Why Ecuador Feels Increasingly Unstable

Ecuador is undergoing a profound political and security transformation. Once regarded as one of the more stable countries in Latin America, it now faces escalating violence, institutional strain and growing political tension. 

In this episode of The LatinNews Podcast, Richard McColl speaks with Samuele Mazzolini, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellow and researcher at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and FLACSO Ecuador, about the forces reshaping Ecuador under President Daniel Noboa. 

The discussion examines the rapid expansion of organised crime, the fragmentation of local gangs, the limits of the government’s security strategy and the broader weakening of state institutions. We also look at Noboa’s increasingly confrontational political style, tensions with Colombia, and the growing role of the United States in Ecuador’s security landscape. 

As insecurity spreads beyond the country’s traditional hotspots and public frustration rises, the episode asks a broader question: what has happened to Ecuador’s stability, and where is the country heading next? 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:01

This is the Latin News Podcast. I'm your host, Richard McCall, here in Bogota, Colombia. We have a very special guest on the line from Italy. We're going to be talking to Samuele Mazzolini. He's a researcher in political science and philosophy at the University of Venice and Flaxo Ecuador. He's also a Marie Curie fellow. He specializes in Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and of course the region. And we're going to be discussing Ecuador today. Much going on there, much conflict, world war of words and trade wars with Colombia going on, plummeting approval ratings for President Norboa. Crime is going through the roof. I think we need to probably just say welcome on the Latin News podcast, Samuel. And how did we get here from Ecuador being believed to be the Switzerland of South America and now obviously in a real situation?

SPEAKER_02 0:57

Hi Richard, and thanks for having me to our podcast. Really honored to be here today. Yeah, things have changed quite dramatically in Ecuador over the last decade or so. We went from a left-leaning government. Rafael Correa left office 10 years ago. No, say nine years ago, when the rate of homicides per 100,000 habitants, inhabitants, it was like around less to s less than 6%. And now it ramped up to 51 persons per 100,000. Yeah, it was the there's a fever from last year, 2025. Maybe it wasn't like Switzerland, but it was still by a large a relatively peaceful country. It was involved in narco routes, but it was nowhere near to what it is today. It looks like it is the epicenter of drug trafficking in Latin America. Great part of the cane produced in Colombia and in Peru, neighboring countries goes through Ecuador and it is shipped from there to different markets to uh to the US, uh, to Europe. And as I as I said, that has been accompanied by a spike in homicide rates. Uh local gangs have grown significantly. Before these, local gangs already existed, but they were marginal in the uh in the crime economy of the country. But now they've been higher, they've been contractors of uh larger international uh cardos, Mexican, Colombian, even Albanian, and they have, of course, been strongly financed and armed, and they uh yeah, and they pose a significant threat to uh the country's security. And the uh the current government that has launched a crusade against these the security reigning in a country hasn't been able to do much about it, right? So there was a very little reduction in the homicide rate in 2024, but it was belied last year again, as I uh as I said a minute ago. So it looks like the the security policy of the Boa isn't quite uh isn't quite working. Alongside uh the narco routes, uh you got an increase in extortion. Small businesses are being extorted massively. And yeah, I was speaking about the policies. There have been a number of uh captures and extraditions of of historical jefes, right? So Fito, Negrowilli, Pipo, some of these figures have been taken by security forces, but the organizations behind it haven't been dismantled, they've been atomized. So right now, all these networks, all these uh all these organizations, Los Choneros, Los Lobos, Tigerones, they work more as networks of factions with temporary pacts, which leads to more internal violence and more extortion, as I cite. Another thing that isn't quite working is the securitization of the country, which has gone hand in hand with the states of exception, with cofies which have been called which have been called every now and then in different provinces, it doesn't seem to be doing much, also because there is no much state building there. Uh for example, the judiciary that that's that's like a bottleneck, right? So many people are taken to prison, but the judiciary system isn't able to uh to do much about it. Out of 150,000 people that have been captured over the last few months, only 10,000 have been processed so far. So that that's that's a real bottleneck. Plus, the Bukele model that Naboa promised in his last campaign is not simply being delivered in the sense that he promised this massive new prison, which ended up as a much smaller facility in the end. And LD Barcos prision, he also promised last campaign, haven't materialized. And I want to, before I we close this chapter, unless you want to ask some further question, one thing that should be mentioned is the incredibly high human cost that these policies have entailed. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has issued two precautionary measures against Ecuador, one for the disappearance of 25 people by the military, and that happened on the heels of another case which involved six, sorry, four children in Guayaquil that were held captive by the military and they were tortured. That was really bad, believe me. And then there was another precautionary measure that also talked about, so hinted at the really serious health uh crisis in the in the prison system of Ecuador. Yeah, the situation is pretty dire over there. Uh, and I think Noboa wanted a quick answer to Bas's popularity, but it hasn't quite worked.

