Can Guatemala's Democracy Hold?

In this episode, we explore the complex political and security landscape of Guatemala with expert Tiziano Breda. We discuss recent developments, challenges in governance, gang violence, and the influence of international actors, providing insights into the country's future prospects.

When President Bernardo Arevalo took office in 2023, many were hopeful for a fresh start in Guatemalan politics. However, his administration has faced numerous obstacles, including constant legal threats and political maneuvering aimed at undermining his authority. The former Attorney General, Consuelo Porras, has been particularly aggressive in her attempts to nullify the election results and impede Arevalo's legislative agenda. 

Tiziano Breda, Senior Analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean for ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) speaks to the LatinNews podcast about the deterioration in security in Guatemala, the current government's move to a more hardline stance on crime and the country's relationship with the United States. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:01

This is the Latin News Podcast. I'm your host, Richard McCall, here in Bogota, Colombia. This week's episode is focused on Guatemala, and we're speaking to expert Tiziano Breda, who is the senior analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean at ACLE. That's the armed conflict location and event data. And we're going to be discussing, well, current events in Guatemala. He's in Italy at the moment, so uh welcome on the Latin News Podcast, Tiziano.

SPEAKER_01 0:30

Hi Richard, I'm a very avid listener to the podcast. So thanks for having me.

SPEAKER_00 0:35

Well, obviously, flattery will get you everywhere, and uh that's a great way to start this. Um, but Tiziano, Guatemala at the moment, uh let's let's just give our listeners a little bit of an overview of what's going on. We have elections in uh next year in Guatemala, presidential elections. So President Bernardo Arrevalo is coming to the end of his end of his mandate. Uh what can we what can we say, sort of looking at mid-2026, has been or will be reflected as his legacy as president? Because it was such a and again, it was a it was that glitch in the matrix of Bernardo uh Arrevolo and Semilla getting into power.

SPEAKER_01 1:18

Yeah, I mean it really is uh quite hard to believe that it's already uh past two years and a half since uh Bernardo Arevalo took office. Um and in a way, this feeling uh stems from the fact that much of his presidency has been uh distinguished by uh constant uh sort of threat uh and and constant legal actions um uh brought forward by the the attorney general's office, uh particularly in the figure of the former Attorney General Consuelo Porras, with several attempts to nullify the elections results to impede his swearing-in ceremony, uh eventually succeeding in uh counseling the uh the party, the semi-a party that uh since March no longer exists, basically. So his 23 deputies still sit in parliament, but they do not represent any more um uh a formal, a formally recognized ruling party. Um and this has translated in and is probably was part of a strategy by uh sort of the um political forces that in a way uh were um allied with or had relations with the um attorney general Consordo Porras because it was precisely designed to slow down the government, to impede um his legislative agenda to be brought forward. And indeed, there has been some reform that has been brought forward, um particularly on uh sort of infrastructure projects that are uh being that have been identified and have sort of started to be put on the way, um, and and a law against uh, for example, uh the monopoly, which is um I was reading Guatemala is one of was one of the last countries, if not the last country in Latin America that didn't have a legislation uh against monopoly, and that that's telling about the sort of economic and political system that has uh sort of uh governed the country for the past few decades. Uh but other than that, and also due to the fact that, of course, as I was saying, 23 semilla or let's say uh uh you know officialist deputies sit in Congress, but the Congress has 160 deputies, so he could not count really on any majority in Congress by far. He had come to some agreements with other parties, but of course, to push forward reforms and and laws, um of course it was be it was it was difficult since the very beginning. So, in essence, two years and a half have passed, and really not much, I would say, has changed in the got in the countries. That there's no clear achievement that the government has been able to um to put forward. Um, and instead, of course, the uh disillusionment um uh among Guatemalans has grown. He was not elected with a strong mandate, as was as you were saying, he was um his election was a bit uh you know the result of uh an attempt to block other candidates that seemed to be favored for the elections, and he resulted to be the one that nobody was thinking it could be voted, and it ended up being elected. Um but so he he did not have a strong mandate, uh, but still a high approval rate at the beginning, around 70-80%, and now it's down to 30-something percent because it actually guessed the malens field um some stasis, no, some stagnation in the government, uh, which has also had to deal with a severe uh deterioration of security in the past uh year or so.

