How to Win a Trade War: Soumaya Keynes & Chad Bown on Trump & China [Top Expert Interview]

In this exclusive episode of Global Trade Deciphered, Justin Hayden Miller is joined by Chad Bown, former Chief Economist at the U.S. State Department under Biden-Harris and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Soumaya Keynes, leading FT columnist and former Economics Editor at The Economist, and 

They dissect the real mechanics of trade wars in 2026: President Trump’s tariffs on almost everyone, the deeper China challenge, the breakdown of the WTO rules-based system, and their view why China’s non-market subsidies and state-owned enterprises creates issues for dispute settlement. 

The conversation examines trade strategy through the lens of real wars — defence, logistics, vulnerabilities, stockpiling — and the attack phase of tariffs and controls. They explore companies as reluctant or obedient “soldiers” in these conflicts, Europe’s simultaneous battles with Chinese EV and solar floods alongside U.S. tariff pressure, and the evidence on whether tariffs actually deliver the terms-of-trade gains economic theory once promised.

Soumaya Keynes — great-great-niece of John Maynard Keynes — reflects on how geopolitics is forcing economics to evolve, citing new research by Christopher Clayton and Jesse Schrager on supply-chain concentration and weaponised dependencies. 

Chad Bown draws on White House Situation Room experience to test what a smarter, China-focused strategy might look like. 

Essential listening for business leaders, policymakers and supply-chain strategists who need to understand the new rules of global trade before the next tariff headline lands.

Published by Simon & Schuster, How to Win a Trade War is out today.

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Transcript

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Can Donald Trump actually win his trade war? And how do China and Europe play out in all this? In a world where trade has become intertwined with geopolitics, two of the sharpest minds in the world on this issue have written the definitive game plan in their new book, How to Win a Trade War. Out on May 26. In this episode, Soumaya Keynes, formerly Britain's economics editor at The Economist and now a leading journalist columnist at the FT, joins me alongside Chad Bown, who served as Chief Economist at the U.S. State Department under Biden-Harris and is now senior fellow at the Peterson Institute. They don't just analyze past trade wars, they reveal what actually works, what doesn't, And crucially, they tell me in this episode whether the US president is changing economic theory and what they would tell President Trump to do right now. I'm Justin Hayden Miller. Welcome to Global Trade deciphered. Deciphering the policies, trends and geopolitics reshaping global trade. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Soumaya. Chad, congratulations to you both on the publication of How to Win a Trade War.

CHAD BOWN: Thanks for having us. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: I've seen you've both been doing the rounds on the major US TV networks. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: They were just a warm up for you. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: I'm flattered. It's a real pleasure to have you both on global trade deciphered. Thanks for having us. How to win a trade war. It's a great eye catching title. I've read the book and it sets out the trade, economics and trade strategy through the lens of the present. And notably, since Donald Trump's decision to impose tariffs on almost everyone, which you consider Soumare as being the real start of a current trade war. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Oh yeah. Absolutely. President Donald Trump never shied away from a trade war. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Chad? 

CHAD BOWN: Yeah. I mean, I think there's two trade wars that are actually going on. There's the one that President Trump is now engaging with the world. And that one I don't think is the correct one to be engaging in. The real underlying tenor of all of this is the trade war that China is undertaking, kind of with the world in a very, very different way. So in a sense, President Trump's trade war with the world is a bit of a distraction from the actual trade war that the world needs to be fighting right now. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Yeah, there certainly seems to be multiple trade wars going on. The so-called US trade war has acted as a catalyst that's amplified many of these issues. I found that the book explains the issues and the trade strategies in a really easy format, accessible to most people, if not everyone. Using analogies to explain the complex theories which are really enjoyed. For example, you say that the World Trade Organization. The WTO, is rather analogous to a sports federation. Chad, I think you were making the link with basketball, but are we moving towards world trade being more like boxing with several competing federations and rules based orders? 