SPEAKER_00 5:43

It's a difficult situation. You have Noboa in power in 2003 in an abbreviated presidency, and then coming back to power after winning in 2023, sorry, and 2025. And then you talk about the Bukele model, and of course, arrests and extradition they play an important role in the removal of criminal actors, but they only disrupt these criminal links and businesses momentarily, and that's what we're seeing. It's as you said, the Bukele model of far more authoritarian measures. It seems to me that the government response, as you said, he needed a quick response to the security situation. But below that, are they are they focusing on anything to make changes on the ground, grassroots changes, so that criminal gangs aren't the most powerful in the regions and in the cities?

SPEAKER_02 6:46

I don't see that happening really. The state has been rolled back since the government of Lenín Moreno. So the present of the state, which have become quite visible in very tangible terms under Korea's government, but that has gone away, that has stopped. So all these nice, beautiful social programs that were implemented back then, with all the limitations of Korea's government, of course, they they provide a future for people, for young people, especially. Now that has been taken away. The state has got much less money at disposal because of the austerity measures that have been, as I said, taken by Moreno and then further deepened by his successor successors such as Lasso and then Loboa. And as per the control of the gangs of the territory, what we've seen the last few months is a quite worrying trend because the violence wasn't, of course, just limited to the coast of Ecuador, but it was it mainly took place there. And it still does, you know, I mean you wrong most homicides, relative terrors that take place in the province of Los Rios, and but since Guayas is a much larger province, that's where you find the bulk of the assassinations taking place. And yet you have seen over the last few months an increase of uh the rate of murders in Quito, which it wasn't a safe haven entirely, but you know, the situation there was significantly better than in different areas. But it's starting to be ever less also because extortion is it is been it is rampant, and a lot of businesses, if not a lot of businesses in the capital, but that can be easily extorted. This is becoming ever more widespread. The state is is just being just rolling back. So in this sense, uh, I don't see the state as being uh responding correctly beyond these sets of emergency measures that are not more like a theater, they're more like uh a show than it's even a measure that is efficiently delivering it. And that that explains why uh Naboa has been losing popularity over the last few months after a period of their honeymoon, which lasted for two years, two years and a half, maybe.

SPEAKER_00 8:55

Significant honeymoon. You mentioned this as the state a lot, and I think it's probably worthwhile mentioning. So, in this circumstance, does you think that the institutions in in Ecuador are incredibly weak, they're incredibly uh fragile then, let's say, for processing criminals, and of course, the for the rule of law, the state is has been compromised over the last decade, would you say?