SPEAKER_00 5:12

I think this is incredibly important to think about this. It's like he's he's sort of a symbolic president for what he represents, but not what he has been able to achieve, as because you're saying very little, a stagnation. Um, and yes, security has uh has obviously worsened. Perhaps uh we can put that into context. What are the current peace and security uh issues? What's that what does it look like in Guatemala right now?

SPEAKER_01 5:43

So in Guatemala, if you allow me to take a step back, um it's a country that just 15 years ago used to be the most violent in Central America, which was already uh the one of the most violent regions in Latin America and so in the world. Uh so in 2009, it had over 40 uh homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Um and many much of this violence originated from criminal structures that were basically encrusted in the state and had participation of political, military, and economic um actors. Um so the CC came in, this UN-backed uh anti-impunity commission, and through um the you know the strengthening of investigative capacities uh of authorities, the promotion of some legal reforms that provided more tools to authorities to actually go after violent organizations, um this essentially allowed this uh the country to dismantle over 70 criminal organizations uh in in the span of a decade. And this contributed, some argue, to a certain extent um to a decrease in the numbers of violence and the levels of homicides. So by 2019, when the CCIG was shut down, um the country was registering uh around 15, 16 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants with a steady decrease over a decade. Now, as I was saying, the CC was shut down because it dared to investigate to open a case against uh then President Jimmy Morales and his brother and son. Um he faced the political backlash that this sparked. On the other hand, uh under Consuelo Porras, uh the Attorney General's office then became a place for uh political venditas rather than an institution that would go after violent crime and corrupt actors. Um so little by little, and after the pandemic, and of course the the impact that it has on the livelihood of many Guatemalans, including in very marginalized communities where gangs breed, um all of these sort of started to reverse this downward trend that the country had experienced. So it little by little it didn't escalate, but violence was going up um again. Uh it had plateaued, more or less. Um, but last year um there was um uh a breakout, uh sorry, an outbreak of of violence between uh the MS-13, one of the country's main gangs, and the Badiri Siocho or 18th Street Gang, the other uh very notorious outfit um in the region. Um, because essentially the MS-13 apparently decided to take out what was an intermediary for both gangs, um, basically a drug supplier, and uh provided them with the drugs that then they could distribute in their own turfs. Um so probably the MS-13 got hold of a different supplier and basically um killed one of the uh leaders of this supplier, which is called the Los Caradura gang. Um, and this prompted an outbreak of war, particularly in Guatemala City and surroundings. We in Accled recorded around 100 clashes between uh organized crime groups, particularly gangs, uh in 2025 alone, and this definitely contributed to a 10% increase in the homicide rates in the country last year. And this has been accompanied by some notorious cases uh of uh sort of the sparked outcry in the country. There were a return to violent uh prison mutinies. It was something that wasn't seen uh for a while in a country that had experienced a lot of unfortunately very violent events in prisons um over the past 20 years. Um and also uh this essentially um was coupled by a great escape by 20 Barrio 18 high-level members uh that prompted a governmental crisis actually and and forced Arevalu to um dismiss then uh interior minister Francisco Jimenez, and that was taken advantage of by political forces in the opposition and by the Attorney General's office that PUDA probably um uh issued an arrest warrant for the for this case against uh the former minister who had to flee the country. And this year, to to finalize uh my comment also related to prisons after the government tried to transfer certain high-level gang members to a facility that had stricter controls. The Badi di Siocho launched a series of attacks that killed 11 police officers in just one day uh in January this year, uh, and this also prompted uh a very uh sort of difficult moment for the government uh and increased the demands for a more confrontational, hardline uh approach to crime, which is something that Arevolo in principle had uh you know argued against. No, he had argued for more violence prevention, strengthening of investigative bodies, um, and intelligence capacities for the police, uh, you know, um all processes respecting the rule of law, the democratic timings, and so on and so forth. And he was uh pushed, of course, to change slightly the his routes.

SPEAKER_00 11:36

It seems so clear that um security issues and politics uh go hand in hand, especially well, Latin America in general, but you know, Central America, uh, you know, Guatemala being previously the most violent country. Uh, but if we look obviously not far away, we have to look at El Salvador and of course the Manodura of uh Naib Bukele, the president there, we covered recently on the podcast. Um, but uh I I I imagine that you have a very vociferous percentage of the population saying they want the kind of a Bukele style uh cleanup within Guatemala, but that's not a revelos, that's not what he, you know, it's not what he campaigned on, but I guess he's being pushed towards that in some extent. Uh how how how much is this affecting his his his governing style, Tiziano?

