Uncommon War Series: The Spanish American War and the Road to Empire

We explore how the United States came to rule over pacific and Caribbean possessions, and the implications of this war.   

Transcript

Uncommon War Series:  The Spanish American War and the Road to Empire 

November 2025 

This episode is the next installment in the Uncommon War series, a group of conflicts that, unlike the War of Independence, the Civil War, World War II, or the Vietnam War, often receive short shrift from popular historians.

“The answer is: war, debt, taxation, diplomacy, a grand governmental system, pomp, glory, a big army and navy, lavish expenditures, political jobbery - in a word, imperialism…” 

William Graham Sumner commenting on the Spanish-American War in 1898

“The guns that thundered off Manila and Santiago left us echoes of glory, but they also left us a legacy of duty.”

Theodore Roosevelt

Wars such as that against Barbary Pirates, the Mexican-American War, or the War of 1812 are forgotten, or uncommon, or whatever 2nd tier terminology one wishes to use.  In this context, the Spanish-American War is often placed on a tier behind those conflicts.  Yet it should not be dismissed so easily.     

The butterfly effect is the concept in chaos theory where a small change in initial conditions can lead to large, unpredictable variations in a system’s future state. In simpler terms, a small event, such as a butterfly flapping its wings, can theoretically set off a chain of events that results in a major outcome, like a hurricane on the other side of the world.  The Spanish-American War, which lasted less than five months and presented virtually no significant challenges to the American military, was that war.  

Because it was against Spanish possessions, if not against mainland Spain itself, it led the US into taking over both Cuba and the Philippines, which had been Spanish possessions for nearly 400 years.  This, in turn, put the United States at the center of the East Pacific sea lanes, which ran from resource-poor Japan to the resource-rich Dutch East Indies.  As Japan built on its vision, which dated back to at least the 1500s, of dominating East Asia, this in turn put the US in Japan’s way.  Would we have conflicted with Japan in the 1940s without the Philippines? A good argument says yes.  However, although I appreciate the what-if scenario as much as the next lover of history, we do know that our presence in the Philippines was a critical factor in World War II’s Pacific theater.   Thus, a simple war in 1898, begun due to an intended misunderstanding half a world away, turned into a brutal conflict in the Pacific, ending with the only recorded use of atomic weapons against an enemy—butterfly effect.  

That was an indirect result.  The direct, known result was the United States’ transformation from a continental power into a global empire. Though brief, the war’s causes, conduct, and consequences profoundly altered both the United States and the international balance of power. Emerging from the war victorious, the United States gained territories overseas and entered a new era of imperialism, while Spain’s defeat signaled the end of its centuries-long colonial empire. 

It also proved out one of America’s greatest military thinkers, Alfred Thayer Mahan.  A United States Naval officer and historian, Mahan, who lived 1840 –1914, was described by the great historian John Keegan as “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.” His 1890 book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 won immediate recognition, especially in Europe, and with the publication of its 1892 successor, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, he affirmed his status as a globally-known and regarded military strategist, historian, and theorist.  I am here to discuss a war between the US and Spain, but Mahan’s influence was felt deeply in places such as Britain, Germany, and Japan.  

Mahan’s works encouraged the development of large capital ships—eventually leading to dreadnought battleships—as he was an advocate of the ‘decisive battle’ and of naval blockades.  Although there is a vigorous debate about some of his beliefs (the German WWI navy became ineffectual), the power of maritime superiority was a key factor in the Spanish-American War.  

By the late 19th century, Spain’s once vast empire had shrunk considerably. Only Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and a few Pacific islands remained under Spanish control. Cuba, in particular, had long been a source of unrest and resistance to Spanish rule. Cuban nationalists, inspired by ideals of independence and freedom, had fought several uprisings, including the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878). Although that earlier struggle failed, discontent simmered until 1895, when Cuban revolutionaries launched a new and more determined rebellion under leaders such as José Martí.

