Season 1, Episode 3 | George Washington Builds the Presidency

George Washington Builds the Presidency. 

Are you ready to uncover how one man's choices shaped the very essence of the American presidency? How did George Washington, a military leader turned statesman, navigate the turbulent waters of power and liberty? What challenges did he face as he established the precedents that govern our leaders today?

In this episode of This Constitution, host Matthew Brogdon sits down with Paul Carrese to delve into George Washington's presidency, exploring his pivotal role in establishing the executive branch within the newly created Constitution. Carrese, a civic thought and leadership fellow, discusses Washington's challenges in legitimizing a strong executive role, influenced by classical sources and his commitment to public service. Key topics include Washington's handling of the national bank controversy, the Jay Treaty, and the Whiskey Rebellion, illustrating his balanced approach to executive power. The episode also highlights Washington's farewell address, emphasizing unity, the dangers of political parties, and his enduring legacy.

In This Episode:

• (00:03) Introduction to the Constitution
• (00:15) Introduction to Paul Carrese
• (01:33) Washington's role in the Constitutional Convention
• (02:58) Washington's legitimacy
• (06:01) Washington's first inaugural address
• (07:31) Washington's farewell address
• (08:45) Washington's self-education
• (09:31) Influence of classical thinkers
• (12:14) Washington's concept of office
• (14:40) Episodes of Washington's leadership
• (15:54) The bank's rationale
• (17:21) Washington's cabinet strategy
• (18:21) Madison's shift on the bank
• (20:03) Hamilton's economic influence
• (22:18) Washington's diplomatic role
• (23:12) Constitutional interpretation of treaties
• (24:15) Washington's treaty process
• (25:29) The Jay Treaty controversy
• (28:04) Whiskey Rebellion context
• (30:43) Constitutional enforcement
• (31:46) Peace through strength
• (32:38) Washington's farewell address
• (33:14) Washington's relationship with party
• (34:31) Significance of the farewell address
• (36:46) Counsels in the farewell address
• (38:51) Washington's legacy
• (39:24) George III's remark on Washington

Transcript

Various Voices [00:00:04]:

We the people. We the people. We the people do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.

Matthew Brogdon [00:00:15]:
The Constitution isn't just a historical document. It's a blueprint for American self-government that shapes our past, guides our present, and defines the future of our country.

Savannah Eccles Johnston [00:00:27]:
In every episode of this Constitution, we dive into the decisions, debates, and stories that are still unfolding at the center of American Civic life.

Matthew Brogdon 00:00:36  Welcome to This Constitution. I'm Matthew Brogdon. I've got a special guest today, Paul Carrese, who is the Civic Thought and Leadership fellow at the Jack Miller Center for the Teaching of America's Founding Principles and History. He's also the founding director of the School for Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership at Arizona State University, which has been an important, sort of path-breaking example to institutions that are committed to civic education in the United States, and an important inspiration to the work we do here at the center for Constitutional Studies. We're going to talk today about George Washington's presidency. George Washington, the indispensable man of the founding, and the father of his country, earned that title first as a military leader and what was a very contingent and uncertain revolution for America's independence.

He sat in the front of the room in that chair with the rising sun over his head in Philadelphia as the Constitution was drafted, including the provisions for the American presidency when the framers were, fleshing out the shape of that institution, there was the man who would occupy it first, and, of course, occupy that position already in the minds of many of the framers of the Constitution and most importantly for us, was the country's first president, and in that role established the contours and constitutional shape of that office and set a precedent that casts a long shadow over American constitutional and civic life. So, Paul, let's talk about Washington. I want to ask first, Washington became president in 1789, in a context where most American executives are pretty weak. There were counterexamples, but the only strong executive most Americans were acquainted with would have been monarchs. And, Anti-Federalists had been arguing that Washington. Not that Washington, but that the presidency, a strong executive like the presidency, was inconsistent with the Republican government.

Matthew Brogdon 00:02:53  So how in taking up the mantle of the presidency, did Washington meet this challenge?