SPEAKER_01 12:34

Yeah, I think he has been able to uh I mean, always had to walk a very tight rope, no? Balancing on one hand, as you were saying, the growing demand for uh a more uh hardline Manodura approach that sort of shows force by the state, uh, that increases sanctions of gang-related crimes, that uh employs the military to go after violent crime, which is something that in this particular time of history is also very much welcome, if not very much fostered by the US administration under Donald Trump in the region. Um so there's one there's growing demand on one hand, uh, and on the other, uh effectively the limits of what was uh being done by the government, which tried to respect all the different sort of procedural um rulings uh that uh that foresee, for example, the transfer of uh censor detainees from a facility to another, that oblig obliges authority to respond to an abus corpus, uh, which in many cases were used by lawyers of these gang leaders to avoid this transfer, not to revert these measures, to to basically maintain the status quo that allowed them to rule from prisons um onto the streets. Uh so in essence, um rhetorically, but Arevolo has not given in uh until sort of the the very last bit of this uh demands, so he's not um you know uh endorsed uh a discourse of war on gangs, on uh shielding the security forces from any persecution if they commit crimes and abuses um or things like uh of this sort, which other governments starting with neighboring Bukele uh but also Noboa in Ecuador have done. But at the same time, he did have to um to give in on specific issues. He, for example, uh basically accepted or uh sort of promoted legislation that defines gangs as terrorist organizations at the end of last year. Um he uh sort of promoted the creation, the construction of a new prison, maximum security prison, um, which rings a bell uh when somebody says secot. Um it had to sort of impose emergency measures uh following this particularly violent event in January. So uh for over four months, uh various states of uh siege or and then prevention, essentially uh states of emergency in which certain rights are uh restricted and uh military operation, the military can operate more easily alongside the police were implemented. Um and at the same time, more recently, an article came out that um sort of uh described how the government has also reached out to the US in a way to ask for greater support in carrying out operations against drug trafficking uh groups. So, in a way, he had to give in partially uh to certain measures that weren't probably in its toolkit uh at the beginning, uh, but at the same time he did not um completely abandon the the sort of rhetorical approach to to the matter and and in a way has never um tried to use these emergency measures to go after different things than violent crime. We we saw that in El Salvador Bukele has also used these emergency measures to go after, unfortunately, the opposition or to um to you know less transparently fund specific projects, but um Arévalo has not has not gone down that route.

SPEAKER_00 16:39

Well, that in itself is a relief. So it we can't say that under Arévalo then you know shifting his his uh politics to a more hard line, uh I guess let's say a tempered hard line politics, because he wants to, it seems he wants to stay true to his his actual political belief, but at the same time, um we we can say that this hasn't been like a backsliding towards authoritarianism, as we've seen in so many other places where you know by decree you declare again this state of emergency and then just extend it almost indefinitely. Uh, you mentioned Ecuador, we've seen that, we've talked about that on the podcast, El Salvador as well, very recent episodes here on the on the Latin News podcast. I mean, that would be a concern. If we talk a little bit about the the gang violence in Guatemala, you mentioned the MS-13 and the Barrio 1818. The I mean, Colombia, I mean Colombia, uh Guatemala is a transshipment country. So is it is it the kind of same gang violence as as was seen uh prior to Bukele in El Salvador, extortion-based, uh, you know, controlling uh urban sections within cities and so on. Is that the kind of gang violence we're looking at in Guatemala?

