Season 3, Episode 1 | 1777: The Crucible That Forged George Washington

Season 3 of This Constitution focuses on the people and events surrounding the making of the Declaration of Independence.

What if America’s Revolution had collapsed before it truly began? In this episode of This Constitution, host Savannah Eccles Johnston sits down with Dr. Kevin Weddle, retired U.S. Army colonel, military historian, and author of The Compleat Victory, to explore how George Washington survived the most dangerous year of the war.

From the daring crossing of the Delaware to the humiliating loss of Fort Ticonderoga, Washington faced both battlefield disaster and political backstabbing. Yet, in the fire of 1777, he learned to balance three roles at once: front-line commander, national commander-in-chief, and political strategist. Together, Johnston and Weddle trace how Washington’s leadership in this single year transformed him into the indispensable man of the Revolution and laid the foundation for his presidency.

In This Episode

• (00:11) Introduction and guest welcome
• (01:00) The army on the brink: Washington’s retreat through New Jersey
• (04:10) The “Ten Crucial Days”: Trenton and Princeton victories
• (08:30) Washington’s Fabian strategy and morale revival
• (11:20) Saratoga campaign and the fall of Fort Ticonderoga
• (15:00) Skyler, Gates, and a command crisis in the north
• (20:45) Washington’s reinforcements: Arnold, Lincoln, Morgan’s riflemen
• (27:30) Talent management and leadership lessons
• (31:10) The Conway Cabal and Gates’ political maneuvering
• (36:00) Washington’s confrontation with Conway and political savvy
• (39:00) How Washington neutralized rivals and preserved authority
• (40:35) Lessons of 1777 for Washington’s presidency

Notable Quotes

(05:45) “Just pulling something like that off with an army that’s falling apart—bad morale, desertions everywhere—is brilliant. It’s a tribute to Washington’s leadership.” — Kevin Weddle

(10:01) “It’s considered the ‘Ten Crucial Days’ of the American Revolution because those two victories really turned things around.” — Kevin Weddle

(28:09) “Talent management—that’s exactly what Washington was doing. He knew where the right leaders needed to be, even if it meant sending his best away.” — Kevin Weddle

(33:39) “I think this is a brilliant move on Washington’s part… he goes to Congress and says: I am commander-in-chief. Reinforce it. And they do.” — Kevin Weddle

(39:57) “By eliminating rivals and strengthening his own position, Washington emerged from 1777 not weaker, but indispensable.” — Savannah Eccles Johnston

Transcript

Intro
 [00:00 - 00:05]:
 We the people do ordain and establish this Constitution.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:05 - 00:22]:
 Welcome to This Constitution. My name is Savannah Eccles Johnston, and today we are joined by a very special guest, Dr. Kevin Weddle, who is a retired colonel and a distinguished fellow at the US Army War College and a military historian who's currently writing a book on the Saratoga campaign.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:22 - 00:24]:
 Well, actually, I just wrote a book on the Saratoga Campaign.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:24 - 01:09]:
 He has written the book on the Saratoga campaign and which we'll speak a little bit about today. But what we want to focus on today is Washington 1777. This is a wonderfully difficult year in the revolution and gives Washington these experiences to develop leadership as commander in chief. It's a real learning year, a crucial year. And so I'd like to examine Washington's development as commander in chief in three different instances. The First Battle of Trenton and Princeton. Second, the loss of Fort Ticonderoga during the Saratoga campaign, and then finally the Conway Conspiracy, which I know very little about, but is quite the political challenge to Washington as commander in chief.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [01:09 - 01:25]:
 So first, let's start with the Battle of Trenton, which actually comes at the end of 1776. People remember this one because it's the crossing of the Delaware with that famous painting. But can you give us some background on the Battle of Trenton and Princeton and an idea of the stakes?

Kevin Weddle
 [01:25 - 08:05]:
 Sure. So before we talk about Trenton and Princeton, you have to go back a couple of months. So Washington had been trying to defend New York City in the late summer and into the fall of 1776, and the British, under General William Howe, landed troops on Staten Island and then proceeded to take Long Island and then Manhattan from the Americans. And he did this through a series of military operations. Washington tried to stop him in several battles, the Battle of Long Island. Battle of Brooklyn Heights. Battle of West Plains across Manhattan. And he failed. And Howe basically pushed him off Manhattan and forced Washington into a disastrous retreat across New Jersey, heading toward Philadelphia. Of course, Philadelphia was the nominal capital of America at the time. And of course, we're past the declaration. So it's the United States of America. And that's where the Congress is. So Washington is retreating. And as he's retreating across New Jersey, the army is disintegrating. His desertions are rampant. Morale was horrible at that time. And Washington thinks that basically the army is melting away. And at one point he writes to Congress and he says, I think we're down to the last two weeks of even having my army together. And so he asks Congress to give him powers that Congress held to themselves in terms of recruiting troops and raising regiments and extending enlistments. So they do that as sort of an emergency war measure. Washington is able to keep, you know, what's left of the Army together. But as we move into December, things are really bad. I mean, things are looking grim. He writes to his cousin and says, it's going to be over in two weeks, the whole thing. And so he realizes he has to do something. And so he has retreated across the Delaware.

