Can Peru Finally Achieve Political Stability?

Keiko Fujimori has secured the presidency at the fourth time of asking, bringing an end to one of the country's longest-running political stories. After years of presidential impeachments, institutional confrontation and economic uncertainty, expectations are high that her government could usher in a period of greater stability.

But significant challenges remain. Can Fujimori build the political consensus needed to govern? Will her administration revive investor confidence and unlock Peru's mining potential? And how will Lima navigate an increasingly competitive international environment shaped by both Washington and Beijing?

In this episode of The LatinNews Podcast, Richard McColl speaks with Dr John Crabtree, Research Associate at the Latin American Centre at the University of Oxford and editor of Mining and the Peruvian State: Social and Environmental Sustainability.

Together, they examine the election result, Peru's political outlook, the prospects for economic reform, the future of the mining sector, and what a Fujimori presidency could mean for Peru's place in Latin America and beyond.

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Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:01

Welcome to the Latin News Podcast. A fully indeed delivered in the key development from, of course, Latin American Columbia. Here's your host from Bulletin Colombian. Journalist, Richard McCullough.

SPEAKER_01 0:14

This is the Latin News Podcast. I am your host, Richard McCullough, here in Colombia. This week's very special guest is Dr. John Crabtree, research associate of the Latin American Center at the University of Oxford and author of the recently published Mining in the Peruvian State and available by Routledge. We're going to be discovering uh discussing Peru and the recent elections. So welcome back, John, on this podcast. It's always a pleasure to have you here.

SPEAKER_00 0:44

Many thanks. Nice to be back too.

SPEAKER_01 0:46

Yeah, no, it's always good because you put things into a very, I would say, digestible manner about the politics of what's going on. Well, that's it, isn't it? Um, so let's let's talk about Peru. I mean, I think we start with there's been such a high turnover of president, and now obviously we have Keiko Fujimori in power. Uh, four times she's run for president, and now she's finally won. Perhaps you could give us a little bit of a background to where we are.

SPEAKER_00 1:22

Yes, well, as this is um, as you say, it's the fourth fourth attempt, and she's pretty narrowly won. All the previous attempts have also in 2011, 2016, 2021, were also very narrow. Um, but um there seems to have been a feature of the Peruvian political system is that it produces very balanced results um in terms of the numbers. And this time is certainly no exception. I mean, we uh we've been when the when the the the the the original count was made, it seemed like Roberto Sanchez had won. But when the um external tallies from um from Peruvians living abroad and um those tallies that were being questioned or for for for irregularities were included, the balance went the other way, and she won. I think um we haven't actually had a final, final, final result, but I was looking at them this morning and that the results at 99.99%, which is as good as it's gonna likely to get, shows that there was a difference out of an electorate of about 18 million or 19 million of just under 50,000. Um it was 50.13 for Fujimori, as against 49.87 for Roberto Sanchez. So very, very close.

SPEAKER_01 2:46

And we're talking about razor-edge elections. Of course, we've just had the Colombian one, but this is even tighter. And this is incredible. And it's and so Keiko Fujimori is going to be a president-elect. She takes over, I think, in the 28th of July, if I'm not mistaken. That's right. That's the Peruvian Independence Day. Uh, and and she'll be a president-elect who will have been voted in by the difference, the margin of difference by voters overseas. She will have actually technically lost within Peru.

SPEAKER_00 3:17

Yes, that's right. It depends also on the on the ballots that were being which which were subject to discussion. So it's difficult to actually extrapolate which which one. So she might have won in the end, yes. Without the voters from Peru. But I mean that the the number of voters outside Peru is is quite substantial. I mean, in a fairly large chunk of the electorate. So it's uh it's a country which has suffered a lot of emigration over the years.

SPEAKER_01 3:46

So uh why uh what tipped the scales towards Keiko Fujimori over Roberto Sanchez? The tiny, tiny tipping towards Keiko. What has brought her into power then?

