The Future of Venezuela

On this episode of The LatinNews Podcast, we dive into the complex landscape of Venezuela's political and economic situation following the recent changes in leadership. With insights from Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group based in Caracas, we explore what’s happening on the ground, the implications of U.S. involvement, and the challenges ahead for the Venezuelan people.

Phil Gunson provides a unique perspective on the atmosphere in Caracas after the leadership change. While many celebrate Maduro's departure, the existing power structures remain largely intact, leading to a cautious optimism among the populace. The release of political prisoners and reforms in the oil industry are significant steps, but the question remains: can these changes lead to a genuine political transition? 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

Welcome to the Latin News Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

SPEAKER_02 0:13

This is the Latin News Podcast. I am your host, Richard McCall, here in Bogota, Colombia. This week we're discussing Venezuela. We're very honored to have Phil Gunson, who is the uh senior Andes region analyst for International Crisis Group. He's based in Caracas. His work on Venezuela is uh, well, I would say perhaps the most informed because, of course, he's on the ground there. And uh anyone who hasn't realized what is going on in Venezuela, well, of course, you'll have remembered, or perhaps we should joke your memory. On the 3rd of January of this year, the US launched a, well, I would say an extraction of President Maduro with the leader of the regime, Nicolas Maduro, who is now up in New York awaiting trial. And uh Delcy Rodriguez has been sworn in as the interim president uh at this moment in time. But of course, to put it into context, 7.9 million Venezuelans have fled that country, and 27.7% of the remaining population in the country requires humanitarian assistance uh due to collapsed public services. Of course, a lot is going on at the moment about the US, well, I mean, I guess they say taking over the oil industry or um a very ambitious plan. So I won't I won't keep on talking. Um, Phil, welcome on the Latin News Podcast. Perhaps you could give us a little bit of a feeling of what is life on the ground there in Caracas.

SPEAKER_00 1:45

Thank you, Richard. It's a pleasure to be with you. Um it's actually pretty quiet here. I mean, if you uh if you parachuted in without knowing um anything about what's been going on, and if you knew you know Venezuela from the past, you wouldn't really notice that much difference. I mean, people are going about their normal business. Um so you know, obviously there's a different atmosphere when you talk to people. There's a I think what what most people regard as a kind of cautious optimism, people are conscious that uh Maduro is gone, which is a matter of great celebration for the majority of the population, but at the same time, most of his team is still intact, led, as he was saying, by his former vice president Dulcy Rodriguez. And so, you know, a lot of things have moved. Um, you know, and the most prominent of those things, I suppose, would be number one, the release of hundreds of political prisoners, which is to be celebrated, and a massive reform of the uh the legal framework for the oil industry, the hydrocarbons law. Um, so these are the kind of the two at least of the of the of the main headlines of what's happened since January the third, which has been a period um uh very, very strange for those of us who've been in Venezuela for a long time. We have a government that um has, ever since the days of Hugo Chavez, who came to power in 1999, claimed to be you know running a socialist revolution, you know, anti-imperialism um was the watchword. Um they had nothing good to say about Uncle Sam, but all of a sudden it's all sweetness and light, not just with the US, but also, for example, with the Europeans or the other other US US allies. Um they talk about the diplomacy of peace, they talk about working hand in hand with Washington and so on. So it's a little bit um that we're suffering a little bit from whiplash here in terms of you know, well, when you know how how did that happen? These are the same people, but they're talking completely different language. But of course, you have to delve a lot deeper into that in order to be able to produce, I don't know, at least some kind of prognosis as to where all this is going. Are we, uh, as seems to be the case, heading for um substantial economic reform and Venezuela's um reincorporation, if you like, into um the um into the global economy via oil, which has always been the most important um of Venezuela's uh export products, accounts for most of export earnings and about half of government revenue. Um we're obviously you know, we're going for that, but the three-point plan that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced after the US carried out this this um astonishing raid on the 3rd of January involves not only political um I'm sorry, economic um stabilization and then recovery, but also a plan for political transition. And that's where you know the big question mark hangs over all of this is Delcy Rodriguez, her brother Jorge as well, who's in charge of the National Assembly, the Venezuelan Parliament. Um, you know, they're talking um of a new era, you know, a new phase of cooperation, so on. But um, do they really intend or are they prepared for this to end up with a genuine political transition in which clearly they could end up losing power?