How? As? Because they're getting into the winter time period. Usually armies during this period don't do much active campaigning. So Howe basically decides not to continue to pursue Washington. But he places some detachments in certain key locations and in Trenton he puts a detachment of about trying to remember the exact number, but some of the about 2500 Hessian mercenary troops in Trenton basically kind of keep watching, watch Washington and see what he keep an eye on him. And then he's got other detachments further back. Back toward New York City, across New Jersey. So Washington takes a look. He sees that isolated kind of by themselves, Hessians sitting there in Trenton. He says this is an opportunity. And he thinks if he can pull off something, that maybe he can revitalize the entire revolutionary project. So he decides to conduct this. This raid is basically a raid, and he takes about 2500 troops. He crosses the Delaware famously, north of Trenton, crosses the Delaware, and then he marches those troops overland about 15 miles.

He does this on the evening of the 25th and 26th of December. So Christmas day into the day after Christmas, he has another detachment that's supposed to cross further down. But there they run into ice on the Delaware and they can't cross. So he's basically left with less than half of his entire force. So he decides to push on and he attacks this isolated German garrison there in Trenton in a really well executed attack. He's able to defeat this organization, this German organization at Trenton. He loses no casualties at all during the battle. There's some wounded. In fact, James Monroe, future president, is seriously wounded in the shoulder. But there's no American deaths in the battle. He loses three soldiers to exposure, though, on the march because they're there marching in sleet and snow and rain. It's just awful conditions. So in some ways, that's why the Germans never expected an attack. Just pulling something like that off with an army that's falling apart. Bad morale is just brilliant. And it's a tribute to his leadership, his personal, you know, lead from the front kind of leadership. I'm sharing the same sacrifices as you guys. And he does a great job. He defeats the German troops. He captures almost a thousand of these guys. So it's and of course the Brits, when they see that they're, they're shocked. I mean, they can't, can't believe what's happened. So Howe sends one of his subordinate generals, General Cornwallis, Lord Cornwallis, with a larger detachment of British troops, about 6000 British troops, down to Trenton. Now, in the meantime, Washington has recrossed the Delaware. He's gone back on the Philadelphia side, but he gets word that this British detachment is heading down toward Trenton. So he crosses the Delaware, moves into Trenton, and he stops the British at a place called Assam Pink Creek. And he stops them cold. Right at this creek. This is on the 2nd of January. So it's a few days after Trenton. It's also called the Second Battle of Trenton sometimes. So he stops them cold. And on the night of the second, he gets word that they have left an isolated detachment back in Princeton, which is just just north of Trenton. So what he decides to do is he sets all these campfires, and he makes Cornwallis think that the Americans are still there. And in the meantime, he marches his guys around Cornwallis, goes up to Princeton and attacks that detachment up there in Princeton and defeats them at Princeton, and then leaves before Cornwallis finds out what's going on and can come back and help the guys at Princeton. Just brilliant operation Washington leads a charge by himself with a militia force during during the height of this battle, and again showing his personal courage, his leadership, and pretty good tactical skills to be able to to really hoodwink the the British who are just sitting there at the on the creek thinking that, oh, the there the Americans across the creek you can see all the campfires. And in the meantime, Washington is heading up to Princeton to fight that battle.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [08:05 - 08:33]:
 Well, I think this is useful so often Washington gets a little dinged as a military strategist. He's a great leader. He's personally brave, but maybe not the best military strategist. But that ignores little victories like these. And we'll talk about this modified Fabian strategy here in just a minute. But it also ignores what he's dealing with. This is kind of a ragtag group of militia being pulled into I mean, only kind of an army, right?

Kevin Weddle
 [08:33 - 09:00]:
 Right. It's an army in name only at this point, really. Now there's two parts, really, to the army. Excuse me? There's two parts, really to the army. And that's the continental soldiers. These are what we would consider, like the regular army, which really wasn't. But I mean, they were the long term enlistment guys. They were basically the full timers that were part of the Army. And then you had militia forces who would only be called out in an emergency, and they were not full time.

