First Bull Run and the Lost Opportunity of the Civil War

We look at First Bull Run and the lost opportunity of that day.  Mathews Hill, the use of trains and the legend of Stonewall Jackson all get a look.  

Transcript

First Bull Run and the Lost Opportunity of the Civil War 

July 2025

“Come with me and go yonder where Jackson stands like a Stonewall. Let us go to his assistance.”

Confederate General Barnard Bee 

Writing for Emerging Civil War, Author Anthony Trusso writes, “On July 21, 1861, the two largest armies ever fielded on the North American continent to that point engaged in the Battle of First Bull Run. By the end of the day, nearly 900 soldiers were dead and an additional 4,000 wounded, captured, and missing.  All notions of a one-battle war to decide the fate of the Union were obliterated, and the soldiers who were involved in the battle would never forget their experiences.  As the demoralized Federal ranks trickled back to the capital following the engagement, news of the first bloody Sunday of the war spread across both sides of the Mason-Dixon line.”

All history has “what if” moments. I am not talking about what if George Washington had not been born, or what if we could go back in time and kill Hitler.  Instead, it is those moments, judgment decisions wherein historical figures are at a crossroads and the future outcomes, good and bad, could be determined by their making the right call. And I am not speculating on obvious, if not easy, decisions.  After the Confederate states seceded, it would have been difficult for any president, especially Lincoln, to avoid the necessary steps, such as raising troops, to bring the secessionist states back into the Union.  It is also part of the presidential oath of office.  

Two what-if moments regarding Civil War battle decisions particularly stand out because both had the potential to end the war.  The second was in 1862 at Antietam when McClellan’s force attacked with uncoordinated thrusts instead of all at once, allowing Lee to shift troops to the endangered part of his lines. Add to this McClellan’s failure to commit his reserves and, finally, his lack of pursuit of the spent Confederates the next day.  Yet before that battle, there was the carnage of the Seven Days’ Battle and Shiloh. And before any of that happened, Irvin McDowell had a chance to end the war at First Bull Run.

Civil War buffs could recite the following few paragraphs by memory. The First Battle of Bull Run (also known as First Manassas, but as you can see, I tend to use the Northern terms for battle locations) was the first major land battle of the American Civil War. On July 21, 1861, the Union army, commanded by McDowell, engaged the forces of Confederate general P.G.T. Beauregard, 25 miles southwest of Washington, DC. Although the Federal army achieved some early victories in the battle, particularly on Matthews Hill. However, Confederate reinforcements, including those under Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, arrived, leading to fierce fighting, particularly around Henry Hill. Eventually, the Confederates drove back the right flank of the Union lines, leading to a retreat. As often happens with inexperienced troops, retreat in the face of enemy fire turned to panic and then to a rout.  Although the Confederates had won the day, they were too disorganized to pursue the fleeing Union army, which limped back to the safety of Washington, DC. Nearly 900 men from either side had been killed in the battle, and another 2,500 wounded. Lincoln and the members of his administration now realized that the war would be a much longer and more costly affair than they had initially believed.

Although World War I would be nearly 50 years away, many of the American Civil War’s tactics would serve as precursors to that conflict. One was the use of machines to transport infantry at speeds never before seen in history.  Even Hannibal’s or Julius Caesar’s infantry could move only as fast as their legs would carry them.  That changed in 1861.  At the First Battle of Bull Run, railroads were strategically used for the first time to transport Confederate troops to the battlefield, significantly impacting the battle’s outcome. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s forces from the Shenandoah Valley were moved by train to Manassas Junction, joining with General PGT Beauregard’s troops and contributing to the Confederate victory. This marked a pivotal moment in military history, demonstrating the tactical potential of railroads and, more broadly, machines in general, in warfare. 

Johnston’s troops marched about 23 miles to Piedmont Station before boarding trains for the remaining 57-mile trip to Manassas Junction. In other words, without trains, it is inconceivable that Johnston would have made it, and if by some miracle he had managed the march, his troops would have been useless due to exhaustion.  

Kat Eschner of the Smithsonian writes about the odd spectacle of civilians from outside DC coming to watch the battle, some even equipped with food and drink.  Though this was not an apocryphal story, it was not the picnic atmosphere that some newspapers later portrayed.  “It’s not totally certain how many onlookers from Washington took to the area around the battlefield at Bull Run to watch “a Union Army made up of very green recruits… march boldly into combat,” writes the Senate Historical Office. Those recruits were all volunteers who had signed up to Lincoln’s army for a 90-day term, because it was thought the war would be over that fast.  It’s also hard to assess the types of watchers present– men, women, and children, according to some sources, but mostly men, according to others.

Those onlookers did bring food and even food baskets to watch the battle. Yet as Jim Burgess writes for the Civil War Trust notes, though, it was anything but a leisurely day out for either spectators or combatants. Picnic food “was more of a necessity than a frivolous pursuit on a Sunday afternoon,” writes Burgess. Centreville, where the battle was fought, was a seven-hour carriage ride away from Washington, and Union onlookers “could not rely on the hospitality of local Virginians, now citizens of a rival nation.”

Much has been made of the inexperience of McDowell’s troops, but it was not as if they were facing seasoned veterans on the other side. Especially in Beauregard’s forces, this was also their first taste of battle.  The Confederates, despite their inexperience, had the advantage of fighting defensively, with some troops positioned behind Bull Run Creek.  This is another theme echoed throughout the war and up to World War I.  Napoleon, the premier general of the past 1,000 years, and revered by commanders on both sides, won his battles through offensive prowess. He would mass infantry into columns and slam them into his opponents with devastating effect.  The changes in weaponry and tactics, evident during the Civil War, would signal a significant shift.  That is why fighting initially from defensive positions gave the Confederates an advantage, despite their inexperience.  

