Season 2, Episode 17 | George Washington: Merit, Power, and the Birth of Civilian Leadership

Did you know that George Washington could have become an American Caesar, but instead chose to walk away from power? Unlike Napoleon or Cromwell, he rejected dictatorship and dynasty, setting the precedent for civilian control of the military, limited executive authority, and the peaceful transfer of power.

In this episode of This Constitution, host Matthew Brogdon sits down with eminent historian Jeremy Black to trace Washington’s extraordinary balancing act. From the battlefields of the Revolution to the presidency, Washington navigated fragile institutions, fractious states, and the lure of personal power and, in doing so, set precedents that continue to define American politics.

The conversation explores Washington’s role as a “meritocratic monarch,” how he differed from figures like George III, Napoleon, and Oliver Cromwell, and why his restraint proved essential to building a constitutional republic. They discuss the challenges of commanding a multi-state army, the dangers of potential coups, his deliberate retirement, and the legacy of leadership “for country, not party.”

They also tackle a deeper question: what does Washington’s example teach us about the relationship between military power and constitutional government? His decision to submit force to law, ambition to restraint, and leadership to the service of the people remains one of the defining features of American constitutionalism.

In This Episode

• (00:03) Opening and introduction
• (00:56) Washington as a "meritocratic monarch"
• (02:34) Contrasts with George III and Napoleon
• (04:09) Washington’s challenges with Congress and state governments
• (05:31) Comparison to the French Revolution and use of force
• (07:01) Civilian control of the military: Historical continuity
• (08:20) Presidential power and restraint
• (09:37) Washington’s post-war precedent
• (10:54) Use of force in domestic rebellions
• (12:23) Continuity from military to executive leadership
• (13:04) Constitutional practices in the Continental Army
• (14:48) Managing rivalries and federalism in the army
• (16:12) Geographic shifts in the Revolutionary War
• (17:25) Washington’s political skills and resource allocation
• (19:41) National identity and the crucible of war
• (22:29) Army vs. Navy in American political culture
• (23:48) Washington’s non-autocratic leadership
• (24:32) Washington as American Cincinnatus
• (25:56) Washington’s farewell address and peaceful transfer of power
• (27:44) Conclusion and legacy
• (28:08) Podcast outro and next episode teaser

Notable Quotes

• (01:00) "I see George Washington as a formative figure in America and an example of the best type of what I call a meritocratic monarch." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (04:13) "Washington does this with enormous skill, not in easy circumstances." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (08:21) "One of the patterns that derives directly from Washington is that of the subordination of the military to civil authority." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (08:37) "Washington was not an American Caesar. He did not create himself as a dictator either." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (19:44) "America is born in the crucible of war, because that defines the boundaries of America." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (23:06) "The expression of liberty becomes that of serving on land in military forces." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (27:35) "I think one could say his politics were for the people, for his country, rather than for himself or his party." — Jeremy Black

Transcript

[00:00:00] Intro: We the people, do ordain and establish this Constitution. 

[00:00:11] Matthew Brogdon: Welcome to this constitution. I'm Matthew Brogdon, and I'm joined again by a special guest, Jeremy Black, an eminent historian, and a friend from the other side of the Atlantic, and he's gonna talk with us today about. The figure that takes the reins first as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army in 1775, 250 years ago, and, uh, eventually sees us through, uh, the establishment of our new government.

[00:00:44] Matthew Brogdon: That's George Washington, of course. So, Jeremy, welcome to the show. 

[00:00:48] Jeremy Black: Thank you. And thank you for inviting me to Utah Valley. Absolutely. 

[00:00:48] Matthew Brogdon: Maybe you could tell us a little bit about how you see George Washington in American history? 

[00:00:56] Jeremy Black: I have the very highest of regards for George Washington. [00:01:00] I see him as a formative figure in America, and an example of the best type of what I call a meritocratic monarch.

[00:01:07] Jeremy Black: So let me try and explain that in the broadest way. As president, which is what he eventually became, Washington, in effect, had the monarchical aspect of governance as the Greeks would've understood it. There are two types of monarchy. There is a hereditary monarchy and there is a meritocratic monarchy. Now hereditary monarchy.