CHAD BOWN: Yeah. Uh, boxing or what's transformed here in the United States is, uh, FC, which is just all kinds of fighting. It gets really, really dirty, At least in boxing, you have some rules for, you know, not hitting below the belt. And I think in the current climate you have fighting of hitting below the belt, hitting above the belt, hitting, hitting all over the place is what's happening. Yeah, I think we've clearly moved beyond, right, the WTO rules based system. And part of the purpose of the book is to explain that what it was about, the rules that really did break down why. And, and part of that, we think, is the role that China has played in all of this. Its non-market system, its subsidies are just really, really difficult to capture in the traditional way of WTO dispute settlement and litigation, where you need to have evidence to be able to make your case when we can't even really define with China what their subsidies are, right. You know, the the lawyers out there in the world will know this quite well. You know, the definition of a public body, right. And the challenge of even accepting internationally whether China's state owned enterprises are granting subsidies or not is an incredibly contentious issue. And when you can't even come to an agreement as to what is a subsidy, what isn't a subsidy. And China has become so massive in terms of the impact of its economic system and its subsidies on the rest of the world. Really, the trading system has broken down. And so, yeah, we are now in a boxing match, a cage fight. You know, however you want to call it.

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Your book quite honestly reminded me a touch of Richard Hawking's A Brief History of Time. And that's a compliment because it aims to explain something very complicated in a simplistic way. But the problem with Stephen Hawking's book is that he started very simple explaining everything in baby language. You know, how time bends and all that, but basically lost almost everyone halfway through if they weren't a scientist, which included me and, well, not many people finish the book. As far as I know. But you guys, you've kept the explanations pretty simple throughout, so I imagine most people are going to finish this one. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: I mean, I hope so. You know, just talking about the structure of the book, right? So the book changes as you go along. So we outline the stakes in a trade war. We introduce you to the players. We've got the governments involved, these big ships sailing choppy seas. And then we explain why the rules didn't work. And then the second half of the book is, okay, well, what do you do? And so we have the defence, identify your vulnerabilities, subsidize stockpile. And then only at the end do we get you the good stuff, right. Which is the attack. So tariffs and export restrictions. And there is a point to that structure right. Um which is that trade wars are like real wars and logistics win real wars. And so if you want to engage in a trade war, then you really need to do your prep, right? Trade wars aren't just about, you know, a blaze of tariffs, as we all know, they are about everything that's come before, right. Ancient grievances about public bodies, um, about WTO jurisprudence, about subsidizing stockpiling industrial policy. Right. And so, you know, one of the things we're really trying to get across is that trade wars are just so much bigger than the kind of basic tariff fights that hit the headlines. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Well, you said it's a mere trade. Wars are like real wars. And I suppose in that sense, the generals or the heads of state and the companies, the foot soldiers. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Absolutely. And so in the chapter we have on companies, the question we're really trying to explore is how cooperative are those soldiers? Right. So when you're thinking about Western multinationals and Chinese companies, who are they working for? Right? Who is working for who? Because there's often a picture painted, say, of Chinese companies that they are essentially working for the Chinese state. And then, of course, the Chinese companies themselves say, no, no, that's that's far too simplistic. We are just like the Western companies. We are pursuing private profit. And so, you know, one of the things we try to do is say, you know, look at the evidence. Chinese government, for example, require party cells to be in big companies, right? And so you have embedded Communist Party officials in companies. The concern is that that is then there is no line separating the private sector and the government. The question we're asking is, are these companies, you know, volunteer soldiers or are they conscripts? And what we conclude is, I think that there is a difference between the soldiers, the companies that are headquartered in China, and Western multinationals, the Western multinationals are much more reluctant to play along. They're very unwilling actors in these trade wars. And the Chinese ones are, you know, in some cases also unwilling. but the consequences for the individuals involved of not playing along are just much more extreme. So we do think there's a difference in in the nature of those soldiers. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: They're more obedient. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Yeah. Yeah. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: I mentioned in one of my earlier episodes at the time of Trump's Liberation Day tariffs, that I thought it was a blitzkrieg. And that lines up with your analogy of trade wars and real wars. But here we have the US potentially fighting a war on multiple fronts. 