SPEAKER_00 3:58

I think probably um she didn't pin make it very clear. Uh her her manifesto was fairly, apart from one and two points, was fairly um non nondescript. And often often the manifestos give you pretty little clue as to what they're actually going to do when they actually reach office. So you have to be a bit careful interpreting. But I think that you know the main focus of it was um looking at the going back to looking at the record of her father as president of Peru in the 1990s, um, which was a time when um Peru began being through a period of considerable macroeconomic instability and of course a massive amount of of violence perpetrated by Sendero Luminoso and the conflict that surrounded that. And in a sense, um the Fujimoristas have always seen them portrayed themselves as being the sort of saviors of the nation in that respect. So that that's quite a powerful uh uh um uh uh narrative to be to be. And of course, Peru is going through, like many other Latin American countries, moments of of considerable uh um um insecurity, um uh criminal criminal problems, which um her sort of um Manu Dura um um line echoed quite well with quite a large proportion of the electorate, um, particularly in Lima, where where sort of problems of of urban violence are particularly have been particularly marked over the last 12 months or so. So I think that's probably what what tipped it. I mean, um in the first round she got 17% to um Sanchez's 12%. So um she had had perhaps an advantage at the big at from the outset in that respect. But I mean both of them had to, you know, to appeal to and it's interesting, I think, that you know, in Peru you get um if you add up those two votes of 17 plus um 12, if you compare that with Colombia, um where the two main candidates are having about 80% between them, it tells you something about the level of fragmentation of Peruvian politics. Um and this is this raises problems of legitimacy, of course. If you get it on the first round, the only people who voted for you is only 17, no, initially is only 17% of the population. It's it is questions as to whether you know how how legitimate, ultimately, how legitimate the result is seen to be.

SPEAKER_01 6:30

This is true. So it it really was uh it was a vote for the main concern security uh and violence, and then of course the vote in Lima uh for for Keiko Fujimori. Okay, so and and and no one's thinking about the reputation of her father in the past, Alberto Fujimori. I mean, it was a pretty big scandal over the years. No one's thinking that it's not doesn't cast a negative shadow over her?

SPEAKER_00 6:56

It does, no. I mean, this is one of the reasons that the politics has become so divided in Peru. I mean, there are certainly large parts of the of the country where the where the legacies of of um Alberto Fujimori loom very large and they and they feed into the the scale of of the vote for Roberto Sanchez. I mean, not least in terms of the kind of human rights problems that existed then. And I think she managed to, I mean, uh managed to dodge some of the accusations about um corruption of her father, of her father's government, which uh you may recall, I mean, he was uh jailed for corruption and for human rights crimes. Um but that that those tend to be things that you know feed into the vote for for the anti-Fujimori uh have done in under successive elections. I mean, it may be the fact that now we are getting a bit further away from the past of that that this is one of the things that may have tilted things in her favor because there aren't so many people who actually remember what it was like in the 1990s. I mean, you know, you've got new new voters coming into the system and and that sort of historical memory, which fed into the sort of anti-Fuji Morista um victories in all the three previous elections. Uh that those memories were perhaps uh um stronger then than they are now.

SPEAKER_01 8:17

I always think that the Peruvian electorate does seem to be kind of rather tolerant. I mean, I remember them vote revoting in Alan Garcia after all of those scandals, you know, who skipped town and went, you know, went off to uh went off to France with some of the state coffers and then came back and spoke so well and won the elections again for a new.

SPEAKER_00 8:37

But again, it was a it was a sort of more more the second the system of two rounds tends to produce a sort of anti-vote rather than the pro-vote. Um, and I think that um Alan Garcia on the second round the second time round um was able rather skillfully to um portray his uh his opponents um or Yanto Umala as being a stooge of Chavez, and which to a certain extent was true because I mean Chavez, you know, the Chavistas Venezuelans helped finance his campaign in Peruvian politics, which the uh um Alan Garcia was able to sort of to to to to uh um um take advantage of.

SPEAKER_01 9:20

But then I think of you know I remember I was there for the protests about the the Vladivideos, you know, the Vladimiro Montesinos, the spy chief in charge and the bribery that took place through all of the period of Fujimori. Yeah. I mean it was it was these were dark times. I mean, absolutely, no. But I mean everyone was corrupted.

SPEAKER_00 9:41

Yeah, and I think now um, I mean the the problem of corruption has been plagued um um Keiko as well. I mean, Keiko is one of the people who received money from from dodgy sources um from Odebrecht and others as part of the Lava Jato scandal back in in 2011 and 2016. And that was something that that moved no, but she's managed to sort of to to to to uh um skirt that one, and she's managed to through the her supporters having a um a controlling influence in the Congress and over the judiciary to get it thrown into the long grass. So it's no longer, I mean, it's actually she's actually been acquitted of those of the of those charges rather peculiarly because the proof the the proof is fairly fairly strident.

SPEAKER_01 10:30

Well is that how fortuitous. I was going to ask, is I yes, what does the Congress look like when it comes to her, you know, her mandate? Will she have a mandate or is it going to be another?