SPEAKER_02 5:02

It as you said, whiplash might be the perfect word for this indeed. I mean, so in in in the space of an of one very long night when we were all watching what was going on. Um I I remain I remain intrigued at how Dulcie Rodriguez has managed this so far, because you know, she seems to do just enough to keep the US on side, and then of course sell a different story back home again with sort of the as you mentioned, the release of the political prisoners, but at the same time, there was a slight as also a pushback to the to the to the US. So it's sort of both sides. How do you see this as well?

SPEAKER_00 5:42

Yeah, it's a real balancing act, and and I think that's well uh well understood in Washington. I I I just come back from Washington, and I think um, you know, policymakers, politicians on on both sides of the aisle in in Washington are very clear that you know they don't they're not too bothered about Dulcie maintaining the revolutionary rhetoric. It's not a question of what she says, it's what she does. Um so they realize that you know she has hardliners on her side. She's no moderate herself, of course, um, but she has hardliners with guns on her side, many of whom fear that if there was a genuine political transition, they might well end up in jail, or even worse, and would certainly lose power, influence, and and the booty that they've accumulated over all these years. Um and and as I say, they have guns. So and she doesn't. So the question is um, you know, there's guns on the US side, we as we you know saw very clearly on in the early hours of January the 3rd, and they're capable of um basically humiliating the Venezuelan armed forces and coming in and grabbing whoever they want, it would appear. Of course, you can't guarantee that if you do it a second time, the element of surprise, of course, has been lost. It you know, it would have to be done presumably rather differently. But the other issue there, as far as the external pressure from the US is concerned, is that the fleet, of course, is being dispersed. The you know, the aircraft carrier that was at the center of it is back in the Middle East. Um, much of the fleet has has been dispersed, uh, as one might expect, and therefore the credibility of the US threat has already begun to diminish. And will the US really keep up the pressure, the diplomatic and political pressure, let alone the military pressure? Is Donald Trump care does he care whether Venezuela becomes a democracy or not? Probably not. Uh although Secretary of State Marco Rubio si, yes, yeah, you know, he does certainly appear to. Um so, you know, there's there's this um curious kind of um air of cooperation at the moment, but there's no guarantee that as things go on, and as we get closer to the to the point at which the government has to decide, well, do we really go for a political opening or not? And the US has to decide, well, if they don't, what do we do about it? That's where you know the rubber hits the road. That's that's that's where we get to see um if there is any political will, both in Caracas and in Washington, to carry this through. Because, and I'll just end on this point, the the Venezuelan people, that's to say, people who didn't vote either for Delcy or for Donald Trump, are watching these two, you know, uh negotiate over their heads the future of Venezuela. And so far, there's not a lot of participation um, you know, by regular Venezuelans. So so unless that's solved, unless there is a means of incorporating their diverse voices into this process, then really it comes down to you know what Delcy and Donald end up agreeing on.

SPEAKER_02 8:36

And of course, uh as you say, they have guns. I mean, I either side. I I I I keep looking at the situation, and of course, we haven't mentioned him yet, but of course, we need to mention Dios da el Cabello. Uh, and it seems it seems that it's key for us to monitor, and of course, obviously Crisis Group, you're you're well into this, uh, monitor the Venezuelan government under Delcy and it's it's cohesion with the military. Um, how is she managing this? Um, because of course, you know, there are there are a number of people all muscling, I think, in for their various parts of the pie here.