CHAD BOWN: Yeah. And I think that's been the real challenge. Right. This is a blitzkrieg, but is quite different from the one that we saw in in World War two. Right. Which was limited. This is tariffs on the world. And the challenge when you do that, if you're the United States and President Trump is you force your partners and allies to then be fighting a multi-front trade war as well. Right? Whereas if you want them to work on a common cause, a common challenge, which is this really big problem of China. It's difficult for Europe to be doing that when they're so preoccupied with having to deal with tariffs, threats coming in from the United States. And I think, you know, that has made, you know, the strategy of this administration in terms of what it is that it wants out of the current trade war, really difficult to understand. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Can I just add to that, that I think that sometimes there's some important nuance that's lost here. So from the US perspective, if you think that the challenges imports coming in from China, then there's more than one way an import can come into the country. Right. And it is a challenge that Chinese components, Chinese products are coming into the US through other countries. Right. So maybe there is some justification for putting trade restrictions on countries beyond China because of the way that trade flows like water. Right. If that's the problem that you're you're trying to to solve, which is, you know, an overdependence on, on certain products coming from China. But that needs to be done really carefully and in a targeted way, which is obviously the opposite of what President Trump did. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Not to say that fighting wars on multiple fronts necessarily fails. You've got the nineteen sixty seven Six Day War, and even the United States in World War Two, where the US was fighting in the Pacific and Europe. But if you take many wars, let's just take World War II as an example. You broadly had two camps, didn't you? You had the allies and you had the axis powers. There were two clear sides. But concerning the current trade scenario, worldwide at least, it is far more complicated than that, because before President Trump's tariff blitz, there were certainly tensions, for example, between the EU and China. 

CHAD BOWN: Yeah, yeah. No, absolutely. And I think that's one of the themes that we explore in this book. This is and this is why earlier I was I was trying to get across that this is not a US-China only battle, and I fear it sort of gets portrayed that way. It really is a China challenge that the entire world faces. And I think nowhere is that more evident right now than what's happening with Europe. President Trump is in the headlines around the world, but the United States at the moment is largely closed itself off to having to deal with a lot of the challenges posed by China. Whereas for Europe, that's not the case. And that's something we explore in the book. Right, is the different approach that the European Commission is taking, for example, with this flood of high tech products now coming into the European market from China, like electric vehicles and solar panels. There's a big question for Europe about how they should deal with that. Do they just erect tariffs and trade barriers like the United States has, or do they try to induce foreign direct investment so Chinese firms to make batteries to establish automotive manufacturing facilities in Europe and create jobs and potentially transfer technology. Borrowing from the Chinese playbook on forced technology transfer that they've done so effectively over the last twenty years. And we lay out, you know, some of the evidence of why we think China has been successful at doing that in the past, and whether we think Europe is going to be successful this time around at trying to achieve some of those same objectives. Where we come out is it's going to be really, really difficult for Europe to organize itself to achieve the bargaining position that it would need to have vis a vis the major Chinese manufacturers, whether it's BYD or Catl, to get the sort of outcomes that they want. Right. Jobs in Europe, technology being transferred to the major European automakers. It's just a very different setup today than when China was doing this twenty, twenty five years ago. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Soumaya, do you agree that any EU objective to contend with trade issues brought on by China in the US interests is just so much more difficult for the EU now because of occasional issues with the US. You know, the EU is not just contending with China, it's also contending sometimes with the US as well. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Absolutely. I think there's a you know, one challenge just in terms of people's basic attention span, right. And, you know, the war in in Iran obviously hasn't helped at all. I think stepping back, there are many in Europe who worry about a race towards protectionism. You know, everyone erecting walls against each other. The US has been a really important market for European exports. Now you've got both US market closing and also China eating Europe's lunch in third countries. So the fact that, you know, the US has said we've had enough. We're not going to work with you anymore. It's a huge, huge problem for the Europeans. I think there is a sense in which, you know, the Europeans are kind of finally turning up to the party that the US has been trying to start for a long time. The US was worried about the challenges that China posed. And the Europeans, you know, really struggled to get to the same place. They were kind of almost happy for the Americans to wave the stick, to try to get China to change its ways. Whereas they were kind of, you know, more interested in the carrot, right? You know, maybe the solution was more investment, more trade, that kind of thing. Now they've sort of realized that that isn't going to work. I suppose what I'm saying is there's a certain amount of I told you so from the US side, and maybe the Europeans deserve slightly less sympathy than they're getting. But I'm also not saying that the Trump administration is doing the right thing by blowing cannons everywhere. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: I mean, it is interesting, isn't it, that since the second Trump administration, especially in the media, tariffs are inherently portrayed as something bad and evil? I mean, But basically all countries have tariffs. The problem is mostly a question of extent and amplitude. I've got two expert economists on today. So I'm going to turn to economic theory and mention Arnaud Castinot. The French American economist and US professor at MIT, and his work looking at what optimal levels of tariffs should be, and that economies like the US can improve their terms of trade and potentially welfare by imposing tariffs as they shift some of the burden onto foreign exporters via lower world prices. So certain economists have considered that it's possible for the US and major economies to compensate these costs by imposing greater levels of tariffs. And the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent and Stephen Miran, I'm sure you know, Chad, have used this in order to defend Trump's tariffs. What's what's your view on all that? 