SPEAKER_00 10:40

The Congress in Peru has asserted its authority um repeatedly um since 2016. When I mean one of the systems, originally Peru had a fairly presidentialist system, but it's only presidentialist if the president can actually control Congress. And since 2016, it's been the Fujimoristas that have controlled Congress and their adversaries who have been in the executive. So um the question of who controls Congress is very important going forward. And to a certain extent now, the boot is on the other foot. If we look at the composition um of the Congress, and bearing in mind that for the first time since 1992, we now have a re reinstated Senate, so we've got a bicameral system, it's not just one chamber but two. Um, the elections um to the Congress um produced a fairly uh um stark divide between almost exactly the same uh number of seats between the Fuji Moristas and their allies in Renovacion and Um Popular, um, as against everybody else. So it's the opposition, the right have got 30, and the sort of left of center parties have got 30 seats of a 60-seat um Senate. So it's it's pretty it's pretty clearly divided, um, so long uh and as as as Fujimori can count on the support of the people from Renovacion Popular. Um the situation in the Chamber of Deputies is rather different. There um the uh Fujimoristas and their allies have uh 56 seats, whereas the sort of uh left of center parties have 74. So there's no longer the same degree of control um of the um of the uh uh um that the executive the executive can expect from from from from the Congress. So in a sense you say, you know, uh uh Fuji Moritas, the Fuji Moristas have won the won the presidency after all, but the uh opposition to a certain extent is fairly well entrenched into the into the um into the into the Congress. And of course, well, um, you know, how that will work out in practice is is anybody's guess, but um it's almost fair to say, I think, that uh the the the the A Fuji Morista government will use all the incentives it can to swing um you know votes across to to support it. And you know the state is important in that sense in terms of financial incentives or the incentives of public office and so forth. So um there will be, I think, uh um some attempt to uh um um particularly in the chamber of deputies to um shift um uh to use the influence of the executive to buy off uh um on and to and to try and split that the the opposition. And it's uh no, the opposition isn't the Peruvian parties are not strong. Um they are they are very um unil disciplined. Um the the lessons from the past are that they fracture very easily um according to um perceived benefits of rewards and so forth. So though you may say that there's a there's a there's a an opposition majority in the chamber of deputies, there are ways and ways of sort of um of of of neutralizing that. So I mean uh um this does, however, push the push the a new government into being slightly more tolerant towards the opposition than the Fuji Maudistas have ever shown themselves to be in the past. Um how long this will last, I I'm not sure, but um we will get a a clue, I guess, um when we know who who's in the cabinet.

SPEAKER_01 14:38

It's true.

SPEAKER_00 14:39

So I mean that's that's the first bit of where where people get bought off, but various other positions within the state also, I mean, you know, will be offered here and there to people. And in particular, um there's a a group which holds the balance in in the um in the Chamber of Deputies, um, which is the group around Juan Nieto, which is sort of centrist grouping, and I would imagine they would be the sort of first set first port of call for the Fujimoristas to try and work out some sort of deals with them. Um they are perhaps less ideological uh um than some of the some of the groups further to the left.

SPEAKER_02 15:17

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SPEAKER_01 15:33

Which suggests that they're easier than to manipulate, less ideological and and then and and of course these are overtures to the opposition, something that, yeah, again, we were not expecting the Fujimoristas to do, but they're it's it's going to be a necessity this time around.

SPEAKER_00 15:49

Yes. I mean the Fujimoristas need in the short run to sort of consolidate their political position. Um what happens in the slightly longer term, you know, say after a year or so, is is anybody's guess. But um in the short term, I would think that they would need to um look for some sort of, you know, you couldn't, it won't be a pact or anything like that, I don't think, but it'll be looking for arrangements that that that provide uh uh uh um basic uh um stability um in terms of support from the Congress towards uh towards the initiatives of the executive.

SPEAKER_01 16:27

And so so looking towards this and looking towards the people who may be named into the cabinet, what kind of thing are we expecting to see for uh Fujimori's economic policy?

