Uncommon American Wars - The Wars of the Barbary Pirates

We explore the true birth of the American Navy and the projection of power abroad in the two Barbary Pirate Wars in this first entry of the Uncommon Wars series.

Transcript

Uncommon American War Series: The War Against the Barbary Pirates

October 2025

“I hope I shall never again be sent to Algiers with tribute, unless I am authorized to deliver it from the mouth of our cannon.” — Captain William Bainbridge.

There is a snort of disdain from the academy for what is often called popular history, or even more derogatorily, ‘Dad’ history.  Indeed, Ron Chernow’s biography of Ulysses S. Grant (a great book, if a bit too long) is far more popular than Ann Blair’s work, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science.  And there is the usual history based on some ism, in this case, sexism, Civil Rights Queen: Constance Baker Motley and the Struggle for Equality.  

My point is not to castigate Blair a professor of history for Harvard (though I do find the intense focus on “ism” history a bit tedious), but rather note the difference for an academic who needs to present unique work in her field and guy like Chernow who can tackle any subject he likes, but probably wants to stay on that best seller list.  There is nothing easier to maintain popularity than to write about politics, war, or biographies, and in the case of Grant, combine all three.   

But even writing for a popular audience features certain subjects.  Focusing on particularly meaty and relevant politics, such as the 1960s, as opposed to the 1880s, will garner more readers.  Substantive presidents, for good and ill, like Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, or Reagan, are far better than, say, Fillmore or Benjamin Harrison.  And when it comes to military feats, there are three major conflicts: the War for Independence, the Civil War, and World War II.  Despite its vast global scope, World War I is barely an honorable mention because America’s involvement was relatively brief, lasting only about 18 months, and primarily focused on Northern France.  Compare that with World War II, where American military activities were conducted in Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, Australia, and even North America.  

For this series, I wanted to focus on several conflicts that have shaped our nation in profound ways, but perhaps do not garner the same attention as other topics, hence the designation of Uncommon.  I originally referred to this as a Forgotten War series.  Yet, the plethora of sources I cite in the middle and end of this piece will demonstrate that the Barbary Wars have not been entirely neglected in historical writing.  Even Fox News commentator Brian Kilmeade, and the guy who presumably wrote his book, Don Taegare, called his book on the subject “Forgotten.”  Cable TV hosts have a rather irritating practice of supposedly writing history, but when you have a “with” on the cover, you did not really write it – the “with” person did.  But I digress.  

And I will start with our very first war: along the North African coast with the Barbary Pirates.  In fairness, our first “declared” war was against Britain in 1812, a time when declaring war was a common practice (the last formal declaration was in 1942, when Congress declared war on Germany’s allies, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania).  Yet I am defining war here as an organized conflict led by an arm of the US military.  

Although a Continental Congress resolution called for the establishment of the Navy back in 1775, during the War for Independence, the United States was reliant on privateers or the support of the French.  For example, John Paul Jones’ Bonhomme Richard was originally the East Indiaman Duc de Duras, which was built in France for the French Indies Company in 1765. The ship was purchased by French authorities and placed at the disposal of American Captain John Paul Jones on February 4, 1779, by King Louis XVI as a result of a loan to the United States by French shipping magnate Jacques-Donatien Le Ray.  At the decisive battle of Yorktown, it was a French fleet that bested a British one in Chesapeake Bay, thereby denying relief to Cornwallis’ army and leading to his eventual surrender and the eventual American Independence.  

After the nation’s founding, the choice of a navy was a source of contention.  As Britain and France began to wage economic war on each other, the British government blocked American ships from the French West Indies, a crucial source of sugar and other commodities for United States merchants. On the high seas and in nearby waters, British warships also harassed and attacked American merchant vessels as part of a wider effort to choke the economy of the French empire and diminish its war-making capabilities. On behalf of President Washington, Secretary of State Edmund Randolph implored Congress to do something about British violations of Americans’ rights as neutrals to trade with those countries presently at war with each other.

According to Adam Bisno, writing for the Naval History and Heritage Command, “Congress still waffled on the issue of a navy. Where the president, his supporters, and most Federalists saw a navy as essential to prosperity at home and prestige abroad, the president’s detractors and most Anti-Federalists had serious reservations. Americans against the establishment of a navy were worried about the enormous debts it would rack up, the federal overreach it would portend, and the devastating retaliation it might provoke from Britain.”