CHAD BOWN: Well, one of the things that we try to do in the book is to move beyond just that theory and actually report back on what the evidence is. So yes, the theory absolutely. That was a huge part of President Trump's motivation for tariffs, both in his first term and then this time as well. The idea that when he imposed tariffs, the rest of the world would lower their prices to be able to keep selling into the US market. And the cost of those tariffs would ultimately be passed along to foreign companies. Chinese companies and Americans would be left relatively unaffected. The challenge is the evidence has just not borne that out so far. And so what we do in the book is we report what we know, all of the economic, serious economic papers that have been published in all the best journals have, for the most part, found that it's somebody in the United States, whether it's a retailer or the end consumer that is so far borne, the cost of the tariffs that the United States has imposed. There are some exceptions, and we acknowledge those two. It's largely in things like commodities. But for the most part, you know, despite this theory, right, it's turned out to be the case that most of the costs of these tariffs have actually been on the country. That's actually imposing them in the first place, not the foreigners. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: There is some nuance to that, of course, which is that, you know, this is what we've observed so far, but pass through might take a long time. Right. So it could be that in the short run, contracts are pre-negotiated. You can't change them when a big tariff hit comes along. But over the longer run those prices will adjust and maybe adjust in a way that's just quite difficult for economics researchers to pick up. So there is some uncertainty around those estimates, particularly in the long run. But yeah, I agree with Chad from what we can see now that terms of trade readjustment looks pretty challenging in practice. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: In April last year, futures markets were taking a dive and I reposted a clip on X of President Trump being interviewed on Air Force One at the time. And in that clip, the reporter, a reporter on Air Force One on the plane, asked him, is there pain in the market at some point you're unwilling to tolerate? And President Trump replied, I don't want anything to go down, but sometimes you have to take medicine to fix something. And I personally think that his analogy of a doctor patient relationship is, is an excellent one. It's just a question of getting the balance right, isn't it? And the point I was making at the time was whether the measures that the US were applying were essentially an overdose. I mean, morphine's a drug with great medicinal qualities in certain circumstances. But if you give too much of it, then the patient dies. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Absolutely. So we have a whole chapter on tariffs in which we make the analogy to tariffs as drugs. And if, like President Trump, you think of tariffs as a kind of party drug? Let's whack. Open the morphine or ecstasy or, well, more beautiful than love. Yeah. Right. Exactly. Then, you know, you're you're in dangerous territory. In some cases, if you are concerned about overdependence on particular Chinese products, then you do potentially need some kind of demand signal to show companies that actually there are going to be costs to concentrating all of your purchases from this one, you know, unreliable supplier. But you need to read the prescription. Be very careful about the dosage. Be aware of the side effects. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Now Soumaya, I happen to know that you are the great great niece of the celebrated economist John Maynard Keynes. So no accident that you share his name. And you're also the great great great granddaughter of Charles Darwin, the father of evolution. I mean, the two cannot be a coincidence. So what I want to ask you is whether you agree that just as much as animals evolve, whether the economy and economic theory is evolving as well, and particularly whether we are seeing and experiencing today with a new world order and a new method of employing tariffs by the US, whether this represents a mutation in economic theory itself. Are we moving away from economic simple economic theory where, you know, free trade is all generally good and it's the holy grail, and we're moving on to some other system. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: I should probably point out that, you know, John Maynard Keynes died in nineteen forty six. So so we weren't close. Um, uh, uh, I can't can't pretend to have inherited anything there. But I think in terms of, you know, your point about the evolution of economics, I think you're right. For a long time point of trade was that, well, it would make us, on average, more prosperous. You could take advantage of the huge economies of scale associated with perhaps manufacturing, production or clustering in one place. It's fantastically efficient. And I think the, you know, the innovation within economic thinking is to acknowledge that actually, although that concentration of supply might be efficient, might deliver lots of cheap stuff, it's also risky in a world in which geopolitics is unstable. And we've got to incorporate those risks. And, you know, you've got this kind of real explosion or a blossoming of economic research looking at this intersection of geopolitics and economics, looking at how companies are reacting to tariffs. You've actually got an AI, I think is opening up a lot of avenues in this area. You've got really great research coming out of Christopher Clayton, Jesse Schrager tweaking our standard framework for thinking about geopolitics. And just to give an example of one of their findings, you know, they look at how dangerous it is, how much power that a party has when they've got, you know, a complete monopoly over supply. And the good news is from from their research that you don't actually need to diversify that much to really, really reduce the power of the weaponizing country, which is a note of optimism in our book. We've been criticized for being slightly less optimistic than the subtitle suggests, but the optimistic spin is that there are things you can do. And actually, you know, diversification, safety is within reach. And if we're careful about it, we might be able to achieve it without overwhelming cost. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Chad, what's your view? Do you believe that President Trump's policies are evolving economic theory? 

