The Tet Offensive: Tactical Failure, Strategic Victory

We look at the Tet Offensive and explore its ramifications not just around Vietnam but in the 60 years since.  

Transcript

The Tet Offensive 

November 2025

By AD Tippet 

No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now.

Richard M. Nixon

Militarily, we succeeded in Vietnam. We won every engagement we were involved in out there. William Westmoreland

I have not spent as much time on the Vietnam War as on the War of American Independence, the Civil War, or World Wars I and II.  And in my now ongoing Uncommon War series, I am tackling smaller conflicts such as the Barbary Pirates and the Spanish-American War.  I considered doing a podcast on Vietnam, focusing on the period before American involvement. However, Dien Bien Phu, the crushing of the French and the end of their Asian colonial empire, was really out of the scope of American history until six years later, when John F Kennedy sent advisors to the now independent South Vietnam to combat incursions from the North.   

The Tet Offensive, or Tết Mậu Thân, launched in January 1968, stands as one of the most pivotal events in the Vietnam War. Although the offensive was a tactical military failure for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, it proved to be a stunning strategic success. It exposed the fragility of American political confidence in the war, undermined public trust in government statements, and marked the beginning of a decisive shift in US policy toward de-escalation. The Tet Offensive thus represents not only a major military campaign that altered the course of a war, but also a watershed moment in 20th and 21st-century American history.  It both affected and reinforced how Americans would view international involvement for the next 60 years.  

First, a brief primer.  The Viet Cong often gets lumped in with the North Vietnamese army, but we’re talking about two different things.  The Viet Cong, also known as the VC, was a military force of the National Liberation Front (NLF) that fought to overthrow the South Vietnamese government and unify Vietnam under communism during the Vietnam War. Primarily a guerrilla force, the Viet Cong used tactics like hit-and-run attacks and extensive tunnel systems to fight the South Vietnamese and American armies. The NLF was a communist organization that worked to unify Vietnam. It operated with a complex political structure that included propaganda, front groups, and a “shadow government” to build popular support and organize operations.

Because of the length and scope of the war, I am going to provide a very brief description of the events leading up to the Tet Offensive, but please realize this summary does not really do justice to the conflict. However, I do want to focus on Tet without this becoming a 60-minute podcast, thus the short intro. 

After World War II, the standoff between the Democratic Republics led by the United States and the communist nations, the Soviet Union and China, resulted in several wars throughout the globe, the largest of which was the Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953.  

After the fall of the French, Indochina was separated into four nations: Cambodia, Laos, the presumably democratic South Vietnam, and the Communist North Vietnam.  Like all the post-World War II presidents before him, John F Kennedy was determined to resist communist advances, so when North Vietnam claimed the South, he acted.  

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy sent a significant number of military advisors and Special Forces to South Vietnam to assist in the fight against communist insurgents. This expansion of US involvement, which followed an initial deployment by President Eisenhower, escalated the American commitment in the region, increasing the number of US personnel to over 16,000 by late 1963. 

After Kennedy’s assassination, his successor, Lyndon B Johnson, wanted a clearer mandate from Congress for action.  When a US ship was attacked, this led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a 1964 congressional statement that gave Johnson authority to use military force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war, following reports of attacks on US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Passed on August 7, 1964, it served as the primary legal justification for a dramatic increase in US involvement in the Vietnam War. 

Johnson sent the first US combat troops to Vietnam in March 1965, authorizing the deployment of Marines to guard the Da Nang airbase. 

By late 1967, the Vietnam War had escalated into a massive conflict involving more than 400,000 American troops. The US pursued a strategy of attrition, hoping to wear down North Vietnam and Viet Cong forces through superior firepower, search-and-destroy operations, and constant pressure. General William Westmoreland repeatedly assured the American public and political leaders that the enemy’s morale was low, that US forces controlled most of South Vietnam, and that victory was within reach.

There is a prevailing opinion that in 1967, the war was a stalemate.  The deep inroads made by the Viet Cong represented a more serious threat than was believed by American leaders.  The reality was a bit different.  

By the end of 1967, North Vietnam faced a serious problem. The tide of war had turned against the North since the US began major combat operations in 1965. With U.S. support, South Vietnam strengthened while the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) weakened. Northern leaders worried that the US might invade the North, so they organized the Tet Offensive to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiation table.

So North Vietnam sought a bold action that would shatter US confidence and encourage an uprising in the South. This impulse culminated in the planning of the Tet Offensive.

The Tet Offensive began on January 30–31, 1968, during Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year—a holiday traditionally associated with ceasefires and celebrations. Using the cover of the holiday, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched coordinated attacks on more than 100 cities, towns, and military installations throughout South Vietnam. The scale and simultaneity of the assault were unprecedented.

