The Greenfield Report with Henry R. Greenfield

Episode 4- Nuclear Umbrella: Europe's Post-Trump Security Dilemma. Part 1 with Marc Finaud

• Henry R. Greenfield/Mark Finaud • Season 1 • Episode 4

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Nuclear weapons have become the ultimate trump card in global power dynamics, with Europe scrambling to redefine its security posture as questions swirl about America's long-term commitment to NATO. While European nations collectively invest a staggering trillion euros into conventional military capabilities, the nuclear equation remains far more complex and consequential.

Former French diplomat Marc Finaud brings 36 years of expertise to this critical conversation, offering rare insights into how Europe might navigate this precarious moment. His diplomatic postings across the Soviet Union, Poland, Israel, and Australia provide a global perspective on nuclear proliferation few can match. Fino challenges us to remember that NATO's mutual defense clause has only been triggered once – when European allies rushed to America's aid following 9/11, a historical fact often forgotten in discussions about alliance obligations.

The Polish situation proves particularly troubling, as a nation traumatized by centuries of invasion now openly courts French nuclear protection. With Poland already spending over 4% of GDP on defense, the psychological imperative to never again be overrun drives decision-making in ways Americans might struggle to comprehend. Meanwhile, Germany's reluctance to fully rearm despite its economic might creates another layer of complexity in Europe's security architecture. As Fino reminds us, increased nuclear proliferation only raises the stakes of potential catastrophe, with millions of lives hanging in the balance.

Don't miss our follow-up episode where we'll explore nuclear dynamics beyond Europe, including Israel's status as a Middle Eastern mini-superpower and how Trump's doctrine leverages nuclear capabilities to reshape global politics. Subscribe now and join the conversation about the most consequential weapons humanity has ever created.

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Speaker 1:

Welcome to the Greenfield Report with Henry R Greenfield, your gateway to understanding today's geopolitical landscape. With 50 years of experience across 10 countries, henry shares expert insights on world affairs, offering practical solutions and engaging guest perspectives. Dive into the Greenfield Report for lively discussions on the issues that matter.

Speaker 2:

This is Henry R Greenfield with the Greenfield Report, for lively discussions on the issues that matter. This is Henry R Greenfield with the Greenfield Report. While events continue to swirl around the globe, especially on the economic side and how they have become interrelated with security, there is an issue that simply is inextricably tied to it all, and that is nuclear bombs, nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament. How this comes together as a global phenomena will be the subject of the next two episodes of the Greenfield Report. Today, in Part 1, we will explore the European side of the equation as we await the back and forth between Trump and Putin on Ukraine, as Putin seems to be in no mood to take any ceasefire proposal seriously. While there are complex historical pieces, there are currently two factors that we need to keep in mind when we think of the future of defense in Europe against the Russians. First, there are conventional military forces, which is where Europe is moving towards with an investment now get this of up to 1 trillion euros or more over the next few years. And the other side is the US nuclear umbrella, which covers not only Europe, through NATO and beyond, but in fact the entire world. No other country than the United States has the reach or capability to deploy nuclear or conventional weapons on land, sea and in the air. Like the US, europe is responding to the challenge of Trump's new Fortress America and the resulting of what is the future of NATO crisis meaning not knowing the future role of the US on the continent by investing, as we noted, heavily in conventional arms and defense. Every country is involved and with German participation high, along with changing its constitution to take on more debt, europe is moving forward. Within a relatively short time I would say five years, maybe even less Europe will be able to outclass Russia and anything that Russia might try against various countries in what is now NATO, without and this is the key without the assistance or participation of conventional US military resources. However, as we shall see as we speak to an expert in this field, when it comes to the nuclear umbrella of the United States, america continues to hold, as Trump would put it, the cards that are driving decisions around the world. Just today, for instance, trump enticed TSMC from Taiwan, the producer of 90% of the world's highest speed chips, to invest $100 billion more, on top of the already $60 billion that Biden extracted from them to produce in the United States. We will discuss this and Israel as the mini-superpower in the Middle East and also today, as part two of our nuclear series. They also made a power move to break up Syria into autonomous regions. None of this could happen without the Trump doctrine of using nuclear weapons as the ultimate Trump card in controlling key areas of the globe.

Speaker 2:

As part of our ongoing understanding on the changing and evolving situation between the United States and various hotspots around the world where nuclear weapons continue to be a consideration, we have reached out to select experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation. As our audience is well aware, this is a complex subject that needs to be broken down in an overall direction as well as specific instances and potential flashpoints. Today we are proud to speak with Marc Fino, one of the foremost experts in this field, and we are very pleased to have him on the Greenfield Report to give us some insights on several aspects which we wish to discuss. But first we'd like to give you a little bit of background on who is Marc.

