Welcome to the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network Podcast, where real-world intelligence expertise meets insightful analysis. Join your host, Neil Bisson, a former Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, for a weekly deep dive into the world of espionage, national security, foreign interference, terrorism, and all matters spy and intelligence related.
With over 25 years of experience in intelligence and law enforcement, both domestically and internationally, Neil Bisson brings a unique perspective to the table. From hunting spies and terrorists to recruiting and managing human sources, he's seen it all.
Each episode, Neil Bisson, Director of Global Intelligence Knowledge Network as he provides a comprehensive summary of the most intriguing international intelligence stories, dissecting the hottest media topics with professional analysis and insider knowledge. Whether you're a seasoned intelligence professional or simply fascinated by the world of spies, this podcast is your go-to source for accurate, insightful, and engaging content.
Tune in weekly to stay informed, enlightened, and entertained. Don't miss out on the latest from the frontlines of global intelligence. Subscribe now to the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network Podcast on Buzzsprout and never miss an episode. Stay sharp, stay informed, and stay ahead of the curve with the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network Podcast.
🤖🕵️ Is AI Now the Ultimate Spy? | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up
Artificial intelligence is no longer simply helping intelligence officers analyze information.
What happens when AI begins participating in the espionage operation itself?
This week, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS Intelligence Officer, former CBSA Officer, and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — examines four stories demonstrating how access, technology, human intelligence and AI are reshaping modern espionage.
🇩🇪 GERMANY — RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE & ACCESS
German prosecutors have charged a well-connected Berlin businesswoman with allegedly working on behalf of Russian intelligence.
Her alleged value wasn't necessarily access to classified information — it was access to people.
Prosecutors allege she helped a Russian intelligence officer enter political and military circles, identify potential intelligence targets and establish contacts.
Sometimes the most valuable person in HUMINT isn't the individual who possesses the secret. It's the person who can introduce you to them.
🇨🇳 CHINA — PROTECTING TECHNOLOGY & KNOWLEDGE
China has introduced new regulations allowing authorities to prevent certain citizens from leaving the country over national-security, technology and export-control concerns.
If strategically important knowledge resides inside scientists, engineers and researchers, does protecting technology increasingly mean controlling the movement of the people who possess it?
🤖 RUSSIA — IS AI NOW THE ULTIMATE SPY?
Anthropic has revealed details of a suspected Russian state-linked cyber-espionage operation in which Claude AI was reportedly integrated across multiple stages of intelligence activity.
AI reportedly assisted with reconnaissance, phishing, maintaining access, malware development and data exfiltration.
Even more significantly, AI agents reportedly monitored whether malicious software was being detected, modified it and tested it again.
The operation also reportedly employed “agent swarms,” allowing multiple AI agents to work simultaneously on different tasks.
What happens when intelligence operations that once took place at human speed begin operating at machine speed?
AI doesn't need to invent espionage to transform it.
It may simply make espionage faster, cheaper and scalable.
🇨🇦 CANADA — FOREIGN INFLUENCE OR FOREIGN INTERFERENCE?
Canada's new Foreign Influence Transparency Registry has begun publishing its first registrations.
Among them is former senior Department of National Defence executive Raquel Garbers, who registered an arrangement involving the U.S. Department of State.
This is NOT an allegation of foreign interference.
Instead, the case provides an important real-world example of the distinction between legitimate foreign influence and covert foreign interference — an issue GIWW has been following since 2024.
THIS EPISODE ASKS:
• Why is access so valuable in human intelligence? • Is China treating technological expertise itself as a national-security asset? • How deeply is AI already being integrated into espionage? • Could AI allow one operator to accomplish work that once required an entire team? • What happens when espionage operates at machine speed? • Can Canada's new registry distinguish foreign influence from foreign interference?
Different countries. Different methods. Different technologies.
But the fundamentals remain remarkably familiar:
Identify the target. Gain access. Collect information. Avoid detection.