The Americans in Vietnam at that time were commanded by William Westmoreland, a general who had risen through the ranks, serving in combat commands ranging from Africa, Sicily, and France in World War II to the Korean War in the 1950s.  In December 1956, he was promoted to major general; at 42, he was the youngest person to hold that rank in the US Army. After commanding the 101st Airborne Division from 1958 to 1960, he was made superintendent at West Point. In January 1964, he became deputy to Gen. Paul Harkins, commander of US forces in Vietnam. In June 1964, Westmoreland replaced Harkins, and he would hold the top post in Vietnam for the next four years. When, in the spring and summer of 1965, Johnson began sending US ground forces to Vietnam, Westmoreland’s attention shifted from advisory matters to their employment. Time magazine named him its 1965 “Man of the Year.”

Westmoreland decided on a war of attrition, one in which the enemy body count was the key measure of merit, and “search and destroy” was the dominant tactical approach.

The Vietnamese did not have quite the same command structure, but the primary architect for the Tet Offensive may have been Võ Nguyên Giáp, a Vietnamese general, communist revolutionary, and politician. Highly regarded as a military strategist, Giáp led Vietnamese communist military forces to victory in the decades-long Indochina wars, first against the French, and then against the US. But was Giap truly the architect or even opposed to the offensive?  The alternative is that twin Le’s, Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, were really in charge.  There is much debate.  

Whoever actually ordered the attack, we know that it began on January 31, when the Viet Cong attacked all over South Vietnam. Thirty-six out of forty-four provincial capitals came under attack, along with hundreds of other smaller towns and villages. The Communists planned widespread surprise attacks in the South to take place during the nationwide Tet holiday. The North Vietnamese hoped to accomplish three goals: cripple South Vietnam’s morale, destroy their will to fight, and incite the people to rise against their government. At the same time, they sought to undermine American confidence in the South Vietnamese government and discredit US claims of progress. They knew that this could boost the anti-war movement in America.

Once the surprise wore off, most attacks were crushed in a few days. Many Soldiers reported that the fighting during those few days was some of the most violent and shocking combat of the war. Soldiers who never expected to be in combat, including cooks, radiomen, and clerks, fought desperate battles in areas initially deemed safe.

The situation became increasingly serious in the North, where the Viet Cong and NVA attacked roads, waterways, and bridges, threatening critical supply lines. The US 1st Cavalry Division was cut off and had to be supplied by air for several weeks. The attacks in this area lasted well into March.

The worst fighting was in Hue, the ancient former capital of Vietnam. US and South Vietnamese forces took on the enemy in the only lengthy urban battle of the war. Hue had a tradition of anti-Americanism, and the North Vietnamese believed the city was ripe for a revolution. They launched a significant effort to capture Hue. House-to-house fighting caused enormous destruction and took more than three weeks to recapture the city.

One account captured by Sean Kimmons for the US Army history content noted the following: 

As they drove toward the airbase in the early morning hours, then-Spc. 5 Dwight Birdwell remembers seeing no civilians along the highway -- typically a bad omen.

Birdwell had seen attacks before during his tour, he said, but they were mainly mines or other small arms weapons fired by a hidden enemy. This day would be different.

When they arrived just outside the airbase, his unit’s column of tanks and armored personnel carriers suddenly stopped.

As if on cue, thousands of tracer rounds began to pepper the vehicles in front of his tank from both sides of the highway. Enemy fighters then jumped onto the cars and fired into them.

“All hell broke loose,” Birdwell recalled.

Almost 20 Soldiers from the squadron were killed, and many more were wounded as they defended the airbase that day. About two dozen South Vietnamese troops were also killed, along with hundreds of enemy fighters.

Birdwell earned a Silver Star and a Purple Heart.

The most dramatic moment occurred when Viet Cong commandos stormed the US Embassy compound in Saigon, breaching what had been seen as an impregnable symbol of American power. Although US forces quickly regained control, the mere fact that the embassy could be penetrated shocked American observers.

In Hue, the battle turned into one of the longest and bloodiest of the war. North Vietnamese forces captured the ancient imperial capital and held it for nearly a month. U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers fought house-to-house, eventually retaking the city at a devastating cost. After the battle, mass graves were discovered, containing thousands of civilians executed by communist forces—an event that deepened the war’s cruelty and complexity.

Militarily, the Tet Offensive was costly for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Estimates suggest that they lost tens of thousands of fighters, including many experienced operatives in the South. The anticipated popular uprising against the South Vietnamese government did not occur. The offensive strained North Vietnam’s capabilities and forced it to shift more responsibility to regular North Vietnamese Army units rather than the Viet Cong guerrilla network.