[00:01:29] Jeremy Black: We know that George III epitomized that he was the grandson of George II. George II's father was George II. George II was succeeded by his oldest son, George II. We know what a hereditary monarchy means, and it has one advantage, which is the predictability of succession, and a whole host of disadvantages, in that you cannot necessarily guarantee the ability of the monarch.

[00:01:56] Jeremy Black: And there are also the problems, incidentally and indeed occurred with George III [00:02:00] about what to do if they are unwell and elderly. The other form of monarchy is what I would call a meritocratic monarchy. Now, meritocratic monarchs are monarchs who gain their position through their own efforts and abilities as understood by themselves and by others.

[00:02:19] Jeremy Black: Now the classic form of that in our ideas is an elected president with all the prerogatives of a president in executive terms, in judicial terms, head of the armed forces, and the honorific head of state, but often the actual head of state. And the idea is. There is obviously the disruption that you get each time that there is an election or a selection, however that is done, but nevertheless, you then get, hopefully, the best person.

[00:02:49] Jeremy Black: Now the trouble with this sort of meritocratic principle is all too often the merit in question has been that of military [00:03:00] skill, success, and position. And this is where George Washington becomes very interesting because George Washington is, on one hand, the contrast, the counterpoint to George II, but on the other hand, he's also the contrast counterpoint.

[00:03:19] Jeremy Black: To Napoleon, who took power, seized power in France in 1799 and then dominated France until his eventual fall in 1815. Now, in the case of George Washington, you have a figure who is chosen to lead the armed forces, but then as the leader of the armed forces plays within. Uses very carefully an understanding of power and authority in which, yes, he has power and authority stemming from his position, but that he has to work with Congress, he has to work with the state governments, and he has to, in fact, [00:04:00] also work with his soldiers insofar as, for example, people that might be disobedient or desertion.

[00:04:07] Jeremy Black: Deserters. You can't kill them en masse. And there were many deserters in the Continental Army. And Washington does this with enormous skill, not in easy circumstances. Now we can follow how his mind developed because his correspondence has been printed. There's a brilliant and very extensive edition from the University of Virginia.

[00:04:29] Jeremy Black: You can see in his Revolutionary War correspondence, which is a whole series, many volumes, you can see his irritation frequently expressed ex postulations towards, you know, state, uh, governments, for example, that they won't release more resources to the continental Army or that they insist on their resources going to the state militia.

[00:04:52] Jeremy Black: And the state militia is often, you know, following, shall we say, a slightly different trajectory of priorities. [00:05:00] So there was irritation on Washington's part, but the key element is he remains within what you can see as a developing. Governmental legal structure. In other words, he ensures that the American Revolution develops in a very different way to the French Revolution.

[00:05:20] Jeremy Black: The French Revolution from 1792 was also affected by difficult circumstances. Each of them had different, different difficulties. In the case of France, it was under challenge. As were the Americans by the equivalent of loyalists, but it was under challenge by a coalition of powers. In the case of the American Revolution, the British actually took the capital, Philadelphia.

[00:05:47] Jeremy Black: In 1777, in a way that, you know, Paris never fell until 1814 and then again in 1815. But the difference is that in France, the [00:06:00] abrupt labor of the guillotine helped to, as it were, maintain control within the military system, uh, that there was a widespread willingness to terrorize people who did not. As it was conformed to what was regarded as appropriate, and there was no real interest in private property or other restraints on the raising of supplies for the military.

[00:06:25] Jeremy Black: Washington's policy is very different. He helps indeed to ensure that there is an understanding of the military as subordinate to civil authority. Now that follows through into the post-war period. And again, there is a precursor here to other great turning points in American history. 18 65, 19 45.

[00:06:50] Jeremy Black: In 1865. The American army was one of the best in the world, and America in terms of the number of warships, had the second largest [00:07:00] navy in the world that could have been turned either to attack neighboring countries, the British and Canada, the French, and Mexico, or in order to support some differing form of political arrangement within America.

[00:07:15] Jeremy Black: Well. There was a bit of the latter in terms of the occupation of the South, but that was again within the legal parameters. And it was ended in 1877 when the army was pulled out of the South by Rutherford B. Hayes, and in subordination to a civil leadership in the military. And in, yes. Yeah. And in 1945 again.