CHAD BOWN: I don't think that theory has evolved all that much. I mean, I want to agree completely with what Soumya just said. I think what economists perhaps overlooked over the last twenty, thirty years when you had all these benefits of globalization, was the cost of what we call agglomeration or the concentration of production. We thought that was really good in terms of efficiency. But then when geopolitics become involved and in some countries seek to weaponize, that can be really bad. But, you know, the challenges of globalization in terms of winners and losers, economists have known and been pointing out for a very, very long time. Right. So I think it's a little unfair for folks to say, oh, economists have only ever talked about the benefits of trade and never the costs. There's been many folks out there that have been trying to point these out for for a long time. So a lot of this stuff really isn't new. I'm not sure President Trump is really redefining economic theory. I think he's closing down systems that are giving us more evidence to show, you know, the costs and benefits of, of, of trade more clearly. But I think more broadly, the challenge that we face today is less about President Trump, but it's really more about understanding China and the challenge is that China's very different economic system poses for an international trading system. Even if you wanted to stay open, how do you do that when the major player out there is just got an economic system with subsidies and industrial policy that's fundamentally different from yours. Right. The old rules didn't work. Well, what are the new systems that we need to have in place so that we can get along with this massive, massive economy out there? That, I think, is the big challenge that economic theorists and researchers really, really need to be paying attention to less to President Trump. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Okay. I wanted to discuss a scenario with you, Chad. You were in Obama's White House Situation Room and during the Fukushima crisis to advise on trade and supply chain consequences. Now, I just want you to imagine for a moment, having come back from China, President Trump calls you Chad, saying he wants to discuss your book and the trade war with you. Let's not exclude the possibility. Now, you're based in Washington, so you hop into an Uber. But he also wants to know the EU perspective. So somehow he sends Air Force One to pick you up somehow. Right now, you're both in the Situation Room. And he says he hasn't changed his mind. He's still on course with his economic and trade policies, but he's lost the Supreme Court decision on the ruling of his liberation tariffs. Party politics aside, he wants your opinion on what he should do now. And he's got the midterms coming up later in the year. So whatever he does, whatever you advise, he wants to show consistency. What do you advise him Chad? Go for it. 