SPEAKER_00 16:38

Well, I think this is one of the areas which is fairly is a bit clearer than the other areas. Um I mean, it the manifesto did spell out pretty much um what they hoped to do or what they thought they would do if they reached office, um, and which is fairly it it's basically more of the same. I mean, this is a sort of fairly status quo um policies. Um they will seek to um ensure there's a degree of macroeconomic stability, they will probably adopt relatively conservative monetary and fiscal policies, um, although they will need to um adapt the fiscal policy towards the sort of political strategies to a certain extent. Um they will um certainly defend the autonomy of the central bank. Um they will be they put a lot of emphasis on the need for private investment as opposed to public investment. But I mean they they don't discharge discount public investment, but make very much the the the argument that the the economic uh uh um future of the country depends on private investment, whether it be domestic private investment or or or international capital. Um they make much of the um the need for what's becomes known in Peru as distrabe, which is sort of uh uh um um basically deregulation. I mean, the Peruvian economy, the the Peruvian system is pretty deregulated already. I mean, this is the legacy of Fuji that Fujimori father goes back to the 1990s, that hasn't really changed that much. I mean, but one of the areas where they really do need to um to boost um investment, foreign investment, is in the mining sector, which um we can come back to um afterwards if you like. And the other area I think which will be important, um which will um try to um reach many of the those who voted for it is a policy of of cheap credit towards small and medium enterprises. Uh um the the the much is much is placed much in the discourse of uh of of Fujimorizmo, much is placed on the notion of um of small-scale enterprise. And um so the this is I mean, whether or not this actually uh uh um materializes, of course, will depend to a certain extent on the on the fiscal and monetary policies that are adopted. But um and uh it's it's to be expected, I think, that you know much of this is is nothing very new. Um it's largely a mount of continuity because really, since the time of the 1990s, Peru's macroeconomic policies haven't changed very much, and they've been they've had ups and downs in terms of success. But uh at the moment there is a clear need to boost um investment in extractive industries. Um in the the as I say, we can come back to talking about um the mining sector if you like. But those are the I would think the it seems to me if we don't know who who the cabinet members will be, but it seems like a very high probability that uh Luis Carranza will become the um uh minister return to the being Minister of the Economy, Finance and the Economy. Um he was um a former head president of the CAF, so he comes with good good credentials. He used to work in the IMF. He was also Alan Garcia's uh uh second time round uh minister of economy. So I mean he comes with a fairly sort of neoliberal agenda, basically, um which will be but which will be which is sort of music to the ears of foreign investors. Um and it's we don't know whether, I mean, there's been a lot of talk about whether um Vellardi will continue as the president of the central bank. He's been a sort of fixture now there for for 20 years and sort of become a kind of symbol of of sort of uh um um of sort of uh reptitude, if you like, in the sort of economic sense. So um Caranza's outlook it would dovetails pretty much with with what I've said about you know the priorities, no, it dovetails pretty much with with the with the Fuerza Popular uh manifesto on economic policy. So I don't see there's going to be any major, major shifts. Um, and I think that this will be um one a discourse which will will um privilege the idea that um private in investment will stimulate growth, um, which has been not very dynamic in the last two or three years. Um and um and and growth, of course, will stimulate employment and this will have trickle-down effects. Now we there are a lot of critics as to whether or not how much trickle trickles down and to whom it trickles down, but anyway, um that I think that that will that is the sort of you know central message of the of of the net of of the narrative, if you like, of um which accompanies the Fuerza Popular into office.

SPEAKER_01 21:58

And what we can expect. I mean, obviously, as you said, it needs an injection of foreign investment, but this is likely to happen. I mean we have uh obviously there's this I would is it a hunger for the Peruvian copper and and other minerals uh that uh that China wants and and obviously all of the other investments, or what what what are we looking at with the mining uh industry?