[00:07:36] Jeremy Black: The military very much accepted the parameters in which they operated indeed, to us. It might even seem, this is a remarkable discussion to have. You can point out how many former generals became American presidents, large numbers in the 19th century. You can point obviously to Eisenhower in the 20th century, every single one of them did so through the ballot box.

[00:08:03] Jeremy Black: And indeed, more recently, when a general stood for his party's nomination for president and was unsuccessful, you didn't get General Wesley Clark turning to the barracks and saying, Right, chaps, we march on Washington, instead of which he accepted the situation. So one of the patterns that derives directly from Washington is that of the subordination of the military to civil authority.

[00:08:28] Jeremy Black: I think that's very important. And the other thing, of course, is the linked point about how you operate when you are President. Washington was not an American car. He did not, uh, create himself as a dictator either at the end of the war when the Newberg conspiracy suggested a lot of uncertainty when there wasn't yet a constitution, when there were all sorts of opportunities for an ambitious man had he so wished.

[00:08:58] Jeremy Black: To push things [00:09:00] and to a very different degree. And I mentioned Napoleon elsewhere in the world. One can think of Thailand. For example, in that period, other generals seized power or earlier in the century in Persia, Nadia Sha, for example, nothing like that. But also, when he becomes president, he does so within the new constitutional method, and he then allows the constitution to develop.

[00:09:25] Jeremy Black: In a way that does not expand his power to, as it were, turn himself into some sort of a, you know, monarchical figure. The contrast, very interestingly, is with the last figure in the anglosphere that had done that, which was Oliver Cromwell. Oliver Cromwell had become, he wasn't initially, he'd become the head of the armed forces of the, uh, parliamentary, you know, having been a great general in the first and second English civil wars, having taken part in the conquest of Scotland and Ireland.[00:10:00] 

[00:10:00] Jeremy Black: He was in a position to be not only head of the Armed forces, but in 1653 to suspend parliament and turn himself into Lord Protector. Now, what does it mean? Cromwell does. He considers himself very interested in possibly becoming monarch. Doesn't take that forward, but what he does do is have a member of his family make his successor, his son, Richard Cromwell, become the next Lord Protector.

[00:10:26] Jeremy Black: Washington doesn't have a son, but he doesn't seek to push some other family member or protege into a similar position as he would've done if he'd been an Oliver Cromwell. Nor does he seek to use the army during his period, uh, to do as Cromwell did as Lord Protector, for example, dividing the governor, the government of the country up among the major generals, and, uh, each of them having an area to rule.

[00:10:54] Jeremy Black: There's absolutely no comparison to that in America. So I think one [00:11:00] should be very. Impressed by Washington's idea about how the Constitution should operate, and in particular, there was the use of force or intimidation in the late 1780s and 1790s. One can think, for example, of the whiskey rebellion, one can think of Shay's rebellion.

[00:11:23] Jeremy Black: Washington himself is responsible for the dispatch of troops into. Pennsylvania, but there is no sense that this should be used to declare a national emergency, suspend the Constitution, and maintain a very different state of affairs, even though there is a clear success in the use of force in that, which would suggest that they might have done.

[00:11:49] Jeremy Black: Similarly, in other circumstances. And again, I think that is very important, and it creates a pattern for the careful nature of the use of force by American presidents. And you could argue. That was, if you wish to be very hostile, you could argue that that was breached by Abraham Lincoln, but you could well point out that the provocation or the reason for it was absolutely so extreme that he would've been, in effect, presiding over the end of the union if he hadn't done anything.

[00:12:23] Matthew Brogdon: So you draw a line of continuity between Washington's conduct as commander in chief of the Continental Army. Through the revolution and his eventual sort of establishment of a constitutional model of executive power that maintains civilian leadership of the military. Maintains appropriate limits on executive power.

[00:12:45] Matthew Brogdon: Maybe you could talk to us a little bit about what those practices were that initiated in the revolution. What, what is it about the way that Washington conducts himself as a general, as the military leader of the national forces, the continental [00:13:00] forces in the revolution that establishes that pattern that you talk about?

[00:13:04] Jeremy Black: I think that's a really good point, and what I would do, because obviously, uh, Utah Valley, you have a very strong commitment to understanding the development of the American Constitution. What I would argue is that all too often when we talk about the American Constitution, we use an ugly, modern word, privilege, from the 1780s, but in fact an American Constitution.