Kevin Weddle
 [09:00 - 10:07]:
 They would again only be called out in an emergency. Otherwise they would just go back to their homes, continuing to be farmers or whatever, whatever occupation that they might have. So the army is made up of both of those components, and that's the army that fights both at Trenton and at Princeton. But the key is those ten days between fighting the Battle of Trenton and then winning the Battle of Princeton on the third of the 26th of December through the 3rd of January, ten days. It's considered that some historians call it the ten critical days of the American Revolution because it's those two victories, and his first ever victory against British regulars is the Battle of Princeton really turns things around. Morale improves. He's able to convince soldiers to stay on beyond their enlistment with most heir enlistments had ended on the 1st of January, the 31st of December, and he convinced many of those soldiers to stay. And so he's able to keep the army together. And that's kind of the essence of this Fabian strategy, which is keep the army together.

Kevin Weddle
 [10:07 - 10:11]:
 If we can keep the army in existence, we can win this war.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [10:11 - 10:18]:
 Right? And a good chunk of it is let's not engage on the battlefield in big fights. Let's do these like, major raids instead.

Kevin Weddle
 [10:18 - 10:47]:
 Right. And in a way, that's what Trenton is a raid, right? For the most part, Princeton's a little bit more of a pitched battle, but still, you know, it's he who goes after this smaller British force where he knows he has the advantage of numbers. And so that's why he goes against Princeton as well. And not trying to face Cornwallis head on, but instead skirting around him and going after this isolated detachment.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [10:47 - 11:08]:
 So in this, this first instance, we see Washington re-energizing the revolution with the really daring attack on Trenton and then the follow-on victory at Princeton, which is, again, remarkable because he's doing this with the most ragtag group you can imagine. This shows immense leadership skills. But then we're going to go into the rest of 1777. It's going to be a really tough year.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [11:08 - 11:09]:
 It's going to end.

Kevin Weddle
 [11:09 - 11:09]:
 It's a tough year.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [11:09 - 11:29]:
 So we're going to see him develop leadership skills in a very different circumstance, right. And the next one I want to move to, if that's all right is Saratoga okay. So that Saratoga campaign where Washington is not there. Instead you have Philip Schuyler of Hamilton musical fame. Right. Eliza Hamilton's father.

Kevin Weddle
 [11:29 - 11:31]:
 Right. Right.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [11:31 - 11:45]:
 And you have Horatio Gates there as well, who is a fabulous character and also very into himself.  And you've got some personality clashes here, which is going to cause chaos.

Kevin Weddle
 [11:45 - 11:45]:
 Yes.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [11:45 - 12:00]:
 And will eventually lead to the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. Big deal. So first, how does this happen? How do the Americans lose Fort Ticonderoga? And then we'll get to what could Washington have done to prevent this? Is he this kind of a failure of Washington as well?

Kevin Weddle
 [12:00 - 13:15]:
 Yeah. Yeah. So Washington is a little bit of a background. So Washington is not only commanding the main American army, he's also the commander in chief of the entire armed forces, not the Navy, but, you know, all the land forces.

So, I mean, that was his charge on the 14th of June, 1775, when he was given his commission by Congress, your commander in chief.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [13:15 - 13:23]:
 Can I pause? You just say these are two very different jobs, being commander of an army and commander in chief of all the armies.

Kevin Weddle
 [13:23 - 13:29]:
 Right. So he's dual had it. He's got two big responsibilities okay. He's the big guy. But he's also commanding the main American army.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [13:29 - 13:38]:
 Right.

Kevin Weddle
 [13:38 - 13:38]:
 So there are two very different jobs, as you said. But he's both. So he not only has to command and fight his army, but he also has to provide guidance and support and any other, you know, supervision that's needed in these other departments. In 1777, there were five departments, and they were generally regional departments. So you had the main army, of course, under Washington. And then you had the Northern Department under Philip Schuyler, mainly upstate New York. So Albany was his headquarters, but it encompassed Fort Ticonderoga.

It encompassed Fort Stanwix on the Mohawk River, on the western end of New York. And that entirely encompassed that entire area. You had the Highlands Division. So those guys were responsible for defending the Hudson Highlands, which was a very strategically important area. You had the eastern, you had the western, you had the southern departments. They were less active during this. During this time, as we get into 1777, after Trenton and Princeton, what's going on in the Northern Department is Philip Schuyler, the commander, who's also a delegate to Congress, which was, you know, something we wouldn't see today, of course, but but you had back then, he felt he had been treated badly by Congress after the 1776 campaigns. So he leaves his command in Albany. Just what leaves it basically, you know, today we call that AWOL. But he just leaves it without permission, goes down to Philadelphia, and he's pressing his case to his fellow delegates down there.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [14:17 - 14:19]:
 And this is a terrible choice.