⏱ CHAPTERS
00:00 Introduction 02:15 Russia, HUMINT & the Value of Access 10:35 China: Controlling Technology & Knowledge 16:30 Is AI Now the Ultimate Spy? 25:25 Canada's Foreign Influence Transparency Registry 34:00 Final Thoughts & Outro
🎟️ PILLAR SOCIETY SPEAKER SERIES — OCTOBER 20
The Ottawa–Gatineau Chapter of the Pillar Society welcomes Canadian journalist Andrew Coyne to the Shenkman Arts Centre in East Ottawa on October 20 for its next Speaker Series event.
Training, presentations and consulting on foreign interference, espionage, HUMINT, proxy operations, sabotage, research security and emerging national-security threats.
This week on Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil B. Son, retired CISIS intelligence officer and director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, examines how intelligence operations are adapting to a world where access, technology, and influence are increasingly interconnected. The episode begins in Germany, where federal prosecutors have charged a well-connected Berlin businesswoman with allegedly working on behalf of Russian intelligence. From there, the focus shifts to China, where new national security regulations give authorities greater power to prevent citizens from leaving the country over technology and export control concerns. Then, Neil examines new reporting from Anthropic detailing how a suspected Russian-state-linked cyber espionage actor used clawed artificial intelligence across multiple stages of an intelligence operation. In Canada, the country's new foreign influence transparency registry begins publishing its first registrations, including an arrangement between a former senior Department of National Defense Executive and the United States government. What do a well-connected businesswoman in Berlin, Chinese technology controls, AI-enabled Russian espionage, and Canada's new foreign influence registry all have in common? They demonstrate how modern intelligence operations increasingly depend not simply on stealing secrets, but on gaining access to people, controlling knowledge, exploiting emerging technology, and understanding the networks through which influence operates. Are you ready? Then let's get started.
SPEAKER_01
Each week I take the latest media reporting from around the world and provide you with the insights, analysis, and intelligence you need to better understand how espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, and terrorism affect your company, your career, your country, and your safety. It's been a busy week. From a German citizen allegedly helping a Russian spy to how AI is being used to change the spy game. There's a lot to talk about, so let's get started. In our first segment, we head to Germany, where federal prosecutors have charged a well-connected Berlin businesswoman with allegedly working on behalf of Russian intelligence. And this case provides a fascinating look at something I talk about quite frequently on this podcast: access. According to reporting from the Dutch Well, a 57-year-old Ilona W, who holds a German and Ukrainian citizenship, operated a marketing agency in Berlin and was also the chair of a lobbying organization. Those positions reportedly gave her an extensive network of contacts within German political and military circles. German federal prosecutors allege that since at least 2023, she has been in contact with a full-time Russian intelligence officer working from the Russian Embassy in Berlin. Following her rush in January, Germany expelled the suspected Russian intelligence officer. Moscow subsequently retaliated by expelling a German diplomat. Listeners who have followed the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up for some time may recognize the much broader pattern developing here because we have been following the evolution of Russian intelligence operations in Europe for a few years now. In June 2024, a discussed reporting that Russia was increasingly recruiting German citizens to conduct espionage following the expulsion of approximately 600 Russian diplomats from European countries after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Those expulsions represent a significant counterintelligence success because diplomatic postings have traditionally provided intelligence officers with extremely useful cover. An intelligence officer working from an embassy has diplomatic protection, legitimate reasons to meet government officials and business leaders, and an established platform from which to identify, assess, and eventually recruit potential sources. But removing hundreds of suspected intelligence officers doesn't eliminate Russia's intelligence requirements. What it actually does is it forces Moscow to adapt. And subsequent stories I've covered on this podcast suggests that is exactly what is happening. I previously provided analysis on Russian-directed Bulgarian spy networks operating in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, where individuals outside the traditional intelligence establishment were used for surveillance and other covert activities. And I've repeatedly examined Russia's increasing reliance on civilian and criminal proxies for sabotage operations across Europe, including suspected operations targeting warehouses, transportation networks, military facilities, and logistics infrastructure supporting Ukraine. In another episode, we discussed intelligence indicating that Russian-backed actors have potentially considered U.S. military facilities and personnel in Europe as sabotage targets. Taken individually, these can look like very different national security cases. Taken together, they show how Russia has been expanding the range of people it can use to conduct intelligence operations and covert operations. The case of Alono W potentially