Paul Carrese 00:02:58  Thank you for the question. Thank you for inviting me for the interview. I'm an admirer of all the work you are doing at the center for Constitutional Studies and with undergraduate students here at UVU and with teachers, and it's just marvelous work. The story of Washington making the single executive legitimate is a story of Washington being invited to the Constitutional Convention because he'd been a leader in the arguments for reform of the Articles of Confederation and not very widely known. He wrote a letter to James Madison in March of 1787, before the convention began. I would translate it in modern terms as I don't want this to be a talking shop and a waste of time. We need to do real work. The language he uses is that radical cures of the Articles of Confederation are needed, and this will take thought. And he knew that Madison could do the thinking while Madison was already working on basically what we would call the Virginia plan. Right? But now he has the authority of the big guy, the most respected man in the country, who had resigned from public life after defeating a superpower. So he was not going to be the Cromwell figure or later, the Napoleon figure. Right? So he's got great legitimacy. He brings that legitimacy to the convention publicly. But privately, he's already told Madison, think big. So Madison proposes an independent executive in the Virginia plan. But there he is present. Then he's nominated, basically by Franklin at the very beginning to be the presiding officer, the president of the convention. And he doesn't get enough credit for making it a serious endeavor because he doesn't speak. He thinks it's his role not to speak very much. He says that on the final day, I thought I should not speak very much. You should be presiding. But he keeps them. He's there every day. He keeps them there every day. He keeps them to the rule of secrecy. So he makes it possible for there to be article two in all kinds of ways.  And they all know in the room that he's the model for it. So when he agrees to the unanimous vote in the Electoral College to serve, he already has all of that legitimacy behind him. And he shows by his deeds by his first inaugural address, to my fellow citizens in the Senate and House of Representatives, that he will be a constitutional executive, and he shows the value of it year by year, by not being a monarch. Right. The Anti-Federalists say this office is the fetus of monarchy, right? He shows that he is independent, where the Constitution says he should be independent with the executive power. But collaborating with the other branches where he needs to collaborate. There's a sticky point about the treaty power between the Senate that works.

Matthew Brogdon 00:06:00  We'll have to come back to that.

Paul Carrese 00:06:02  But he shows year after year that he is not a monarch, that he's guided by the Constitution. This is an office he's holding under the Constitution, and he's showing the value of it. The economy improves. The legislation working out with Hamilton as Treasury secretary, other things, you know.  So by the end of his first term, he asked Madison to write what we would now call the farewell address, a statement of valedictory address. He calls it to Madison. Madison says, I don't want to do this, but I will because he wants to resign. It's like being successful. I've shown that this works. I can leave, can't I retire? Right. And Madison says I don't want to do this. They all unanimously. The party factions thing has already started with the French Revolution. All of them separately. Right? Or signal to him, Jefferson, Madison. Hamilton. Adams. They also cannot leave. And so he has Madison's draft and he just puts it away and is unanimously elected a second time, unanimously in the Electoral College to be president.

Matthew Brogdon 00:07:08  That's remarkable.

Paul Carrese 00:07:09  So to discipline himself, to say, I'm serving the Constitution and to show that in his public statements and his private, you know, negotiations and actions, he was abiding by the Constitution and doing the functions the office was needed to do to provide some executive energy, but especially about foreign affairs, but not only about foreign affairs he proved the value of it right away, such that there was no dissent from anywhere on the thought that he would be elected again for a second term.

Matthew Brogdon 00:07:40  And it's not surprising that he's elected unanimously the first time around. But to win reelection in that fashion, I know, you speak of Washington's conception of the presidency as an office. And I've heard you talk before about, the provenance of that term of office that that Washington's not just drawing guidance from the Constitution, from that work of the framers in the 1780s, but he's actually drawing inspiration from an understanding of public service that's much older than that, including from someone like Cicero who writes of, duties. Actually, I guess, Cicero's one of his most important works on public service. On duties we usually interpret it is actually day offices, the offices. So maybe you can help us understand that. How is it that Washington draws inspiration from these older, classical sources when it comes to the way he exercises powers and understands his role as president?