SPEAKER_01 17:58

There are certainly some similarities, uh, but also some differences. Um, first of all, the similarities uh are related to some of the actors that are involved in in violence and in crime in in Guatemala. Of course, you mentioned MS-13, Bari di Chu, these are all gangs um uh that uh sort of originated among Central American migrants in the US in the 90s and then spread through Central America, so to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, uh following mass deportations by the Clinton administrations back then. Uh so the you know, nominally the actors, uh some of the actors are similar. The very much the great difference um uh compared to El Salvador, for example, is that these groups, first of all, could count on fewer members. Um the latest estimate is that they could count uh to between a 10,000 to 14,000 members, whereas in El Salvador we will be talking about four times, five times these figures. Um and that's also because geographically they are more concentrated than they were in El Salvador when they were present to uh in all over 90% of the country's municipalities just a few years ago. And in comparison in Guatemala, this phenomenon concentrates much more much more around the capital, the surrounding municipalities and departments, and uh with to some extent uh Casaltenango, which is the second largest city in the country, but essentially the extortion rackets um uh are more prevalent in in the city and surroundings. Um but also uh the the among the differences is the fact that, as you said, Guatemala is much more prominent than El Salvador in the drug trafficking trade in the region. So, of course, it's uh it has a much bigger uh sort of uh extension, um it has uh much bigger ports through which um some uh some of the drugs can can flow through. It has a lot of green in the northern part of the country, in Peten and Las Vera Paces, um, which can be used by um are used by sort of uh organized crime groups to build illegal airstrips and so uh traffic also by air, something you can't really do in a super highly populated country and small such as El Salvador. So whereas in the cities you have great presence of gangs, in the more sort of border departments um and maritime departments, there are um strong drug trafficking clans. So uh compared to some 12 years ago when the the Zetas from Mexico tried to make inroads in the country and really sparked a very violent um well-invariant dispute uh for drug trafficking, uh let's say a kind of balance, no, a kind of uh equilibrium has been reached in that sense. So the violence in those departments is not much for the competition among groups, but just perpetrated by very powerful clans, you know in Wewetenango, Los Juistas and Sacapa, the Lorenzana family, and so on and so forth. Um but of course it also means that gangs, in a way, had increased their participation in not only extortion activities, but but also increasingly so drug fur drug peddling first and foremost. But um the according to the the security minister recently uh said that even in drug trafficking they had sort of increased their participation in a way. Uh so the increase uh in or the diversification uh of uh of these activities has become has been greater in Guatemala, which uh of course becomes problematic if the main actors of course uh then start fighting for the control of these activities as we've seen uh since mid-2025 it it's there's a complexity here and and and we are we're kind of getting closer to it I think it it when you talk about the clans and the criminal gangs of course we said the MS-13 and the Baru 18 how connected are these then to the political system and the sort of the corrupt clientelist system within politics itself because that's something that's come up on this podcast uh on every time we've mentioned Guatemala it's it's been that so where where does this sort of you know become you know the fluid point between the these clans and elites and the families and the political uh authorities I think we can start with an anecdote on this question Richard which is uh one of the main leaders of the Bari di Sorcho or if not the maximum leader in Guatemala um uh alias El Lobo so du pie aldo du pie um is engaged or like his partner is called Maria Castageda Torres now this surname the second one in particular may sound to many Guatemala followers uh familiar because she is the niece of Sandra Torres the presidential candidate that uh Arevalo faced off in the runoff in 2023 and you know a longtime political figure former first lady um of the country I mean we're talking about a very close relationship now we can't um let's say by osmosis accuse Sandra Torres of uh you know uh the crimes or the the relationship that her niece has has developed but that certainly uh gives a hint as to how close to the high highest excellence of the political circles uh some connections between organized crime groups and um and gangs uh sorry and and politicians can run in Guatemala another example was that the former um president of Congress was um a relative of Los Vistas the the other group the drug trafficking group um that I was uh referring to uh in um a few my minutes ago so um I mean that gives a hint as to let's say again we relatives cannot be blamed for the sins of others but in a way the fact that some or very known organized crime groups are um engaged, connected have links with the highest excellence of political figures in the country uh is certainly uh a hint no as to how how deep these connections run.

SPEAKER_00 25:13

You you've stepped around it very carefully um and I I commend you on that but yes I mean there's no way that these families don't know that it is ongoing. And there it so therefore I would suggest as as much as I can is a very close relationship without being you know uh overly outspoken about this.

