Brungardt Law's Lagniappe
A little extra perspective from Brungardt Law conveyed through conversations with individuals of various backgrounds exploring the interplay of practices, policies, and laws with decision making and leadership. An opportunity to learn how to navigate towards productive outcomes as well as appreciate the journey through the experiences and observations of others.
Brungardt Law's Lagniappe
Organizational Culture is the Rosetta Stone of Institutional Success: A Conversation with Dr. Thomas Manken
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Today’s guest is Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Senior Research Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar and practitioner of strategy and defense policy with extensive experience across academia, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Navy Reserve. Dr. Mahnken reflects on his personal journey, intellectual influences, and decades of experience at the intersection of academia, defense strategy, and public service. Growing up in Del Mar, California in the shadow of World War II, Mahnken developed an early fascination with history and military affairs, shaped by parents who had both served during the war. Dr. Mahnken describes his career path as a hallway of “doors” that periodically open—opportunities to be accepted or declined, not forced. What unifies his diverse roles is a commitment to public service, research that matters, and decisions grounded in values rather than rigid ideological frameworks.
When it comes to the national defense, the U.S. Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to provide and maintain a navy, whereas it is limited to raising and supporting armies through appropriations of only two years. While the U.S. Constitution provides a means for military power to defend the nation, it also reflects a concern regarding the establishment of a permanent military force. Welcome to Bringart Lawslining Act, where we provide a little extra perspective through conversations. I'm Maurice Burngart, your host. I enjoy engaging with experienced, knowledgeable, and passionate individuals for the opportunity it affords to enrich our understanding of the world through their eyes. The more we learn, the more likely we can become better versions of ourselves, guide others towards this aim, and perhaps have a little fun along the way. Today's guest is Dr. Thomas Mankin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, also Senior Research Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar and practitioner of strategy and defense policy with extensive experience across academia, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Navy Reserve. Welcome to the program, Dr. Mankin. It's my pleasure.
SPEAKER_01:Glad to be with you.
SPEAKER_00:Well, again, thank you for joining us, and we'll hop right into this. You served in academia, government, and policy research. How and where and why did your journey begin in that way? And what drew you to the field of strategy and national security?
SPEAKER_01:Look, that's a wonderful question, and uh it takes me, it takes me back. Uh it takes me back to uh my hometown of uh Del Mar, California, my beautiful seaside town north of San Diego, uh, place I couldn't afford to live now, but fortunately uh was was had had parents with uh foresight to to settle there. Uh it brings me back to a time where uh I was born 20 years after the end of World War II. And uh the legacy of World War II was very much alive in my parents' generation. My father was uh was a World War II veteran, marine aviator. Uh my mom had worked for the Navy during World War II. And so from a uh a very early age, I was interested in history, read a lot of history, had history read to me. Uh I was interested in military affairs, uh and that you know that interest just continued to grow uh throughout my childhood um and into college and into graduate school, and maybe you know, un so unusually, at least for a lot of my my male cohort uh friends, uh I I chose a path fairly early on and have just kind of followed followed that path throughout my career.
SPEAKER_00:And if you don't mind me asking, uh, where did you go to school, uh university?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, so I I attended the University of Southern California uh and for several reasons. Uh one of them being uh that they had a School of International Relations, a really good School of International Relations. And at the time they also had an outstanding defense and strategic studies program. And um I can recall sitting in uh a classroom, I can I can visualize it in my uh in my head. Uh for the very first class I took in strategic studies. And uh I remember the books that we read, I remember opening those books, and I just remember entering a whole new world, you know, a world of history, a world of leaders, uh, and a world of ideas. And and my time as an undergrad uh really kindled my my love of international affairs and and strategic studies. That uh I then you know went on to uh to study in greater depth in grad school at Johns Hopkins for my master's, then went off, worked for a little bit, and then came back to get my uh my PhD at uh at Hopkins and really have been teaching there for quite some time after.
SPEAKER_00:Uh out of curiosity and just deviating momentarily, um, how would you compare uh similarities and differences uh between your time as an undergrad and what there in California and what you perceive as the experience for the undergrads at Johns Hopkins?