SPEAKER_00 9:11

Yeah, um, I talked loosely about the the people with the guns, and you mentioned Gustavo Cabello, who is uh the interior minister, has been the interior minister since uh Maduro stole the election in 2024. As interior minister, he controls the police, he controls a large chunk of the intelligence services. He's a guy who, with Hugo Chavez back in 1992, tried to overthrow the democratically elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Um, he is generally regarded as the top hardliner. Um, and of course, he has means and motivation when it comes to um attempting to derail this process or prevent it emerging as a full-scale political transition because he's wanted. I mean, there's a$25 million bounty on his head by the US. Um, no doubt the International Criminal Court, if he ever gets around to indicting anybody over the Venezuela case it's been looking at for years, um, yeah, I'm sure he'd be probably close to the top of the list. Um he's really got no uh, you know, the the idea of a political transition is naturally um anathema to him. Then, of course, you have General Vladimir Padrino, who's the defense minister, has been defense minister over a decade. Um he controls the armed forces. They were, of course, humiliated um when it came to defending against an external enemy at the beginning of January, but um over the year, and the reason what the reason why is of course that not only is that they're terribly corrupt and inefficient, but also that they have really become um focused on the enemy within. I mean, they're more of a you know they're more of a gendarmerie to to keep the Chavis to Chavis to keep Chavismo in power. Um so so there they are. Now, how is Dulce coping with that? I mean, it of course it's hard to say because we don't know what they say to each other behind closed doors, but when we talk to people who are, you know, who've been present in meetings where, for example, um Dulce Rodriguez and Cabello are both present, both speaking, relating to each other, you know, talking to each other, they watch clearly, very closely for any clues that there's strain between the two of them. I mean, what's the body language like? How do they address each other and so on? So far, it appears they're on the same page, and and that leads me to believe that Delcy has been able to convince them so far of two things, I suppose. One is we're really not intending to go that far, so don't you don't need to worry. But the other thing is um we think we've got the US we can manage the US, we can manage their their their demands. Um and ultimately, you know, we think that this, you know, that Donald Trump will get bored with Venezuela and and and he won't have the political, maybe particularly after the midterms, which he appears set to lose in November of this year, um, less political capital to expend, less less time, less less enthusiasm for running Venezuela, as he was very keen to do back at the beginning of January when he actually um styled himself acting president of Venezuela.

SPEAKER_02 12:09

It's a it's a it's a situation that's so very interesting because of course it's it's balanced. Everything comes back to this issue of balanced. Um I would would imagine, I would imagine then that Delcey has has struck some kind of deal to convince uh you know General Padrino and of course Dios de Al Cabello. And it's about also keeping the people on the ground. Uh well, I mean, keep keeping them contented, uh not happy, but contented. And I think obviously all of this chatter about the US uh plunging in investment into the oil industry and bringing it back into the sort of global economy, as you said. The people, people, Venezuelans in general are going to need to start seeing a return to Venezuela of some of this capital, some of the oil capital. How do you see this uh developing, uh Phil?