Events in the Mediterranean ultimately forced the issue in early 1794. Algerine (Barbary) pirates, having signed a truce with Portugal and been paid off by the British, began to attack American ships in full force, not just in the Mediterranean. In 1794, Congress resolved to create “a naval force, adequate to the protection of the United States against the Algerine corsairs.” A committee was formed and recommended the construction of a fleet of six frigates. The committee, as well as the fifty congressmen who voted for the subsequent Act to provide a Naval Armament of March 27, 1794, which finally re-established the United States Navy, primarily represented maritime trading cities of the north and east, where the first calls for a naval force had originated back in 1775.

Ian Toll’s 2006 book, Six Frigates, provides an excellent guide to the debates surrounding the construction of the Navy, as well as the nature of the ships to be built.  As with many debates in the new nation, Alexander Hamilton was pitted against Thomas Jefferson.  Hamilton’s argument for the Navy, begun in Federalist 11, stated, “Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!”

Jefferson’s position raised concerns about the threat of a standing military in a nascent republic and the cost of maintaining such a force.  After all, a key part of the revolution was Britain’s need to impose taxes on the colonies to pay for military readiness.  Jefferson’s description of an ideal United States military was “for internal defense, [we should have a] militia solely till actual invasion, and such a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbors.” Late as president, Jefferson did build a series of gunboats for coastal protection.  

Yet, as we shall see, the North African raiding on American shipping compelled Congress (back when Congress did things) to authorize the build of a small but powerful overseas fleet.  

Because the sheer cost of building larger, ship-of-the-line vessels would have been exorbitant, the decision was to go with Frigates, which were lighter but faster than the larger capital ships.  The United States did not want to dominate the seas as Britain did.  Nor did it envision directly taking on the British fleets, as the French and Spanish did in the ongoing battle for European continental dominance and imperial possessions.  Instead, the goal was primarily to protect America’s merchant fleet.  

For example, a standard ship of the line boasted 74 guns.  To understand the scale of British naval ambitions, it is worth noting that during the height of the Napoleonic Wars (1798–1815), they had over 100 ships of the line.  

None of the American frigates exceeded 44.  Yet Frigates could range from 28 to 44 guns, and the US decided to build larger frigates to overwhelm the type of piratical ships they were likely to encounter. There is even debate whether one of the six frigates, the Constitution, was a large frigate or a very small battleship; but regardless, no pirate possessed a full-sized ship of the line.  

Bisno adds, “In order to spread the economic favors that the construction of a navy would bring, Congress had no two frigates built in the same yard. Portsmouth, New Hampshire, got Congress – 38 guns; Boston built the Constitution (44, but at one point 54!); New York City constructed the President - 44; Philadelphia erected the United States - 44; Baltimore, the Constellation – 38 guns; and Gosport (now Norfolk), Virginia, the Chesapeake - 38. The oak came from as far away as Georgia. And added to the six was the USS Philadelphia, 36 guns.  

Although the wars between France and Britain would have nearly led to conflict with the French in 1800 and did result in a declaration of war in 1812 against Britain, it was remnants of the 400-year-old Ottoman Empire that triggered the US’s first overseas military action. 

These conflicts—primarily the First Barbary War (1801–1805) and the Second Barbary War (1815)—arose from long-standing North African practices of state-sponsored piracy, also known as corsair activity. The Barbary states—Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and, to a lesser extent, Morocco—controlled the southern Mediterranean coast under nominal Ottoman oversight and financed themselves partly through piracy and tribute payments from maritime nations. For a young United States that had just gained independence and lacked a formidable navy, confrontation with these powers tested its ability to defend its commerce and sovereignty on the global stage. The wars ultimately marked the emergence of the United States as a maritime power unwilling to submit to foreign coercion.

Frank Lambert, writing in his The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World, states, “In 1785, American troubles with the Barbary powers took on a much more sinister tone, ending wishful thinking about free trade. In just July alone, pirates captured three American merchant ships.”  