SPEAKER_01:Oh, that's a great it's a great question. And I I um I can't answer it directly because these days I don't teach undergraduates. So I've never I've actually never taught undergraduates. Um I but I will say I I I have or I had two in my household. Now one's graduated and the other's still. So I can I can connect to today's undergraduates uh um through them. But I think for me, uh it was just it was uh a wonderful place, a wonderful time. Um LA in the 1980s was was great. Uh my dorm was actually built for the 1984 Olympic Village, so it was uh it was brand new, although it's kind of a a pale, pale shadow of today's college dorms and apartments. I I look at my uh my daughter's uh apartment at West Virginia University, and it's it's not only better than every every uh university apartment I lived in, but probably the two or three I lived in after graduating college. Uh, but that was a it was a wonderful time. Uh I I you know the contrast I would draw is um well, two contrasts. Um, number one, uh there was a real kind of vibrant, vital conversation around national security in Southern California in in the 1980s. And unfortunately, uh that's no longer the case. And uh uh there used to be much more vibrant conversations about national security across the country. And unfortunately, what's happened, particularly since the end of the Cold War, is uh that's really receded. It's receded to uh you know to the to the northeast, to the Acela Corridor, or to the you know, the swamp, whatever you want to call it. And unfortunately, in in all too many colleges and universities, and in civic life in too many cities across the country, people just aren't talking about these issues. So that that's one, I think, one one uh one big contrast. But as to the the student experience, um I think students today, by and large, and I'll say undergraduate and graduate, um I think a lot of them have a much more utilitarian uh sense of education than certainly I did. I mean I was looking at I I was eventually gonna get a job and I was interested in that. But but uh I I find more common today just this utilitarian notion of okay, well, what is this going to do for me? Um I also find a lot of today's students to be uh to look be looking for much more guidance than I ever expected, let alone got uh in college or graduate school. And um yeah, I think that's uh you know that's that's a that's a concern of mine.
SPEAKER_00:Do you think that could be attributed to, and then I'll pull us out of the rabbit hole, um, to the fact information is much more readily available and accessible today, that uh people I guess are inherently moving towards seeking guidance as opposed to before uh you didn't you couldn't get all the information as quickly, and so you made decisions based on what you had at hand.
SPEAKER_01:I I I think that's one dimension of it. Uh I think more, you know, more broadly, um kids, and I mean kids, you know, growing up are are more sheltered uh from having to make decisions, uh take risks of various sorts, right? And so of course some of that's good, right? Um but on the other hand, look, I I um I'd say fairly unusually for for my friends growing up, both of my parents worked. Uh so I guess you know today uh I would be called a latch key kid. I didn't really think about it that way. What I thought about was I walked home from school, I sat down, I did my homework, and then with my friends, we went out and explored the the canyon that was uh uh uh a block behind our house, um you know, rode skateboards or bikes, and then at the appropriate time, appropriate time determined by the placement of the sun in the sky, I made my way home and had dinner. And uh I did that from kind of you know elementary school on. And um that's a very different you know existence than I think a lot of a lot of kids today. Maybe in some jurisdictions, my parents would be arrested for for childhood neglect or something like that. But um I think I just I benefited from it greatly, you know. Um yeah, I'll I'll just leave it at that. I could I could talk about you know growing up in San Diego and as a teenager being really close to the Mexican border and the ability to go across borders pretty readily, but I you know I won't go too far into that, uh, it of that.
SPEAKER_00:Yes, you've you've opened up potentially a whole new topic anyway.
SPEAKER_01:Um Senator, I have absolutely no recollection of anything.
SPEAKER_00:For those uh unfamiliar with your your work, uh what would you say ties together your experiences across the military, academia, the Pentagon, and now the think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments? Yeah.
SPEAKER_01:Well, I think look, uh somebody far wiser than I many years ago uh gave me uh a very powerful way of thinking about uh a life or a career. And it's it's one that I uh I took to heart and and I uh advise people about all the time. And the basic notion is that living your life is like is like walking down a hallway. And um you should probably enjoy you know that walk. That that that walk in and of itself should be uh fulfilling. Now, as you walk down the hallway at various times, different doors open up. And so the big decisions in life are about do you go through those doors or not? And it's not about um there's a door that's locked, can I pick the lock? Uh can I blow open the door? Can I can I get a drywall saw and create a door where none exists? It's about um making decisions as opportunities present themselves. And um that's the way I've tried to live my life. So that walking down the hall, you know, I've I've engaged in in research, studies, you know, I've I've investigated topics that I find interesting. And on certain occasions, different doors have opened up. As you say, there was a door. Uh uh I uh I tried to go through a door of uh of joining the Navy Reserve. First time that door was locked, I kept walking. Uh, and then uh the next time it was open and and and I went through it. Um uh got an opportunity to teach at the Naval War College, which was uh uh an institution that I'd always uh regarded very highly. I went through that door, never regretted it. It was an amazing experience. Um got an opportunity to teach at SIS for what I thought was gonna be a year, and that was over 20 years ago. Um I decided to go through that door. Got a call literally, sort of out of the blue, from the Pentagon, uh, which led to a job there. I decided to go through that. And then similarly in 2016 uh was was sort of head headhunted uh to come to lead CSBA. Um those are the doors that I went through. Um there were a bunch of other doors that I decided not to go through, and I have absolutely no regrets about not going through those doors. I also you know didn't haven't spent a lot of time. I'd be lying if I said I spent no time, but I haven't spent a lot of time trying to, you know, unlock those locked doors or blow open the doors or create new doors. Um so that's one one thing. But I think another thing tying everything together is you know is a very broad but basic notion of public service. I think one of the things that that uh fulfills me is looking at questions, answering questions that have a sort of a public impact. You know, it's not although I appreciate you know the development of knowledge for knowledge's sake, that's just never been where my heart uh is. So it's being able to do things that serve the public good some in some way, directly, maybe less directly, maybe immediately, maybe uh less immediately. And again, that's changed over time. But those, you know, those are the threads that have kind of uh tied things together.