Paul Carrese 00:08:45  A Great Resource is a book written by Richard Brooke Kaiser, longtime editor for National Review, and it was the first of his series of biographies of founders Madison and John and John Quincy Adams and Hamilton.  But the first one for the 1990s is Founding Father, and the subtitle is Rediscovering George Washington. He says this very explicitly in the first one, he's writing Plutarch's biography, a character study. It's not a 1000-page biography study of Washington. Those have already been done. And John Marshall's first biography was very long. The first effort, then Marshall shortens it. And at the end of his life, Marshall shortens it again to one volume.

Matthew Brogdon 00:09:31  Which is what got his, Marshall's one-volume biography down here on the table. That's right. Which was used for schoolchildren.

Paul Carrese 00:09:37  He wrote it in sort of somewhat in desperation under the Jacksonian democracy era, thinking the real story of the founding and of constitutionalism and the Republic might be lost. So he reduces his own life. It was initially in five volumes that Marshall reduces it a few years later to two volumes and shorter in length, and then 30 years later, at the end of his life, it actually comes into print after Marshall has died, 1838. But the subtitle of it now is The Life of George Washington written for schools. Right? So I say, those are the two best biographies, in my view, and I haven't read every single one. But Marshall's especially the final one, his final condensed essence of Washington and his greatness, his constitutional greatness. This is the great Chief Justice, John Marshall. Right. And then Richard Brooks, a character study, reading all the other biographies and histories and all that stuff. But the point to get back to your question is that Brooke Heizer takes very seriously that Washington was self-educated to agree that most of US political science history, we don't appreciate it. He had 900 volumes in the Mount Vernon Library at his death, some that he inherited from his father and his older brothers, and they weren't all about agriculture and military affairs, right? He had his own copy of Cicero's Daily Fix. He may even have more than one, but he's definitely got one in translation on duties. He has Plutarch. He has Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace, the first major comprehensive work of international law we would call it. Right? Who is this dumb general with, you know, spending money on these books? So, between his own reading and then Bruckheimer makes a great point, having the confidence with his own efforts at self-education, not being able to go to college. He has the confidence to be writing back and forth, talking to very smart people like George Mason, then Thomas Jefferson, then James Madison, then Alexander Hamilton, then John Jay, then John Adams. Imagine having the intellectual confidence to want Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton in your cabinet already sensing these are two very different characters. And then after year one in the cabinet, these are very, very different characters. He wants them to stay in as long as possible. And after they've left, he's still writing to both of them. And with Madison. And so he had a liberal education more than we give him credit for. He spent the money on the books to do that. He's writing to these smart people and he absorbs.  He's a wonderful emblem of but embodiment of the liberal arts education that all these great learned founders we have. We think of that whole list I just gave. It all comes to a consensus in him. So when you read a document, you said, well, it was ghostwritten. The first inaugural was ghostwritten by Madison, and the The Farewell Address in 1796 was ghostwritten by Hamilton. It was actually ghostwritten, at Washington's insistence, by Madison, because, he says to Hamilton in in 1796, You must use as much as you can of Madison's draft from 1792, and then at the end of a process of going back and forth with Hamilton, he finally likes the version that Hamilton has sent him. He says, I would like you to show this to John Jay. And so Washington brings back, to use a Blues Brothers metaphor, probably not. Nobody gets that. Washington brings the band back together. He brings Publius from the Federalist Papers back together on his own initiative, that the the ideas of Hamilton and Madison and j inform the farewell address. So the word office is used in the farewell address. He also uses the word trust about this office. Right. I'm serving the Constitution. He takes very seriously the oath of the Constitution and refers to it as serving the Constitution. Obviously, his independent judgment has to be used, but he's serving an office. It's a duty. He uses these words regularly. And that is not the predominant understanding of holding office today. We use words like public servant, not really tracing it back to this Cicero onion idea. And we think of administration and we think of executive authority, but we don't trace those back to the deeper ideas which inform but also bind and limit those. But Washington is using those words all the time, in private correspondence, in public writing and public addresses.

