Boots on the Ground
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Boots on the Ground
Coalition Math: Why Every Vote is a Compromise ep 42
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In this episode of Boots on the Ground, Ari and Sean break down the four critical issues that will dominate the upcoming Israeli election cycle: Security, the role of Haredi society, the Economy, and Judicial Reform.
We move past the "mudslinging" to analyze the strategic consensus on Israel's borders, the growing friction over military service and economic contributions, the impact of the cost of living, and the looming constitutional crisis surrounding the Supreme Court. Is it possible to prioritize all four, or will the next government be forced to choose just one?
Welcome to another episode of Boots on the Ground, where we discuss Israel's war, politics, and identity. With an election coming up, we're gonna discuss what are the main issues that the parties and the society in Israel are gonna be talking about. But first, a thank you to our partners at Jerusalem Media Group and our sponsors, beTheirisrael.com. For all your events in Israel, be th BeThereIsrael.com provides live streaming services so you and your families can join you from around the world virtually. And remember to like, share, and subscribe. Ari, how are you doing? I'm doing great, Sean. How are you doing? I'm okay. We have an election coming up, which means everything is tumultuous. There's going to be a lot of screaming and shouting. And I think that we need to discuss what are the issues that the parties and society are going to be talking about in the coming three months.
SPEAKER_01I think it's also really important that we start off with by talking about the ideas and the policies before we even get into which parties and which people and all of that. I think the reality is that by within the next three to four weeks, more parties are going to announce that they're running, more people are going to announce that they're part of parties that are running. And the map of who's running and what constellation with who, where, when, and why and how is going to be evolving drastically over the next couple of weeks. And there's really no point in getting into the details of who's running in which party in which constellation of coalitions at the moment. Let's first talk about, let's build up the issues and understand the issues, and then at a later episode, we'll have plenty of episodes between now and the election in 100 days from now, we can talk about the specific parties, the potential coalition agreements, and all that and so on.
SPEAKER_02Okay. So I agree with you that it's going to take at least another couple of weeks before we know exactly who's who. But let's start with the issues that as of now are going to play a major role in the election cycle and what voters are looking at. I think first and foremost, everyone is looking at the issue of security. In my opinion, that is going to be the primary primary issue that almost everyone is going to be voting on.
SPEAKER_01Right. So let's let's go through what we think are the most and let's break them down. So, like we said, I agree with you. The number one is going to be security, but it's more going to be not just our own personal security, but what to do with the security situation from where it is today.
unknownRight.
SPEAKER_01I think the second issue is going to be rebalancing the relationship between Kharedi society and the rest of Israel, whether that's around drafting and serving in the army or around the economic relationship between them and the state.
SPEAKER_02Right. And the third actually is connected to both of those, is the way I see it, is the Israeli economy. And that is a combination of the Israeli taxation system, how much people are paying versus how much we're getting out. But most importantly, it's going to be discussions around the cost of living and inflation and prices in Israel.
SPEAKER_01Right. And I think the fourth, which is actually probably going to be closer to number one or two, is going to be anything related to judicial reform, either reforming the current judicial system or leaving it the way it is. And I think that's actually going to be much higher up on the list than we anticipate, potentially higher even than the security situation.
SPEAKER_02Aaron Powell Well, I'm actually mildly looking forward to seeing how all of those four play out, especially as we get closer to what the different parties are going to be, who are the players going to be, and who is the who are the what are the leaders going to offer us. Exactly. I I don't want to say elections are exciting, but at least that is going to give give us something slightly more positive to talk about.
SPEAKER_01Exactly. So let's break them down. Let's start with the security situation.
SPEAKER_02Okay. So when we say security, there are a lot of different parameters. It's everything from the Lebanese situation to Gaza to what's going on in the Shamron to personal security.
SPEAKER_01Right. So I think also like this. The reality is that on the ground in Gaza, on the ground in Lebanon, Syria, and anything we're doing with or without the Americans in Iran, most of the political spectrum is in that's an 80-20 issue, where almost everyone agrees on the overall strategic picture. And the reality, the only difference comes down to the details, is the way that I understand everyone on the political map at the moment when you take off the very, very extremes of the spectrum.
SPEAKER_02Okay. So when you say 80%, what do you mean by people agree with? What is the consensus with the way Israel is at the moment, strategically, militarily?