SPEAKER_00:Uh you mentioned your time, um the Navy Reserve door uh locked and then eventually it opened. Uh beginning with that, and whether it was as eventually uh a Navy officer in the field, uh in the classroom as an educator, or you are informing decision makers, uh, numerous times you operated uh within among uncertainty. Uh from your perspective, how should decision making be undertaken when information is incomplete or the risks are ambiguous? And especially for people nowadays who have information readily available and in great quantities and immediately uh and sometimes they want to have like a complete picture before making a decision. How would you recommend they undertake decisions?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, look, it's a great question. Uh I would say that you know uncertainty uh is inherent in life. And you're right that there is more, you know, data available, more information available. But of course, you know, um some of that's authoritative, a lot of it is uh is questionable, some of it is actually just kind of like you know, laughable or farcical. So just the fact that there's more information doesn't uh drive down uncertainty. If anything, I think in some cases it drives it up. So I think the first thing is to recognize that that uncertainty is uh is a part of life, and that uh oftentimes uh a good faith, decent decision in the face of uncertainty is better than no decision whatsoever. Um I think, you know, um and the and the and the the folks who I've worked for over the years, whom I respect the most, and I you know, I think about uh former Secretary Bob Gates, who I who I served, uh as one example of that. You know, uh the way he put it and puts it is, you know, like usually all the all the easy decisions are made below a senior decision maker. Like the the really easy decisions are have already been, you know, have already been taken. So the ones that are left to senior decision makers are are always kind of difficult and rife with uncertainty. Uh so you just gotta you gotta live with that. The other thing I would say too is that um it's I I I I believe very strongly in acting to gain information, right? So one uh uh uh what you implied with your question, I think it's it's quite frequent, is to sit back and just gather more information or wait for more information to emerge. Sometimes that can be wise. Um, but oftentimes you can act to gain more information. Um, you know, how you know, how is uh you know a particular country likely to respond to you know to something we do? Well, okay, you could try doing it in a certain way and see see if it uh see if it see if it has uh a good impact or a not so good impact. Um so I believe really strongly in in being active in in the face of uncertainty.
SPEAKER_00:Um as a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and now your current role, head of a uh think tank, what do you propose as an organizational culture that best enables the translation of sound policy into uh productive, actionable results?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, look, first uh thanks for the question. Uh, because I am a person who believes strongly in organizational culture. I actually think you know organizational culture is um the Rosetta Stone, you know, the secret decoder ring uh for understanding so much of what goes on. And uh I'm I'm tremendously fortunate. Again, this is back to that walking down the hallway and doors opening. You know, I did a piece of research fairly early in my career that essentially was looking at the organizational culture of the US military and the different services. And um, I was able to do it at a time in my career where I actually had time to focus on things for a long time. And I've benefited from those insights ever ever since. So, first, organizational culture is huge. You should start by recognizing that. Um and organizations, you know, even nominally like organizations can have very different cultures. So um, in my current job, I deal uh a lot with different defense firms. And I'll just say, and it's without prejudice to any particular firm, right? The the the cultures of of nominally similar firms are just very different in ways, uh in in kind of measurable ways. So it's really important. But to your to your question about you know what type of culture um best uh allows one to translate policy into productive, actionable results. Look, I I look back at the the culture that existed at least during my time uh in the Pentagon in the uh in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It's also the the culture that uh I I say we have here at CSBA. And that's that is uh a culture. This may sound actually uh a little bit um ironic, but it's a culture that really values individuals and their talents and their contributions. So it's it's uh it's a culture that puts skilled, talented individuals at the forefront. So, you know, in policy, um I would say about 80% of the value of that organization when I was there was produced at the action officer level, which is the entry level.
SPEAKER_00:Yeah.
SPEAKER_01:And I say that as somebody who was rungs above that. My my the job of of me, uh those between me and the action officers was just to add a little bit more value uh to what the action officers were producing, to uh uh you know, bar the door to make sure that they got into the meetings and things like that. So it really, and and uh policy, at least at that time, was just uh an outstanding, very high performance organization. And at CSBA, similarly, I mean it's it's about our researchers and it's about their work and putting them in the best position possible to do their work, uh, to shine and to and to move forward. Uh that's just yeah, it's it's that's just key.