represents another part of that evolution. Rather than simply replacing an expelled Russian intelligence officer with another intelligence officer, Moscow may have attempted to identify someone already living in the target country who possesses legitimate access to people, institutions, and information Russia wants. Someone who already speaks the language, understands the political environment, and has established relationships with government officials, military personnel, and business leaders is potentially an extremely valuable intelligence asset. And unlike an accredited Russian diplomat, their presence at a defense conference, business reception, or political event may attract little or no counterintelligence attention. German intelligence authorities have been warning about precisely this type of activity. Germany's domestic intelligence service has previously warned that Russian espionage activities increase significantly following the invasion of Ukraine and that Moscow has become increasingly aggressive in its operations against Germany. The Alona W case also demonstrates why counterintelligence isn't simply about protecting classified documents. It's about protecting people and understanding how intelligence services develop relationships. Someone attending a conference, business reception, or defense industry event may not possess classified information themselves, but they might know someone who does. They may also be able to provide background information about a potential intelligence target, facilitate an introduction, or help an intelligence officer understand who, inside an organization, might be worth developing further. Those seemingly insignificant pieces of information can become extremely valuable during the spotting and assessment phase of a human intelligence operation. And according to prosecutors, Alona W allegedly went beyond simply providing information about events. She helped the Russian officer gain access to them. One of the most striking examples of her access came during a German-Ukrainian economic event in Berlin in December of 2025. Photographs from the event reportedly show her sitting only a few rows behind Ukrainian President Vladimir Zedalinsky and German Chancellor Frederick Mertz. That doesn't establish espionage by itself, of course, but it provides an extraordinary illustration of the circles in which she was able to operate. This case also provides some indication of where Russian intelligence operations may be heading. The next generation of Russian operations in Europe may increasingly involve networks where the professional Russian intelligence officer sits several steps removed from the ultimate intelligence target. I previously discussed how Russian intelligence services use proxy officers to conduct assassinations, surveillance, and sabotage operations. The case of Alona W shows that proxy can be used to lead Russian intelligence officers to potential recruitments, much like a hunting dog is used to guide hunters to their prey. One person might provide access or identify potential sources while others conduct surveillance, facilitate communications, move money, or carry out other operational tasks. In some cases, individuals participating in different parts of that network may not even understand the complete operation. That compartmentalization creates an enormous counterintelligence challenge, and this isn't simply a European problem. CISIS has publicly warned that Russia views Canada as a legitimate target because of our NATO membership and continued support of Ukraine. Canada has military facilities, defense contractors, universities, technology companies, critical infrastructure, and government institutions that would potentially be of great interest and value to Moscow. But looking here at home, Canada shares one of the characteristics Russia has successfully exploited elsewhere. We are an open democratic society where politicians, government officials, academics, business leaders, former military personnel, and members of the national security community routinely interact through conferences, professional associations, business events, and public forums. Those interactions are important to healthy democracy, but they can also create opportunities for intelligence collection by foreign enemy states. And the person attempting to develop a relationship with a Canadian official or defense industry employee doesn't necessarily have to be someone working at the Russian embassy. They could be a business person, consultant, academic, lobbyist, former government employee, or simply someone connected to a trusted professional network. That is why the Alona W case matters well beyond Germany. It is important to emphasize that these remain allegations. From an intelligence perspective, the allegations against Alona provide an excellent case study and how modern human intelligence operations can work. The most valuable person in an intelligence operation isn't always the person who possesses the secret. Sometimes the greater value comes from the person who can identify who possesses that secret. Provide information about them, make an introduction, and create the circumstances that allow an intelligence officer to begin developing that relationship. Russia's intelligence services have suffered significant setbacks across Europe since the invasion of Ukraine, particularly through the expulsion of intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. But our previous reporting on the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up has demonstrated that Russia's intelligence activity didn't stop as a result. It evolved and continues to evolve. We've seen locally recruited spies, criminal and civilian proxies, sabotage operations, and increasingly unconventional methods of operating