SPEAKER_01Consensus, there's there's basic consensus across the board on ASA right now that the situation we're in right now can be maintained indefinitely. We have a massive security buffer between the communities of the Western Negev and where the Gazans are living in Gaza. They're under total blockade in the sense that nothing is coming in or can come in without going through a detailed Israeli check. And we can maintain that situation at a minimal cost indefinitely. Until the right situation arises, we can maintain that pretty much indefinitely at minimal cost, both in in actual cost to the treasury and in manpower. And up north, we have a not the same, but a similar situation. We have created now a buffer zone on our northern border that has pushed Hezbollah far enough away that they don't pose an immediate threat to the to the to the northern border of Israel. We've maintained that security zone in southern Lebanon. We're constantly strengthening it. Again, its cost in both uh manpower and to the treasury in actual cost is much higher. But there's no one that really says in an intelligent way that we have we don't have a better solution at hand at the moment. Now that we see the Lebanese National Army getting involved, will it work? Won't it work? Will they stand up to their agreement? God only knows. Pretty sure he's not sure either what's going to happen. But in the end of the day, that's one of those no one's against it. Everyone's for it. If it works, great. If it doesn't work, we're not giving up our security zone. No one of any significance is saying we should either. In Syria, no one's even discussing the reality in Syria, where again we have a massive buffer zone. We have the Druzy communities after that. We're supporting them and bringing them under our diplomatic umbrella and our security umbrella, and basically creating an even larger buffer zone within Syria. There's no discussion, there's no disagreement about that. Iran vis-a-vis Iran. I think like this: I think there's two things that are overlooked. One, the closeness of the cooperation between Israel and America in the last Iran war is the first time there's actually been an integration of militaries. People don't realize it, but it wasn't that American squadrons were flying one mission and Israeli squadrons were flying another. We had joint squadrons where Israeli and American planes were flying side by side. The last time there was coordination on that scale globally was America and England in World War II.
SPEAKER_02Uh the sec the first Gulf War.
SPEAKER_01First Gulf War was not integrated. There were separate squadrons, they were separate commands. It wasn't integrated commands and integrated operations.
unknownAll right.
SPEAKER_01I was under your belief too. There was a united command under the American military umbrella, but it was still independent. Here in Israel, we had in Iran, it was a joint command structure, flying joint missions with with tools being shared and data being transferred in real time. We had a joint command that was based in the US. We had a joint command based in Israel, and it was integrated the way the American military and the British military were integrated in World War II, which hasn't happened since then. So anything that's going on in Iran, there's a level of cooperation on a military level. Diplomatically, we have our differences. Militarily, the integration and the cooperation, no one is going to change that. There's no Israeli interest that's going to change that. And there's also no American administration that's pop that's coming up that's going to really want to change that if they want to work in Iran. That's the reality on the ground. And there's no, that's not a discussion. The question comes down to whether we're going to have be more aggressive and attack in Iran or follow this American diplomatic lead at the moment, which is on the one hand being more passive. On the other hand, they're being extremely aggressive on the ground right now. They're basically carving out southern Iran around the Strait of Hormuz and disconnecting it from the rest of the country physically. They're destroying the roads, the railroads, the infrastructure, all the stuff connecting the entire southern region of Iran that borders the Straits of Hormuz is being disconnected from the rest of the country.
SPEAKER_02And important, a lot of that doesn't have to do with Israel and Iranian nuclear facilities. No, we're not really involved in what's going on right now.
SPEAKER_01We're not involved militarily directly in the sense that it's not our planes dropping the bombs. I I wouldn't be surprised if it's a huge piece of our intelligence, electronic warfare, and all the technological stuff that we're really, really good at isn't playing a very key role in it at the moment. Again, there's no open source information on any of that, so it's purely speculation at this point.
SPEAKER_02Alright. And then we've got the fact that Israeli bases are being used for American aircraft, um, refueling and others, which has never happened before, at least on the scale, which is very important.
SPEAKER_01Correct. So again, and I don't think that that that's a question that there's no there's no Israeli administration that's gonna come out that's gonna change that.
SPEAKER_02Okay. So we've covered the borders. Um the next two issues from security that are very important. The first is Yudah and Shamron. What is the future there? And here we have a significant split between the different parties. But what's the situation on the ground right now? And what are the different security options that people are speaking about?