Speaker 2:

Marc Fino is a former French diplomat who has been located in Switzerland for the past 20 years, providing expertise with various international organizations on arms control and, more specifically, nuclear arms, during his 36-year career as a diplomat from 1977 to 2013. He served in several bilateral postings in the Soviet Union, poland, israel and Australia, as well in multilateral missions to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Conference on Disarmament in the United Nations. He holds master's degree in international law and political science. He is also a senior resident fellow for the WMD program at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and he was there between 2013 and 2015. Without further ado, mark, welcome to the Greenfield Report.

Speaker 3:

Thank you very much, robert Nice, to be with you. Thank you very much, robert Nice, to be with you.

Speaker 2:

Thank you. So, mark, if you don't mind, we're going to jump right in and we'd like to go to the questions that our listeners have provided us with in several areas and questions to discuss. So, mark, the way we'd like to do this is I'll just give you a question and you speak as long as you like about this subject because you're the expert. Okay, thank you. That's very dangerous. So the first question, which is the foremost question right now in the world on nuclear weapons and nuclear armaments, is can Europe replace the United States nuclear umbrella? Why or why?

Speaker 3:

not. Yeah, it's interesting, of course, that this question is being raised now. Of course, you know, the second Trump administration this statement is almost alliance with Putin raises this question. Of course it's not completely new, since, of course, during Trump's first term, there were questions about the reliability and the credibility of Trump's yes, the United States' support for Europe's security, for NATO, including extended nuclear deterrence, and there were questions asked and the answers were not always clear.

Speaker 3:

Now, of course, these fears are increasing but at the same time, it's not absolutely sure that we're heading towards this completely new situation. First, because the United States is still a member of NATO, is bound by the North Atlantic Treaty and has been committing to support European security for many years, and because, you know, this was not done out of philanthropy or generosity. This is also because the security of the United States depends on this alliance. By the way perhaps just a short parenthesis, maybe American audience perhaps forgot this, but the only time in history when Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was triggered that means assistance in case one member is attacked this was when the United States was victim of the 9-11 attack was when the United States was victim of the 9-11 attack and European countries provided a lot of assistance in the United States, but of course also in the Afghan wars and the Iraqi wars, supporting the United States, because they felt that this was part of this solidarity on which the alliance is based.

Speaker 3:

Now, the question about the nuclear umbrella, I think, is a little bit theoretical and certainly needs a deep discussion and a real dialogue, not only among experts but also including civil society, parliamentarians, the media, because, after all, you know this idea of potential use of nuclear weapons. If it ever happened one way or another, obviously we would be the victims. You know people, the population, you know, you can imagine the figures of any use of nuclear weapons. We're talking about millions or hundreds of millions of victims throughout the world, not even mentioning the environmental catastrophe and nuclear winter. You know world famine, et cetera. So that means that we need to be able to have this or say, droit de regard on this issue.

Speaker 2:

So, mark, just to take a step back, if we could, for a second. So first of all, as a typical European, thanks a lot for reminding the Americans about the only time Article 5 was used. But now that you brought it up, what is your view on the future of NATO, meaning remaining as a nuclear shield and allowing the conventional forces to replace NATO with European-only troops?

Speaker 3:

Yes, well, of course, the scenario, the worst case scenario, of the US withdrawing from NATO and, you know, abandoning Europe to its own fate, is still, you know, hypothetical.

Speaker 2:

The question I'm trying to ask maybe I didn't ask it very well, mark is that do you see any possibility where the US would still keep the nuclear shield but allow Europe to basically do all the conventional forces?

Speaker 3:

Well, actually, you know, when you read the statements from NATO, the doctrine, there is a combination of both so-called conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence, to which, of course, the United States is the major contributor, but to which also the nuclear forces of the UK and France are considered as contributing to this overall deterrence. Now the question is again whether this so-called nuclear umbrella is really an umbrella and whether it is not just a means of reassuring allies, and whether it is really credible and reliable. Now, of course, most NATO countries that don't have nuclear weapons have relied on this, have believed that the US would come to their rescue and possibly use nuclear weapons in case of attack on Europe. But there was never any absolute guarantee that this would be the case, because the question was always sort of pending Would the United States, president, risk the vitrification, the eradication of New York or San Francisco in case Berlin or Warsaw was attacked?

Speaker 2:

Yeah, let me just ask about that, okay. So let's just take this in a couple parts. So I hear what you're saying. So you're saying that that's never been tested? Okay, I got it right. But staying with the European side, just yesterday, how do you view the Polish president's demand to go nuclear with French nuclear weapons? Is this provocative? Can he succeed with that? In other words, to break away from the US nuclear umbrella, to have, let's say, a sub umbrella with, possibly, let's say, the US with its very vast nuclear armaments, to still be there but then begin to rely on France?