below the threshold of direct conflict. I expect that evolution to continue, not only in Europe, but potentially in Canada and throughout the other five Ice nations. For our intelligence and law enforcement agencies, that means counterintelligence can no longer focus exclusively on identifying the traditional foreign intelligence officer. Increasingly, they also have to identify the people and networks surrounding that officer. And the allegations against Alono W may provide another very good example of exactly why. The rules can also impose exit bans ranging from six months to three years on Chinese citizens who return home after committing certain illegal or criminal acts abroad that authorities determine have harmed China's national security or national interest. On the surface, this is a story about travel restrictions. But if you look for the deeper issues surrounding this new law, it speaks to China's growing concern over losing a military and economic advantage that AI and other related technologies provide. China has used exit restrictions before, so the concept isn't itself new. But what makes these regulations particularly interesting is the explicit connection between someone's ability to leave China and the protection of industrial and technological security. This demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party has serious concerns related to the compromise of Chinese scientists, researchers, and technology. We've talked extensively on this podcast about the technological competition underway between China and the West. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and other emerging technologies aren't simply commercial products anymore. They increasingly represent strategic national assets with economic, military, and intelligence applications. And protecting those technologies doesn't simply mean protecting computer networks or preventing someone from downloading sensitive files. You also have to think about the people who possess the knowledge. An experienced semiconductor engineer, AI researcher, or advanced manufacturing specialist may possess years of technical knowledge and institutional experience. That experience can move across international borders without someone carrying a single classified document. And this is one of the core advantages of humant or human intelligence. You don't need to hack a system to acquire information from a human source. These new regulations demonstrate that Beijing increasingly recognizes human capital itself as something that may require national security protection. There's an interesting connection here to something we previously examined on the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up. We looked at Chinese reporting describing an intensified crackdown on technology leaks and espionage involving artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biomanufacturing, new materials, and energy technologies. At that time, I suggested that China's concerns were revealing. Beijing wasn't simply worried about cyber espionage. Chinese authorities were highlighting employees leaving companies, international corporate recruitment, academic exchanges, and commercial partnerships as potential avenues through which valuable technology could leave the country. And I made the point then that what China is worried about losing can also tell us something about what Beijing considers strategically important. Lee's latest regulations appear to take that philosophy a step further. China isn't simply trying to control the movement of technology. Under certain circumstances, it can now restrict the movement of people associated with that technology. This also comes amid an intensifying technological competition with the United States. Washington has spent years attempting to restrict China's access to advanced semiconductors, except for when US President Donald Trump opened up Nvidia chips to purchase by the Chinese government. And other technologies that could contribute to Chinese military modernization and artificial intelligence development. Beijing, meanwhile, has been strengthening its own controls over outband technology, data, and investment. What we're seeing increasingly resembles a struggle not simply over who develops the next generation of technology, but who can control the movement of the knowledge behind it. The new regulations have already generated concern in Taiwan, particularly because Beijing considers Taiwanese citizens to be Chinese nationals. Taiwanese officials have specifically highlighted the provisions dealing with export controls and technology transfer and warned about the implication for Taiwanese technology professionals traveling to mainland China. Beijing rejects those concerns and argues that the regulations provide greater legal clarity and protection. There is a broader intelligence issue here for Canada and other five IS countries. We've repeatedly discussed Western concerns about Chinese efforts to acquire advanced technology through cyber espionage, academic partnerships, talent recruitment, corporate relationships, and human intelligence. We've also discussed warnings from CISIS and American intelligence agencies about protecting Western technology startups and research institutions from foreign intelligence collection. So there's an interesting symmetry developing. Western countries are increasingly trying to prevent strategically important technology from moving into China. This is where I think the bigger national security lesson lies. Technology competition isn't simply about protecting intellectual property. It's increasingly about protecting and controlling knowledge. And as I previously mentioned, that type of knowledge resides in people. China's decision to explicitly connect exit restrictions with industrial