SPEAKER_00:Um I'll I'll come back to uh your reference to your researchers, your people, so to say. Uh it's it's the people that count, the action officer. Um organizational culture, it it struck me while you were talking and you highlighted uh the the Pentagon. Um and I'm gonna go out on a limb here. Um but thinking of under the former Soviet Union and the organizational culture they had regarding their space program, obviously the way they approach things in a communist environment was much different than we did at that time, yet they were able to produce actionable results. I mean, they got into space before we did. Uh so how would you comment on that? You know, can you have successful cultures, uh organizations that are operating on completely opposite ideologies?
SPEAKER_01:Oh, absolutely. Look, the the um you know the Soviets had uh a way of mobilizing talent and directing it to national objectives. Um the Russians still do. Uh the Chinese also do that. Um and they do it in a you know in a particular way. So um, you know, one of the things that the Soviets did, as part of their their missile program, the space program, the nuclear program, you know, they were able to identify the best and the brightest. They, you know, they kind of hived them off into these uh uh these science cities that were basically hidden from the public and actually not even on maps. Uh so they they um you know they concentrated talent and they created when they were successful, you know, they they created uh ecosystems where um I will say many of the rules of the communist Soviet Union didn't apply or weren't as strictly enforced. Um so that's one model. That's a very different model from the way the US does it, right? But the way the US does it is uh and we've done it so most successfully, is to is for the government to provide incentives uh and then to let the free market uh do its business. And then market also, or the government also can serve to provide a demand signal where there isn't normally a demand signal. Um, but you you talked about space. My my dad um worked on the Atlas Missile Program.
SPEAKER_00:Oh wow.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah. Um and that was an amazing achievement. Um, and that was another mobilization of talent, but that was done in a very different way. I think that was, you know, that was done in a very democratic, capitalist uh sort of way. And um I uh yeah, I given the historical results, I have difficulty um betting against our system uh when when properly uh when properly employed.
SPEAKER_00:Returning to your researchers, organizational culture, um what would you comment on the importance of diversity? And especially in the sense that in some ways uh it can be, I think the quest for diversity can sometimes uh miss the mark uh in the way it is approached or executed. Uh but a lot of times uh it doesn't, you know, quite the opposite. It's achieving its aims. But regardless, uh speak to us a little bit about diversity within an organization and how it creates this kind of effective culture.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, look, uh it's a great question. And and um I again I'm I'm going to uh uh address diversity in all of its manifestations. I think unfortunately, you know, in recent years, um you know, that word has been boiled down to uh a synonym for ethnicity or you know, or genetics or something like that. And um I think that's a shame. Um again, reflecting a little bit on my on my childhood, you know, I I I grew up in a uh uh in from one perspective, a very a very diverse um neighborhood. I you know, I had I had and I kind of like stumble over uh this formulation um because it doesn't come naturally to me, but like I, you know, I had I had friends who were uh Hispanic, uh friends who were Asian American, friends who were black, and I kind of I stumble over that because they were all they were all my friends. And in the neighborhood and the environment I grew up in, they were all just friends.
SPEAKER_00:Yes.
SPEAKER_01:Where there wasn't uh uh diversity, in uh the neighborhood where I grew up was was in expectations. Uh there was no diversity of expectations. You were going to get an education. Doesn't matter what color your skin is, doesn't matter what your parents did, you're gonna get an education. And you're gonna go, and and that might be community college, it might be state, it might be an Ivy League, it might be anything, but my high school, public high school, you are gonna go get an education. And so uh, in some ways, I I I I definitely approve of a lack of diversity when it comes to expectations, high expectations. But but I think when it comes to a diversity of experiences, uh diversity of expertise, skills, personality types, uh, I think that's extraordinarily important. And uh taking a multidisciplinary approach in kind of the broadest sense uh of things, I think is tremendously uh is tremendously important. Um no single approach has you know all the answers. So I've I've I've actually been quite fortunate whether you know at the at the Naval War College, you know, I taught I taught in the Department of Strategy. We had political scientists, we had economists, we had historians, we had regional specialists. One of one of the things that made us really strong at SIS and the strategic studies program at SIS, similarly, uh you have people with all sorts of different uh academic backgrounds, professional backgrounds. We have a number of professors who don't hold PhDs, but they had very distinguished uh government careers as practitioners. Same thing here at CSBA. We have people with military backgrounds, with different academic backgrounds, different policymaking backgrounds. And that really enriches uh the work that we do and it puts us at a competitive advantage, to be honest, against I just say, like, you know, a group of historians. Yes. Or, God help us, a group of political scientists.