Matthew Brogdon 00:14:18  It is a remarkable element of his presidency that he thinks of the role in the office as a set of duties, and especially the duty to, faithfully execute the laws, of course, in the presidential oath, faithfully executing the laws and protecting and defending preserving the Constitution. I think it would be helpful to talk about some particular episodes to get an idea of how Washington in practice understood and interpreted the powers of the presidency, because it's fair to say that he was a strong president. he certainly had a conception of the presidency as constitutionally limited, but also exercised the powers quite vigorously. So I think that that would be helpful to play that out to to tease that out by talking through some of these. I think there are three especially that are worth us touching on the controversy over the Bank of the United States, which he oversees as president and brings into creation, the J treaty with Great Britain, which involves him, embroiled him again, like it had with the Neutrality Proclamation and the exercise of presidential discretion in foreign affairs. And then the Whiskey Rebellion, which is a thing that I think a lot of people don't know a great deal about. but it was a fascinating episode. So why don't we tackle those one at a time? Maybe walk me through how Washington's leadership is president in the bank. Controversy helps us see his conception of the office.

Paul Carrese 00:15:54  Wonderful question. The rationale for the bank is to strike the right balance between liberty and a small but vigorous federal government with an executive branch that has military capability. Right. So you want liberty there for a small government, right? Therefore, you don't want a large standing army and standing navy. The language of the Constitution about the Navy is to provide for and maintain a Navy right, which means it's permanent. Okay. And then to raise armies temporarily. Right. But Washington is persuaded by Hamilton that the English have a good idea. They mostly have a small standing army and a permanent navy. But the bank for centuries had allowed the British to, in emergencies, fund men and material for an army, and also to boost the Navy that allows there to be liberty at home with the capacity that is a signal to potential enemies. You really don't want to risk this, do you? Because we have enough of a standing navy and standing army and we have the bank capacity.

This is really not a good bet for you, is it, Mister monarch, Mister Empire, Mister, whoever.

Matthew Brogdon 00:17:12  What was Churchill's term? America's the arsenal of democracy. We think of this.

Paul Carrese 00:17:21  The bank allows that capacity without having a big standing permanent, you know, small shell, the capacity is there. And then you fund it quickly in an emergency. Right. So he's persuaded by Hamilton and he's persuaded by Hamilton that part of Washington's genius is he really uses the cabinet to bring in excellent people who have strong opinions. Just think of Hamilton and Jefferson, the two. Right. As if Hamilton and Jefferson are not smart enough, he's writing privately to Madison in the house. So he wants the best opinions, and then he makes his own judgment, and he's persuaded by Hamilton that the necessary and proper clause at the end of article one, section eight, is there for a reason. It can't be a vacant clause. They knew what they were doing, and he was there when it was written in the convention.

Paul Carrese 00:18:05  This is a necessary and proper step, the bank to implement some of the clauses above, national security rationale, other rationales. So he's persuaded that's the reason he wants a national university as well.

Matthew Brogdon 00:18:18  Something we don't talk about often. His desire for all.

Paul Carrese 00:18:21  Eight years of his presidency. He asked the Congress for a national university. Right. So he's persuaded by that. And let me just say about why he was proven correct. James Madison, opposing the bank, admits silently by 1815 that Hamilton and Washington were right. Never admits it, but Madison suddenly discovers the bank is constitutional. Why? Well, the national capital was invaded and burned in 1812 because there was no standing army. There was a rowboat. Navy. It was called. It was a joke, right? Jefferson didn't want the taxes, didn't want a strong federal government. We've got an ocean. We don't need all this meddlesome, strong, monarchical federal government thing. Right. Well, after 12 years of that, the British are pushing us around like we're nothing.

Paul Carrese 00:19:10  And we are nothing. Right. So we get ourselves into a war that we didn't need to get ourselves into. What Washington and Matt and Adams together had avoided for 12 years. Suddenly, the Jefferson Democratic-Republican administrations get us because we have no army, no Navy, and no bank. Right? So after the national capital is invaded and burned in that war, they bring back the bank. They fund an army capability and a Navy capability much more than they had. And by 1819, there was a de facto naval academy in Annapolis. Not under that precise title isn't formally established in 1840, but it's there. So the bank was eventually recognized, even by Madison, as necessary for national security, because ugly experience had proven the wisdom of the Washington Hamilton strategy.