From a strictly battlefield perspective, the US and South Vietnamese forces successfully repelled the attacks and inflicted enormous casualties on the enemy. General Westmoreland declared the offensive a major defeat for North Vietnam.

Despite the battlefield outcome, the Tet Offensive achieved its true aim: shattering the United States’ political narrative of progress.

Marvin Kalb, writing for the Brookings Institution, noted of William Westmoreland’s counterattack, “Still, even without the additional forces, Westmoreland managed to lead a successful counter-offensive, killing tens of thousands of Communist troops and severely weakening their military position.

But, for Westmoreland and the United States, it was too late. The Tet Offensive gave the Communists an overwhelming propaganda victory. It undermined America’s credibility; more damaging still, it ignited the feeling among war-weary Americans that no matter how many troops the United States sent to South Vietnam, the Communists would eventually win. It was time to end the war.”

For years, the Johnson administration had assured the public that victory was near. Tet exposed these claims as illusions. Americans watching nightly news broadcasts saw dramatic images of fighting in cities that US officials had previously declared safe. The breach of the US Embassy in Saigon deeply rattled public confidence.

This is from Vietnam and the Sam B Johnson Center: 

“To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in a stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months, we must test the enemy’s intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.” Walter Cronkite.  

To President Lyndon Johnson, Cronkite’s words were devastating. In response to the editorial, Johnson was quoted as saying, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.”

And Johnson, whose first term after the Kennedy assassination was less than two years, was eligible to run again.  Mainly because of Vietnam, and indirectly the Tet Offensive, he chose not to. Johnson shocked the American public during an address to the nation on March 31, 1968, by announcing that he would not seek reelection. With that decision, Johnson became yet another casualty of the Vietnam War. However, he would not be the last, as American involvement in the war continued for another five years.

The offensive also intensified domestic protest movements. Students, civil rights leaders, clergy, and veterans increasingly called for withdrawal. Johnson’s approval ratings plummeted, and by March 1968, he announced that he would not seek reelection. His administration shifted toward de-escalation, halting most bombing of North Vietnam and beginning negotiations to end the conflict.

Strategies were reshaped on all sides. North Vietnam recognized that the war would be long but that American political will was weakening. The NVA increasingly assumed primary responsibility for fighting. South Vietnam faced renewed questions about its government’s stability and ability to defend itself without American support. For the United States, Tet catalyzed a shift from the search-and-destroy strategy toward pacification and Vietnamization—policies intended to strengthen South Vietnamese forces while gradually withdrawing US troops. Obviously, this policy did not work. After many other events too numerous to recount in this podcast, by 1975, the last Americans left Vietnam, and the North unified the nation, even renaming the Southern capital, once Saigon, into Ho Chi Minh City.  

The Tet Offensive left an enduring legacy that extends far beyond the Vietnam War. In American politics, it became synonymous with the “credibility gap”—a growing distrust of government institutions and official statements. It contributed to the rise of a more critical, less deferential press. In military strategy, Tet is studied as an example of how psychological and political effects can outweigh battlefield outcomes. For Vietnam, the offensive marked a costly but decisive moment in the long path to reunification.

Beginning with the Mexican War in 1846, the US had enjoyed an unprecedented string of military victories against national foes (I am excluding the Civil War).  From Native Americans to the Spanish in 1898.  From the Germans in World War I to the Germans and Japanese in World War II.  Even the eventual stalemate in Korea was seen as a win, as it looked in 1950 like the North would conquer the South.  But one characteristic of all these wars was that none lasted longer than four years. Even World War II, the longest war with a foreign power since the Revolution, lasted three years and 9 months.  

Though the Tet Offensive was technically a military win, it demonstrated that to beat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong eventually, it would require at least an additional two years to the years already committed.  And against a foe fighting the US with guerrilla tactics, or the ability to retreat into Laos or Cambodia, it was a new experience for the US, one that I would argue we still have not quite gotten our arms around, as demonstrated recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Kalb adds, “It should not be a surprise then that the Vietnam War has had a powerful effect on every subsequent president, from Ford to Obama, whenever he is faced with a decision to put ‘boots on the ground’ and to commit troops to war. Vietnam has profoundly changed the way presidents decide questions of war and peace. Because Vietnam always seemed to have a seat in the Oval Office, questions that could have been sidestepped must now be confronted. How can a president avoid another Vietnam?” 

In this sense, Tet stands as a reminder that wars are not won by military power alone. Perceptions, political will, and the human cost of conflict shape them. The Tet Offensive remains one of the defining episodes of the Vietnam War precisely because it demonstrated that the most important battles are often fought not only on the battlefield, but also in the hearts and minds of nations.