SPEAKER_02 9:22

Absolutely, yeah. I think we should speak in in large terms about these weak institutions in Ecuador. So it's not just a stereotype, it is we're witnessing an authoritarian term. So the rule of law is really being undermined under Noboa. So what we've been seeing, oh concrete terms, is the executive concentrated power and a systematic effort to neutralize every horizontal check that the constitution provides, combined with a selective use of justice against opposition and disciplining of civil society immediately through new laws. Many people talked about Korea also taking a similar route, which was certainly true, but I think this is going far beyond what Korea did 10 years back. So just to be concrete, just to come up with a number of examples, there was a set of bills that were passed last summer, uh in a matter of weeks, actually, summer as in European summer, right? So I was speaking about last June to August last year. There was this Lay Organica de Solidaridad Nacional, which provided a formal framework for declaring the internal armed conflict. It involved presidential pardon for police and the military, and it opened the door for lethal force with weakened accountability. Then you had this lay Organica de Intelligentsia, uh, which provided for powers for undercover agents with false identities. You had this lay the Transparencia Social and Lay de Fundaciones, which regulates NGOs and foundations under an anti-money laundering pretext, but has been denounced by different groups as a tool to amedrentar, to cartel critical groups and their rights to criticize the government. Now, the constitutional court suspended a number of articles of these laws last year, and then sometime later, parts of these laws were declared anti uh unconstitutional, right? And that's when these big battles between the executive and the constitutional courts uh began in Ecuador with serious consequences uh for the for the institutional stability in the country. So, yeah, let me just add a few more things that I think corroborate what I just said. There has been uh a suspension of the of the Citizens Revolution Party, which is the party of Rafael Corea, the main opposition party in Ecuador, for nine months by the Tribunal de Contencioso Electoral, there was the electoral dispute tribunal, right? Because uh there was an alleged illegal, there were alleged illegal contributions and money laundering involved in the party. In practice, they say that there was money coming in from uh from Venezuela in the in the 2023 elections. Uh these decisions ratified uh in April, just a month ago, which means that uh the next local elections, which have been uh, you know, that were supposed to take place next year in uh in February, but they have been now, the calendar has been switched, right? They have been set in November. Accordingly, because the uh there's some climate phenomena taking place next year, so they had to be anticipated. But this is a way to leave less time for the opposition to organize. Uh, plus, as I say, the party of the citizens revolution is being temporarily suspended. So this means that about 10,000 affiliates of that party now are having to disaffiliate to be able to run. So the movement will participate under alternative speakers, but this is just yet another way to make life for the opposition more difficult. Okay, another thing that I think deserves mentioning is the case of Aquiles Álvarez, the mayor of Guayaquil. He had very high approval ratings, very outspoken critique of uh of Noboa, and he was a presidential prospect for 20 2029, right? If I'm not wrong, right? Now he's been he's been taken to prison in a very in a case that has been declared by many as totally political. Let's see what the judges will have to say, but the the way it has been, the case has been specularized. The way he was held captive, he was taken prisoner a night when he was in his pyjama and the whole thing was filmed, that rises doubts as to how justice is being manipulated by the current government. In actual fact, the UN special rapporteur Finan Romero has been publicly denouncing uh an authoritarian drift taking place in Ecuador. And if we want to frame this, and with this, I'm trying to close this chapter in uh in a sort of academic way, if we want to tap into the academic literature, uh, I think this is a clear case of competitive authoritarianism as analyzed by Stefan Levitzki. So elections are still there, but somehow opposition can compete, but the playing field is ever more skewed. It is ever it makes the possibility for organizing the opposition more difficult, and yeah, and so that this is a drift that is it is increasing day by day, and it's under everybody's eyes.

SPEAKER_00 14:44

This is obviously a consolidation of power by Noboa, uh, of course. This, yes, as you say, uh an authoritarian drift. Do you think that Noboa was always working towards this after the let's say the failure of his referendums in November 2025? Do you think that this is something he's I'm gonna do this it's in the best it's in the best uh interest of the country to force all of all of this through?