and technological security tells us something about how seriously Beijing views this competition. It also reinforces something we've discussed previously on the podcast. China's own defensive actions can provide valuable intelligence indicators. When Beijing identifies particular technologies as important enough to protect through national security legislation, Western governments should pay attention. Because the sectors China is most determined to protect at home is likely to overlap considerably with the technologies it considers strategically valuable abroad. For Canada, this means artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnology, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing and defense research will continue to require serious counterintelligence attention, because Chinese intelligence services will be actively looking to access those technologies through recruitment, intellectual property theft, and cyber espionage. The global technology competition is no longer simply about protecting what's stored on a server. Increasingly, it's also about the person or persons who put it there in the first place. On to our main story this week, and it's one that takes us into an area that regular listeners of the Global Intelligence Freekly wrap-up will know we've been following for quite some time. The convergence of artificial intelligence, cyber operations, and espionage. Anthropic, the company behind Cloed Artificial Intelligence Platform, released a new threat intelligence report on September 10th detailing how malicious actors have been attempting to use AI models. Among the cases uncovered was a suspected Russian state-linked cyber espionage operation targeting Ukraine and European government and military intelligence organizations, diplomatic and defense organizations, and individuals connected to U.S. foreign policy. But what makes the stories particularly important isn't simply that a suspected Russian intelligence actor was using artificial intelligence. It's how deeply AI was being integrated into the espionage operation itself. And when we compare this case with stories we previously covered on the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up, and when we compare this case with stories we previously covered on this podcast, we can actually see the evolution taking place. Anthropic tracks the actor behind this operation as GTG 20006. According to Anthropic, its attribution is consistent with public reporting connected to the actor named Midnight Blizzard, the Russian-link cyber espionage group, also known as APT-29 or Cozy Bear. Midnight Blizzard has previously been attributed by Western governments to Russia's foreign intelligence service, the SVR. An important caveat here. Anthropic isn't claiming it independently established that GTG-20006 is the SVR. Rather, it says the targeting and tradecraft it observed are consistent with public reporting linking the activity to Midnight Blizzard. Anthropic says one of the operators was a Russian speaker using the online handle Jack Korturz. The group conducted operations against military intelligence targets within Ukrainian and European governments, as well as diplomatic and defense organizations and individuals associated with American foreign policy. And the extent to which artificial intelligence was integrated into those operations is remarkable. Clode was incorporated into workflows involving infrastructure acquisition, phishing, maintaining access to compromise systems, malware development, reconnaissance, and ultimately data exfiltration. The actor maintained two families of Windows implants, a mobile exploitation kit, credential stealing software targeting passwords stored in browsers, a phishing platform designed to impersonate high-priority organizations such as government agencies, and an administrative system for managing compromised accounts. But perhaps the most interesting element involved avoiding detection. Anthropic says the actor developed AI agents that modified whether its malware was being detected by cybersecurity products. When one of those malicious tools was detected, AI agents could begin modifying and rebuilding the malware. The altered malware could then be tested again, and that process could continue until the malicious software was no longer detected. That has potentially significant implications for counterintelligence and cybersecurity organizations. Traditionally, cyber espionage involves something of a technical cat-and-mouse game. An intelligence service develops a tool, eventually, defenders identify it and create a signature capable of detecting it. The intelligence service then has to devote personnel, time, and resources to modify or replace the capability. But what happens when artificial intelligence can perform significant portions of that cycle automatically? The cost of the intelligence service begins to decrease while the speed of operation increases. And this is where I think it's useful to look back at what we previously discussed on this podcast, because the development of AI and intelligence operations hasn't appeared out of the blue. Back in August 2024, we examined an FBI warning concerning China's use of artificial intelligence and espionage. At that time, the concern was that AI could enhance traditional intelligence activities, allowing intelligence services to process enormous quantities of information, identify potential targets, and conduct cyber operations more efficiently. Then, earlier this year in June, we returned to the issue when we examined Anthropic's advanced Fable V and Mythos V models and the national security debate surrounding frontier artificial intelligence. One of the issues we discussed was the ability of increasingly capable AI systems to assist with vulnerability