SPEAKER_00 13:06

Yeah, you know, it's fairly simple um to achieve the stabilization of the economy. And and and the the other day, Marco Rubi was essentially saying, Well, we've done that. Yeah, that that's handled. We we've we've taken control of the external accounts, essentially. I mean, or most of the you know, oil accounts for so much of what Venezuela earns that when you um you you you assume control of oil exports, as the US has done, and you channel the money, uh, then then you know you can you can achieve a turnaround fairly fast because Venezuela, of course, was selling oil at massive discounts um to the you know to buyers in Asia mostly up until the 3rd of January, and now it's being sold via um brokers selected by the US at more or less international market prices. So the first thing that happened is around$300 million of the proceeds came back into Venezuela, channeled through private banks, sold into, sold to the private sector at more or less market rates. Um the money the local currency generated by that then goes to the government. Supposedly they put it in two funds that Delcie Rodriguez says she's set up. One is a sort of humanitarian fund, the other one is an infrastructure fund. Um so what that's done is that it's dampened inflationary expectations. Inflation here is still running at around 600% at an annualized rate, which is massive, and of course, when especially when people are on poverty, starvation wages. Um a lot of people just can't put food on the table, and prices going up 600% a year is is is is just devastating. So at least, I mean, inflation, I don't think you can say it's been brought under control, but at least we've you know, we're we're not heading for hyperinflation, which which we were towards the end of last year. And um as a result of that, um, you know, the um well sorry, it's the other way around. I mean the the that was going to say as a result, but in fact the the other impact has been the uh the impact on the exchange rate. I mean the dollar, the the price of the dollar in local currency terms is obviously going through the roof. Nobody wants nobody wants bolívaras in the in their pockets, there only wants dollars and there aren't any dollars. So the fact that some came in brought the price a little bit under control. I mean, it came down quite a bit in the first week or so, it's gone back up since then, but at least it's not deteriorating at the same rate as it was. But what that doesn't mean is that there's that you know, ordinary folk are seeing the benefits in terms of, you know, when they go grocery shopping, it's it's it's still extremely depressing. Um and any and that the impact on that level is going to take months, I think. And and you know, we don't there's no guarantee that it will, you know, that Venezuela end up with a healthy economy at the end of the day, even if the worst possible outcome that we were staring at, you know, staring in the face um at the turn of the year, that that that doesn't seem to be going to happen. But then there's the longer-term issue of will the capital that's needed to recover the Venezuelan economy come in. And we are talking about tens of billions of dollars uh over a over a decade at least just to recover the oil industry. But then you also have to think of the billions needed for electricity, water, roads, hospitals, schools, uh, you know, the internet, um, you know, telecommunications, um, all this sort of stuff, which is you know, um extremely deteriorating. You know, power cuts are frequent. Um, yeah, where I live, we only have two days of Maine's water a week, for example. Um so where's that money going to come from? Some of it could come from multilaterals, potentially. Um, I'm talking about the infrastructure money in in particular. But that has lots of things need to be sorted out on that front. Venezuela's not recognized by the IMF, for example. It has nearly five billion dollars worth of special drawing rights um stowed away at the IMF, but it can't get at them because the IMF doesn't recognize the Venezuelan government so far. Um, but as far as the oil industry is concerned, whilst there are certainly a lot of smaller operators who are interested in coming in and making money in more relatively marginal fields, the the over the bulk of the money that's needed to boost Venezuela put Venezuelan production back from where it is now at around a million barrels a day up to somewhere closer to the three million that we were producing 12 or 15 years ago. That is a much bigger question. Exxon and I believe some others are sending in teams to look at the situation, but they have not been optimistic so far because the fact is, you know, it's not just a question of you know the money you need to spend just to re-up, you know, to upgrade the system so that it'll actually work again, you can produce. But it's also the legal framework. Um, you know, there's no legitimate elected government, there's not the institutions don't work, they're all there's they're not autonomous, the judiciary is not autonomous, and so on. So it's not an appealing place to put your money. And there are lots of other places if you happen to have$10 billion in your back pocket that you might wish to put it um to greater effect.

SPEAKER_02 18:18

It it doesn't that doesn't it doesn't bode well, does it? It doesn't it doesn't sound all that positive when you're when you're looking at the the the sort of the grand scheme of things, the the money required to re-enter, let's say, global markets, and of course Venezuela's complicated debts. Um I was reading up to sort of$200 billion, and so even getting out back into this global market would require significant economic or financial somersaults. Um and as you said, Exxon coming down to study, Chevron, of course, are there, but will they stay and expand slowly? Is is that what we could look at? Is that is that something we could say that's positive?

SPEAKER_00 19:02

Yeah, Chevron are here. They never went away, um, unlike ExxonCon, but um they've made it clear that they are prepared to uh expand production. Um they, I think, produce something like 250,000 barrels a day at the moment. They can certainly boost that, and um and that will help overall. Um, but they've also said that they're not going to bring in fresh capital, they're going to fund any expansion from profits that they're making from what they produce now. So so even they, you know, are not you know hugely bullish on the prospects of Venezuela. On the other hand, I mean, you say it doesn't sound too good, and and you know, obviously you have to be skeptical both on the political and on the economic front. But I think it's important to see the glass half full and not half empty. I mean, we are in many ways a lot better off than we were prior to the 3rd of January. Um I think the key thing, as I say, is going to be whether or not um the whether or not that there can be a framework negotiated uh for a political transition. Marie Corina Machal, the opposition leader, who's currently, I think, still in Washington, um, left the country to get her Nobel Prize last year. Um, and she has been very much uh in the in the glass half-empty camp. She's been talking about the Del C government as a corrupt regime that's on the point of collapse. She says that nothing that emerges from them uh is legitimate, the National Assembly is undemocratic and therefore its laws are null and void. All that may be true, but it's not what you want to hear if you're a foreign investor um hoping to benefit from the change in the in the hydrocarbons law. Um and I think that unless the opposition, of course, she is the I mean, she head and shoulders above every other opposition leader, but there are plenty of more moderate voices inside Venezuela um who want to work on the basis that the glass is half full and that the task ahead is uh to fill the remainder of it. In other words, you know, don't just sit sit around saying this is no use, that's no use, you know, they'll never do it. We know what they're like, they they they only negotiate to buy time and all this. That's not going to be good enough because it because I mean it's not it, it's not a very politically sensible approach. Either this will work and you will have been made a fool of because you know you said it wouldn't, um or it won't work and you're still in exile, right? I mean, or you're or you're still unable to um take advantage of a political opening. So there's really no I don't see where the plan is there. Um I think the only thing that the opposition can do, with all the caveats and all the skepticism that you like, is to put its shoulder to the wheel and start pushing in the right direction because because there's Dulcie Rodriguez is not going to do this out of the goodness of her heart or because she believes in liberal democracy. That is not going to happen. And probably Donald Trump, who is also not a great believer in liberal democracy, may well lose interest as well. And Marco Rubi, at the end of the day, whilst he may be keen to see this through to a political transition, ultimately is the employee. I mean, Trump could fire him tomorrow. So, you know, unless this turns into a process driven by Venezuelans, driven by the demands of Venezuelans. I don't mean just demands on Dulce, but also demands on Donald Trump, you know, to make it clear that the Venezuelan opposition is not simply a creature of Washington, then I then I would then I am sceptical. But I think at the moment, I think we um we have to, you know, hope that that's going to be the case.