The United States had both humanitarian and economic interests in the conflict. American newspapers vividly reported Spanish atrocities and harsh military tactics used by General Valeriano Weyler, who forced Cuban civilians into concentration camps. This policy led to widespread disease and death, shocking the American public. Newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer competed in sensationalism, printing exaggerated or false stories to stir public sympathy for the Cuban rebels. This practice, known as “yellow journalism,” fueled American outrage and helped build public support for intervention.  

Economic factors also played a role. American businesses had invested heavily in Cuba’s sugar plantations, and the instability on the island threatened those interests. Additionally, there was a growing sense of American nationalism and a belief in the country’s manifest destiny—a conviction that the United States was destined to expand its influence and ideals globally. Many Americans viewed the Cuban struggle as a moral cause and an opportunity to extend democracy abroad.

The immediate catalyst for war came in early 1898. The US battleship USS Maine was sent to Havana Harbor to protect American citizens and interests during the Cuban revolt. On February 15, 1898, the Maine mysteriously exploded, killing 266 sailors. Although the exact cause of the explosion remains disputed, sensational headlines and public anger quickly led to Spain being blamed. The rallying cry “Remember the Maine! To hell with Spain!” swept across the country.  What caused the Maine to blow up? Later investigations suggest the explosion was more likely caused by an internal accident, possibly a fire in a coal bunker that ignited the ship’s ammunition. But as Jonathan Swift noted, “Falsehood flies, and the truth comes limping after it.”

Despite Spain’s willingness to negotiate, the United States declared war on April 25, 1898.

The Spanish-American War was fought on two significant fronts—Cuba and the Philippines—demonstrating America’s growing naval power and global reach. The first major engagement occurred not in the Caribbean, but in Asia. On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey led the US Asiatic Squadron into Manila Bay in the Philippines. In a swift and decisive battle, Dewey destroyed the entire Spanish Pacific fleet without losing a single American life. The actual figures were 371 casualties for the Spanish compared to only 9 Americans wounded. 

The victory stunned the world and instantly elevated Dewey to hero status. It was not like this was a pure stroke of luck or consummate skill on the part of Dewey.  Beginning in 1894, the Naval War College (and later special boards convened by the Secretary of the Navy) examined the possibility of war with Spain over trouble in Cuba. An attack by the US Asiatic Squadron against the Spanish forces in the Philippines was first included in the Navy’s plans in 1896. The objective of the offensive operation was not to conquer all or part of the Spanish colony, but to tie down or divert enemy ships and gain a stronger bargaining position for the United States at the peace settlement. Nevertheless, the consequences of Dewey’s triumph were much different.

And it was not like the Spanish Admiral,  Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, had any great delusion about his chances—just a few examples.  Dewey’s flagship, the USS Olympia, boasted four 8-inch guns, and the ship was commissioned just three years before the battle.   The Spanish flagship, the Reina Cristina, had been commissioned 11 years before the battle with a main armament of 6-inch guns.  The Olympia could fire on the Reina Cristina at a range at which the Spanish vessel could not reach.  And the Olympia could speed along at 21 knots.  At the time of the battle, the Spanish Cruiser could achieve less than 11.  

Therefore, the Spanish were deeply pessimistic about the fleet’s chances of survival.  Montojo was more concerned about giving his men a better chance to escape from their vessels should they be sunk in the upcoming battle, rather than a path to victory.  In one stroke, in one afternoon, the US became an empire, a regional power in the East Pacific, and in charge of an Archipelago of 7,000 islands populated by a large number of people not keen on trading Spanish overlordship for that of the United States.  

In the Caribbean, the US military faced more logistical challenges but achieved similar success.  Given the US Navy’s power, managing amphibious operations was not problematic, especially just 90 miles from Florida.  American forces landed in Cuba in June 1898, with volunteer regiments joining regular troops. Among the most famous units was the “Rough Riders,” led by Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to join the fight. The Rough Riders, along with African American regiments known as the “Buffalo Soldiers,” played a crucial role in the Battle of San Juan Hill near Santiago. 

The US Army Fifth Corps fought its way to Santiago’s outer defenses, and on July 1, US General William Shafter ordered an attack on the village of El Caney and San Juan Hill. Shafter hoped to capture El Caney before besieging the fortified heights of San Juan Hill, but the 500 Spanish defenders of the village put up a fierce resistance and held off 10 times their number for most of the day. Although El Caney was not secure, some 8,000 Americans pressed forward toward San Juan Hill.