SPEAKER_00 22:20

Well, the mining industry um whether whether you like it or not, is going likely to be very important going forward. I mean, in terms of the energy transition, Peruvian minerals will be much in demand. Um, copper in particular, but also, you know, if they manage to start producing lithium and other rare earths required, I mean, Peru stands to gain from that. Now, looking back over the last um 10 years or so, the level of new investment has been relatively modest in Peru. There have been some new uh mines opening up, but not that many. I mean, there's a large sort of pipeline of projects, but the investments um uh haven't been forthcoming um in to the to in the way which um the the the Ministry of Mines would would have liked. Um now, of course, prices of minerals are very high, we all know, um gold in particular, but also copper and other things too. Um and we all know also from from looking at the global patterns of supply and demand for these minerals that um there, particularly copper, there is a problem of um uh of demand outs outstretching supply um going forward. So I mean it seems reasonable to believe that uh prices will be high for the forthcoming future. And of course, you know, it's that it's the it's the expectation of high prices which is determines uh investment. Not the only thing, but it's one of, you know, without that sort of uh trend, um it's unlikely to uh uh um there will be investment. And the level of investment, I say, over the past few few few years has been a bit disappointing. Um, partly, I think, because of political un instability. I mean, you know, Peru is a country that's gone through um nine presidents in in a decade, and and uh, you know, that that does have its impact. I mean, also, I mean, not only the presidents, but also if you look at the ministers of economy, the ministries of mines, and all the rest of them, I mean, you know, that the the they don't last more than about a few months on average. So, you know, and and what what mining companies are looking for are guarantees, a reasonable guarantees of stability. I mean, of course, mining companies are are are used to calculating risks, and if the if the rewards are high, which they look as though they will be, um, you know, the their appetite for risk is probably higher than it otherwise would be. But um, but it seems to me that you know fairly uh logical to think that there will be um some important investments going uh coming to fruition um over the next 10, 15 years or so. I mean, Peru's has as you used to be the world's second largest uh um producer of copper. It's slipped back to um being third, uh being overtaken by the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Um whether or not it can recover its position as the second largest I don't know, but um um not at the rate at which the investment patterns have been taking place in recent times. And you know, um some for many places like the Congo is a cheaper place to be doing business than than in Chile or in uh or in Peru. So I know the perspectives for the the the the uh economy uh for the mining economy are are pretty good, I would say. And the question, I think, which which we try and sort of analyze in the book is to whether or not um, you know, looking forward over the next um 25 years to 2050, whether any of the lessons that have been learned, uh how many of the lessons have been learnt um domestically uh um over for the last 25 years, I mean beginning with you know it was exactly just over 25 years ago that we had the first kind of big uh upsurge of um neighborhood opposition to uh mining projects in Tambo Grande on the in Piura, and there have been several others which have sort of also clouded the the investment climate to a certain degree, uh, because there have been um issues and in the and and and the management of mining projects has not been without its difficulties, put it put it mildly.

SPEAKER_01 26:43

When you think of these Andean regions, maybe, like again, if you look at Piura, oh that's up in the north, but then if you think of down in the south as well, is it likely to be a protest movement led by the opposition and and Roberto Sanchez? I mean, he has been making noises in that he'll you know, saying that he will mobilize his supporters and so on. Can we expect some sort of instability surrounding this?

SPEAKER_00 27:10

Well, I uh I think the mobilization to a certain degree is is is related to to problems around mining. I mean, um, but it also relates to problems about sort of regional development as well, more broadly. Um, and it's no accident that the the the the the areas where uh he won um by handsome margins are those precisely those areas which have received probably least from terms of the patterns of development over the last 30 years or so. I mean, in places like Bruno, for example, in the south, I mean, he won by 80%. So, I mean, you know, there was a clear rejection. I mean, there are specific uh reasons why that was you know, which go back to sort of human rights problems in and under the previous administration, um, that it could help explain that. But um, it's it goes wider than simply about mining. Now, one of the areas, of course, which is contentious, highly contentious in in Peru at the moment, is the scale of informal mining and illegal mining. Um and uh I think it's fairly clear to fairly clear from the from the electoral from the figures one has is that probab that that um illegal mining or informal stroke illegal miners are not one and the same. So I don't want to be don't want to confuse the two, but they are um voted massively for uh uh Sanchez as opposed to Keiko. Uh and of course they have become a significant proportion of the electorate. I mean, we it's reckoned that there are, you know, maybe uh in terms of numbers of families and so forth, there may be a you know more or less more than a million people who depend one way or another on illegal mining or informal mining. And this is and the number has gone up and up and up as the price of gold has gone up and up and up. Um and for many people on on scant incomes in in low-income parts of the country, mining, informal mining represents a lifeline. Um, I mean, I've done interviews with people in within small-scale miners in in places like Arequipa, and you know, that it this becomes a way in which people can begin to you know have a think about having a uh uh upward become upwardly mobile. You know, I met one head, one leader of a of a of a peasant community in Arequipa, which who's um who managed to put his his kids through education, higher education in Spain, you know, and this is sort of thing that doesn't happen. You know, these this is it struck me very strongly that that you know that the the that people are using the you know it becomes a resource to to to change people's economic trajectory. And of course, you know, as we all know, I mean, um mineral prices can be high, but they can also go down. So I mean it's a question for them of making making uh um straw well the well well the sun shines.