SPEAKER_01 22:48

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SPEAKER_02 23:05

It is it is such an interesting situation, of course, worrying, but as you said, you you know w what kind of what other option is there but but to to push forwards and but to try and lift Venezuela out from this this this miasma in which it finds itself and has been for for so long and this lack of investment in critical infrastructure in the country. Um I'm just I just I have to get it out there. You know, we you we mentioned Marco Rubio and uh and so on, of course, you know, very, very possibly, um very probably arming or putting together his his run at the presidency and the next uh round of next elections and so on. And so his success is pegged entirely to what happens in Venezuela and of course we must mention Cuba. Um how do you I mean he may be keen on a transition to democracy, however, this this takes time. I mean, it it feels a bit of a poison chalice for someone with as high ambition as as as he might have. Also, I'm I I my concern when we're when we're thinking somewhat cynically is that US policy overall really isn't consistent with long-term institution building that I would suggest might be what Venezuela really needs right now. So I yeah, I I mean, I want to be positive. I want to know that we're going to move forward, but again, the anything is better than what was be what was prior to December the third, I suppose. We are moving in the right direction. You have Maria Corina Machado still on a world stage, still making the right noises, but at the same time, you know, she's saying that she's going to return to Venezuela quite soon. What do we expect about her return to the country? I mean, how do we expect? I mean, Delcy can't throw her in jail, surely.

SPEAKER_00 25:06

I I no, I think that's unlikely. Um I mean, I'm sure that the US will say, you know, make it very clear that that that's that's not to happen. But of course, Washington doesn't really want Marie Karina to return, for the time being at least. Um, because they regard her presence as potentially destabilizing. The government, um, Delcy Rodriguez and and and Cabello and other people in the government have made it very clear that she and the people around her um are not included in the political amnesty, for example. Um, Delcy has said that if Marie Garina returns, she'll have to face the consequences because they argue that um, you know, she is essentially uh a traitor because she asked for US military intervention, because she's called for sanctions. Um and of course, it's it's going to be very awkward if and when she does return because um because those threats may turn out to be empty, um, at least in the in the first instance, Maria Corina may start to do what she does very effectively, which is campaign around the country. Um, and the government will be faced with this very uh critical dilemma. I mean, it's a a sort of um intensification uh um of the dilemma it already faces. In other words, do you go along with the political opening in the hope that it won't ultimately cost you your job and possibly send you in jail? Or do you put the brakes on and risk the retaliation of the United States? Maria Corina coming back accelerates that whole process and makes it makes it a much more intense dilemma. I'm you know, I think the US has been sending the strongest possible hints to her, to Maria Corina, um that her presence is not what we need to see right now. There are people close to her, you know, inside Venezuela, um who you know could operate on her behalf, and obviously not her, she's in victim, but there are people here who could be her her representatives. Um I just think that you know her returning prior to you know this process gaining some sort of momentum um really could derail it, and and and that's that's very that's very dangerous. I mean, when going back to Marco Rubio, I mean yes, Rubio, you know, he wants to see he was very keen to get rid of Maduro in Venezuela because he wants to see an end to the Cuban regime, and and and that's what the US is trying to achieve right now. But of course, Cuba's a lot more complex, not least because it's 90 miles off the coast of Florida, and you know, if they get it wrong, then there's going to be an absolutely massive uh refugee crisis that they're gonna have on their hands. Um and you know, I I think it's one of the one of the problems, one of the downsides to what the US did on January the third is that somehow Donald Trump at least got the idea that oh, you know, if we can do it in Venezuela, we can do it anywhere. So it's a kind of it's a model that doesn't really fit, I don't think, anywhere else, but as well as a very particular case. Uh in the end, of course, all countries are uh particular cases, and and you can't, it's not a one-size-fits-all situation. So, so that is a little bit worrying. That success here, um, to the extent that it that we've had success so far, which I think on balance is is the case, leads them to be emboldened as far as activities elsewhere in the world, of course, most recently the case of Iran.