SPEAKER_00:Um, yeah. And I think one can also take the concept of diversity and really personalize it, that as an individual, one would need diversity of thought internally, uh, especially when you're going to be approaching uh challenges or issues. And in that regard, uh when it comes to strategic decision making, there's often a tension between ideals and practical necessities. How do you reconcile that tension? And I'm not asking you personally, but uh in this realm, how does one reconcile that tension? And what advice do you offer to leaders trying to do the same?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah. Well, I'll I'll I'll I'll tackle that on two different levels. Um uh because uh uh I there there are ideals as in uh I'll just say like you know, platonic ideal types, uh, and then there's ideals in terms of values. And let me let me kind of take it on in both ways. So I mean uh uh you know, the the platonic ideal, again, the the people who believe um, again, they they they they fall in love with a particular approach or a particular answer or a particular framework, and and everything gets uh fit you know fitted into that. Um I uh I worry about people like that when they're exposed to to reality for so long because uh I think uh a a background, you know, uh uh uh in a particular approach, a particular discipline is helpful, but the world doesn't really adhere to any particular approach. So that's that's you know that's uh that's one take on it. On the other hand, when we talk about uh values, look, I I think I think values are tremendously important. And you know in the end, um you have to live with your actions and your inaction. And and so you need to you need to act in accord with your with your with your values. You know something I used to say a lot when I when I was in the Pentagon um when you know members of my team were kind of hesitant to speak truth to power, I would always say, look, we we don't live in Stalin's Russia. What's the worst thing that's gonna happen to you? You're not going to be marched to the basement of the Lubyanka and shot in the head. Right? What's the worst thing? Um and and and as a practical matter you know uh at that time the worst thing was somebody wasn't gonna listen to you or might say something kind of brusque to you.
SPEAKER_00:Yes.
SPEAKER_01:So in that type of environment live the courage of your convictions and and I still believe that that's that's the way to go about things.
SPEAKER_00:Turning this around briefly for a moment um it reminded me of a question I've always had when it comes to uh presidential candidate debates and I've always been intrigued why the question has never been posed to any person pursuing that office why would you want to have your finger on the nuclear trigger? Because at the end of the day if it ever comes to that you will have to make that decision. Uh and I'm curious they've never really put someone on the hotspot about that the closest they came to I think was the debate between Hillary Clinton and and current president Donald Trump and they were asking about executing a preemptive strike and they both kind of danced around the issue. Do you think it's important uh for candidates to be challenged in that regard uh I I think it's useful uh I and I think the point you make is a really good one um I think it's very useful for for candidates well first you know there's there's the basic question of like why why do you want to do this anyway? I mean frankly well yeah but we tend to associate like we tend to associate our presidency with you know this altruistic office but the reality is it's much more than that.
SPEAKER_01:No that's absolutely right uh no I mean my point was just like you know why would anybody want to run for elective office these days uh it just seems so ungratifying um but but your point is a good one and and the you know the the historical track record you know is that after being elected you know uh uh president after after well you know after being elected before being inaugurated then after being inaugurated uh presidents are confronted with tremendous responsibilities and you you you point to one of the um one of the gravest responsibilities and um presidents take those responsibilities extremely seriously you know and in in some cases it has led presidents to um imagine you know the the the uh the abolition of nuclear weapons in in other cases it's led presidents to take very seriously the need to defend the United States against uh against a hostile attack um it it there is a sense of responsibility that uh that comes upon a president after he's elected and i look i served a president georbush after 9-11 i i i entered government a number of years after 9-11 but that you know that experience of having failed to protect the United States against attack um haunted that administration until its end and I think you know even even went uh uh even even went beyond you know that administration so um it it would be good to uh you know to ask candidates to try to uh inoculate them uh I uh a little bit on this but I think uh what you talk about is extremely important. Uh you mentioned 9-11 and 9-11 being representative of you know a global conflict um you have a book that you uh authored Learning the Lessons of Modern War and it surveys conflicts across decades which lessons do you feel we not just the United States but many in the world have just not learned yet yeah well thank no thanks for uh mentioning the book I mean it's it's um and it's a it's a sad commentary but the book hasn't been out uh that long uh and it's already missing a whole bunch of case studies uh such as you know and so maybe that's that's one I mean that's one overall lesson which is uh you may not be interested in war but war is interested in you and we haven't seen the end of war and um uh it it's maybe a gloomy way of looking at the world but I think it's an accurate way my way of looking at the world is either either you're at war or you're in an interwar period of undetermined duration. Yeah that is gloomy well but I think it it's it is gloomy but uh it it it hopefully is also sobering. Yes I mean I think particularly in the United States particularly in the Western world we we would like to wish war away we would like to believe I think most Americans see peace as the natural order of things and wars as temporary diversions from that natural order. I think history tells us something different and uh that war is a very human activity we're still you know fundamentally the same as our ancestors centuries or even millennia ago and war is something that needs to be prepared for and prepared for uh among other reasons to hope to prevent it. So yeah it's it is kind of gloomy but you know lesson number one is there's always the possibility of of a war and lesson 1A is uh the the the way to increase the possibility of experiencing a war is not to prepare for it. Um you know it's it's a flip flip flip of the classic uh Latin phrase you know if you want peace prepare for war. Yeah and um yeah I wish I had something you know more pleasant to say about that but I think it's true and it's probably um more intuitive to more of the population now than it was you know three, five ten years ago. But we live in a world uh with countries and regimes that wish us ill uh and we need to be prepared.