It is easy to criticize McDowell in hindsight for leading inexperienced troops.  Yet, thinking the war would be over quickly, it was the wrong military decision by Lincoln and his advisors to request 90-day enlistments, which were due to expire in the summer of 1861.  Lincoln wanted the business done quickly, and McDowell was concerned about his army melting away, so he went into Virginia with ill-trained men.  Let’s just say it would not be the last time politics would dictate military outcomes.  

In his book, Searching for Irvin McDowell: The Civil War’s Forgotten General, writers Frank P. Simione Jr. and Gene Schmiel note, “on occasion on the battlefield he lost his composure,” resulting in “impulsiveness [which] sometimes led him to act without sufficient forethought.”  

In McDowell’s own words, “I fear that I am one of the never-have-beens rather than one of those who have been and are.” And in an understatement, McDowell noted, “Had I won that battle, I should have been the most popular man in America.” Had McDowell ended the war on that Sunday, he might even have enjoyed a road to the White House trodden by Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, and Zachery Taylor, all victorious generals prior to the war.  In reality, he ended up again grossly misjudging the tactical situation in another Virginia battle, 2nd Bull Run, which finished off his career.  Though McDowell was to stay in the army another 20 years, he never held a battlefield command again.  

On the other side of the battle stood McDowell’s West Point classmate with the south-esque-sounding name of PGT Beauregard.    I note the West Point connection, but these relationships were not unique, given that so many generals on both sides attended West Point and served together in the Mexican War.  There were figures such as the older Lee and the younger McClellan, but most Civil War military leaders fell within the age range of 35 to 45.  

Safe to say that at the very inception of the war, First Bull Run was Beauregard’s greatest battle. After the battle, Beauregard was the deputy at the battle of Shiloh in Tennessee, and was the commander at the Siege of Corinth in Northern Mississippi.  He was at Charleston and defended it from repeated naval and land attacks in 1863.  He had another sterling moment when he saved the city of Petersburg, Virginia, and thus also the Confederate capital of Richmond, from assaults by overwhelmingly superior Union Army forces in June of 1864.  In April 1865, Beauregard, again united with General Joseph E. Johnston, convinced Davis and the remaining cabinet members that the war needed to end. The majority of the remaining Confederate armies surrendered to Sherman. 

Like his fellow commander at Bull Run, Johnston, who we shall review shortly, Beauregard did not maintain the best of relations with President Jefferson Davis, nor with his fellow generals on many occasions.  Aside from Lee himself, whose sheer gravitas was enough to temper some of the relations between himself and his government, and that of his generals, the South was rife with rivalries, jealousies, and conflict among very proud men.  Not that petty matters of protocol did not exist with the Northern generals, but the Southern concept of honor even meant that duels did occur. In one case, Generals John Sappington Marmaduke and Lucius Marshall Walker clashed, resulting in Walker’s death.  

Joseph Eggleston Johnston was one of the original five full Confederate generals. He graduated from West Point in the same 1829 class as Robert E. Lee and served in the War with Mexico, the Seminole Wars in Florida, and Texas and Kansas. By 1860, Johnston was widely looked upon as one of America’s finest military officers. Johnston was given the primary command in Virginia and, in 1862, was the commander defending Richmond and launching the Battle of Seven Pines (also known as Fair Oaks), where he was severely wounded. Robert E. Lee would succeed him, and for obvious reasons, Johnston never reassumed command in Virginia.  Later, he commanded the Confederate Army of Tennessee in 1864 and led a strategic retreat during the Atlanta Campaign. Though he was successful in stymying the Union advance, his caution led to his removal. However, He concluded his service by surrendering to General Sherman at Bennett Place. 

One of the most well-known episodes of the First Bull Run was the creation of the legend of Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson. Eyewitness accounts from soldiers in the 4th Alabama Infantry provide the best lens for understanding how Jackson received the moniker.  During the afternoon fight on Henry Hill, General Barnard Bee rode to the members of the 4th Alabama and, pointing toward the front, stated, “Yonder stands Jackson like a stonewall; Let us go to his assistance.”  In many regards, this was the turning point in the battle.  

It is easy to assess that Bee was in praise of Jackson, but Bee, like Jackson, would not survive the war, in Bee’s case, the battle.  Bee was shot through the stomach shortly afterwards and died the next day; thus, it is unclear precisely what he said or meant. Moreover, none of his subordinates wrote reports of the battle, so there is no firsthand account of the exchange. One account has Major Burnett Rhett, chief of staff to General Johnston, claiming that Bee was angry at Jackson’s failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades while they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe that Bee’s statement was meant to be pejorative: “Look at Jackson standing there like a stone wall!” If so, it would not be rare in US history that an epitaph like George S Patton’s Ole’ Blood and Guts, or Winfield Scott’s Fuss and Feathers is not necessarily meant as a compliment.   

So what if, let’s say, the train from Piedmont broke down and Johnston’s army of Shenandoah, about 12,000 men, the one with Jackson’s and Bee’s brigade, both crucial to turning the battle, never made it to the field?  Then McDowell would have had around 31,000 facing Beauregard’s 22,000.  And before Johnston’s arrival, the Union was doing well.  Had Johnston not been there, and McDowell having broken Beauregard’s force, he would have been easily able to then deal with the 12,000 men of Johnston’s force alone, or have continued to Richmond.  Such a reverse, so early in the war, might have sapped the will of the South to continue and ended the war before what would eventually lead to the death of 600,000.  However, that is the problem with what-ifs: we never really know.