SPEAKER_01 25:34

So when we talk I think again we come back to this hardline approach new prisons you know asking for uh US support this puts obviously Bernardo Revelo even more into uh the let's say the President Trump sphere of influence and under the Hawkish uh Marco Rubio of course of Cuban descent but very much um interested in in the l the Latin hemisphere let's say um but Bernardo Revollo was not invited to participate in this Shield of the Americas that took place a few months ago you know so it seemed like it was a more politically aligned group of of uh regional leaders uh rather than uh an actual you know overarching shield to stop uh drug trafficking illegal migration and and criminality indeed this is uh this has been carefully handled by both the US government and uh the Guatemalan government um I I would say on the US side of things um there's been a clear attempt to give the Shield of America as uh an ideological fruit footprint right so beyond the kind of policies that the governments offered to bring forward or that the US uh demanded that they bring forward the the Shield of America in essence is a platform for governments that have ideological affinity with Washington and that's been proven by uh basically the uh a statement on that was put out recently by the Shield of America's leaders on protests in Bolivia I mean nothing that was related to drug trafficking or you know how to tackle crime in the region so on and so forth. And um and so inviting Bernardo Arevalo could uh could in a way you know uh was not in line with with the political purpose of the meeting itself. On the other hand um also Bernardo Arevalo has uh avoided no being um framed as uh a political vassal of the of the US no of uh being too uh aligned or or surveillant uh um towards the the US and has preferred to opt for a more pragmatic engagement not with the US so um giving way for greater cooperation on migration issues uh sort of accepting a lot of deportation flights um recently uh unfortunately also giving into pressure to let the Cuban doctors that were present in the country go as part of this overall regional policy by Washington to sort of isolate Cuba and um sort of deprive it from any basically source of of income. But at the same time yeah without necessarily as you were discussing sort of fully buying on the the militarized rhetoric that only uh pure force can can solve the the crime issue in in the region. So I think the two have been dancing this tango uh carefully and essentially I mean uh of course uh the there's been uh some some great engagement with the Ministry of Defense uh traveling um to the margins of the summit meeting with the with uh with the political figures there US secret state secretary Marco Rubio visiting guatemala so they they both have basically maintained a productive pragmatic relationship even if not sort of fully uh endorsed and publicized as um uh as a full-fledged political alignment basically so uh yeah a a working a working relationship pragmatic being a word um what uh how does that play at home uh what how do guatemalans feel about this do they feel they need greater US intervention or they're happy to to be more you know let let's let's be more on the sideline about this would we uh how how is this playing back in Guatemala great question indeed um I think much of the government's approach to this issue has parti has precisely been a result of the fact that they it needed to uh respond to different currents no um within the country certainly uh the Semidia Party has a strong uh some wings not all the same party but has a strong left leftist uh sort of leaning um sort of ideology and vision of the region that is certainly not very fond of US interventionism and uh meddling with internal affairs and so on and so forth so that's the reason why I would say uh Arribado has refrained from uh being you know um I identified as basically no a uh a full-fledged ally and and vassal of the US on the other hand most Guatemalans um recognize the importance that maintaining good relationship with the US has for the country's stability I mean um around one fifth of the population lives in the US let's just uh think about that and also when it comes to public inbe to to private investment to to trade uh the US is undoubtedly the the the the greatest partner that the country has um in the hemisphere and in the world so um from a private sector perspective from uh an overall societal perspective um arivallo has also had to uh avoid direct confrontation with Washington which have which would have been um particularly uh sort of uh impactful and would have uh um have would have had repercussions internally for his uh uh for the stability of his government yeah of course any any in let's say uh let's say poking poking the the the sort of the the sort of the Trump tiger would would be you know very much detrimental to uh Guatemalan politics and political uh uh stability of Bernardo Revalos certainly i we need to jump topics a bit because it's it's June 2026 and uh we know that well Consuelo Porras the former attorney general from 2018 to 2026 if I'm not mistaken was she appointed by Jimmy Morales back in the day when he was president she has finally she's no longer Attorney General we've got Gabriel Garcia Luna taking over I mean we can say that Consuelo Porras really was a a figure of significant authority