The concept of presentism is one in which the modern scholar or reader imposes their own ethical or moral ethos on those of the past.  The clearest example is the condemnation of slavery.  The practice should be condemned, but to judge slaveholders based on 2025 mores can warp the sense of history.  Slavery has been around since humans began to organize into tribes tens of thousands of years ago.  And since the sixteenth century, the Barbary states had engaged in privateering against Christian maritime nations, capturing ships and enslaving Christian crews unless tribute was paid. Great Britain, France, and Spain, possessing powerful navies, found it cheaper to pay annual sums to the Barbary rulers than to engage in endless conflict. When the United States was part of the British Empire, its vessels were protected by British tribute payments. However, following American independence in 1783, that protection ceased. Without a navy and with a government under the weak Articles of Confederation, the United States found its merchant ships captured and crews enslaved by Barbary corsairs.

As Historian Christopher Hitchens states, “One immediate effect of the American Revolution, however, was to strengthen the hand of those very same North African potentates: roughly speaking, the provinces of the Ottoman Empire that conform to today’s Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Deprived of Royal Navy protection, American shipping became even more subject than before to the depredations of those who controlled the Strait of Gibraltar.”

As Lambert adds, “One enormous advantage of Britain’s closed trading system was the protection afforded to American merchants by treaties with the Algerian powers, and when in dispute, the power of enforcement by the Royal Navy.”  

American leaders initially attempted diplomacy. In 1795, President George Washington’s administration agreed to pay Algiers over $1 million in tribute—a staggering sum at the time, constituting nearly 15 percent of the federal budget. These payments included cash, naval stores, and even warships. However, such treaties only encouraged further demands. 

The John Adams administration followed suit. Adams felt that any conflict in the less than a decade old Republic would prove “too rugged for our people to bear.” Putting the matter starkly, Adams said: “We ought not to fight them at all unless we determine to fight them forever.”

By the time Thomas Jefferson became president in 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli was dissatisfied with American compliance and declared war on the United States after Jefferson refused to increase the tribute.

The First Barbary War (1801–1805) was the United States’ first major overseas military conflict. Jefferson, unlike his predecessors John Adams and George Washington, rejected the policy of appeasement. Jefferson, as usual, was the ultimate contradictory man.  Desiring governmental frugality, he lived as a spendthrift.  Claiming liberty for all, he owned slaves.  And after warning of the dangers and costs of a standing military, he was the one who dispatched a squadron of naval vessels to the Mediterranean under Commodore Richard Dale to protect American shipping and blockade Tripoli.  In fact, Jefferson had taken a bellicose position regarding the pirates as early as 1784: “Would it not be better to offer them an equal treaty. If they refuse, why not go to war with them?”  A US envoy in the region, James Cathcart, summarized Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli, the ruler of Tripoli’s message as “if you don’t give me a present I will forge a pretext to capture your defenseless merchantmen; he likewise says that he expects an answer as soon as possible, and that any delay on our side will only serve to injure our own interests.” Well. 

Although the fledgling US Navy was small, it benefited from experienced officers and the relatively young frigates, such as the USS Constitution and USS Philadelphia. Dale and his squadron were to protect American shipping from the corsairs and to “chastise their insolence — by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & Vessels wherever you shall find them.”

Things did not go as planned.  After Captain Edward Preble replaced Dale in 1803, disaster struck when the Philadelphia ran aground in Tripoli Harbor and was captured, along with over 300 American sailors. To prevent the ship from being used by Tripoli, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur led a daring nighttime mission in February 1804 to burn the captured vessel. British Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson allegedly called it “the boldest and daring act of the age.” Pope Pius VII declared that the United States “had done more for the cause of Christianity than the most powerful nations of Christendom have done for ages.”  Decatur’s raid became legendary and symbolized the resolve of the US Navy.

Jefferson then supported military actions on land. In 1805, with the aid of Marines and mercenary forces, US agent William Eaton led a campaign across the Libyan desert to capture the Tripolitan city of Derna. This campaign marked the first time the American flag was raised in victory on foreign soil and is immortalized in the Marine Corps Hymn (“to the shores of Tripoli”). Faced with mounting pressure, the Pasha agreed to a peace treaty. The United States paid a $60,000 ransom for prisoners but ended the annual tribute requirement. Although the treaty did not completely eliminate Barbary piracy, it was a significant step toward asserting American maritime independence.