[00:13:26] Jeremy Black: Was in place in the running of the Continental Army. Mm-hmm. 

[00:13:29] Matthew Brogdon: A small sea constitution. 

[00:13:31] Jeremy Black: A small sea constitution, but an unwritten constitution. Army. An unwritten constitution. But, well, there were articles of war. Yes. And articles of war are a constitution. Uh, and you could argue more important that many matters that tend to be taught about, particularly when you're fighting a war.

[00:13:45] Jeremy Black: Well, there are a number of things. First of all, yes, if you wish to criticize Washington, I'm not talking here about his battlefield decisions. I've written about those. If you wish to criticize Washington, you could point out that several [00:14:00] talented generals fell out with him, and you could argue. Whether that may or may not have had something to do, do, in part with his attitude.

[00:14:10] Jeremy Black: So the, the most obvious examples are Charles Lee and, far more egregiously, uh, Benedict Arnold. Mm-hmm. But I think what you could also point out is that, um, Washington faced opponents within the Senior Officer Corps. Not just both of those, but also, for example, Horatio Gates, who very much thought he ought to be in charge of the Continental Army.

[00:14:34] Jeremy Black: It is fair to say that Washington, uh, conducted, first of all, his relations with his fellow officers in an essentially peaceful fashion. Yes, Charles Lee is disgraced. But he's not shot. Horatio Gates isn't disgraced. I mean, he fails at Camden. Uh, so he loses that command, but he's not disgraced, [00:15:00] and he again is allowed to go on and becomes a nuisance again at the end of the war.

[00:15:05] Jeremy Black: So there is the implicit practice in which Washington has a kind of band of brothers approach to use the language employed about Horatio Nelson and the British Naval Commanders. Trafalgar, you know, these are a band of brothers. Uh, obviously echoing Shakespeare's language about Henry V at the Battle of Ur.

[00:15:31] Jeremy Black: And you know, Washington was well aware of that kind of idea, but separate from doing that, there is the more important significance of his ability, however, irritated to run. A federal system. He doesn't really try to nationalize the state militias. He negotiates with state governments about allowing [00:16:00] the dispatch of line regiments from their state.

[00:16:03] Jeremy Black: So the key element, which is a really difficult one. It's that initially, the revolution in military terms was restricted to New England. Then, although of course I'm, I'm not a fool, I'm well aware. There's fighting outside Charleston in 1776. It's saying, but essentially, then it switches to the 

[00:16:21] Matthew Brogdon: middle colonies.

[00:16:23] Matthew Brogdon: So and, and just for our listeners. We're moving in 1775, we get Lexingtonand  Concord. Then the British Occupy Boston, which, well, the British are already in Boston, 

[00:16:33] Jeremy Black: Right? We're talking about the siege of Boston. Yeah. Uh, Bunker Hill and the American troops eventually took in positions on the Dorchester Heights. So the British evacuated Boston in March, uh, 76 from that summer.

[00:16:50] Jeremy Black: The fighting is focused in the middle colonies. Now I'm not, as I've said, ignoring, fighting elsewhere in the Hudson Valley, uh, further north. And also as I've [00:17:00] said briefly around Charleston, but essentially it's in the middle colonies, what you would think of as New York, Pennsylvania. Maryland, I would also say, was, uh, you know, part of the military sphere if you like.

[00:17:13] Jeremy Black: Mm-hmm. And New Jersey, of course, Clinton and all, and many new very much things that happen. Um, but the. Then of course you get the war developing in the south, and the British followed what they call the southern strategy. So they established themselves in Savannah at the very end of 78. They attempted unsuccessfully to advance on Charleston in 79.

[00:17:34] Jeremy Black: They advance on Charleston and successfully seize it in 80, and they try to exploit that in 81. Now, what that then means is that Washington has to persuade. State authorities in the north provide resources that will be entirely spent in the south and used in the south. That is a formidable task ,and it speaks a lot to his [00:18:00] political skills that he's able to do that.

[00:18:02] Matthew Brogdon: That's, it's also remarkable that he's having to do that when one would think Congress would be. Negotiating this where there are representatives of these states, but so much hinges on Washington's leadership. A, a, a unified. You started out talking about, about meritocratic monarchy in a way, the, the monarchical principle here of some unifying figure having to negotiate 

[00:18:27] Jeremy Black: this.