SPEAKER_01 30:17

And so we I think this is a moment to talk about is you know the fo Keiko Fujimori is his one. Uh obviously, this falls into line uh behind the US doctrine towards Latin America and the right wing swing that so many are talking about. Where does this leave the the Peruvian sort of wedge between uh the US government under Trump and of course investment from China? What what do there is a there is a tug of war going on?

SPEAKER_00 30:51

Yes, I mean I think that the elections were interesting in as much as there weren't many signs of direct involvement of the US administration in terms of trying to influence the result. I mean, in comparison maybe with the case of Colombia or other parts in Central America in various instances. Um, I think they realized that you know uh uh uh um intervention on these issues would be uh counterproductive, um, and that it would swit simply have you know swing votes in favor of Sanchez if they were to come out sort of saying vote for vote for vote for Keiko. Um so I think they were quite cautious. Um I mean, clearly a a a Keiko government will be preferable in Washington to a Sanchez government, um, without a doubt. Um and they will um the United States will use its influence to try and draw draw Peru a bit closer to its uh its its own interests. Now, of course, the problem here lies the fact that um in a inasmuch as within the polarized global um world of divided between the United States and China, uh um Peru is one of the economies of Latin America which is most dependent on China. I mean, China is the uh um main uh uh um main uh customer for its uh mineral exports, not the United States. Um and it's also a key investor in some in extractive industries, many other things as well. And of course, one of the uh um issues that may that has the potential to be could become a sort of flare-up between Peru and the United States is the port of Changkai. The port of Changkai, um, as you may know, is is is a port which has been built and developed and owned um by uh um Chinese companies, um, and of course, you know, indirectly by the Chinese state to a certain extent. And the United States has um drawn attention to the fact that um Chiang Kai might have military uses as well as commercial ones. Um now the Peruvians have vehemently denied that to be the case, um, and the Chinese ditto. But uh this has become an issue in in recent times, and um particularly um by um members of the US Armed Forces. So this is a this is a potentially a a tricky one for any any Peruvian government to manage, on the one hand, your dependence on China, but on the other hand, trying to maintain good relations with the United States. I mean, it it it's it's probably uh um more difficult. I mean, it's also a problem that probably faces um caste in in Chile as well, to a certain um, but this is likely to be an issue which um um could uh um become a difficult one for a Fujimori government if the United States tries to push too hard um on the government to sever its links with with China, which you simply can't afford to do.

SPEAKER_01 34:12

I did find it, as you you mentioned, I did find it absolutely fascinating that there was it was clearly silent approval for Keiko Fujimori from from the US government, but without openly saying anything like they did in Colombia or in Honduras. But you knew it was there. Yes. You knew that that kind of, and that's what's what was so interesting. And I think uh I think it was Bernie Moreno, the senator from from Ohio, who was down, he was in Colombia, but he was also in Bolivia and he was in elsewhere. But this was a hat tip to the region, you know, that that this was needed, that they were supporting this. It was very, very interesting that Peru should be the outlier, and as you said, very nationalistic politics. If if the US had got involved, then it would have swung probably the vote towards Roberto Sanchez. So someone in the White House knows what's going on in Peru because you know that was very a very sage advice.

SPEAKER_00 35:08

Yes, yeah. Um so I mean I think this is uh this is uh this is a this is a potentially a a tricky issue, um, one which um Fujimori will seek to maintain close ties with Washington. I mean, whether or not she sort of joins the group grouping around um probably will, I suspect, of no, the that sort of the grouping of of Trump supporting presidents around issues of uh of security and drug trafficking. I mean, of course, bear in mind that Peru is the source the second after Colombia the second source of cocaine, which is something that we're not hear quite so much about um in Peru as you do in Colombia or Bolivia, um, where the United States tends to get more exercised about, you know, they've been quite, you know, they try to keep Peru a bit off the map on that one. But I mean, that there will be, I suspect, closer military collaboration, whether or not this would re lead to the installation of US bases in on Peruvian soil. That again would be a tricky one, I think, because as you s as you note, there is a kind of nationalistic back uh reactions to to to the presence of foreign foreign troops on on Peruvian soil. And this goes back, as you say, you say there's a strong nationalistic streak which goes back to the 1960s and 70s.

SPEAKER_01 36:38

I there's there's one thing I can see. I could I could imagine Keiko Fujimori presenting the presence of US advisors as a security measure, you know, as in trying to sort of appeal to her voters and placate maybe people in more in more unstable regions. I could see that coming together under the sort of, again, this big umbrella of the shield of the Americas, but nothing too open, like saying, no, we have invited them down, sort of thing. I could see a very political discourse around it.