SPEAKER_02 15:17

Just to make a small historical recap, when when he was elected pressing for the first time in 2023, and then by that time he only had a year and a half ahead because he was just closing, was he had to conclude the last mandate of Lasso, he was elected on the premise that yes, he was an anti-Coraista, but he was a moderate one, right? So he seemed quite seemed to adopt a quite conciliatory tone. Of course, the the there was no room for thinking that he could make life easy for Koraistas, but it didn't look that he could go down this route. And certainly his politics and he himself have become more embittered after what he just mentioned, that is the defeat in last year referenda. That was a really a big blow for his politics because he almost all observers expected his referenda to uh to pass. The year uh before he promoted other 11 referendums, right? None of which passed. So you had the perception that the the population was actually looking into the single proposals that were being put forward. So none were passed, two were rejected back in the year before. Now this year, sorry, last year, at the end of last year. Let me just recall what this entail because it is important. The first one had to do with the with lifting the ban, the constitutional ban on having military, foreign military bases in Ecuador, right? So basically what he wanted to do was to bring back uh some US military base in Ecuador. The second one was the was about reducing the the fine the money being given to political parties by the state. It's a very anti-establishment proposal that almost all observers thought no matters what this is going to pass. Because it is gonna tap into a sort of a very widespread feeling of caste and all that sort of thing. Same for this for the next one, which was the reduction of lawmakers, of national lawmakers by 50%. So the in actual fact the the Congress will go from 150 to almost 80 lawmakers. That was also rejected. And the last one was about uh a new constitutional assembly, right? Of course, the two middle proposals that I just mentioned were meant to drag the population to vote yes for everything, okay? And yet all of them were rejected, which means that in a way people were showing to be shown to be quite fed up with his politics only months after his re-election, which took place in if I don't recall correctly, if I don't remember wrongly, it was around March, April last year. One of the reasons people didn't want a new constitution, a new constituent assembly, was that his proposals were quite confused. He never quite said what what he wanted. So I think the population say, okay, we don't give you a blank check. It's as simple as that. Many times during the during the campaign, he had to backtrack of a number of things he said. So the perception he gave was that of not having uh his ideas too clear, or to rather to be hiding something from the population. But anyhow, that was hard blow, and yet he's now trying to smuggle one of the constitutional changes through the constitutional coronal. And that has to do with the uh precise thing. Right now, the designation uh of the Fiscal General and other positions of control within the state is in the hands of a body which is pretty much under his control, but that body will be renewed later easier in the local elections because that's that that body is uh is elected by the people through direct vote. Uh, and he fears that he will lose that body. So he wants those positions, those top state positions, to be designed by the assembly, where he will likely hold a majority for a number of years. Um, so you see, every move he's taking these days um is you know designed to um you know keep his uh uh keep his power intact uh and actually to aggrandize it uh to the you know as much as possible. But these are short-term moves that I'm I'm not sure how long they will work because uh his popularity is plummeting. Um so if you look at the last polls, he I mean he he ranks among the four worst presidents in Latin America with around 60% of disapproval. Um and uh and yet another uh recent poll suggested uh uh that almost 60% are in favor of recalling Noboa. You know, in Ecuador this uh revocatoria de mandato, which can be triggered either by the assembly, which is never going to do it, or by the people through a collection of signatures, which I don't think will either work because uh institutions have to validate those signatures, and those institutions are in the hands of Noboa for now. And we saw that even with Korea, when uh uh bunch of uh citizens try to collect signatures to protect the Yasuni initiative that he wanted to revoke uh Korea, Korea's controlled body actually uh invalidated a number of signatures. So no referendum took place. So I don't think a revocatoria is in the uh you know it is in the horizon for now. Uh but the prospects for him aren't too good. I know the elections, the presidential elections are really far away in time for them for the time being.

SPEAKER_01 21:03

But uh unless he changes course, I think uh he will have a hard time.

SPEAKER_00 21:11

Yeah, as you say, rising fuel costs, crime, unpopularity. So what do you do? Well, you you uh you pick a fight with your neighbor and and throw uh throw attention another way. Of course, the tariff war with Colombia comes in perfectly, and of course the uh hundred percent uh tariffs put on Colombian goods and saying that it's uh it's a uh a security fee for the lack of uh security that Colombia has provided to the border of Ecuador. And this is uh this is obviously big news here and and of course in in Colombia as well, the tit for tat between uh Gustavo Petro and and uh President uh Noboa. How how is it being seen in Ecuador from and from your perspective?