[00:18:27] Jeremy Black: Yes. But one of the things to bear in mind is that whatever Congress may or may not decide, the line regiments in the continental Army. Uh, Washington has to persuade them not to desert. So its northern regiments to the South, and its middle colony regiments to the south. And that happens. And if you look at a battle like Guilford Courthouse in 81, there are a lot of troops from further north and they take heavy casualties.

[00:18:52] Jeremy Black: So I think it's fair to say that this would've been extraordinarily difficult without Washington the very. The very operational moves of the Yorktown campaign later in 81. The movement of troops to concentrate them around Yorktown is in fac,t a movement of troops across state boundaries. Mm-hmm. And it's, you know, you, I can't help.

[00:19:17] Jeremy Black: It goes off seamlessly. 

[00:19:19] Matthew Brogdon: Among those northern regiments, you actually have, uh, among them the, uh, free black regiment like the Massachusetts 54th that are, are fighting in, in the American South. During the war. Um, which is sort of an amplification of this point that you've got people coming from one part of the union that seemed to owe nothing to the place that they're fighting for.

[00:19:41] Jeremy Black: Yes. And I think you could argue that America is born in the crucible of war. And literally born in the crucible of war because that defines the boundaries of America. So that, for example, it doesn't include Canada because the Americans have failed there. It doesn't include the Floridas because [00:20:00] West Florida is being captured by the Spaniards and they, in peace terms, are able to gain East Florida as well.

[00:20:07] Jeremy Black: But you know, you are excluding that. You are talking about a state, a community, a political community forged in the crucible of war, which then has to determine what the federal principle means in terms of the running of a government After. The war in terms of a constitution and what the liberties enunciated principally in the Declaration of Independence.

[00:20:32] Jeremy Black: But not only is that going to mean in terms of a new political culture now. It's not only the case, you correctly talk about the role of Congress, but it's not only the case that it is the military. That has been a definition because so many men have been rotated through the military, particularly if you include the state militias as well as local volunteers, as well as the Continental Army.

[00:20:58] Jeremy Black: So that for most [00:21:00] American men who had fought, they had actually had to consider. Fighting might mean operating outside the bandwidth of their local community. That was, I think, a very important element of what happened. And you know, in a sense, it's different to that of some other, um, federal systems, shall we think of the Swiss federal system, because there is a significant national army in the continental Army.

[00:21:37] Jeremy Black: Not, um, an overall reliance simply on or largely on state militia. So, I mean, interestingly enough, of course, this works for the Army. It doesn't for other reasons. I work for the Navy. That isn't a model at all. And as you may know, in the late 1790s, during the naval confrontation with France, the quasi [00:22:00] war, the quasi-war, they had to raise the Navy by subscription.

[00:22:03] Jeremy Black: You know, they raise warships by subscription, a totally different pattern. And of course, the, uh, the Democratic Republicans, you know, uh, Jefferson and Co. never really in. Invest psychologically in the Navy to the extent that they invest in the Army, which is very interesting. And again, I think there's a whole host of reasons for that.

[00:22:25] Jeremy Black: But I think again that in part it's Washington's legacy, and it's worth thinking about this for a second. The British, after all, from whose political culture the Americans came and against which they reacted, of course, but you know from whom they came, for the British, the Navy was the force of liberty.

[00:22:44] Jeremy Black: The army is not, the army is an autocracy. The army needs to be limited. We don't want a large army. We pass the Mutiny Act every year through parliament in that period. In order to ensure that the understanding is that the [00:23:00] army is subordinate. To the legislature, the Americans turn this round, the expression of liberty becomes that of serving on land in.

[00:23:14] Jeremy Black: Military forces now for, uh, agrarian Democrats, the Jeffersonian Republicans, democratic Republicans. This is largely militia activity, but there is still an understanding that you need an army and that land service is part of being an American, which of course, has gone to the present day with the zeal to shoot game and own guns and all the rest of it.

[00:23:38] Jeremy Black: And um, whereas. There isn't quite the same emotional commitment, shall we say, to, to the sea and to the idea of the Navy as a force and form of liberty. And I think, you know, it's worth considering Washington's role, a whole host of factors play a part, but it's worth considering Washington's role in that as a general, he [00:24:00] is not an autocrat.