SPEAKER_02 28:41

Yeah, and I and I know we we shouldn't really mention Iran too much, your your sphere of influence being uh the Andean region, of course, being based in Caracas. But uh, you know, there there's a obviously oil prices are have been somewhat affected by uh by events in the Middle East uh of late. This, I mean, I realize that the investment required and the time required to to improve Venezuela's infrastructure is not on the same timeline, but of course it's something positive in terms of global economy, in terms of uh hydrocarbons and and so on. It you know, I'm sure people are looking at that going, well, maybe we should maybe we should rediscover Venezuela once again.

SPEAKER_00 29:25

Yeah, I mean the first impact, of course, in terms of the rising oil prices is that it makes Delcy Rodriguez very happy because um you know Venezuela's income is is boosted. Um but yes, as you say, I mean, a a short-term boost to global oil prices based on a on a conflict, um, is not the basis on which you want to set about investing$100 billion over ten years. That that the yeah, the timescale is completely different. Um but um no, I think more broadly, it's it's very interesting to on the political front, it's very interesting to see you know how Venezuela, which of course was probably Iran's key ally in in the region uh up until the 3rd of January, how constrained they are under the current circumstances. We don't know for certain because it's all kept very secret, you know, we assume that the Iranians who were here mostly left. Um there were all sorts of rumors, hardly any of them confirmed about the presence of the um you know the Revolutionary Guard and the Kutzforce and all the rest in in Venezuela. They probably have left. But but beyond that, when you look at how the Venezuelan government has reacted to what's going on in Iran, um they have been very, very cautious, um you know, saying, you know, lamenting the violence, lamenting and and and hinting that they weren't happy to see the UN, sorry, the US attack their ally Iran, but not mentioning the US, and then and and and expressing solidarity with Gulf states hit by Iran, um, which is also kind of curious, um, and taking down statements that, although they seem incredibly mild by Chavista standards, appeared to be um uh un unwelcome in in Washington. They took they'd taken down communique that um that looked as if they were uh too pro-Iranian. So um so geopolitically, I mean as a as a as a friend of mine, um political uh advisor on the opposition side put it to me not long ago, said on January the third the Chavistas woke up and re realized that they live in the Western Hemisphere. Um which I think puts you know put puts it very succinctly and and very accurately, it never was in the long term a viable proposition for Venezuela to seek its economic and its political uh ties a long way from the Western Hemisphere. Um and ultimately that was bound to you know, you it could be sustained while Venezuela had lots of money coming in during the oil boom after 2003-2004, but really long term it it makes no geopolitical sense. So um of course, you know, as our compatriot John Maynard Keynes once said, in the long term we're all dead. So so you know, but fortunately in this case, the long term appears to come come a little sooner than that, and we're still alive. So um there's a considerable shift, and and that, regardless of what happens on in terms of the restoration of Venezuelan institutions and democracy and human rights and so on, it does seem that in terms of relations with the US, that particular experiment is over, right? The one that Uchav is inaugurated at the beginning of the 21st century.