SPEAKER_01So without getting the security situation with Judah and Shamron, I think that the the next two pieces of security are going to be where we start seeing differences in the parties of how and what to do with Judea and Samaria and how and what to do with personal security within Israel. So let's focus on Judea and Samaria for first. Judea and Samaria, over the last two and a half years, there have been tens, if not hundreds, of farms, as we're calling them, legally um uh what's because they're legally instituted, which create an Israeli stronghold on the actual land.
SPEAKER_02Okay, so let's just need to go into more detail. When you say farm, what does that mean? Is the Israeli communities, right? Uh the Israeli communities, many of them hold hugely strategic benefit either in high ground or in specific areas with regards to resources, water, um, access roads, bypass roads. Uh many communities also serve as a buffer to prevent the expansion of Palestinians' cities, towns, and villages. And over the last couple of years, sorry, I just want to explain this, over the last couple of years, what has happened is uh Jewish communities have set up what they call farms. And these are a variety of different agricultural communities, um, everything, anything from literal farms that are planting things to uh shepherd and grazing lands. And in some cases, it's a few caravans and a few people. And these are these have become, if you want to call, outcrops of the larger settlement communities, and they serve to strategically make more land available for Israelis.
SPEAKER_01It's prevent encroachment. For again, a residential community built with homes and roads can take up only so much space and it can't project its control beyond the last road or the last house in that community. Whereas when you create a farmland with a flock of grazing sheep, that's hundreds, if not thousands, of acres of land now that that one guy and his herd now have, you know, they're projecting control over a much larger group of them. It's preventing encroachment from our enemies onto the land itself, and it's maintaining that land for future development for the communities. Again, the whole idea is you start off, you start developing it with the minimal infrastructure necessary for agricultural work, whether it's grazing, whether it's it's planting vineyards and fields and so on and so forth. And as the community expands, it can get expand into cont into land and territory that you don't have to fight over now. It's already projected. So they've brought a whole new security reality to all over Judea and Samaria now, that there isn't the the amount of space now that's under Israeli jurisdiction and enforced is thousands of times more.
SPEAKER_02Right. And it's important to note that there are two there are two important aspects with regards to the these farms. The first is their strategic value is also that much greater when you consider that for the last 25 years, the Palestinian Authority has been doing this exact same thing with millions, uh tens of millions of Euro investment mainly from the European governments, who are actively trying to prevent Israeli sovereignty in Udan Shamron and with their goal of creating a Palestinian state. Uh so the Israeli Jewish farms that are being built are directly opposing what has been done to negate Israel's sovereignty. That's the first thing. The second, and this is where it gets tricky, because you have competing ideals with regards to taking over the land, from the Jewish perspective, we want to increase these farms so that they project more sovereignty over more areas that belong to the State of Israel. From the Palestinian perspective, they want to do the exact same thing. They want to take over more land so they can project their sovereignty and hold it for some type of future Palestinian state. And in that seam zone, we have the potential, and we already do have, a lot of violence is taking place. Both sides.
SPEAKER_01There's a lot of friction, but in the end of the day, that friction is now on the outskirts and far away and between smaller groups instead of being right up against where hundreds of people or their families are living. Right. You you've shifted again. It's the concept of strategic depth. You've created strategic depth for your holdings within Judea and Samaria, which didn't exist beforehand. You're creating a buffer zone between the violent enemy and your community, and you're doing it at a very minimal cost. And it's and it's a massive force multiplier for the army in those areas. And again, you served almost entirely, you serve entirely in Judea and Samaria. You have firsthand knowledge. I'm going to be serving Judean Samaria in the near future again, and I I haven't done it in many years. But the reality is, is that there's the the there's too many places and there's not enough soldiers. And there's no amount of soldiers that will ever be enough to be everywhere all the time. We don't have enough of a population to create an army of that size, which means by having these shepherds and these farmers out there, you have a massive force multiplier for the army.