[00:24:01] Jeremy Black: That is very 

[00:24:02] Matthew Brogdon: unusual for generals. And in terms of his leadership of the army itself, the way that he assembles his band of brothers, as you call it. Yes. 

[00:24:11] Jeremy Black: In terms of his leadership of the army, he is not an autocrat. Yes, he gives instructions and orders, but he is not an autocrat. And I think that he's not an autocrat by action.

[00:24:22] Jeremy Black: He's not an autocrat by temperament. And I think that's very important to the American culture of the period. And it contrasts, as I said, very clearly with Napoleon. 

[00:24:33] Matthew Brogdon: And is depicted so vividly in all of these works, either paintings or statues that are produced in the Early Republic of Washington, depicted as an American Cincinnatus, as a Republican figure, hearkening back to, uh, you know, a, a Roman Republican who would, uh, take up the power of.

[00:24:54] Matthew Brogdon: What the the Romans called dictator. It's quite a shocking term for us to use there, but conceived of [00:25:00] as a person who would come to the aid of the republic, save it from danger, and then return to private life. Yes. And lay down this kind of absolute 

[00:25:08] Jeremy Black: power. And you see, to give you an example of the contrast, I've referred to Napoleon, bear in mind in 1814.

[00:25:14] Jeremy Black: When Napoleon falls, having been, you know, abandoned by his marshals, having totally failed, he is allowed in the Peace treaty to go off and be an enlightened monarch of Elba, you know, a small place. Okay. It's a small place, but it's his, and you know. So what does he do? That's the equivalent of sin artists, you might say.

[00:25:35] Jeremy Black: So what does he do that doesn't work? As soon as he gets the chance, he goes back to France and becomes not king, of course again, but emperor Emperor and you know, there is this, and then he has to be exiled all the way to Lina. There is no need to conceive of what an American equivalent of Senator Lena might have been for George Washington.

[00:25:56] Matthew Brogdon: I think people are commonly aware that Washington writes a farewell address of course, and retires after a second term of office and starts that convention that custom in American politics of resigning after two terms as president till we constitutional it, what is probably less well known is that Washington wanted to retire after his first term.

[00:26:16] Matthew Brogdon: Yes. Had Madison prepare a first draft. Madison's in the house and oddly is becoming a sort of opponent of the administration. But Washington asked Madison to produce a first draft of a farewell address, which of course winds up in the desk drawer because he decides after being. After people plead with him, he decides to run for a second term and serves and then has to pull the draft out for Hamilton and and even Jay to take a, 

[00:26:44] Jeremy Black: And it's worth it, you are right, and it's worth bearing in mind.

[00:26:47] Jeremy Black: The problem that arises after the second president there is a contested election. Jefferson and his supporters initially think that they're going to be cheated [00:27:00] and you know, there is. Discussion in Virginia of raising troops to contest it. Now, fortunately for America, a civil war was avoided in 1801, but it's worth bearing in mind again, one needs to remember that Washington.

[00:27:20] Jeremy Black: As it were, operated the political system with a way that was careful of others to an extent that is unusual. Let's just put it like that. And if one wanted to praise him, one could say, and I do want to praise him, I think one could say his politics before the people for his country rather than for himself 

[00:27:43] Matthew Brogdon: or his party.

[00:27:45] Matthew Brogdon: It's an excellent note to end on. Thank you, Jeremy, for helping us understand Washington's leadership, his legacy of civil-military relations, and the peaceful transfer of power of a non-autocratic mode of governance. [00:28:00] We appreciate you joining us today. 

[00:28:00] Jeremy Black: Well, thank you very much. I'm delighted to be in Utah Valley, and I hope you'll invite me again.

[00:28:08] Outro: The Constitution is more than parchment under glass at the National Archives. It's a blueprint for American self-government that shapes every part of our civic life—from the rights we cherish to the laws we live under. We explore the ongoing battle over the meaning and relevance of America's founding document.

This Constitution will equip you to engage the most pressing political questions of our time. Join us every two weeks as we hash out constitutional questions together. This podcast is ordained and established by the Center for Constitutional Studies at Utah Valley University, the home of Utah's Civic Thought & Leadership Initiative.