Matthew Brogdon 00:20:03  I'd never connected. I teach the National Bank controversy to undergraduates a great deal, and I usually put it in the context of Hamilton's economic program tariffs and assumption of state debts and its economic health. But it is a really critical connection that the bank is a financial institution that's really essential to the national security of the United States.

Matthew Brogdon 00:20:28  which something I always have observed with students whenever we go through Hamilton's writings is, just how much he does acknowledge the economic basis of military power.

Paul Carrese 00:20:42  It connects to the J treaty because I think it's fair to say that today we think Washington's not very smart. He was important and established these precedents, but it's smarter people informing him. And, you know, he has been successful for eight years. But Adams is implementing the Washington Hamilton strategy for the next four years. So we have 12 years in which this infant government, nothing like it ever in the history of humankind, stays out of the French Revolution and the wars of Europe has a booming economy. It is thriving and has the capacity to expand. The Generalissimo, who could have stayed in office till death resigns, wants to get out of there after four years, is out of there after eight, survives the birth of parties and a party transition and and is still strong enough after you can see I'm being a little critical of Jefferson and Madison as presidents is still strong enough to survive the War of 1812, which did not need to be fought.

Paul Carrese 00:21:46  We shouldn't have been pulled into the capital, invaded, and burned, and it survives. It then goes on to come up with an accommodation between the Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison views about all of this and moves on into the rest of the 19th century. That's astounding. But Washington, I think, doesn't quite get enough credit. Washington. Hamilton together for laying the foundations. What does article two mean? What does article one mean, let alone what does article three mean, and how to make this real and successful and a model elsewhere.

Matthew Brogdon 00:22:18  So the J treaty, how does it I guess, how does it establish the constitutional role of the president diplomatically? So this is very important. We now think of the president as obviously, sort of the first diplomat of the nation, as well as commander in chief. So it's very natural for Americans now to think of the presidency in this position. But not everyone thought of executives, especially Republican executives, as being able to wield that kind of power in foreign relations and at the same time remain elected Republican officers.

Matthew Brogdon 00:22:58  So how did Washington's use of this power, his navigation of foreign affairs, especially with the J treaty, maybe with other things, establish his understanding of the constitutional scope or duties of the president.

Paul Carrese 00:23:12  The bank controversy shows this same issue of constitutional understanding. And then the J treaty, another episode we in the 20th century into the 21st century have fallen into the lazy, unconstitutional view of thinking the judges decide the meaning of the Constitution. Well, the great Chief Justice, John Marshall, did establish for the unanimous court that the court does have an important role, but not an exclusive role. Washington The Cabinet the leaders in the House and Senate are working out the meaning of crucial clauses in Article One and article two, and extend Article Three as constitutional interpreters. And I give them their. You know, Madison has his reasons to say the bank is not constitutional and you know Jefferson as well. These are reasonable concerns that they have. I think they were wrong. But the Jay treaty, the treaty power, Washington, the cabinet leaders of the Senate don't quite know what these clauses are about.

Paul Carrese 00:24:15  The advise and consent role of the Senate in relation to the executive. There's an episode where Washington goes in person to the Senate, thinking that advise and consent means he's proposing a treaty and thinks at the beginning of the process he needs to be working with the Senate on what the terms would be, and finds it completely frustrating and walks out, kind of storms out and and basically never returns in person figuring out himself. This can't ever be what was intended because nothing would ever get done. So there has to be an executive who drives the diplomacy and the treaty process. And then there's a possibility for some consultation with leaders in the Senate. And, you know, you could say that's all a matter of prudence. But then the formal role is for the Senate to accept that the executive has negotiated a treaty on the premise that he thinks he's read the Senate and that this is acceptable to a supermajority. And that's what happens with the Jay Treaty, the controversy of the storm, of controversy because of the French Revolution.