SPEAKER_02All of this is correct. That we are expanding Israeli sovereignty, we're projecting more power, we're keeping those who would do harm, we're keeping them further away. However, there it this has created new levels of friction. And when you say there is no cost, unfortunately I disagree with you because the cost is not necessarily in lives. The cost is we have seen an entire new, if you want to call it, libel against Israel, and that is the libel of settler violence. What it really is, how large it is, it is much smaller and less significant than is being portrayed in the media, but it's created an entire genre of a new way to attack Israel, and that is settler violence. And that is playing a major role in Israel's perception, and it is create it is creating a major excuse. I'll give you two examples why there is a price to this. Ireland, Spain, Belgium, and other countries in the European Union are not friends of Israel, and now the UK as well. They're not necessarily but we do maintain relatively good trade relationships with these countries and the European Union. We need to trade, we need to sell them stuff, we need to buy stuff from them, they need to buy stuff from us, and they need we this back and forth. We have an agreement where we can buy and sell stuff one from another at almost tax-free prices. It works to both sides' benefit. Over the last couple of years within Europe, there are growing calls not only for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions, and many of the left-wing governments around Europe are capitulating to the people, the anti-Israel activists. The result has been they don't want to boycott Israel. It started off by saying, okay, we're not going to boycott Israel, we're just going to boycott the settlements. We're not going to let products or services from Yudan Shamron into the European market. Okay. And all of that has now been justified by these European governments because of settler violence. Correct. Israelis in the settlements are violent.
SPEAKER_01If it weren't for that blood libel, there'd be a different one. There'd be something else. It's just an excuse. And we can't decide national policy and our national future based on the excuses of the people that hate us and are looking for an excuse to justify their hate. It's an absurd reality. And at the same time, where we're maybe losing out on trade with Ireland, we're gaining trade. We were gaining trade with Hungary. We're gaining trade, it makes me nuts as the grandson of Holocaust survivors with Poland, which is turning out to basically be the Texas of Europe at the moment. We're gaining trade with Estonia. We're creating trade with countries that are returning to conservative values and values that align with the state of Israel and the Jewish people. So we're trading off people that hate us for people that are friendly with us. And in the end of the day, the people who hate us, they don't need whatever excuse we're giving them. They'll find an excuse. If it's not going to be for settler violence, it's going to be for communities in Judah that they don't exist. If it's not going to be for that, it's going to be because we control too much of Jerusalem. And if it's not going to be that, it's going to be because we exist at all. There's always going to be an excuse. The idea to make our national policy based off of not hurting and not insulting the Goyim, with all due respect to the Goyim, they're going to hit us anyways. So let's have the strongest national position that we can, no matter what. But again, this is where the election, where we're going to start seeing the differences of whether we want to continue and maybe expand the policies that the current government is doing in Judea and Samaria, increasing the sovereignty over the area, expanding development, expanding infrastructure work, increasing the levels of sovereignty on a legal perspective, and decreasing the levels of military sovereignty, which is what we have right now, or shifting back to the completely opposite of extremes of let's go back to surrendering, let's go back to strengthening the Palestinian Authority, which is not our partner in anything. Let's go back to strengthening our enemies for temporary quiet. And maybe the world will hate us a little less. Those are the two ends of the argument, and that's where the parties are going to differ in their approach.
SPEAKER_02Okay. I would put it slightly more diplomatically. Um it's not about I I clearly I'm not we're not going to pretend which side of the argument we're on, but from many of the upcoming parties, especially those on the left, it's not about surrendering. It's about creating a it's about readdressing a security problem, and it's about withdrawing to more defensible borders. It's not about expanding and spending money in areas that may not be part of the future state of Israel. Exactly.
SPEAKER_01This one again is expanding and strengthening our hold on Judean Samaria and increasing sovereignty, and there's surrendering that sovereignty and that control to our enemy. In the end of the day, if you want to create an entity of any nationality with between the river and the sea, you are the enemy of the state of Israel. You can say and justify it that you're creating a stronger Israel by removing but you're an enemy of the State of Israel if you're trying to create another entity on the same piece of geography.
SPEAKER_02All right. Well, that will go into uh that's a whole different discussion about a future Palestinian state, what the issues are and everything else. I think I've got you a little angry, but I'll we'll move on.
SPEAKER_01I don't like the P-word.
unknownOkay.
SPEAKER_01It's not an thing.
SPEAKER_02Moving so I think we've we've spoken about almost all the aspects of security. There is one more that is personal security, internal security, day-to-day security of the average citizen beyond what is going on in Yundan Shimron and the and potential missiles, day-to-day feeling of security.
