Climate Economics with Arvid Viaene

#34 Dr. Frank Venmans - The EU ETS Compliance Puzzle: High Compliance, Low Enforcement

Arvid Viaene

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0:00 | 45:40

What happens if firms simply do not comply with a carbon market?

In this episode, I speak with Frank Venmans about his paper “Policing Carbon Markets”, which studies compliance and enforcement in the EU Emissions Trading System.

The headline result is striking: compliance is extremely high, at around 99%. But the standard economic explanation — firms comply because they fear fines and enforcement — only explains a small part of what is happening.

We discuss:

  • how high compliance is in the EU ETS
  • why the first phase of the system looked very different
  • the gap between theoretical fines and the fines actually collected
  • how the paper tests whether firms are reporting emissions truthfully
  • the role of verifiers, inspections, naming and shaming, and legal penalties
  • the “Harrington paradox” of high compliance despite relatively limited enforcement
  • why long-term relationships between firms and regulators may matter
  • what newer carbon markets can learn from the European experience

The paper also highlights a less glamorous but very important lesson: carbon markets are technically complex. Registries, reporting systems, verification, financial regulation, and data management all matter enormously for whether the system works in practice.

Transcript: [TBD]

Paper: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2025.2464699 , and 

Frank Venmans: https://www.fvenmans.com/

For questions, comments or suggestions, you can contact me at arvid.viaene.ce@gmail.com