SPEAKER_02 32:49

I I'm I'm still uh I can't believe you brought in John Maynard Keynes, but that's okay. Um very interesting to bring in in this situation. So if we were to look, we were look ahead in the sort of the immediate month months as we wind this conversation down, uh Phil. In the immediate months, I mean, you know, crisis group, it's a conflict prevention organization. If you're looking at this, um we expect coercion from the side of the US and and sort of uh uh let's say pseudo-pushback from Delsey, but really towing the line, because I mean these recent meetings, Delcy Rodriguez, of course, uh these recent meetings uh that saying they're going to work with the US for oil infrastructure and oil and so on. Is that is that what we can see? We've reached this kind of um, I would say, sort of uncertain stability uh in Venezuela for the coming months ahead?

SPEAKER_00 33:47

Yeah, I think that's a very good way to put it. I think I think you know there is a new equilibrium. Um and to a degree that's good. I mean, you know, it's a lot better than the pr prior six months where we were watching the huge buildup of the military in the in in the Caribbean and expecting at any moment to be bombed out of our beds. Um so you know, this equilibrium is good to a point, but there's all there's a tremendous danger that it simply becomes the new normal. And you know, what the follow what the political scientists like to call authoritarian consolidation takes over. Um, that neither the government here nor the government in Washington want to push political reform because it's destabilizing. You know, the other the argument against that, of course, is the one that Marco Rubio himself has put um in recent days. Um you can't have an economic recovery without a legitimate set of institutions because people won't bring in them the amount of money that's needed if your institutions don't guarantee the safety of their staff, their you know, their personnel, but also their investment. And so, you know, Marco Rubio argues, and and it's a powerful point, that there has to be political reform and there have to be stable and independent institutions, because otherwise the econom the economy will never recover. It will it will remain at this at this stable but very unappealing level, where you know, some people, a very very tiny portion of the population live very well, and a vast majority. I mean you mentioned, I think, you know, more than a quarter of the population, according to UN estimates, are in need of in need of food aid. I mean, this is terrible. Country that, you know, let's not forget Venezuela for much of the 20th century, was the pretty much the richest in terms of per capita GDP in the whole of Latin America. Its currency was more stable than anything except the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen at the time. Um, and it all started to go wrong at the beginning of the 1980s, and it's never recovered. It's just been one blow after another. Will we ever get back to some resemblance, some semblance of where we were in the in the mid to late 20th century? Who knows? But you know, the only way to do that is through political reform because reform. Because unless we start to see a situation in which um people, for example, are appointed on the basis of talent and not political loyalty. That's one of the things that's you know that's gone wrong here. Um, you know, I think Delcie is perfectly prepared to be an economic reformer and to open up the economy. But that's only going to go so far, you know, if she's not prepared to push on the political front. And and of course um the danger there is that um she if she does decide to do that, her her personal future may be put in jeopardy.

SPEAKER_02 36:48

Yeah, I can certainly see that. I mean, there's no no uh you know security at all that she's uh uh president of Venezuela this time next year. That's that's the absolute reality of it. Anything could almost happen. And uh I'm sure there are plenty of people waiting, you know, waiting in the shadows to to perhaps take over and of course secure their their roles and uh and that of course um you know look after number one. They've been getting very rich in these last years and so on and so forth. So I think uh Venezuela's always one to watch. Um you know, Latin America seems to be very much in the uh US uh uh sites at the moment. And the recent news out of Ecuador, of course, US military helping against um uh what do they call it in the international crime cartels, drugs cartels, the bombing of the of the alleged drugs boats off the Caribbean coast of Venezuela and Colombia, and of course of the Pacific. It's very much we seem to be in the line of fire of the US. So we can't we can't predict. We can only just sort of look at uh look around us and say, well, what might happen? And so thank you. Uh I must say thank you so much to uh Phil Gunson uh of the International Crisis Group. Uh he's of course the senior analyst for the Andes region and based in Caracas for sharing so unselfishly his thoughts about what is going on in the region in uh Venezuela at this moment. So thank you for being on the Latin News Podcast.

SPEAKER_00 38:20

It's been my pleasure, Richard.

SPEAKER_02 38:21

Very nice to talk to you. It has been an absolute pleasure. Remember, of course, you can subscribe to the Latin News Podcast wherever you get your podcast and on YouTube. Hit subscribe, never miss an episode. We'll be back in two weeks' time discussing further developments from this region and of course uh uh uh how it affects us uh here and around the world. So thank you everyone for listening. I've been Richard McCall, and goodbye.

SPEAKER_01 38:48

You've been listening to the Latin News Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.