SPEAKER_01We have to talk about which is basically the police force in Israel and its war against protection from criminal freedoms. Organized crime. Organized crime and protection, whether it's violence in the streets, whether it's also how you respond to protests that shut down the country and block traffic, create tons and tons of traffic. And in the end of the day, what we'll touch on it later, the duchess and how we deal with corruption within the government. But let's talk about the physical violence first, because that's what we're talking about on this issue. There's basically no difference from what I can tell from the stated goals, aims, or proposed policy of any of the parties within the middle range, I guess that you know, again. I'm sure if we take the extreme ends, we'll have differences. But again, we're leaving off the extreme ends of the political spectrum. They've all basically come out. They said we need to expand the police force. We need to expand the what's called again? The police enforcement. Basic enforcement of the existing laws. The difference where we have is how you deal with protests, and that's a big difference from one side to the other. And in the end of the day, that's where the differences are. But I don't see anyone making any significant changes.
SPEAKER_02So there are the way I see it, there are a few. The reality being that the high crime, the highest crime area in the highest crime areas in the country are the Arab areas, mixed towns, Arab neighborhoods. These are the highest crime areas. And we're talking about everything from violent crime, murder, protection rackets, all the way down to car theft, accidents, and insurance fraud. All of that is the majority of that is taking place in the Arab communities. So here there is a bit of a difference across the political spectrum. Just starting with what is being implemented right now, the current government has started increasing the role that the Shabbak is playing in internal crime fighting. And that is, while it does give the the enforcement the enforcement and intelligence community a whole range of new tools that they can use. There is and I'm there is a little bit of doubt. I'm one of them. Firstly, I'm not a big fan of the Shabak in general. I personally hold them at fault for many of the failures of October 7th. Now they do have a new leadership. The new guy in charge, Zini, is a phenomenal person. He's definitely changing the outlook and the shape and the intensity of the Shabbat. But bringing this type of organization into Israel's internal security, in my opinion, is overstepping a line. But it does might possibly need to be crossed.
SPEAKER_01So the question is look, the Shabbok is basically Israel's secret police. Correct. And I have a problem with that. And the question is, is if their tools are crossing the line of personal liberties and legal protections for the citizens of the state of Israel. And again, I have the same questions and the same doubts and the same concerns as you because the question is, is at what at what point do you cross the line of this is acceptable and this is not? Who's deciding that and who's doing oversight on that? And as we've seen in the past, the Shabbat and oversight on them are not very compatible and don't really work together. And there's no real way to do it because they can always do the same thing they're doing on criminals on the people doing oversight on them. Right.
SPEAKER_02And that's and like that's not. Today it can be against the Arab community. Right.
SPEAKER_01And then it's a switch of a government and it could be against the settler communities. It could be exactly. It's one of those things, it's a Pandora's box that once you open it, you can't really close it and you don't know what's going to come out. Right. But in the end of the day, the current government, again, the differences that we're going to see is one is that right now the current government is focused on enforcement. Whereas the opposition parties, especially, including the Arab parties in the opposition, which would be necessary to make up the next coalition, they would be focused more on the carrots and not on the sticks. Let's not enforce the laws. Let's try and encourage and buy our way into peace and peace and security. Those are the oversimplifications of the two approaches.
SPEAKER_02Again, that that is an oversimplification, but I think the way it's going to play out in the coming election cycle is if you zoom out, Israel has had hundreds of murders this year, which means when you speak about enforcement, the current government has not been very successful. There are more internal murders during this current government. Now, we can speak about, well, there's more, there's also more weapons out there, both legal and illegal, and it hasn't been effective. There have been more car accidents that have been unsolved. There have been more car thefts that have been unsolved, which means the current government's enforcement standards have been pretty bad. Correct.
SPEAKER_01But the question is how long have they been focusing on, how long have they been trying, and what their approach will be in the next administration? The question is we we we identified the problem. I don't think anyone will disagree with what the problem is. The question is how you solve it. And I think that the current members of the coalition or the parties that would be making up who are be similar to the current coalition would be focusing more on the stick and the cat than the carrot, more enforcement, more um more officers on the street, more investigations and more trying to enforce with a stick. Whereas if the parties that make up the current opposition and their potential coalition would be focusing more on educational efforts or trying to integrate their societies more and let's teach them so that they don't want to steal cars, not let's just throw them in jail so they can't steal cars situation. Again, it's a carotinous stick, and that it's an oversimplification of the two approaches. But that's those are the differences that we're going to be seeing. And and parties will fall, it's a spectrum. Parties will fall along their political lines. Along their political lines on their spectrum of which they're more in what direction they're more of.
SPEAKER_02Okay. So I think we've pretty much spoken in depth about the security aspect that we both agree will probably be the primary focus of the upcoming election. The next aspect, and this is unfortunately something that gets people very emotional, is going to be the role of the Haredium.