Speaker 3:

Yes, of course one has to keep in mind, first of all, that the conventional forces of NATO altogether, including of course the US, is far superior as what Russia has and, by the way, it has lost a lot in this Ukraine war and this is the reason why Russia has actually built up its nuclear arsenal to compensate for this inferiority, this imbalance. Second, again, if you take the whole economic wealth and strength of European countries and their military forces assets, you know manpower, equipment it's far more superior than Russia. But of course there is always this risk that Russia, being an aggressive country, as it has demonstrated, actually more to actually reconstitute its former empire, the Russian and Soviet empire, targeting mostly former Soviet countries like Georgia or Moldova and then Ukraine. The risk, of course, is real that it could cross the border of NATO and attack NATO countries, but at the same time there is high confidence that such an attack could be deterred, confidence that such an attack could be deterred Now.

Speaker 3:

Would it be deterred only with conventional weapons or nuclear weapons? I guess now it. It is in the interest of everyone to maintain this ambiguity. Now, obviously, the risk is higher of any use of nuclear weapons by anyone, any side, because of the humanitarian, devastating consequences, and it doesn't make sense, wouldn't make sense, for Poland to host or to possess nuclear weapons, to use them against its neighbor. You know, and because the fallout, the consequences of it to me, poland, poland has got a very large military presence.

Speaker 2:

Poland has over 4% of its GDP, so you know they're well on their way to meeting any kind of thing that Trump would ask of them. But Poland is also on the front line. Poland has a history of being overrun by both Germany as well as the Russian and then Soviets as well as the Russian and then Soviets. So do you think that if Poland had that option not, in other words, not trying to pull the Article 5 card, but actually saying, you know, using the Trump metaphor of cards if Poland just had that card of like hey, you're crossed into our territory, whether it's via Belarus or whatever way that the Russians were threatening Poland, would they use nuclear weapons to defend themselves? In your view, yes, I guess it's.

Speaker 3:

You know, I served in Poland. I know Polish people very well and they're still, you know, traumatized by the First World War, which resulted in a pact, in a treaty, an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and France had an alliance with Poland. But at the same time in France, you know, everybody was saying who is going to die for Dantzic? And you know this is the whole. And of course the Poles are still, you know, very you know, have this resentment about lack of support, even if, of course, france and Britain entered the war immediately. But now the question remains about the credibility. And just as de Gaulle didn't have any total trust in nuclear umbrella from the United States and that's why he developed the French national arsenal, the same question could be asked Is France, is a French president, are French people ready to be wiped out by a nuclear response from Russia in case they use a nuclear weapon in response to an attack against one of the allies?

Speaker 2:

I'll put my two cents in on this, even though this is an interview. My view is, mark, also having studied history, although I haven't lived in Poland, my view is that the Poles will not allow themselves to be overrun ever again. I personally believe that they would rather go down than allow that to happen. The trauma that you speak of is a trauma built into their DNA. Now, it's not a one-off. It is something that they've experienced for hundreds of years, and I think that they feel strong enough now that they're not going to let that happen. What do you think?

Speaker 3:

Yes, I mean you're right, but they, as you said, they have built their conventional capability and obviously they would receive assistance, just like Ukraine has received assistance. And again, it doesn't necessarily mean that you know you need to cross the threshold and actually start proliferating. First, because it's against all the treaties that Poland and other countries have signed the non-proliferation treaty and also because the situation would not be safer. On the contrary, the more actors you have with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk is that these weapons will be safer. On the contrary, the more actors you have with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk is that these weapons will be used and again, everybody would suffer from that. So, in this respect, I think the purpose, the action now should be and this is done by about 100 countries that have signed the treaty making nuclear weapons illegal to join this fight and act, put pressure on Russia and the US with the largest arsenals to reduce and eliminate these weapons. And actually, you know, trump made some interesting comments on that, which, in my view, now needs to be followed up.

Speaker 2:

So Mark, moving on to another area of this, as we all know, europe's economic engine has been and is Germany, and it looks like, with the new chancellor that's coming in, that they're going to start investing again in defense. So how do Europeans, in your view, feel about Germany rearming, given its 20th century history, and do you think that they will try to get more separate nuclear protection outside the US umbrella, meaning France or a combination of France and the UK?

Speaker 3:

Yes, of course this is a logical debate in the current circumstances. I'm not sure there is already consensus and agreement in Germany for dramatically changing the status of Germany. I mean, increasing military budget is one thing, and obviously, as we can see, this is not something you can do just overnight and have immediate results. Secondly, in this area there is a need for more cooperation between European countries, including France and the UK, but not necessarily on nuclear weapons. And finally, if you look at all the polls, the opinion surveys in Germany, the majority of people are still, I wouldn't say, pacifist, but they are certainly not inclined to become a military superpower and even less a nuclear power, because there is really strong resistance, including to civilian nuclear power, as you know Well we've been speaking with Mark Fino.

Speaker 2:

This ends part one of our interview. Part two we're going to discuss nuclear weapons in the rest of the world. So thank you, mark, and we will be back with part two.

Speaker 1:

Thank you for joining us on the Greenfield Report with Henry R Greenfield. We hope today's insights into the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape have sparked your curiosity and broadened your perspective. Stay connected with us for more in-depth discussions and expert solutions. Until next time, keep exploring the world beyond the headlines.