SPEAKER_00:Okay. Do you think that perhaps some of this is a result of sometimes we we want a boogeyman uh so to say um or I mean for for the United States and I know I'm I'm approaching this uh very uh sophomorically for lack of a better word uh but again uh it it sometimes it seems as if uh we can be driven by the need to identify you know a boogeyman whether it's in the form of an uh uh ideology like communism uh it's a problem like uh the drug war uh or it's terrorism um do you think that plays into this mix uh somewhat look uh it's not sophomoric at all I think it's a uh a very widely held view um I would say my view is a little bit different my view is that we again I say as Americans I mean that's we're not unique I would say you know a lot of Western societies are similar but let's let's let's stick to our own we as Americans that we tend to be optimists we uh tend to think we can kind of muddle through things and if anything I think we are late you know we are late to recognize dangers I mean I think you know Churchill said yeah you know the Americans can be called uh counted on to do the right thing after they've done everything else and um I you know I think that's right and and whether we go back to um well you could go back as far as you want in American history but you know um for uh but we talked about 9-11 right the the the problem with 9-11 wasn't that we created al-Qaeda as a boogeyman and then and then went and rampaged uh through Afghanistan it was that we didn't do enough early enough to deal with uh the threat that al Qaeda posed to the United States until after until after 9-11.
SPEAKER_01:There were certainly efforts to deal with Osama bin Laden i'm not I'm not disregarding that but as a nation we were asleep to that um I similarly think that uh there well there were multiple presidential administrations um that earnestly sought to build a constructive relationship with Russia after Vladimir Putin rose to power they all failed right um and and so I don't think it's in the case of Russia similar to al-Qaeda I don't think it was a case of us turning Russia into a boogeyman uh I think more it was a case of of us indulging in some maybe overoptimistic assumptions about uh about russia and uh its leadership and and its leadership's attitude towards the United States but this does leave us then vulnerable to manipulation where someone wants to gain our our favor and say oh I have a problem with fill in the blank communist terrorist uh and it's not necessarily a true instance of that they just may have an opposing party or an opposing segment of society uh but they want to take sort of an iron fisted approach to it and then they get support from us.
SPEAKER_00:I find that at times weak and exploited because of our own optimism and uh the willingness wrong or right to sort of be the policeman in the world. You mentioned again our optimism and that we're not looking uh for boogeymen and our country is founded upon the rule of law I referenced the U.S.
SPEAKER_01:Constitution at the beginning and yes we've had our flaws over time and over time we've evolved and uh done what we can I think to address uh uh the flaws in our governmental uh system but the irony is we have the rule of law here at home um but we've engaged sometimes uh in debatable military operations uh and again not questioning it but people have debated whether uh we should have engaged in one uh activity or a conflict or not but all of keeping that in mind how does one maintain moral clarity and public trust and work that necessarily involves secrecy sure yeah it's a great question uh I would say um a couple things first we should realize that that even among liberal democracies uh the United States is a pretty transparent system we we are we are more transparent than the UK for example um our system of government right the uh system of checks and balances that we have um forces us to be more transparent than just say a parliamentary system right so um uh a fair amount of transparency is in our DNA um and so the problem there is you know there there are sometimes things that for very good reasons one would want to conceal uh and here I'm not talking you were talking about military operations and things like this but but uh when it comes to intelligence for example you can imagine uh types of capabilities or operations that cost a lot of money are very perishable like if if they were to be disclosed uh an adversary could undertake countermeasures that would be fairly cheap fairly quick fairly simple those are the types of things you'd really want to keep secret right um if only just to be a good steward of the taxpayers dollars that uh you'd like to be able to do that um and and I think that's proven exceedingly difficult in our in our system I mean I think about uh you know various leaks over time that have undermined efforts like that and again this is that's quite apart from issues of uh of of morality yes right so so just you know maintaining secrecy can be difficult what I would say though to the to the broader question is um because of the transparency of our of our system uh decision makers should always keep in mind uh the the possibility maybe even the probability that something that they you know they hope to conceal is going to come to light and um how are they going to respond or how would they respond in you know in defense of that uh action should it come to light and by the way again I think there are plenty of cases where something is kept secret uh that is completely morally defensible. You know the people talk about the New York Times test how you how would you feel about it uh if it appeared on the on the front page of the New York Times which in and of itself is a dated reference because some people probably don't even know what a front page is others may not know what the New York Times is aside from an uh the NYT app yeah which which includes Wordle. So I think that's I think that's a key part of it. I look my experience has been limited as as it is but my experience in government has been that by and large uh leaders take their take those responsibilities very very seriously.