SPEAKER_01Right. And like we said in our last episode, it's not just whether they serve or don't serve in the army. I think the question that society is asking itself more is what is the nature of the relationship between the Kharedi community, the ultra-orthodox community, and the state of Israel as a whole? And the question isn't only about army service. That's a huge piece of it. No, it's the their general role in Israeli society. It's not just army service, it's also the economic side of things. In the end of the day, we're the economic contribution and the economic cost and the lack thereof or increasing military service. And those are that's going to be a big question. And I think that's going to be one of the most explosive issues because there is no easy solution. It's not cut and dry. Anyone who likes to think, yeah, we can just arrest everyone, we can force them all to work. It's all populist talking points that aren't realistic. And at the same time, I don't see a formula that exists that would be acceptable to the Khariti community that the rest of society can accept. And I think that in the end of the day, it's going to be an exploding flashpoint where everyone goes head to head with it, whether they're on the left, on the right, the coalition, the opposition, and I don't see a solution coming out of it. I really don't.
SPEAKER_02Right. I think that's what we've said before is this is going to be a major issue because it touches on everything from security to economics to the future of what this country is going to look like in 10, 15, 20 years. All of those things are tied up in the Haredi issue. It's not just the army, it's not just security, it's everything together.
SPEAKER_01It's the army, it's security, it's economics, it's education. Again, like I said, and I think that the question is going to come down to what people are willing to compromise on for which gains. And I think that's where we're going to see the difference in the parties. Where some parts of the law, I'm willing to compromise on security in order to gain some sort of a change, like whatever a specific change in that relationship. Or I'm willing to compromise on judicial reform in order to achieve a change in this relationship. Or I'm willing to compromise on the question is what the give and take is going to be. And the question is what kind of and it's all going to be how you form a coalition, either with them and what you have to compromise on in order to have them part of the part of your coalition, what you basically, what you have to give them to bring them in to accomplish everything else, or what kind of a coalition can you create without them? And then in order to change something from the legal standpoint that would harm, in their view, harm them, because now they're not members of the coalition, what the members of that coalition would have to give up of their other stated goals in order to achieve it. And that's a very interesting question that at the moment I don't think anyone's capable of answering because we don't even know who all the players on the field are.
SPEAKER_02So this reminds me very much of reading about Israeli politics in the 90s.
SPEAKER_00Okay.
SPEAKER_02What I mean by that, in the 90s, the primary issue that Israelis were dealing with was security.
unknownOkay.
SPEAKER_02The left-right split was security. It was the land for peace or military strength will create peace. Correct. Those were the two competing options between left and right. Both sides convinced voters in order to the the place you compromise is on Haredium. Going back to Shamir and Perez, to Rabin Barak and Netanyahu, everyone was willing to compromise on the Haredi issue because they needed the Haredium in the coalition. That's exactly what it was. We want to do land for peace deals, but we need the Haredium in the coalition, on that we'll compromise. We need to strengthen security and shy away from land for peace deals. We need the Haredium in the coalition. And that's the way Israel ran for 15 years, to the point where we are now, where every coalition that has existed on the right has almost automatically had the Haredium in it. Now they have become the issue where everyone will compromise on security for.
SPEAKER_01Well, that exactly that's the question. Is the like I was saying, the question now is going to become what are you willing to compromise on to keep them out of the coalition? What can I work with on the other side of the on the other side of the aisle, which isn't really the other side of the aisle, because most of the security issues, they're 80-20 issues where 80% of us agree on it, or it's not something that's going to really change the next government. Also, what can we really compromise on in order to keep them out of the coalition? That's going to be a huge question in this election. Because I think that they, which again, this is a strategic mistake, I believe, on the Kharedi community's part, they've made themselves not just disagreeable to the majority of Israelis at this point. I think they've actually made themselves the that the majority of Israelis feel almost an animosity. I don't want to say hatred because that's a very strong word. There is a there's a level of growing animosity towards their community. Now, whether you say the media is inflating that and making it worse and inflaming it, it's entirely possible. But just judging by the man on the street conversations, it's definitely a sentiment that's growing. Whether it's the because the media is fanning it or whether it's because it's a real sentiment, it's it's growing. Reality is it's growing, and they're not doing anything to help themselves. They're making it worse. Right.