Kevin Weddle
 [14:19 - 14:17]:
 It's a terrible choice. So he basically Northern Department is basically without a commander. In the meantime, Congress has appointed Horatio Gates another two star general. Major general to command up at Fort Ticonderoga. Now, that was a job that Gates had already had in 1776. He didn't want to go back up to Fort Ticonderoga, but that was his orders to go back up to take command, Fort Ticonderoga. We think the British are going to try to attack Canada. They already did in 1776. It didn't work, but we think they're going to do it again. So you need to go up and make sure Ticonderoga squared away. So Gates, very ambitious, super ambitious, thinks he should have an independent command of his own. He notes that Schuyler has left his command. So he says, well, there's a vacuum here. I will fill the said vacuum. And he goes to Albany, and he takes command of the Northern Department in Schuyler's absence, so he doesn't go up to Ticonderoga, even though Ticonderoga is within his responsibility.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:15:23 - 00:16:18]:
 He doesn't go up there. And so Ticonderoga is basically I mean, they have generals up there, but there's no one overall in charge up there. And so he's not, it's not as if Gates is ignoring Ticonderoga. He's sending advice and messages and hey, you need to do this and you do that. But he's not up there. He doesn't make a personal visit up there. In fact, one of his aides writes it goes up kind of a fact finding tour and writes him saying, you got to get up here, somebody's got to do something because nothing's getting done up here. But Gates doesn't. He wants to be in command of the Northern Department. Well, Washington during this period, obviously, he's got a lot of things to worry about. He's trying to rebuild the army that had almost collapsed before Trenton and Princeton. He's worried about what Howe was going to do with his army, obviously. So Washington basically kind of ignores what's going on up there in the Northern Department, and so does Congress.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:16:18 - 00:17:35]:
 And so consequently, Ticonderoga is without adult supervision, let's say. Finally, Congress corrects the problem. Reappoint Schuyler to command Saint Schuyler. Get back up there. They order him to get back up there.. They'll tell Gates. They tell Gates you need to go to Ticonderoga. Gates says no. If I can't command the Northern Department, I'm not going to command anything. And he said, I refuse. I'm not going up there. So Ticonderoga is basically not ready when Burgoyne starts his advance. And Bob Burgoyne, I'm talking about Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, who is in command of the army up in Canada, and his mission in 1777 was to come down Lake Champlain south on Lake Champlain from Canada, seize Fort Ticonderoga, which basically guards the entrance to the Hudson Valley. So take Fort Ticonderoga, continue south, seize the Hudson River Valley for the British, which the British had hoped what they were hoping? What would happen is they would split off what they thought was the more rebellious New England colonies, away from what they thought were the less rebellious, more loyalists sentiment in the New York and Southern colonies.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:17:35 - 00:17:52]:
 And then they could kind of pick them off one by one. Basically, they would pacify New England, and then if they needed to, they would head south. But they thought basically it was a war winning strategy. If we can seize the Hudson River Valley and split off the Canadian, or the New Englanders will win the war.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:17:52 - 00:17:53]:
 That is a pretty good strategy.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:17:53 - 00:18:41]:
 Actually. I'm not sure it was a war winning strategy to begin with. Well, so when Burgoyne leaves Canada, he's got about 10,000 men, and he's got another 1800 or so that their job was to sail up the Saint Lawrence River into Lake Ontario, and then come down the Mohawk River and meet Burgoyne at Albany. So he's got a total of about 12,000 troops. So now, yes, if he took the Hudson River Valley, it would be a big blow, obviously. But the Hudson River Valley is a big, long area, right? And to think that you'd be able to control that entire area with only 12,000 troops is a pipe dream.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:18:41 - 00:19:21]:
 There was no way that they would be able to actually control that. They might be able to seize it initially, but to actually control it and actually seriously cut off New England from the rest of the. It just was never. And to then conduct military operations into New England with that same 12,000 guys, it just was a non-starter. But they thought they thought the Americans would collapse after they seized the Hudson River Valley. And there was no, no indication of that, that that would ever happen. So the Brits loved this idea. The King loved it. He thought it was a great idea, but I don't think it would have worked. Would it have caused problems? Yes, it would have caused lots of problems, but I don't think it would have.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:19:21 - 00:19:22]:
 It wasn't the war winning.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:19:22 - 00:19:36]:
 It was not a war winning strategy. I think General Howe had the right idea. No, he's the commander in chief in North America, minus Canada. There's a separate guy up there, but he's the commander in chief of all British forces in North America.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:19:36 - 00:20:30]:
 And by this time, after Trenton and Princeton, Howe realized that the only way we're going to win this thing is if we destroy Washington and the army in the main army. Because Washington had basically with Trenton and Princeton, he had basically made the Army and him kind of the symbols of the revolution. It's sort of the way I explain it to people is, if you think about the American Civil War and you think of Robert E Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, that's kind of what Robert E Lee did with his army and Grant and Lincoln people who really had a good strategic feel for that war, knew that the war would never be over until they defeated Lee and his army. And because Lee had made the Army of Northern Virginia and himself the symbol of the Confederacy, and Washington had done the same thing with, with, with his army.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:20:30 - 00:20:31]:
 The Virginian thing.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:20:31 - 00:20:43]:
 Is a Virginia thing. Maybe. Maybe. But how had realized that the rest of the other British senior leadership had not by that time? And Howe knew that the only way we were going to win this is if we destroy Washington and his army.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:20:43 - 00:20:46]:
 That's what he's trying to do in 1777.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:20:46 - 00:21:04]:
 Okay. So it actually takes us back to Washington. So while the Northern Department is kind of falling apart and we've lost Fort Ticonderoga, where is Washington? Is this a really important learning situation for him or okay, I can't neglect this commander in chief role. I need a firmer hand. How does he respond?