SPEAKER_00:And it goes back to earlier conversation I mean once once you are in a position of authority um you take these things very seriously um and and that includes things that uh that could result in the loss of life either you know American lives foreign lives uh the the loss of a of a you know of a key capability the expenditure of lots of of money um there's no easy answers there but but by and large you know the decision makers that I've uh uh that I've been around have taken that very uh very seriously in terms of decision making so practices that are uh linked to that it's a chicken and egg conundrum from from my vantage point do effective practices make a good decision maker or do good decision makers create effective practices and yeah it it's a it's a great question and it is sort of chicken and egg but what I would say is um people trump practice uh and the example uh and look uh having both would be great right uh if if you but um the example that I would provide has to do with uh the Reagan administration and and specifically the Reagan administration strategy that um well helped helped us win the Cold War really it was the Reagan strategy against the Soviet Union um when it came to process the the Reagan White House the Reagan uh NSC was a disaster area I mean it was you know uh if if you were process oriented or organization oriented it'd be a case study and all the things not to do.
SPEAKER_01:I can't remember how many national security advisors Reagan went through but it was a bunch. Again the policymaking process left a lot to be desired. And yet there were enough of the right people and I would say in this case beginning with the president who thought strategically and uh came up with a coherent strategy for competing with the Soviet Union and then implemented it through the remainder of of Reagan's two terms. So there that's that's just a good example of of human capital of people trumping process. And and I'll also admit my I mean look that's that's my philosophical bias anyway again I think people are tremendously important. Process is important in its own way um but uh people really do do reign supreme and so it's you know you could imagine um uh I don't know imagine you know uh jimmy Carter getting uh re-elected in in 1980 and having a great process he didn't actually have a great process either but imagine if he had a great process uh with uh some of the advisors around him he had some good advisors some some less so uh you could imagine a very different a very different outcome so again I think it's it's people that really uh that really trump process and speaking of the people and influencing uh the people in an organization and the ones that are going to be in the field uh if you wouldn't mind commenting briefly the impact influence that say a particular organizational philosophy or an individual's vision for the organization a motto can have as an example you know one would see a lot of times or still sees occasionally in police departments like on their squad cars uh to serve and to protect or General Mattit uh giving instructions to Marines and say if you can't remember anything else do no harm right uh and how that trickles down uh comment on that oh no I think that that um that uh crystallization of values uh that that uh level of vision I think is tremendously important um I think that type of a a direction is more important than you know I've been down this path too like the you know the whole exercise where you come up with your vision statement and your mission statement and and and that can just kind of become its own you know its own sort of cult right but but that that basic direction um I think is you know is extremely important and because I think you know in in in any organization um in government you know out of out of government we're all sort of advisors you know we're always advising someone often I mean sometimes it's formal oftentimes it's informal uh and so I think it's important to and I I you know certainly when I was in the Pentagon I I very much thought of myself as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and that forced me to think about yeah what what are his priorities and ultimately what are the president's priorities and how can I help so and and and you know folks who've been the most difficult to help and they'll go unnamed on this podcast were were people who didn't have that articulated vision. Right so without that sense of direction how can I help hard for me to figure out how I can fit into that but as you say like in Mattis is a good example of that. That basic guidance okay got it now I can you know now I can I can move out and see how I can contribute to that.
SPEAKER_00:What comes to mind thinking of based on our intelligence threat assessments that come out annually so we've identified countries as being adversaries Russia China North Korea Iran but putting that descriptor aside what comes to mind from any of them that you say we could actually learn from in terms of effective organizational practice well I I think so when when when uh I think about learning uh I think about learning in a positive way I also think about learning in a negative way right so that's no but I look I think it's a really key point right so there's the type of learning that you say like oh I want to emulate this which I think was your your your kind of the intent of your question right so no not not emulating again it's uh an an actual although it's subjectively done but as close to an objective realization that well there is this one thing they are doing well and it is driven by this particular philosophy.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah yeah no what was what I was gonna say was you know you you can learn in a from a positive standpoint you can also learn from like don't ever do that. Yes value that's just as valuable. I've by and large had really good uh bosses in my career I've had some that are not so good I learned from both both types. Yes and and even if it's don't ever do what that person, you know, what you saw that person do to their assistant don't ever do that. That's that's extremely valuable even if it was something that I wasn't going to do on my own anyway. Just good reinforcement. Look what I would say is that um Russia and China and I'll just they're individual countries different but actually they have a fair amount in common in what I'm about to say um they really do think about national security in an integrated sort of way um our system as designed by the founders you know uh is stovepiped you know our system was designed what to defend against tyranny to promote liberty that's why the but those are the those are the values that I think are are most deeply enshrined in our system uh but that comes at a cost of inefficiency and even in some cases you know ineffectiveness um the authoritarian states are built for you know for much greater efficiency um now I'm not saying we're never gonna out-authoritarian the authoritarians so we shouldn't try uh we need to be we need to be true to our values um and so what I would