CHAD BOWN: Sure. I mean, I think the most pressing issue that the United States faces at the moment is what Sameh described as is these really concentrated dependencies that it has on China for certain products, right? And so if you take the one that we saw last year that China weaponized of rare earths and permanent magnets, the ones that really put the US automobile industry at risk because they needed these as inputs to be able to make cars. Well, the thing you need to do is to quickly come up with alternative sources of supply. How can you do that? Yeah, we can try to do it ourselves here in the United States. But do you know who has a really big head start on diversifying away from China? Two countries, Japan working with Australia, right. Japan, right next to China. They need these permanent magnets and rare earths, too. They have been working with mining companies in Australia for fifteen years following a similar event, China shutting off their exports of rare earths back in twenty ten. They have been actually subsidizing Australian firms to get this stuff to mine it, process it, get it to Japanese companies. They've got a head start. It sounds like we could get there working a lot more quickly and efficiently, and probably at lower costs if we actually worked with Japan and Australia on this issue. So could we do that in a way that would actually make sense? Well, maybe that means we actually need to not impose tariffs on Japan and Australia, right. And put the tariffs to the side and focus on the challenge at hand. And it's really these sorts of other issues that we have with China. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Soumaya? 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: I think if I were trying to inform President Trump with a European perspective, it would be to encourage him to look at some of the really interesting policy ideas being floated. So, you know, one that's come out recently is, is this suggestion that actually there be there might be requirements for certain industries to, to source from multiple partners. So, so you wouldn't be able just to source from China anymore. The Europeans are they've clearly struggling with internal divisions. There's clearly some disagreement about how EU first they want to go. But I think there are lots of people who genuinely trying to to tackle the problem without Discarding the benefits from relatively open, relatively rules based approach to trade. Uh, so yeah, so look to Europe. They've, they've got some, they've got some things going on there. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Well, suppose he agrees with you both. Suppose he says, you know, my aim is just to put America first. And if it's in America's interest and we're going to win the trade war with China by doing this, that's no problem for me. The starting point is tariffs, unless I get something else instead that's even more valuable when you're there. He does mention that the Biden administration didn't cancel all his tariffs. I mean, if and when the Democrats get back in. To what extent do you think there will be a reversal of current U.S. policy on tariffs and a shift from current trade policy in the US? 

CHAD BOWN: Absolutely. The Biden administration did not reverse President Trump's first term tariffs. I think a future administration really has to figure out what trade war they want to fight. Hopefully they will read this book, How to Win a Trade War, and recognize that the really big underlying issue that the United States and the global economy faces is China, which probably means some of the tariffs are going to need to remain the ones having more to do with China. They need to be more sophisticated than the way they're being applied right now. But when it comes to the rest of the world, again, I don't think imposing tariffs on partners and allies, the same countries that you want to have work with you on common areas of concern with China. The way to convince them to do so is by whacking them with tariffs too. So we'll see. But again, you're right, the next administration is going to have a lot of challenges to face. And some of them is going to be figure out which policies the Trump administration impose they want to keep and which they're going to want to reverse and what they're going to want to do that's different on their own. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: Thank you both for coming on. You've got your own podcasts out there that I'll mention. Samir, you've got the economic show with Samir Keynes and Chad, you've got trade talks that you both set up together. I really enjoyed the book and it would be a great summer read for people. Details of the book, out now published by Simon and Schuster, are in the show notes of this episode. Soumaya, Chad, thanks for being on Global Trade Deciphered. 

CHAD BOWN: Thank you. It's been wonderful. 

SOUMAYA KEYNES: Thanks so much for having us. Thanks for having listened to the podcast. 

JUSTIN HAYDEN MILLER: The content of this podcast is intended only to provide an information resource of interest and does not constitute legal, tax or financial advice of any kind. Should you require advice, then you should engage an appropriately qualified person to provide you specific advisory services in the field. The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in this podcast are my own and do not necessarily represent the views, thoughts or opinions of any law firm, nor that of any third party, other person, company or organization. Stay tuned for the next episode.