Kevin Weddle
 [00:21:04 - 00:21:41]:
 So Washington's basically doing the ultimate and multitasking. Now, by this time when Ticonderoga falls, it's an utter disaster. I mean, the American people, Congress, Washington had all been led to believe that Ticonderoga was impregnable. There was no way Burgoyne or anybody was going to be able to take it, as long as we just normal, regular stuff up there just had some competent military guys up there. We're going. It takes the fort in three days. And Burgoyne himself thought that he'd have to do a protracted siege at Ticonderoga. And he doesn't. Burgoyne was like, wow, this was great.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:21:45 - 00:22:01]:
 And he really thought that would be the hardest part of his entire mission.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:22:01 - 00:22:03]:
 So it's a huge shock. And in fact, there's people saying that there's even people accusing Schuyler of treason because they think that the only possible explanation for losing Ticonderoga so easily is that we turned it over to the British.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:22:03 - 00:22:03]:
 Is no one blaming Horatio Gates at this point?

Kevin Weddle
 [00:22:03 - 00:22:37]:
 No, no, because Gates isn't up there. So he's not blaming because he's not on the ground. Oh, so they're blaming. They're blaming Schuyler because he is the northern commander, because he's been reinstated to that job. And they're blaming the guy on the ground up in Ticonderoga, which is Major General Arthur Sinclair. Okay. I am not kind to Arthur Sinclair in my book. He does not do a particularly good job. But to be fair, he was only up there for about three weeks before Burgoyne's attack. So it's not a ton that he could do. But at any rate, he does. He does give up the fort almost immediately.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:22:37 - 00:22:39]:
 Does this kind of kill Philip Schuyler's military career?

Kevin Weddle
 [00:22:39 - 00:22:40]:
 Pretty much. Pretty much. He is. To his great credit, though, after the fall of Ticonderoga, he does a pretty good job pulling together the shattered remains of the troops that escaped from Ticonderoga and pulls them back together into a reasonable force. He does a good job obstructing the route and doing some hit and run attacks on Burgoyne, which really slows down Burgoyne. So Burgoyne's advance is super slow. He's only going an average of a couple miles a day. So he's going very, very slowly. So that turns out to be a huge problem for Burgoyne. So he's doing a decent job. But the problem is his communication skills are not very good because he's writing letter after letter after letter to Washington and Congress saying we are doomed. There is no way we can stop. We're going. It's over. And he's begging for reinforcements. And, you know, tell me what to do. I don't know what you know. What he's doing on the ground is good, but he's not indicating that in the letters.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:23:47 - 00:24:07]:
 There's no optimism whatsoever. And, you know, the troop morale isn't very good up there because of his own poor morale. And that's something that Washington never did. Washington always was optimistic, even in the worst times, to his soldiers and to his troops, maybe to personally. He wasn't when he was writing his letters.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:24:07 - 00:24:09]:
 So how is Washington responding?