SPEAKER_00 37:11

Yes. I mean, uh the the the other issue, of course, here is that I think is a is an area of policy which is going to be much more difficult, really fraught with difficulties, is what to do about um um beefing up security, um public security in in Peru. Because the level of of uh illegal operations of one kind or another, and they vary enormously in terms of scale and in terms of the sectors involved. Um, but you know, that there is a an illegal illegal economy which is sort of burgeoning in Peru. Um I mean, we've talked a bit about the scale of drug trafficking, drug cultivation and drug trafficking, but I mean this is closely related also to um the the the trafficking of of illegal mining and illegal gold, which becomes a way of of uh laundering, laundering um the profits of drugs. So the two things are tightly interwoven. And quite what is what Peru can actually do beyond sort of declaring states of emergency, which has been the sort of typical reaction up to now. You know, if you've got a problem and you get accused of not doing very much, you create a state of emergency, which brings, you know, enables the troops to be brought in and you know one thing and a few civil liberties to be, but it doesn't actually get to the doesn't actually it isn't very efficacious in terms of of its ability uh to uh um to to clamp down on these things. And in and Peru is not El Salvador in this sense. I mean, everybody invokes Bukele, but it's it's it's it's a lot harder in a country where the state, the writ of the state doesn't run very far um than is the case in a small country like uh um El Salvador. And you know that the the even even where the state, you know, you would have thought that state presence in in Lima would have been sort of, but it it it the part the recent past has shown uh very clearly that um the ability of to to to actually uh um have a a policy that is actually successful in terms of reducing levels of urban crime, I mean much of it is petty crime, it's not very we're not talking about sort of uh major uh um industrial scale crime, um, but this is the crime that actually matters to most people. Um this has proved extraordinarily difficult. And um and whether or not, I mean, simply building more jails and and and creating uh giving uh greater um powers to the armed forces is not necessarily the answer to this problem. What the answer is is another matter. But one of the problems, of course, that adds to this difficulty is the penetration of organized crime into the um into the police force. I mean, the police force uh um suffers from problems which kept a long-standing. It's not very new, but um they go back a long way in terms of uh um the the extent to which, and also to a certain extent true of the armed forces, the to which criminal um organizations are able to penetrate these the these forces by virtue of the amount of money that's that's that's being thrown around.

SPEAKER_01 40:26

Yes. I've been reading a lot about extortion and of course the the the proposal as well to militarize the prisons. So I mean again this sound sounds a bit nebulous though, isn't it?

SPEAKER_00 40:39

But it doesn't I mean Peru has I mean it Peru needs more prisons, that's for sure. I mean, you know, if you've got the the problem of overcrowding in Peruvian prisons is horror horrendous. Um but you know, I mean so maybe a program of building more prisons would be something that's welcome, but it would be um it doesn't in self solve the problem it's trying to solve, it seems to me. I mean, uh um I mean there's a for many people, you know, the the the the the the discourse, the narrative around, you know, well what do you do with these people, well you simply throw them in jail and throw away the key. That doesn't the problem goes on, and new people, new new people replace the people who are in jail. And uh uh and it's it uh I mean I don't know what the answer is here, but uh um um some sort of um efficacious police reform, at very least, is something that needs to be done.

SPEAKER_01 41:37

And finally, I guess I guess we should we should sort of wind down but talking about the issue of human rights. You did mention human rights when we thought about Puno, and of course, I guess that was under uh Dina Boluarte uh and her presidency. What can we expect that how Keiko Fujimori might address the issue of human rights in the U.S.