SPEAKER_02Also, and the interesting thing is going to be, and with this, I think we'll end and move on to the last issues. Um, which which parties and when the new parties come out is where people are willing to fall and what compromises will people make in a coalition that goes for one aspect or another and keeps Kharedim out. That will be something that we will follow very closely in the coming months.
SPEAKER_00Exactly.
SPEAKER_02Now we have two more.
SPEAKER_00The economy and the judiciary.
SPEAKER_02All right. So let's move on to the economy. Yes. Simply put, Israelis are paying higher taxes, and the general feeling is we're not getting benefit from our tax system. And even though the Israeli economy is a relatively strong, the two aspects are growing inflation. Day-to-day life in Israel is becoming far more expensive. Everything from transport to fuel cost to basic commodities are increasing in price. Housing prices are astronomical. There is not enough dem there's not enough supply to meet demand. Those are all major aspects of the uh that are playing into the economics. Um there was one more, but I can't remember what it was.
SPEAKER_01The overall cost of living and it's going up because again, prices for everything are going up. Housing, actually, if we look at the market, isn't exactly going up, but it's basically stabilized at already a very high price, which keeps a lot of Israelis out of the market or only keeps them out until a much later point in their life. Now, the question we're gonna have between all the parties is how you approach these issues. To one extreme, we're gonna have the level of socialist control, which is just government controls on markets, which artificially lower prices at what expense? And then the other extreme that is gonna be open up to more free market situations and allow more things more foreign competition in in order to break local monopolies and then therefore bring prices down, but also at the expense of exporting some of our labor force, exporting some of our profits, exporting some of our power. And the question comes down to on each market where you find a balance. And every party is gonna approach that very differently in the end of the day, whether we view things more from a socialist perspective, more from a capitalist perspective, and different parties are gonna fall at different places along that line. And it's very interesting to see how they work out because they could be for housing prices. Some of them are gonna fall somewhere in the middle. Where it comes to gasoline prices or basic products, they'll fall to a total extreme where we should have total government control over pricing, like we have at the moment on milk and eggs. Where we're gonna break those monopolies and allow a little bit, not allow, but allow free markets to take over where the prices will fluctuate like crazy at first, but they will stabilize eventually.
unknownRight.
SPEAKER_02So that's the economic issue. I think we've we covered it in basics, but I'm sure in in the coming months we'll discuss it more as different parties come out with their manifestos. The loss aspect that you think is going to play a more significant role is judicial reform. Now, we're speaking about the judicial reform that caused all of the upheavals and controversies prior to the October 7th war. Now, I think most both of us are in agreement that there is a problem with Israel's current judicial system.
SPEAKER_01Right. I think look, I think when we look at it right now, we can there's a couple of major reforms that are on the table for the judicial system that a lot of people can agree on are necessary. I think we have to look at the reality also right now. The current Supreme Court has nine judges. When the Supreme Court is full, it's supposed to have 15. There's six Supreme Court justices that haven't been appointed in this government, which definitely need to be appointed in the next. And there are multiple judges that, depending on the length of the next administration, will be forced to retire because they've hit retirement age. So there's going to be even more judges to appoint. The question is, is how are you going to break the deadlock right now on the Judicial Appointments Committee? If the judges start retiring and it goes from drops from nine, it drops to six, it drops to three, we might get to a situation where we have no Supreme Court justices anymore because there hasn't been an agreement to appoint new ones. There's the whole reality of the government, both the state prosecutor and the legal advisor to the government all being rolled into one position that has veto power on everything the government does, even though that's an unelected position. We have the question of whether judiciary can knock down the Israel's equivalent of constitutional laws, basic laws, which are legislated in the regular process of any other law. And there's creating a level of state or of order in all of this reality that needs to be addressed. On one extreme, we'll have the no, let's leave the system the way it is, let's protect it at all costs because it serves our interests politically, it's aligned with us. You have the other extreme, which is let's just break the whole system down and completely rebuild it in a completely different model that's 100% appointed by the people. And then you have steps along the way. Now, I think the reason it's going to be one of the most important issues is because to change anything, you need to fix the judiciary first. Because in the end of the day, as we've seen in the current government, if the govern, if the judicial, if the Supreme Court is just going to overrule every decision, cancel every decision, and put put put um put roadblocks in the way of everything and every how bill and and prevent the government from functioning, nothing else gets accomplished. Again, the fact that the government was able to appoint three heads of um bureaucratic officers, the head of the Shabbat, Buzzini, Ronan Golfman as the head of the Mossad.