and power in Guatemala so what can we expect uh really now of this it's quite seismic change uh taking place in the in the in the country yeah this is been um particularly important because besides the Attorney General's office sorry the attorney general uh other important figures in the judiciary have been elected a new constitutional court a new uh supreme electoral tribunal and all of these processes have actually brought about partial change and partly positive um of course change for example Garcia Luna was elected he has a strong trajectory within um the the judiciary uh but according to people far more knowledgeable than me on the Guatemalan judicial conundrum um there would have been even better options that were eventually prevented from being selected um to to make it to the final short list now in Guatemala the the president has to appoint an attorney general and pick it from a selection of five candidates that come from different um different organs of the state right um but it still the figure of Garcia Luna the the the sort of um initial moves also that he's brought forward are promising in a way he's um he's uh already dismantled the the facing of the anti-corruption um special unit within the Attorney General's office that s was created uh under the wings of the CC uh but then after the shutdown of the CC turned into um a bit of what I was referring to uh before um a a place a platform for political vendettas so uh under the FACI uh a lot of political cases against journalists activists civil society representatives and politicians have been brought forward whereas high levels corruption cases um unmasked by journalists by investigative uh journalism etc were basically let fall on their fears um and and that's a huge change as I was saying I mean Consolo Porras has not only been a constant thorn in this on the side of the Arevalo administration but she's uh she's overseen a progressive deterioration of the institution's credibility and um sort of uh uh image no um because she she's let go uh over 500 um you know between administrative officials and attorneys uh within the institution uh some two dozen um judicial operators very well known judicial operators that had spearheaded very high level corruption cases uh have had to flee the country um over the the past few years um and um yeah in essence um had focused much more resources um to to prosecute to to um hinder the ability of uh of Bernardo Rival's government um to carry out any any sort of uh political reforms uh and let go one of its main um its main mandate right uh which is effectively effectively tackling violent crime so uh it's true that um funded by the US there was a project that expanded the Attorney General's office presence throughout the country and that sort of was an improvement in a way um but was an improvement because it gave a clearer or it made it more easier like it made it easier for people to go and denounce if they saw or were victim of a crime. Just a few years ago if you were uh from Alta Vera Paz or We Tenango uh you had to travel all the way to the country's capital to file a complaint on extortion on whatever and it's it can be uh six seven ten hours rides just to go there plus the resources so many uh crimes were went underreported so having more offices throughout the country at least uh helps better map what's the current state of play um but at the same time the efficiency of the Attonan's office in giving you know continuity and and opening cases and and bringing justice to those cases has dropped dramatically and I think it was just around six percent um of resolved cases uh compared to the to the complaints uh last year so it's really uh an unefficient um uh uh basically as it had become a very an inefficient um despised also institution because of the role it had had it has had in undermining uh the the country's democracy no uh trying to to basically annul the results of the elections in 2023 so there's a great hope with the mandate of Garcia Luna that things can improve that the institutional image can be overhauled and so on and so forth but of course these things take time uh it's uh not from one day from from another and uh and as you were pointing out at the very beginning Arevalo doesn't have have that much time left in one year uh there will already be the election so the country will soon enter a pre-electoral period and um so yeah we're basically Arevalo appears to be laying the groundwork to uh for the next government to pick it up and contribute now to this sort of democratization um transparentization if you allow me this term and sort of um improvement of the state's capacity to respond to citizens in a clearer way and less corrupt way but it remains to be seen whether the next president will pick up this groundwork or will just reverse it and try to re-establish the sort of um kleptocratic clientelistic um way of doing policy politics that um preceded Arevolo I I I think a attorney general in Guatemala would be a thankless task uh of a job to try and pick up and start with it seems to me that Consuelo Porres again with this project from the United States of expanding the Attorney General's office around the country obviously as you said incredibly positive but then you've created you know what is an immense and and and largely I would say immovable judicial backlog by dismissing so many functionaries.