SPEAKER_00 41:54

Well, I if if she adopts fairly authoritarian postures, which many people think she will, um this evidently has um impacts um on terms of human rights. Peru has a pro uh you know a negative human rights record, um, and and relatively recently so. I mean, you know, that what happened in Puno and um the south of Peru uh at the time when um Pedro Castillo was impeached is uh um is something that uh has a de had a quite destabilizing impact. Um, and one of the reasons why um people in Puno voted so solidly against uh um Keiko Fuki Mori, because the Fujimoristas are perceived, and whether rightly or wrongly, to be um amongst those who um who have been responsible for human rights violations um over the years. And of course, one of the one of it just as a as a it happens to be the case that just last week um the Congress dominated um it's a Fujimorista proposal that was supported by the hard right and pushed through the Congress with lightning speed, is a is a legislative uh a new law, um, which I'm not sure whether whether the present president has promulgated it or not, which um forces um the all all members of the police force and the military going forward will not be able to be face trials in civilian courts for crimes committed in during the course of their the their active their actions. And this, of course, you know, as many people see is is is is is an invitation to impunity because you know the the the the the way in which military justice works is to tends to protect uh members of the armed forces against the kind of accusations to which they are put. And this goes back again, this kind of defensive attitudes of the armed forces goes back. To the kind of the post-Fujimori, first Fujim, post-Alberto Fujimori period, when human rights issues and their and they were held to account to a certain extent. I mean, senior, senior members of the armed forces were jailed for crimes committed during the course of their actions. There are many weren't, but there were cases, and this has been an ongoing thing, which has uh and and I think that the the the Congress has um under under the Fuji Morista leadership and in recent times has done its done its best to try to um establish you know to to to to satisfy um the concern within the armed forces that they are being held criminally responsible for uh um the jobs that they are being asked to do. And you may you may say that's that's quite reasonable that they should they should um have a degree of of you know that they are being asked to do a difficult job and that sometimes you know there are excesses and you know. But I mean it goes back to all the debates that came from the period of of conflict under with with with Sendero Luminoso, and that the shadow of of Sendero is a long one, very long one in Peruvian politics, will continue to be so, I think.

SPEAKER_01 45:27

Definitely. And you can imagine Keiko invoking that shadow, but under you know different guises, of course, to maintain security. You can imagine it. Not the Sendero per se, but organized crime of the modern day. Uh you the the the these candidates, they they require this universal hate figure.

SPEAKER_00 45:49

Yeah, I mean so uh it this I think is one of one of the more tricky areas going forward. I mean, I think that there will be uh um you know there's a danger um uh uh um of the the human rights community, if you like. Um it's already under a been put under a lot of pressure. Um I mean there are um um uh the inst organizations like the Instituto de Defensa Legal, which has been playing a very important role, that the Coordinador Nacional de Derechos Humanos played a very important role in defending human rights historically. These are organizations which are in the firing line so far as some people are concerned within within the ranks of Fujimorismo.

SPEAKER_01 46:37

Well, I as we sort of close this down, uh John, how about uh an overview then? Are you positive towards the outlook to Peru then in this in these coming months, or are you a little a little bit of trepidation towards a presidency under Keiko Fujimori?

SPEAKER_00 46:53

Well, I think it depends a bit on on, I mean, so far as um the economy is concerned, I think that probably um you know growth will will pick up. So I think that's that's that's positive. You can't get, you know, Peru still has a major problem with with poverty. Um a large proportion of a substantial proportion of the population are either in poverty or on the verge of it. So I mean growth is important in terms of uh if the Fujimoristas are able to um to um pursue the the the economic policies successfully, um this will give scope for um for uh uh um programs to to try to reduce poverty. And I mean, I think I mean to give Alan Garcia credit for his second administration, I mean he he managed to do that. I mean, Peruvian poverty rates came down abruptly, um, you know, with very large when growth was very high. Now, Fujimori has promised that by the end of her five years, Peru will be growing by an annual rate of growth of over six percent. I I well we'll see about that. I mean, you know, this may or may not be the case, but um so I mean on that level I think that the the there are positives, but uh the as I do have certain concerns um with respect to things like human rights and um uh uh um and the and the future of a more democratic Peru, um one which is a more tolerant Peru. I feel that there is a you know a possibility of of growing intolerance, of growing uh um regional strife. Um I mean, I may be wrong here, but I mean maybe maybe you know maybe the Fujimori government will have the sense to try to you know to to to put the put a uh uh um put the priority on on meeting some of the criticisms to which it's been you know subject in the past. I hope so, but I mean you know there's no guarantees that's the case.

SPEAKER_01 48:56

Well, let me take this moment, this is a good place to bring this to a close and say thank you so much to Dr. John Crabtree, who is the research associate at uh the Latin American Center at uh Oxford University and author of the recently published Mining and the Peruvian State, published by Routledge. So thank you so much for your time and for coming back on the Latin News Podcast.

SPEAKER_00 49:19

It's been a pleasure. Thanks very much for inviting me.

SPEAKER_01 49:22

You're most welcome. The pleasure, of course, has been ours. We'll be back in two weeks' time discussing further issues from the region. Remember that you can subscribe to the Latin News Podcast wherever you get your podcast, Spotify, iTunes, YouTube, and beyond. I've been Richard McCall here in Colombia, and goodbye.

SPEAKER_02 49:42

You've been listening to the Latin News Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.