“It’s no exaggeration to describe the psychological fallout of this first war as formative of the still-inchoate American character,” adds Hitchens

Despite the success against Tripoli, the other Barbary states continued capturing American vessels, taking advantage of the distraction caused by the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. Algiers, under Dey Omar, experienced increased attacks from 1812 to 1814. With the Treaty of Ghent ending the war with Britain in 1815, President James Madison and Congress turned their attention back to the Mediterranean.

The United States, now possessing a far stronger navy, was determined not to resume tribute payments. Under the leadership of Commodores Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, two powerful American fleets set sail to demand unconditional surrender from the Barbary rulers.

The Second Barbary War was swift and decisive. In June 1815, Decatur defeated the Algerine flagship Mashouda, captured Omar Dey’s top admiral, and sailed directly into Algiers Harbor. With American guns trained on the city, Decatur issued an ultimatum. In Tripoli, Decatur also secured the release of all European captives from Pasha Qaramanli.  The resulting treaty ended all tribute payments, freed all American captives without ransom, and forced the Dey of Algiers to compensate the United States.  The US Senate ratified Decatur’s Algerian treaty on December 5, 1815.

Decatur then sailed to Tunis and Tripoli, imposing similar treaties. Crucially, these agreements ensured not only American ships but also European vessels would be free from Barbary extortion. The United States had permanently ended the policy of paying for safe passage through the Mediterranean, asserting the principle that free nations should not subsidize piracy or submit to coercion. 

Britain, which had been under the obligation of Peace with the Barbary states during the Napoleonic Wars, was now freed to address an issue that was several hundred years old – the taking of Christians as slaves. Britain subsequently sent a fleet to bombard Algiers. Although British shipping had long been safe from the pirates due to the tribute system, the British government had resolved to abolish Christian slavery in North Africa. It had also taken several small island nations in the Mediterranean under its protection. When the Algerians broke the terms of a treaty signed with Britain, Britain retaliated immediately. It shelled the city for nine hours, destroying all of the Algerian forts and much of the city. The greatly weakened pirate state was no longer a threat to any European power; the slave trade was severely curtailed. Algiers became a French colony in 1830, and Tunis and Tripoli likewise fell under European control in the next few decades.

More than any philosophical debate, the incursions of the Barbary pirates proved the need for a powerful, if not overwhelming American Navy, especially for a nation bent on trade.  

This was the first time the new nation overtly asserted its legal rights against another entity.  It was not just the refusal to pay tribute or endure the losses.  The North African campaigns sent a signal to the European powers that the American Republic was capable of protecting its interests and enforcing its claims.  The Derna campaign represented the first American military ground intervention overseas. It set a precedent for later US involvement in global affairs and demonstrated the willingness to project power abroad to defend national interests.

The projection of power, coupled with the stalemate achieved in the War of 1812 against the most powerful nation in the world, not only proved resilience and stoked national pride but also put teeth in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which stated that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonial business.  

Many historians regard the Barbary pirates as early state-sponsored terrorists who used hostage-taking to extort political concessions. The American response laid an ideological foundation for future policies opposing terrorism.

Hitchens even argues that the Barbary threat, which the Articles of Confederation were incapable of addressing, spurred the ratification of the Constitution.  

At a time when the young Republic lacked financial stability or military prestige, it faced entrenched powers, subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, that had intimidated nations for centuries. Yet through a combination of naval strength, political resolve, and bold leadership, the United States ended the Barbary tribute system and asserted its right to navigate the seas freely. These conflicts strengthened American national identity, stimulated naval expansion, and demonstrated that the principles of independence and sovereignty declared in 1776 would be defended not just at home but across the world. The Barbary Wars thus marked the birth of the United States as a nation capable not merely of surviving among established powers, but of demanding equality and commanding respect.  Top of Form

The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World, by Frank Lambert (2005); 

Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror 1801–1805, by Joseph Wheelan (2003); 

To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the US Navy and Marines, by A. B. C. Whipple (1991, republished 2001); 

Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the US Navy and Shaped a Nation, by Joshua E. London (2005).