SPEAKER_00 40:15

So on the one hand you make it look efficient because you can you can denounce crimes but on the other hand it's it's just never ever going to see the light of day. So again quite clever if that's what you wanted to do because and uh with with no uh you know consuelo porras is has been as you said a thorn in the side of the of the current government and I'm sure that Bernardo Arrevelo is is celebrating her departure but remember it's only been I mean a month really since uh Garcia Luna is in in in in this position so uh again we really don't know what's going to happen in the coming months.

SPEAKER_01 40:56

Um and finally uh Tiziano uh we've talked a lot and I you know I know it's it's it's late in Italy now but uh I I want to ask are people already sort of moving their you know their political bases around for potential uh you know you know sizing up uh where to run for uh presidential elections next year are we are we seeing candidates already uh you know uh making themselves known yeah there are still there are already some movements um of course it's still very early to tell uh how many candidates how many parties will participate in the in the election um but there are some initial movements that I think can be can be spelled out first of all uh well let's talk with the ruling party we said semilla is uh being cancelled and he had already split into two factions before that happened so there was um uh Samuel Perez a very young and renowned representative of um of semilla that basically yeah I mean uh with due to divergences in the in the management of uh nominations in Congress and so on and so forth um separated and created its own uh movement raíces so roots uh and it would certainly try and register this uh this new party to to run for the election in 2027 um I'm not sure how will it fare because of course uh as we were saying at the beginning much of Arevalo's fortune was the um you know uh the the fact that some of the most favorite candidates uh were not allowed to run in uh 2023 such such as Thelma Cabrera which had a strong appeal among the indigenous population in the country and Carlos Pineda who was uh basically yeah was uh this sort of outsider sort of business businessman that uh attracted a lot of sympathy over social media and this time he is likely to to try it again and maybe can capitalize on that initial um initial uh sort of sympathy that he was attracting um there's of course uh also the everlasting uh sort of undefeatable hard right uh movements that um see in the figure of Suri Rios now the the the the daughter of um dictator essentially uh Ivan Rios um that Riosmont uh that um is certainly trying uh to go for another uh attempt presidential attempt um and uh may certainly attract now the interest and the the the the the support of uh the most conservative military private sector sort of sectors but I'm not sure if that kind of that way of doing politics, that what she represents, um is somehow likely to make a comeback in the country. I think something has changed the the role that the 48 cantons, no, that the indigenous population played in safeguarding democracy in 2023, I think has been um uh has um no um revived certain citizens consciousness about the the importance of uh defending democracy and and the the difference that it can make um to to try and go out of the street and and face off a system that seemed undefeatable, no, but now there's a new attorney general, there's a new constitutional court, there's a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, there's a government, uh an outgoing government that certainly would not um try and meddle with the election in an undemocratic way and uh will be happy to support any transition to a future government. So I would say um maybe uh maybe I'll be completely wrong, but I will I I would say it's it's hard to believe that uh sort of these more traditional parties and representatives will make a comeback. But on the other hand, this would could go in a different direction, which we are seeing in other countries in the region, which is does not mean that you have another progressive democratic leader arising, but rather this is this satisfaction with the traditional party system expresses in the rise of a more populist figure, um, such as De La Esprea in Colombia, no, or uh um Bukele, no, as it was, it used to be, and so on and so forth. And therefore, there are several possibilities in that direction. One is this Carlos Pineda, there's also Roberto Arzú, who comes from a very well-known uh political family in Guatemala City. Basically, I don't know how many of the past mayors have had uh Arzú as surname, um the very powerful in the city, but somehow he's detached from his relatives and is taking on a more sort of um you know uh sort of independent uh approach and figure to politics. So I think he could also stand um a chance in in this election. Um closing on on this note, I would just add that though the government is sort of preoccupied that in a way the next election could sort of rekindle uh certain or or could repeat certain events of violence that took place during the past election. So luckily there's already a plan being drafted to try and identify the main hotspots to prevent political violence ahead of the election from from happening. Uh, but certainly in an era of transition now of different power dynamics at the national level, but possibly also starting to trickle down also at the local level. Uh this in a country which has strong uh a strong influence now of uh also illicit economies can uh certainly raise the risk for for more violence uh at the local level against political figures to to emerge.

SPEAKER_00 47:44

We certainly hope uh you know no political violence and and and that these elections in 2027 uh you know come across peacefully and democratically and as much as possible. I think Arsu, there was an Arsu who was president when I lived in Guatemala back in like 1998. Uh I think very a very political name for Guatemala City. Um thank you so much, Tiziano, for your insights into the situation in in Guatemala. As always, you know, there's but there are you know, I would say glimmers of hope. I mean, we you the Bernardo Arrevalo really did represent a change. Of course, it was he got in more by the uh I guess mismanagement of Consuelo Porras, but it allowed for this change. And maybe this has uh shifted, as you say, like the political grounds on which Guatemala has been run and these these families that have have continually uh kind of uh possessed the power. But uh fascinating how the stars aligned for so many important things in one year, the key with the constitutional court, the attorney general, and so on. It's it's it's really interesting how that should happen. Uh so therefore this will have an effect on next year's elections, definitely. So um uh it's been an absolutely uh incredible conversation. I've been talking to Tiziano Breda, who's the senior analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean for ACLET. That's the armed conflict location and event data. Uh, I believe you have a report coming out uh sooner, but about Venezuela and and Colombia. So we'll I guess we hopefully we'll talk about that in the future as well, but I'll keep an eye out for that. Uh Tiziano, thank you so much for your time.

SPEAKER_01 49:26

Thanks so much to you for having me, Richard. It's been a great pleasure.

SPEAKER_00 49:29

It has been an absolute pleasure for me as well. Um, I've been your host, Richard McCall, here in Bolgot, Colombia. Remember, you can subscribe to the Latin News Podcast wherever you get your podcast, Spotify, iTunes, uh, YouTube, and so on. Uh, very easy to find. And we're out every fortnight with more issues and items of interest from the region. So thank you again, and goodbye.