Hundreds fell under Spanish gunfire before reaching the base of the heights, where the force split up into two flanks to take San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill. The Rough Riders were among the troops on the right flank attacking Kettle Hill. When the order was given by Lieutenant John Miley that “the heights must be taken at all hazards,” the Rough Riders, who had been forced to leave their horses behind because of transportation difficulties, led the charge up the hills. The Rough Riders and the black soldiers of the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments were the first up Kettle Hill, and San Juan Hill was taken soon after. From the crest, the Americans found themselves overlooking Santiago, and the next day they began a siege of the city.

All of this sounds rather heroic until one considers the numbers involved.  The US brought 8,000 troops to the battle.  The Spanish mustered fewer than 600.  In fact, the surprising part was the ability of the Spanish to inflict nearly 1,200 casualties.  

The naval battle accompanying the land one was even more one-sided than the Battle of Manila Bay.  The Americans had five battleships and two armored Cruisers against four armored cruisers for the Spanish.  Every ship in the Spanish fleet was sunk, along with their New World Empire, which had endured for over 400 years, dating back to 1492.  

Meanwhile, US forces also invaded Puerto Rico and easily occupied the island. Puerto Rico remains a US territory, officially a commonwealth, and not a full-fledged state to this day.  Some forces would like to see that changed, or not changed, for political purposes.  

As noted, the conflict was short-lived; by August 12, 1898, an armistice was signed, and the formal peace treaty, known as the Treaty of Paris, was signed on December 10, 1898. (Why does Paris seem to be the place to sign treaties? Another podcast for another time.  

The Treaty of Paris ended the war and redefined the global order. Under the treaty’s terms, Spain recognized Cuba’s independence and ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. Spain also agreed to sell the Philippines to the United States for $20 million. These acquisitions marked America’s emergence as an imperial power with overseas territories spanning both the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Domestically, the victory sparked intense debate about imperialism. The US moved way beyond adding territory through payment, such as the Louisiana Purchase, or adding adjacent lands after the Mexican-American War.  The Philippines was thousands of sea miles away.  Supporters argued that acquiring new territories was both a moral duty and a strategic necessity. They believed that the United States had an obligation to “civilize” and modernize other nations, reflecting the era’s paternalistic and often racist attitudes. Critics, known as anti-imperialists—including figures like Mark Twain, Andrew Carnegie, and former President Grover Cleveland—condemned annexation as a betrayal of American democratic principles. They argued that ruling over foreign peoples without their consent contradicted the nation’s founding ideals of liberty and self-government.

Although the American First debates differ in substance from those of 1898, what remains similar is the contention over what America’s role should be in global affairs.  Teddy Roosevelt would have been considered a neoconservative in our time, with Twain taking on the role of suggesting that America’s presence abroad not only distracts from domestic issues but also creates more problems than it solves.  

In the Philippines, American rule was met with immediate resistance. Filipino nationalists, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, who had initially welcomed US support against Spain, soon turned against their new occupiers. This led to the brutal Philippine-American War (1899–1902), a conflict that cost hundreds of thousands of lives and revealed the darker side of American expansionism.

For the United States, victory in the Spanish-American War marked its entry into world politics and set the stage for greater involvement in Asia and Latin America throughout the 20th century.

The Spanish-American War legacies include the demonstration of the importance of naval power, leading to further expansion of the US Navy and a greater emphasis on overseas bases. It also propelled Theodore Roosevelt to national prominence, eventually leading to his presidency. Moreover, the war ignited debates over America’s role in the world—debates that continue to shape foreign policy today.

The war also transformed the relationship between the press and public opinion. The role of yellow journalism in pushing the nation toward war showed the growing influence of media on politics and policy. The media had tended to be local in the early days of the Republic, or primarily, as is the case today, catering to a focused constituency.  But Hearst and Pulitzer were the progenitors of what we might call mass media and the influence that comes with those platforms.