legislative and structural pressure on Taiwan, to the ongoing debate within Canada about the future of its foreign intelligence capabilities, this week's stories all point to a common reality. National security threats are no longer confined to traditional domains. They are increasingly embedded within industries, political systems, and the infrastructure that supports modern society. Whether it is foreign intelligence services targeting private sector companies, states shaping influence through political and legislative mechanisms, or adversaries positioning themselves near critical undersea infrastructure, the objective remains consistent, to gain advantage without triggering direct confrontation. This week's episode also highlighted how these pressures are playing out in real time. From Russian submarine activity near undersea cables in the North Atlantic, to the investigation into arson attacks in London that may point to the use of proxy actors and deniable tactics. It is becoming increasingly clear that the line between espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and foreign interference continues to blur. These are not isolated incidents. They are part of a broader pattern of gray zone activity. Persistent, adaptive, and designed to exploit gaps in awareness, coordination, and response. And more importantly, these threats are not limited to distant regions. They have direct implications for countries like Canada, where industry, infrastructure, and democratic systems remain exposed to many of the same pressures we are seeing globally. Producing the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up requires constant monitoring of international reporting, intelligence developments, and emerging national security trends to provide clear and practical analysis each week. If you find value in this work, you're encouraged to support the podcast by visiting BuzzSprout, where you can make a one-time or ongoing contribution. Your support helps sustain independent intelligence analysis and ensures this program can continue each week. Don't forget to subscribe, share the episode, and leave a review. It helps more listeners discover the show. And as Neil always says, stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.