Kevin Weddle
 [00:24:09 - 00:24:53]:
 Well, Washington is responding very, very well. So he didn't do anything particularly I'm pretty critical of Washington in the spring early summer period because he's not stepping in to resolve this command problem in the Northern Department. But once Ticonderoga falls, I think it really kind of concentrates his mind. And even though he also has to keep an eye on what Howe is doing because he's, after all, commanding the main army, he's facing how he has to figure out what Howe is up to. Which is not always easy. He's also now paying very close attention to what's happening 300 miles to the north with Schuyler. And so he starts and he's also, of course, getting these very woeful letters from Schuyler.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:24:53 - 00:25:59]:
 So he sends all the reinforcements he can possibly spare, both from his army and from the Hudson Highlands. He's transferring soldiers up there to help out Schuyler. He's also what I think is the most important thing he does. He sends good leaders up to help him. So he sends Benedict Arnold, who is arguably the most dynamic, aggressive combat commander he's got. I mean, combat leader. Yeah, up there sends him up there. He's also. Washington knows that Arnold is a militia really like Arnold. The militia hates Schuyler. Oh, and Washington also knew that we would need it because of this emergency. We need the militia to come out. And because Schuyler was just despised by the militia, especially New England militia, they weren't getting any New England militia to come out to help. No one wanted to serve under Schuyler. But now he sends Benedict Arnold up there. He knows Benedict Arnold is militia friendly. He also sends Benjamin Lincoln up there. Major General Benjamin Lincoln, he's one of these generals that is really important  but no one's ever heard of. Benjamin Lincoln is from Massachusetts. New England militia. Like him, he's really good with militia. He's a steady guy. So he sends him up there. He sends a couple other generals, General John Nixon, General Glover, both really competent guys. Send those guys up there. They're little more. They're brigadier generals, not major generals. They're junior, but he sends them up there to help. He also sends up Colonel Daniel Morgan and his riflemen. So this is a very elite force that Washington has just put together. He sends those guys up there. Now, just. You're sending your most elite force away from your army to join another army. So that's a very selfless act when Washington sends him up there. And when you think about it, Daniel Morgan and his riflemen think like Delta Force or Seal Team Six. I mean, that's kind of what those guys were. They were elite. There's only one of them, so everybody wants them, right? And so Washington sends him to send them up there, even though he knows he's going to have to fight Howe.
  Washington is pretty selfless when he's sending all these important people and reinforcements up there to help out Skylar and every single one of those people that I just mentioned. And of course, Daniel Morgan's riflemen play a huge role in the ultimate defeat of Burgoyne at the two big battles of Saratoga at the end of the campaign.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:27:24 - 00:27:48]:
 So what we're seeing from Washington here is through 1777, he has learned how to balance the role of keeping the main army together, which is a symbol of the revolution winning these kinds of raid-like victories, avoiding Howe. And at the same time, being commander in chief, managing personalities, managing talent, balancing the needs of the main army with not losing up in.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:27:48 - 00:28:05]:
 I like the way you put that. Talent management is a great way to put it. I wish I had used that phrase, but that's exactly right. And he knew that even though he wanted those guys with him. Obviously you want your best people with you? He knew that.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:28:05 - 00:28:56]:
 And that's what a lot of military people have to do. You have to balance. You know, where are they? Where can they best influence the battle or the war? And in this case, he knew that Skyler needed some backbone. And these guys were providing the backbone. And in fact, they do. They go up there and they perform brilliantly for Skyler. And in fact, even once Benedict Arnold gets out there, he writes a letter to Washington saying, you know, it's not quite as bad up here as you might think. You know, I'm up here now. Skyler seems to have a handle on things. I didn't think he did, but he seemed to have a handle on things by that time. Unfortunately for Skyler, Congress had had enough. And Congress decides to relieve Skyler of command, and they replace him with Horatio Gates.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:28:56 - 00:28:57]:
 He gets what he wants.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:28:57 - 00:29:00]:
 Yes. He will finally get his independent command.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:00 - 00:29:02]:
 Yeah, we had to throw a fit first to get.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:29:02 - 00:29:10]:
 Yeah. I had to throw a fit first. In fact, one thing I, you know, probably I talk about in the book. He literally gates literally goes to Congress and throws a fit.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:10 - 00:29:12]:
 Yeah.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:29:12 - 00:29:39]:
 He's allowed into. They allow him to come in. And when they reappoint Skyler to command of the Northern Command, Gates is obviously very upset. He thought he should have been the guy. Basically, he said, I'm not taking Ticonderoga like you want me to. I'm coming. He goes to Philadelphia. He somehow Congress, they make a mistake. And they said, sure, you can come in and address Congress. And he basically just berates Congress and they are not happy about that at all.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:39 - 00:29:42]:
 This guy and we're going to get to this guy