discovery. The concern then was that advanced AI was becoming more than simply a commercial technology. It was becoming a strategic national security capability. And that June discussion raised an obvious intelligence question. What happens when those capabilities become incorporated into actual intelligence operations? Well, three months later, this latest Anthropic report gives us at least part of the answer. We're now looking at a suspected Russian state-linked actor using AI not merely to answer technical questions, but to help operate portions of an espionage campaign. Anthropic describes this broader transition as AI moving beyond simple question and answer assistance towards direct execution and orchestration. GTG 20006 reportedly ran what Anthropics describes as, quote, agent swarms, unquote. A lead AI agent could divide a larger intelligence requirement into separate tasks and assign those tasks to multiple AI subagents operating simultaneously. One could conduct reconnaissance, another could search for vulnerabilities, another could develop and test malware, another could collect publicly available military doctrine, government publications, regional defense, reporting, and policy information. The system also maintained persistent campaign information, including target lists, stolen credentials, the status of individual operations, and standing instructions, allowing an operation to resume with accumulated knowledge from previous sessions. Think about what that means from an intelligence perspective. That begins to look less like an intelligence officer using an AI assistant and more like an AI-enabled intelligence collection platform. Anthropic's assessment of this evolution is particularly important. The company says the greatest danger isn't necessarily that artificial intelligence doesn't suddenly invents cybersecurity techniques we've never seen before. In fact, many of the attacks it observed rely upon very familiar methods, phishing, stolen credentials, exposed services, and exploitation of unpatched systems. What has changed is the economics of the operation. Anthropic says work that once distinguished well-resourced state operations, reconnaissance, exploitation, tool development, and processing stolen information can increasingly be delegated to AI models operating simultaneously at machine speed. In some of the operations examined by Anthropic reaches were completed within two to three hours, while individual operators were able to handle dozens of victims simultaneously. And from my perspective, that's where the intelligence significance of this story lies. AI doesn't have to invent a completely new form of espionage to transform espionage. If one intelligence officer or cyber operator supported by AI can accomplish work that previously required several highly trained people, then intelligence organizations can potentially conduct more operations against more targets at considerably greater speed. And that changes the challenge facing counterintelligence organizations because defenders aren't simply trying to identify an adversary's tools anymore. Increasingly, they may be confronting systems capable of adapting those tools in response to the defender. There is another important element here as well. Anthropic itself became part of the counterintelligence picture. Because these actors were operating through Cloud, Anthropic was able to identify patterns across accounts, investigate the activity, disrupt the accounts, strengthen the safeguards, and share intelligence with authorities and industry partners where appropriate. That means Frontier AI companies increasingly possess visibility into certain foreign intelligence and cyber activities that governments may not immediately have. And that could make cooperation between AI companies, cybersecurity firms, and national intelligence organizations increasingly important. When we put the latest story beside the previous reporting we've covered on Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up, a pattern begins to emerge. In 2024, we were discussing warnings that intelligence services could use AI to enhance espionage. Earlier this year, we were discussing advanced AI models capable of accelerating vulnerability discovery and national security capabilities. Now we're examining the suspected Russian state-linked actor that Anthropic says was using AI agents to conduct reconnaissance, develop and modify malware, maintain intelligence collection infrastructure, and support cyber operations. That is a significant evolution. The fundamentals of espionage haven't changed. Intelligence services still need to identify targets, gain access, collect information, and avoid detection. What is changing is the speed and scale at which those activities can potentially occur. So perhaps the question is no longer whether artificial intelligence will become part of modern espionage. The evidence increasingly suggests that it already has. The more important question for intelligence and security organizations may now be what happens when intelligence operations that were traditionally conducted at human speed begin operating at machine speed? Because based on what I've been following in the intelligence game over the past two years, that transition appears to be well underway. For our last segment this week, we end in Canada on an issue that regular listeners of the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up will know we've been following for more than two years. Foreign interference in Canada's efforts to bring greater transparency to foreign influence activities. Canada's new foreign influence transparency registry has begun publishing its first registrations. And one of the first names appearing on the registry is particularly interesting. Rachel Garbers is a