SPEAKER_02 21:54

I don't think it is fitting too well with the population really, and that's why he has started to backtrack already. Um look, the the start of war with with this trade war with Colombia is a complete nonsense. In the first place, because the motivation he gave is it's quite boggles, in my opinion. Colombia and Ecuador have been cooperating on security along the border, along the frontier for a number of years. I don't think there was an insufficient uh cooperation from from Colombia in that regard. I think it was very much politically motivated. And it was also way to intervene in the upcoming Colombian elections later later this month. And that was that became clear when he said that the tariffs from 100% were being reduced to 50% again after conversations with with Paloma, right? With the uh with the Urubista candidate, with Paloma Valencia. So that sounds to me as a very blatant interference in in the uh in the issues of a governor country. And that somehow imports Trump uh Trump's style of conducting foreign policy through through tariffs and through trade, which uh it doesn't seem to have marked work much even in Trump's case, anyway. But what is really stunning to me is that it is self-inflicted economic damage to Ecuador because what you have in Ecuador these days is severe supply problems. Ecuador imports from Colombia a number of goods not because of an aggressive Colombian trade policy, it is because Ecuador cannot produce it, can produce those goods, and it needs those goods, medicine, hospital inputs, basic goods, they're all imported from Colombia because of sheer need and shifting to other commercial partners. It takes time, it takes logistics, it takes possibly more money, and it has an inflationary effect on the country, and it also impacts on economic players in your country. It's not just Colombian exporters that are being hit, it's also Ecuadorian importers. So I think it has got economic, negative economic effects on both sides of the of the borders, especially in the border zone, of course, by the Cauca, the cities of India, and are being badly affected these days. But they're they're just bad, and I think that is just silly um economic management in my own eyes. Uh and let's see now how the uh the warnings of uh the Andean Community of Nations uh will fare. Because uh a few days ago the the general secretary published uh the number of resolutions finding the tariffs, um but also the the closing of a number of crossings between the two countries violate the Cartagena Agreement. And now we all know that the CAN, the Andere Communication Nation, doesn't count much. It is a very fragile, wicked institution. Um its invitation to do away with the tariffs, Colombia already said that they will have no problems in you know removing the tariffs provided Ecuador does the same. Um Ecuador maybe it's gonna take some time before it does. It can um it will probably file a recurso de reconsideración, it will probably uh ask the general secretary to review the case again, um, and then the cut the Khan will have another further 30 days to to rule. Um but I think in a way the the the uh the latest uh shift from 100 to 50 is already signaling the recognition on Ecuador's side that it it it wasn't it wasn't very smart move to uh to do because it's not doing any good to and and and of course the um the money has been you know um has been uh uh I would say um levied through these uh through these tariffs uh that's very little money. It's forty-fifty million dollars. You're not gonna go much, uh you're not gonna go anywhere with that money. And of course, the more the tariff increased, the less trade there is between the two countries, so the less money you will get out of these uh these tariffs. I think economically it just made little sense. Uh it had a political one. Um there was there was really um Petro, beyond the uh ideological differences between the two, which was always on the table, he participated, Petro participated to both uh presidential appointments of uh uh of the Boa. So in a way he wanted to make it just of courtesy and show that okay, no matter what they think, what their ultimate beliefs are, what their policies are, their neighbors they need to collaborate. Um and I I think response much, I think the boa's the boa's moved response much to US pressure, really. Uh as we know, Petro for for a few weeks has been one of the targets of Trump's rhetoric. Now he's disappeared from his rhetoric, but you know you the US don't like having a lefty in power in Colombia, and it looks like they will they might be ratified in a few weeks. And we're better about it.

SPEAKER_00 27:17

It's I wanna also I I guess that's something I'll be talking about in a different episode before long. I think I think there's also one other thing to add is of course the energy sales from Colombia to to Ecuador, and Ecuador having suffered from severe crippling droughts uh and of course relying so much on hydroelectric power, you would hope that Naboa, which doesn't seem like it did, had a backup plan for this because of course sales have been suspended until further notice. And yeah, it seems to me obviously. Please.