Paul Carrese 00:25:29  And should Americans be more with France and republicanism or with monarchy and Britain and all that. Washington just says I'm executing my constitutional role. I have assigned the Foreign secretary of the Articles Confederation government, John Jay, who's now the chief Justice, Supreme Court for this role. And it's not an official role. It's not violated the Constitution that Jay is holding two roles. Right. And I trust him. And because there are no smartphones there, no faxes there, no satellites, he's just got to send Jay off on a ship and go negotiate and trust him. Right. And I will have done my duty, George Washington, to review what Jay comes back with and say, this is I trust Mr. Jay. This is the best we could have gotten. This keeps us out of war. This affirms our independence. And I will send it to the Senate. Well, a storm of controversy breaks out. You know, the House wants to get involved and they want to see all the negotiating documents. And Washington just says, I'm reading the Constitution. I don't see any role for the House in a treaty. Of course, there's an indirect role in appropriating funds. Things like that. But they don't confirm anybody involved in the process, and they're not involved in the crucial language of article one or article two. So he says this between the Senate and me and, you know, all kinds of outrageous things happening. John Jay being burned in effigy and, you know, party and all this sort of stuff. And Washington just keeps his cool and says, I'm doing what the Constitution says should be done, and the Senate will have to decide. But his firmness gives just enough authority and cover to the Senate that they say this. We accept the views of the president that Mr.. Mr.. Jay negotiated the best that we could get and what does it do? It keeps us out of the wars of Europe and affirms our independence in a way that the Treaty of Paris is now being followed up by this second treaty with Britain.

Paul Carrese 00:27:26  And look at what it did. It did exactly what Washington said it was going to do. But it was his internal debate with the cabinet, then with reading the Senate and saying this is what the Constitution meant to do. What's hard for us is that there's an aristocratic quality to this. The Senate is a Roman Republican term. It's not a Democratic term. The executive acting this way is a semi monarchical role, office function. And we are not so comfortable. And at the time, members of the House weren't comfortable with it. And the Democratic Republican Party out there is not comfortable with it. But the wisdom of it and the constitutionality of it, I think, was proven.

Matthew Brogdon 00:28:04  Makes me feel like we need an episode at some point talking about, you know, not undemocratic institutions and democratic society and including the military, of course, how you do this and we just talk about John Ford Westerns, I think. And but Washington can't ride off to London to negotiate the J treaty.

Matthew Brogdon 00:28:22  He can, however, go out to western Pennsylvania to deal with the Whiskey Rebellion. so acquaintance briefly with what occurred in the Whiskey Rebellion and how that shaped Washington's understanding of the presidency, or indicates for us the kind of precedent he says it's.

Paul Carrese 00:28:40  Related to these two episodes. We just discussed the bank and the treaty power and the earlier discussion about office and constitutionalism. Washington thinks we are a constitutional republic. He is enough of a literal reader of the Constitution, which only uses the word constitution, and Republic does not refer to democracy. Right? This is the formula we have. They know the distinction between a democracy and a republic. Now, there's some you know, Danielle Allen of Harvard argues, well, they were using both terms and somewhat interchangeably. I lean on the side that that is partly correct, but still the greater emphasis is on the distinction between the two. Under the authority of the Constitution. As a republic, it was legitimate to pass legislation about a tax. The federal government had that power.

Paul Carrese 00:29:29  This is all part of Hamilton's, you know, financial scheme, but there's enough consensus in the cabinet. Washington goes forward with it. It's passed into law. And these are the laws of the land. And it's all legitimate in letter and in spirit. Right. The Whiskey Rebellion is, in Washington's mind, something of a reprise of an echo of Shays Rebellion in the immediate period before the 1787 Constitution, a major reason the federal convention was called in Philadelphia 77. This rebellion in 1786. Right. Is it in Massachusetts in which farmers upset at the tax and finance policies of the state of Massachusetts, claiming they're in debt, they can't repay their loans, so they're just storming, you know, they form a militia. Shays is a veteran of the Revolutionary War, and Washington, writing from Virginia, is just horrified at this. This is a further reason for him that we must gather a convention to reform and revise the articles. Because the article's government is helpless. It can't come up with the right finance, tax, tariff, international and domestic policies to deal with these economic issues which are causing violence.