Kevin Weddle
 [00:29:42 - 00:29:43]:
 We're going to get to him.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:43 - 00:29:44]:
 Going to continue to be problematic.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:29:44 - 00:29:44]:
 Yes you.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:44 - 00:29:52]:
 Will. This is quite remarkable from Washington, this ability to see this bird's eye view of the entire war while managing the general army.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:52 - 00:29:52]:
 These are very different skills, tactical talent management, and dealing with them in the more strategic sense.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:29:58 - 00:30:06]:
 Right. And now he’s going to show a third capacity, which is his political sense. And this is also remarkable that he can do all three is quite something.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:30:06 - 00:30:38]:
 He is quite politically savvy. And when I say political, I’m not talking about, you know, partisan politics because he’s not at all apart. In fact, he tries very hard throughout the entire war not to be seen as partisan at all. He’s a great role model for military people today, right. But, small p politics, understanding how to deal with people in and out of organizations. He’s very, very good.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:30:38 - 00:30:52]:
 Right. So here's a great example. End of or getting toward the end of 1777. He is now going to have to deal with the ambitions of Horatio Gates. So, this is the Conway Cabal.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:30:52]:
 Okay.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:30:52 - 00:31:25]:
 So after Gates’s victory at Saratoga and Washington, a series of losses throughout the summer, including Brandywine. There is some talk that maybe the wrong man is in charge, right? Maybe it should be Horatio Gates and not George Washington, who's commander in chief. And in November, Congress is going to make Gates the head of this Board of War. Right. And I guess Washington has to report in some sense to this Board of War, even though Gates is a subordinate.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:31:25 - 00:32:06]:
 Yeah. So, yeah, this is such an interesting period of time. So you’re absolutely right. So Gates has just won what many people think is the most important victory in American history, the victory at Saratoga because it caused the French to come in on our side and of course all the great things that came with that. Because ultimately we win. We won at Yorktown with a combined American French army and with the French fleet and all that. So Saratoga is huge, and so Gates is riding high on this tide of adulation after he forces Burgoyne to surrender on the 17th of October.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:32:06 - 00:33:18]:
 But relations between Gates and Washington have deteriorated. When Gates is named to command in the Northern Department, Washington, I think, anticipates that Gates will be a problem child. And so he even and I think this is also an example, a great example of Washington’s political savvy because he goes to Congress and he says, I know you just appointed Gates to command the Northern Department, and he’s probably the right guy, but I want you if you would, please, would you please issue a congressional resolution that codifies or reinforces the fact that I am the commander in chief? And Hancock, John Hancock, says, yeah, absolutely. I’ll put it before Congress. Two days later, I mean, they turn. That’s a pretty good turnaround. Congress turns around, then they issue a unanimous declaration or resolution basically saying that we don’t intend, by any appointment we make, to circumscribe your position as commander in chief of all land forces. I think this is a brilliant move on Washington’s part, because it’s although he never explicitly says, that is clearly geared towards Gates.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:33:18 - 00:33:19]:
 Right.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:33:19 - 00:35:05]:
 Toward Gates. But then after Saratoga, you’re right. Washington has lost the Battle of Brandywine. He has lost the Battle of Germantown. Howe has captured Philadelphia and forced Congress to evacuate to York, Pennsylvania. Right. So there’s grumbling in Congress. We just had—look. Gates just won this spectacular battle. He’s captured an entire British army. It’s never been done before, by the way, in all recorded history. The entire British army has been captured. So he’s just done that. And Washington is just giving us this litany of this series of losses and these losses. Philadelphia. And we’re sitting here in York instead of where we normally meet in Philadelphia. Maybe the wrong guy is. And so there's some mumblings or grumblings in Congress—not widespread—but I mean, there’s people like John Adams who are talking about that. John Adams is never serious about it, but he’s like, yeah, this isn’t a good look.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:35:05 - 00:35:20]:
 Right? In the Army there’s some grumbling too. And you’re right. So Congress—Washington had been asking for a Board of War. He had up to this point been answering to a bunch of different committees and John Hancock. And so, I mean, that was a lot of work for Washington. It had added a lot of burden to him. So he asked Congress to consider appointing a Board of War that would be sort of one belly button that Washington could go to. So they do, they create this Board of War, and they decide to make Gates president of the Board of War. And the way they had established it was that Washington would report to the Board of War. So now Gates—Washington now would have to report to a subordinate.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:35:20 - 00:35:05]:
 Right?