SPEAKER_01 27:53

Yeah, so sorry, no, I think there was a time delay.

SPEAKER_02 27:56

Uh yeah, and what I want to say is that I think at the water levels, you know, you know, and Ecuador relies a lot of on hydroelectric uh energy. The water levels for now are sufficiently high, so there's no immediate risk of uh of shortages, but not at least until late in the year. Then go figure what will happen. But yeah, you're right in saying that. It is a risky move. You had that two years ago, and Colombia there was very crucial, important provider of energy for Ecuador. It does make very little sense also from the energetic point of view.

SPEAKER_00 28:32

So it's interference, it's interference in a neighboring country's elections. Would you say it's total coercion by the Trump government to the ally in Ecuador? Would you say that this is the US interference saying make life more difficult for Petro and perhaps his the continuity candidate of Ivan Sepeda?

SPEAKER_02 28:53

Whether it is coercion or it is zeal, simple zeal on the part of Boa, because he wants to compete, of course I'm just joking, with Pillet as to who is the most favorite president in South America for Trump, that it is difficult to tell. But certainly it has got to do with his with his affinity between Ecuador, his affinity that Naboo has been trying to build with the US. We all know he's got very strong ties with the US. He was born in the US. Uh he was born there attending Harvard, and then he has made no mystery in his sympathies towards the Trump's administration. Uh and he's been invited to this forum of Latin American Like-minded presidents in Florida uh a few months ago.

SPEAKER_00 29:37

Uh I think yes the shield of the Americas.

SPEAKER_02 29:41

Trump is trying to Yeah, exactly. Uh I think that through Rubio, Trump is is patrolling these America's US historical courtyard much more strictly again after some decades of neglect and disattention. Now they care much more about what goes on in Latin America than the previous administration and what happened in the first 25 years of this century, say.

SPEAKER_00 30:10

But obviously, tricky times. I think Asamuele, we need to wind this down a bit, but again, we don't see I don't see anything. And one thing I want to bring up actually before the referendum in 2025 and the issue of lifting the prohibition of US or foreign bases. There there are there's now, is it an FBI office in Ecuador? Is that right? Am I right in what or at least the DEA is now definitely working again in Ecuador, right?

SPEAKER_02 30:39

Yeah, collaboration has been has been intensifying over the last over the last years with Lhasa, but of course it's grown bigger under Nobo's administration. Yes, the military base is is technically still not possible because of the constitutional ban. But uh this doesn't mean that they cannot cooperate on security matters uh much more the work much more intend intended than what they used to do. So, yeah, as I say, there's an FBI office and there uh there's a number of uh trade and other related agreements that have been signing over the last few years. Uh so yeah, I would say the relations between the two are ever more ever more solid. And whether that is a good or lady to uh solicit your interpretation.

SPEAKER_00 31:27

As you say, elections don't come along until 2029, but and that's a ways off. Uh there's so much could that could possibly happen between now and then, and of course, the will and the whim of Marco Rubio and of course President Trump as well, elections in Colombia, the political fragmentation in neighboring Peru. The region looks a little bit uh little bit on edge at the moment, definitely. So, well, let me take this moment and say thank you so much to Samuele Mazzolini, who is the researcher in political science and philosophy at the University of Venice and Flaxo Ecuador. He's the Marie Curie Fellow, and he obviously is an expert in all things in this Andean region, Ecuador in particular. Thank you for your time and thank you for sharing your expertise with us here on the Latin News Podcast.

SPEAKER_02 32:15

A pleasure and thank you, Richard.

SPEAKER_00 32:19

You're most welcome, everybody who's listening. Please remember you can subscribe on Spotify, iTunes, YouTube, and wherever else you get your podcasts. We are here every fortnight with a new episode speaking to experts in their fields from the region. I've been Richard McCall here in Bogota, Colombia. Thank you again, and goodbye.