Paul Carrese 00:30:43  Okay. So it's a reprise for him of the very reason why you needed article one. Article two in a new constitution. We followed the letter of the law. We are now going to enforce the letter of the law. It's a sticky moment because he's the civilian commander in chief, but he's the most famous general of the right on the continent. And he decides he should ride out and he decides diplomacy right as much as he can. But then the diplomacy is not working. And, you know, federal tax collectors are being tarred and feathered and chased out and violence and all that. So he just decides we have to exercise constitutional powers. He has to call out the state militias as a federal force, and he gets the cooperation of these several states to do it all under the Constitution, and then decides he should show up in person, not in uniform, not in uniform as a civilian, and far enough away from just where the gathering is. And then the force goes off. Well what happens? There's no bloodshed.

Paul Carrese 00:31:51  Not a single shot is fired. It's the same strategy as for the bank. If we show enough force, foreign powers will decide. Not a good bet. Too risky. I'm not going to try something on the Americans. Right. All the rebels against the tax disappear. Not a shot is fired. And eventually compliance with the tax follows Washington's peace through strength. Peace through strength on domestic policy. And to show he writes about it in his annual address reporting to Congress. This was a test of our constitutional form of government and whether self-government could follow the rule of law and we passed the test.

Matthew Brogdon 00:32:30  Okay, so here he is.

Paul Carrese 00:32:33  And you, Republican, not Democratic, constitutional, not Democratic.

Matthew Brogdon 00:32:38  To bring us to a close. Appropriately, Washington's farewell address. He warns against the spirit of the party. He warns Americans, to Revere their laws and constitutions. and warns them to maintain a, you know, the importance of character and morality and national politics. and clearly he had modeled many of those things themselves, but he had also been, in many ways, a party leader.

Matthew Brogdon 00:33:14  He was the Federalist president by the time he left office. He hands off the mantle of the presidency to John Adams. it's always been a peculiar thing that we refer to. Jeffersonian Republicans, but not Washingtonian. Federalists.

Matthew Brogdon 00:33:31  What was Washington's view of the president's relationship to the party by the time he left office? Did he reconcile himself at all to the idea that he was a president with an opposition party in the form of Jeffersonian Republicans?

Paul Carrese 00:33:49  I'll start first with the party, then go back to the greatness of the farewell address. He warns against the party in the Farewell address. Not to say parties should be abolished, should be outlawed. It's an echo to some extent a federalist. Number ten. Any government strong enough to eliminate parties and factions would be tyrannical. It's part of human nature and liberty and free government. That itself was an echo of the Montesquieu sketch of the English Constitution and party spirit in the spirit of laws. So it's too moderate, it's too temper. It's to remember that there are larger purposes than party, and that party could destroy the whole system, a whole constitutional system.

Paul Carrese 00:34:31  So to that extent, there's a consistency in his last years in office, his second term and in the farewell address and his final years to never publicly identify himself as a Federalist, even though his body language, you know, he walks like a dog, he talks like a dog. And Tocqueville in Democracy in America, does classify Washington and Hamilton as the Federalist Party and Madison and Jefferson as Democratic Republicans. But there's a consistency to Washington, never himself identifying with party to the greatness of the farewell address. Today is September 19th, and that is the date in which the Farewell Address was published in a Philadelphia newspaper without the title The Farewell Address. It was just dated September 19th. United States friends and fellow citizens. And then he begins the farewell address. I would wish that every high school in the country, private or public or homeschooling, every college and university, should, should read and teach and study this extraordinary document, I said. He deliberately brings back Publius. It's saying I am doing my duty by resigning from public life as I wanted to.