SPEAKER_02And the army.
SPEAKER_01What?
SPEAKER_02And the third one being the army.
SPEAKER_01No.
SPEAKER_02The new chief of staff was appointed under this government.
SPEAKER_01Without with agreement of the judiciary first of who they appointed. But again, the third one where they they were able to get through was um the Natsifku the Nativ Sheruta Medina, the oh my god, I'm forgetting what the state controller, which again is now currently sitting in the Supreme Court to overrule the decision to appoint them. Those three positions are massive accomplishments for the government, which they fought tooth and nail through the entire judicial branch. Instead of those appointments taking a week or two, which is what they should normally take, it took months, if not over a year, in the end of the day, because the judiciary put so many roadblocks in their way, which prevented the government from functioning properly. Again, without fixing the judiciary, anything else you do is not possible. You can't fix anything or make any major changes because the judges can just overrule you. And it comes down, there's going to be the reality is most likely there's going to be the equivalent of a constitutional crisis. There's going to be a point where the judiciary goes head to head with the government and they're forced to basically give each other the middle finger and play a game of chicken to see who goes first. And we're getting closer to that point. The question is, is under which government is that going to happen and what the outcome is going to be?
SPEAKER_02Okay, well, that is going that is going to be something that um I'm actually not not looking forward to because as much as I have a problem with the Supreme Court, I disagree with the idea of letting it c letting it collapse on itself. And at the same time, while I disagree with the fact that it's been a roadblock in any government accomplishment, I have a problem with the idea of just saying we can ignore the Supreme Court, it doesn't exist.
SPEAKER_01Again, I'm not gonna say that there needs to be the same way that you're you're uncomfortable with having a government that has no checks and balances on it. I'm just as uncomfortable as having a judiciary with no checks or balances on it. Agreed. And we've had this runaway judiciary for years. And that needs to be solved before anything else can be fixed.
SPEAKER_02All right. Well, here I'm gonna bring us back to our initial discussion. I don't think that anybody is willing to compromise with certain parties in order to do that first. Because the question has to be what which aspect of the four we've discussed, which is the priority? Security, the Haredi issue, economics, or the Supreme Court. You can't have all. In this in most cases, you can only choose one.
SPEAKER_01Exactly.
SPEAKER_02You're gonna have to choose one and compromise on the other, on compromise and ignore the other three.
SPEAKER_01There's a famous um business quote for people who work in um where anytime where you create a product for a client, you can always have two out of three speed, quality, or price. You could only have two. You can never have all three. So the question is, is out of this list of four things, what is the next government gonna make its priority? And around what of those priorities is a coalition gonna be formed around? And I think that's gonna be the question of the next of this election of on a national level, which are we gonna prioritize right now, whether it's security, the judiciary, the economy, or rebalancing the relationship with the Kharim? Which which combination? You can't have all four. Maybe you can only have one. I we can only have one. We can and again, and if we can only have one, which one is it gonna be? If we can have two, even better. Maybe we could even have three. We definitely can't have all four. The question is, and that's I think what this election is gonna be about. Of which of those four are we prioritizing at the moment?
SPEAKER_02All right. Well, with that, I think we have a lot of food for thought. October 27th is a long way away. There is going to be a lot of discussion about these different things. In the coming weeks, we're going to see new parties coming, people changing new hats, new roles. And unfortunately, we're also going to see a lot of mudslinging, a lot of names, some awful things coming out. Um I hope we can maintain some type of dignity, but I don't see that being a reality. For now, let's continue to discuss it.
SPEAKER_01And I would like to turn to our viewers and all of our listeners and say, leave us messages in the comments. What subjects do you would you find interesting for us to cover in future episodes? Should we do an episode about the technicalities of elections and how vote sharing works and how votes are counted in Israel? Should we do an episode about how different parties choose their lists? Should we go deep dives into the biographies of the different heads of the parties? What is it that you would find interesting for us to discuss on the show? Let us know in the comments.
SPEAKER_02And with that, that's the end of another episode. I need to bring it down. There we go. And with that, we come to the end of another episode. Thanks to our partners at Jerusalem Media Group and our sponsors, beTheirisrael.com. For all your digital events here in Israel, BeThereIsrael.com provides live streaming services so your family and friends around the world can join you virtually. And remember, like, share, and subscribe. And as always, I'm Israel.
SPEAKER_01Hi.