former senior executive with the Department of National Defense who previously served in senior defense policy positions and played an important role in the development of Canada's 2024 defense policy, our North Strong and Free. Garbers is now registered as having an arrangement with the United States Department of State. Now, that headline could certainly attract attention. But before we go any further, there is an extremely important distinction we need to make. Appearing on Canada's Foreign Influence Transparency Registry does not, repeat, not, mean someone has been accused of foreign interference, espionage, or any other wrongdoing. In fact, the registry itself states that arrangements appearing there are transparent and in compliance with the Act. And that's what makes this case so useful. Because after more than two years of discussing how foreign interference and foreign influence is affecting Canadian diaspora communities, national security, and Canada's sovereignty, we finally have an opportunity to examine how this system has been implemented. According to Canada's new policy registry, Garbers has an arrangement with the U.S. Department of State running from September 5th until September 24, 2026. The registry says she is participating in education and leadership development events hosted by the State Department in Thailand and Taiwan for American officials and invited foreign officials. Garbers says she will lead lectures and a tabletop exercise dealing with geopolitics and economic statecraft, during which she expects to make references to Canadian foreign policy. The registry categorizes the activities as communicating with public office holders, communicating or disseminating information, and providing a service. And that was sufficient for the arrangement to be registered under Canada's new legislation. But here's where this becomes particularly interesting in the context of intelligence and national security. The foreign government involved isn't China. It isn't Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, or any other country that has been previously identified as a perpetrator of foreign influence and interference in the Hogue Inquiry. It's the United States. Canada and the United States cooperate through NORAD, NATO, and the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance. But Canada's Foreign Influence, Transparency, and Accountability Act isn't supposed to determine whether a foreign country is a friend or an adversary. It is designed to provide transparency when someone enters into a certain arrangement with a foreign principle involving activities intended to influence Canadian political or governmental process, and that's an important distinction. To really understand why the story matters, we need to go back to some of our previous analysis on the podcast. Back in May 2024, I referenced the introduction of Bill C-70 in Canada's proposed foreign influence transparency registration. At that time, Canada was in the middle of a national debate about foreign interference following revelations surrounding attempts by foreign states to influence Canadian democratic institutions. I explained that the proposed registry would require certain individuals acting in association with foreign governments to disclose their activities, and my assessment at that time was that the legislation was a positive development. But legislation alone won't solve Canada's foreign interference problem. I said Canada would also need the resources necessary to detect, deter, and prevent foreign interference. That was more than two years ago. Then in June 2024, we returned to the issue, but from a different perspective. I examined concerns raised by Canada's U-15 research universities that the proposed registry could have what they described as a quote chilling effect on legitimate international research partnerships. Universities were concerned that broad reporting requirements could capture researchers engaged in perfectly legitimate international collaboration. And that distinction raised a question that we returned to repeatedly on the podcast. Where exactly is the line between legitimate foreign influence and covert foreign interference? That distinction matters. Foreign governments attempt to influence one another every day. Diplomats advocate for their governments, businesses lobby governments, universities cooperate internationally, experts provide advice to foreign governments. Governments sponsor conferences, academic exchanges, and policy discussions. None of that automatically constitutes foreign interference. The national security concern arises from foreign state involvement when it becomes covert, deceptive, threatening, or otherwise clandestine. In September 2024, we returned again to foreign interference when the Ho Commission shifted its attention toward what Canada needed to do to protect itself against future threats. My analysis at that time was that Canada needed to move beyond simply documenting what happened during the 2019 and 2021 elections and begin developing institutions capable of responding to foreign interference as it has evolved and continues to evolve. So we see an interesting progression here. In May 2024, we were asking whether Canada needed a foreign influence registry. In June 2024, we were examining whether the registry could distinguish legitimate international engagement from potentially problematic foreign influence. In September of 2024, we were discussing how Canada needed to build long-term institutional resilience against foreign interference. Then on August 4th, 2026, the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act and its regulations finally come into force. So more than two years after we started examining this mechanism on Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up, we can finally see how it's operating in practice. Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner Anton Bogman announced this week that the first arrangements had been made available through the public registry. He explained that one of the objectives of the Act is to allow Canadians to better understand who may be attempting to influence Canadian civic and democratic institutions and how those activities are being conducted. Under the legislation, individuals or organizations generally have to provide information when they enter into an arrangement under the direction of, or an association with, a foreign principle involving activities intended to influence Canadian political or government processes. They normally have 14 days to register the arrangement. But importantly, the Commissioner's Office often makes clear that many foreign influence activities are lawful and legitimate. This is something worth emphasizing. Foreign influence and foreign interference are not the same thing. And from my perspective, Garbers registration gives us an excellent real-world example of precisely the distinction we were discussing back in 2024. Two years ago, critics worried that a foreign influence registry might inadvertently stigmatize perfectly legitimate relationships between Canadians and foreign governments or institutions. Now we have an actual case to examine. Garbers hasn't been identified because investigators uncovered a secret relationship with the United States. She was disclosed because the system is established for precisely that purpose. And the registry explicitly states that arrangements appearing there are transparent and compliant with the Act. That's not evidence of foreign interference. It's evidence of transparency surrounding foreign influence. And that distinction is critical. When we connect this story and what we previously discussed in 2024, I think we're seeing something important. One of the first registrations involves a former senior Canadian defense official and the government of the United States. And rather than demonstrating a failure of the system, this case may actually help demonstrate what the system was designed to accomplish. Transparency. The real test of Canada's new foreign influence transparency registry won't simply be how many names appear on. It will be whether the registry can provide Canadians with meaningful information about foreign influence while maintaining the critical distinction between legitimate foreign influence and covert foreign interference. And there is another question we'll need to watch very closely. Will the registry eventually expose arrangements that would not have been disclosed voluntarily without this legislation? But that's where we really begin to see whether the mechanism we've been discussing for more than two years is accomplishing what it was created to do. For the first time, we're no longer talking about what Canada's foreign influence transparency registry might look like. We're watching it operate. And I will continue following it closely here on the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-up. Well, that will wrap up this week's wrap-up. I want to remind my listeners that the Pillar Society will be hosting a speaker series at the Shankman Center in East Ottawa on the 20th of October with guest speaker Andrew Coyne, a Canadian national security journalist who has provided extensive reporting across several media outlets in Canada and the United States.
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Mr.
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Coyne specializes in Canadian politics, economics, and public policy. He argues that Canada faces an unprecedented national security and productivity crisis driven by psychological unpreparedness, a weak and under-equipped military, insufficient independent foreign intelligence collection capability, and rising geopolitical coercion from a shifting U.S. foreign policy. Tickets are available from the Pillar Society website, and I will leave a link in the show notes and the transcript. I hope to see you there. Until next week, stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.
SPEAKER_00
That wraps up another episode of the Global Intelligence Weekly wrap-up. Thank you for listening. This week, four very different stories demonstrated how the methods of modern intelligence continue to evolve. In Germany, the alleged recruitment of a well-connected businesswoman by Russian intelligence reminded us that sometimes the most valuable commodity in espionage isn't the secret itself. It's access to the people who possess it. In China, new exit restrictions demonstrated how strategic competition increasingly involves protecting not only technology, but the people and expertise behind it. Meanwhile, Anthropic's reporting on a suspected Russian-state-linked cyber operation showed how artificial intelligence may allow familiar espionage activities to take place faster, at greater scale, and with fewer human resources. And in Canada, the first registrations under the new Foreign Influence Transparency Registry provided an important reminder that legitimate foreign influence and COVID foreign interference are not the same thing. The research, analysis, and intelligence that goes into every episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up is a result of time, effort, experience, and unique expertise. If you find value in the podcast, please consider supporting the channel through Buzz Sprout. Also, like, subscribe, share it with others, and leave a review on your favorite podcast platform. We hope to see you again next week. And as Neil always reminds us, stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.
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