Kevin Weddle
 [00:35:05 - 00:35:59]:
 Right. They also—he had been asking to appoint an inspector general, and Congress wanted to appoint a foreign-born officer to that because they thought these foreign-born officers knew more about, you know, drill and tactics and things. So they appoint this brigadier general who Washington does not care for, a guy named Thomas Conway, who was an Irish French officer. They make him the inspector general. Washington also has to answer to him. So these two, he now has to answer to these two subordinates. So Washington is not pleased about this. At the same time, what’s going on is Conway is lobbying to be promoted to major general. So he writes this groveling letter to Gates basically saying, basically telling Gates, kind of sucking up to Gates, basically telling him, you know, you should really be the commander in chief.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:35:59 - 00:36:00]:
 Right.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:36:00 - 00:37:35]:
 And so this gets back to one of Washington’s friends, another major general who forwards the offending quote to Washington. So Washington gets this quote, and he immediately confronts Conway with it. Conway says, well, I—you know, I have total respect for you and, you know, you’re the greatest and all that. And, you know, I never meant to, you know, disparage you or anything like that. And then Gates gets word through another one of these people who are grumbling about Washington, General Mifflin. He gets word that Washington has found out about this quote from this letter that Conway had sent Gates. Well, Gates initially denies it. He then says, well, it was a forgery and oh, you’re attacking my integrity and all this stuff. And Washington very, very shrewdly basically kind of lets him stew for a while. And he immediately confronts Conway, but he lets Gates kind of just kind of twist in the wind. And Gates is starting to panic now that he thinks he’s going to be caught in this lie, which it was, of course, a lie. And several weeks later, Washington then goes back to him and says, really? I have proof that, you know, you knew Conway and you knew about this letter, and it’s, you know, you’ve been lying. He doesn’t come out and say it, but in his very roundabout, formal manner, he’s—and he's. I'm glad to hear that you’re, you know, any such thing.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:37:35 - 00:38:42]:
 I’m glad to hear that we’re still friends and that you, you know, that you—you know, I still have your support and all that, but clearly it’s a—he’s a I got I got your number, buddy. And at the same time, Washington is getting good support from the new president of the Congress, Henry Laurens, who has replaced John Hancock. So he’s got support there. He builds more support within Congress as we get into the Valley Forge period in early 1778. And basically he forces Gates to issue him an apology. So Gates writes him this very long mea culpa, you know, sorry, I do support you. You are the guy, never intended to take your place and blah, blah, blah. So he does apologize. And so Conway will resign his—his—because he’s been exposed as this, you know, liar, awful guy. He resigned his commission and his position as inspector general. Washington is able to get him replaced by Baron von Steuben.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:38:42 - 00:39:07]:
 And then, although Gates hangs on as president of the Board of War, his influence is shot by that point, and he then resigns pretty quickly afterwards. So now Washington doesn’t have a threat. He has basically eliminated the threat both from this Inspector General office and the Board of War, right, and he’s strengthened his own position as general in chief.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:39:07 - 00:39:37]:
 So this is remarkable. This is—this is Washington is the indispensable man in 1777, his ability to wear these different hats, to command the general army, keep it out of Howe’s grasp, have this strategy to keep it together while at the same time being commander in chief and managing the war from a bird’s eye view, and at the same time preventing ego and political factions from destroying the war effort and his own authority.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:39:37 - 00:39:38]:
 His own authority.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:39:38 - 00:39:41]:
 And managing all three of these things at once is quite remarkable.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:39:41 - 00:39:48]:
 And dealing directly, you know, dealing with Congress, dealing with the states. He's also doing all that at the same time. Managing military operations. I mean, while this is happening, there’s still fighting going on, not big battles, but there’s still fighting going on around Philadelphia. The British are still trying to clear the Delaware River so they can get supply ships in. All that Washington is kind of—you know, he’s got his fingers in all that. He’s doing all this stuff at the same time.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:40:09 - 00:40:33]:
 Right. So Washington—the skills he’s developing in this year will be a preview, not just for the rest of the war, but for the rest of his political career, his capacity leading into the Constitutional Convention, his abilities as the first president of the United States and really creating that role. You first see it, this development of this, this multitasking ability, this political capacity, the tactical capacity, the management capacity, all in 1777.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:40:33 - 00:40:47]:
 Yeah, yeah, I think I think so. That’s why I think 1777 even though earth shattering things are happening in 75 and 76 and 78 and beyond and all that, obviously.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:40:47 - 00:41:28]:
 But 1777, it’s—there’s so much going on. I mean, it's also where the most active combat operations took place during 1777 as well, just that Americans will suffer more battlefield casualties in 1777 than they will any other year of the war. They’ll also inflict the most casualties on the British of any year of the entire war. So there’s just so much happening in 1777, political intrigue. And you mentioned the personalities. I mean, that’s so,we haven’t even talked much about that. But just managing all these really, you know, really interesting and dynamic and…

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:41:28 - 00:41:29]:
 Complicated.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:41:29 - 00:41:35]:
 Complicated personality issues and relationships are also, you know, just amazing.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:41:35 - 00:41:51]:
 So to recap here, 1777 was a fabulously  important moment for the American Revolution, but also for the development of Washington, I think so as a leader. Yeah. And we only touched a little bit on the Saratoga campaign. But if you want to know more, they’ll have to get your book.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:41:51 - 00:41:52]:
 They’ll have to get my book.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:41:52 - 00:41:53]:
 Well, thank you so much for joining us.

Savannah Eccles Johnston
 [00:41:53 - 00:41:54]:
 You are just fascinating.

Kevin Weddle
 [00:41:54 - 00:41:57]:
 Thank you. Thank you. I really enjoyed it. Thank you very much.

Outro
[00:41:57 - 00:43:05] 

The Constitution is more than parchment under glass at the National Archives. It's a blueprint for American self-government that shapes every part of our civic life, from the rights we cherish to the laws we live under. We explore the ongoing battle over the meaning and relevance of America's founding document. This Constitution will equip you to engage the most pressing political questions of our time. Join us every two weeks as we hash out constitutional questions together. This podcast is ordained and established by the Center for Constitutional Studies at Utah Valley University, the home of Utah's Civic Thought and Leadership Initiative.