Paul Carrese 00:35:47  He says, I asked to do this four years ago, and I'm doing my duty. I'm not failing in my duty. It would be good for all of you if we showed there was rotation in office and then praise for the Union and the Constitution. Republic makes various prayers and then says there perhaps I should stop. But he says in it, in effect, in my first retirement, 1783, the circular letter, the final circular letter, he writes as commander of the revolutionary forces to all the governors circular letter write. He had done the same thing. We won the war. Congratulations to all of us. Praying for the country. And here's some final advice. You've done it in 1783. So he says, well, you allowed me to do that. The first time there was a good reception to that. I'm going to do it again. And then, you know, 4/5 of the document is the council series of councils, like 9 or 10 main points, and you just listed several of them.

Paul Carrese 00:36:46  But he emphasizes liberty and says, I don't need to talk about that very much because you're all you all love liberty. And the rest of it is about order, the union, the Constitution, the separation of powers, and then and party right. Because the party undermines order, undermines the constitutional republic. So I think in a way I'm going to read back and then finally, the parts that we, we, we really don't quote anything other than party from that early part in this today 21st century, we do quote the phrase on religion and morality. Those paragraphs sometimes support educational institutions. And, you know, occasionally the paragraphs on foreign policy we quote, but we tend to misquote and misunderstand those as if he's an isolationist, which is wrong. but all of the more particular points are set up by Liberty and then union and constitution and separation of powers. That's the foundation for warning about parties for, religion and morality, for public credit, for education. On the foreign policy, it's all on the basis of constitutionalism.

Paul Carrese 00:37:57  So I think in a way, Washington might appreciate what Van Buren did after Jackson elected president to bring some order. Parties are a reality. They're there. But we need to fit this into our constitutional order, which is there should be national parties, but they should be from the ground up. They should have federalism in them. State and local party people rise up into the national party and the parties control the nominee for the major offices, especially for the presidency. It's not a plebiscite. It's experienced people in government who know the whole constitutional context and fabric from from local to state to national. And then they pick. And, and I think that fits pretty well with the spirit of what he's saying. Don't let parties be vehicles for demagoguery and vehicles for hatred because that's the path to destroying the constitutional order. Yeah.

Matthew Brogdon 00:38:51  Well, it sounds like from the story we've told about Washington, he's one of those rare individuals that's great enough to establish an order rule within it. Right. It disciplines his own conduct by sort of submitting himself to the rules of the game to the constitutional order, but also by his own character, sort of bring it along, bring it to maturity and develop it.

Matthew Brogdon 00:39:20  And that's a rare thing.

Paul Carrese 00:39:21  Can I finish with one little story?

Matthew Brogdon 00:39:23  Please do.

Paul Carrese 00:39:24   An American painter painting the portrait of George III. Here's about the farewell address. George III says to this American painter. If that's true, knowing that Washington had resigned once from power. Not going to be a Cromwell. If that's true, Washington is the greatest character of the age. This is George III. Yeah. Shortly after long comes this Frenchman named Napoleon, who in exile makes a disparaging remark about Washington. They wanted me to be a Washington, but if Washington had been in my situation, he never would have resigned from office because it was sort of, you know, and he basically says, oh, what's easy? It was easy for Washington to resign, but I can earn it. Well, he's being a pompous ass, right? He's being Napoleon. Even Napoleon had to recognize the greatness of Washington and try and explain it away. Right. So George the Third and Napoleon both say this is extraordinary that this immensely proud, ambitious, talented man resigns twice from very great power to allow constitutional government to be founded.

Matthew Brogdon 00:40:32  What a remarkable precedent. Well, thank you for helping us understand Washington's presidency. Paul, thank you for visiting the center. Thank you for having part of what we do.

Paul Carrese 00:40:42  Thank you for all the work you're doing.

Matthew Brogdon 00:40:44  We're just beginning to explore the rich legacy of America's Constitution. If today's discussion deepened your understanding, share this episode with a friend or student and subscribe to continue learning with us. For more insights and exclusive content, visit uvu.edu. Folks, thank you for joining us and we look forward to exploring more with you on This Constitution. Brought to you by the UVU center for Constitutional Studies, home to Utah's Civic Thought and Leadership Initiative.