even say there is look you know a little bit better coordination and integration is is not incompatible with uh with being a liberal democracy and there I would I would you know I would cite one of our closest allies uh Australia I mean I think the Australian government does a very good job of integrating military diplomatic economic you know various aspects of national security policy they do a very good job of it and now there it's easier for them to do because of their size their relatively small size but more kind of integration in in in national security policy would be good and it's again it's not incompatible with being uh a liberal democracy shifting gears um and putting you a bit and your think tank in the limelight here for the lay listener what exactly does the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments do in practice Yeah so uh I'll give you the the clinical answer right the clinical answer is we're a 501c3 nonprofit organization which that's a you know that's a provision in the tax code uh but what that means is we are a nonprofit that serves a public purpose and really what our public purpose is is to do research analysis and educate uh about national security issues um we help educate the American people um and I would just say since you bring it up so you can go to our website which is csbaonline dot org if you go to just csba.org I think that's the California Small Business Administration they got to that domain name before us so csbaonline.org uh all of our our publications are there they're free for download uh I would urge your listeners to um read what you know read about what we do so we are focused on national security policy and strategy uh capabilities and concepts and budgets and resources and we educate the public we also educate uh policymakers um in including legislators and their staffs I think one of the things that um I didn't fully appreciate I will confess in my career up till the time I joined CSBA was what an information poor environment that members of Congress and their staffs exist in. Now in a way it's it's information rich. There's like a lot of data like we talked about there's a lot of stuff that's out there but members and their staffs I think are are justifiably skeptical of a lot of the information that they have presented to them on silver platters because they realize that more often than not the people that are doing that are uh doing it with their own sort of agenda and their own assumptions. And members and their staffs sensibly enough would like to make up their own minds. So we help do that. We help lead conversations on national security.
SPEAKER_00:I mean lead conversations in terms of uh um oftentimes we have less to say about what's happening right now and more on the things we need to think about in the next year or five years or so with that in mind um after Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, military spending is the largest U.S. expenditure uh of the overall government budget our allies like Canada, the UK, France, Japan, uh they've spend on average two to six percent annually uh for the last 20 years of total government expenditures on defense whereas here in the US we're spending over 10% of our total government expenditures on national defense. So to me this raises the question are we perhaps overspending or simply spending differently? I mean it's obviously we're spending differently but again uh are we prioritizing differently is the gap justified by the geopolitical climate or has it become a reflexive habit of policy?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah it's a it's a great question um and I would start by well you're the the way you framed it which is a legitimate way of framing it has to do with um government expenditure uh and I think uh Americans can disagree and actually do disagree um over you know just what how much the government should be spending and for what uh and I think in in many cases you can have a very productive debate over how much the government should spend on entitlements, social spending um those are all very meritorious debates Where there is no debate is uh over the fact that there is no substitute for government spending on defense. Meaning if if the government doesn't spend on defense, it's not as if private industry is going to do that, right? And in fact, one of the most sacred uh duties of the US government, um, executive and legislative branches is to provide for the common defense. It's a it's a core uh it's a core uh mission of of the government. So I think what you say is is is true when it comes to government uh spending. I would also point out though that that when it comes to um defense spending, right now we're spending just around or just north of three percent of of gross national product.
SPEAKER_00:Of gross national oh yeah, but when it but when it comes to the total allocation, you know, the budget.
SPEAKER_01:Sure. And and that's and that's but uh again, that's that's that says something about defense, but it also says more about as you say, social spending uh and um and kind of uh how you know uh what the what what the what's discretionary, what's not discretionary, right? So when I tend to think about it, I tend to think about it in turn, and and so this also gets to your your point about allies, right? Um allies many European countries have uh uh you know more uh more ornate uh social system social spending systems than we do. So you look at defense spending against that, okay, it it looks, you know, it looks it looks sort of meager. That's why I like to look at like for like. So I look, I would look at uh at levels of GNP. And what's going on now, I'd say two things. So where what we are I'll say three things actually. So first, what we are spending uh in in terms of GNP is basically on par with where we were at the during the peace dividend of the of the Clinton years after the end of the uh uh the end of the Cold War. Um and yet the world that we live in today I think is is much more dangerous than that era. Uh if we could go back to that era, that would be great, but I don't think we're going to. So if I look at what we're spending on defense relative to um what we spent during the Cold War, um it's a fraction of that. Um if I look at what our allies are spending, again, and I think about it in terms of GNP, um many, most of our allies are increasing their their defense spending in in an absolute sense. And look, we the Trump administration uh has uh uh told our allies you know that we expect them to get up to five percent of uh of GNP on defense. That's you know, uh our NATO allies, I believe it's been said to our allies in Asia, I guess what I would say is if both the United States is a founding member of NATO and we're telling all the other NATO allies to get to 5%, we should probably get to 5% uh as well.
SPEAKER_02:Hmm.
SPEAKER_00:Well, one of the reasons I uh focused on as a percentage of government expenditure, again, this is the allowance you know, my parents gave me, so how am I going to spend the allowance, right? Um and uh it just gave me a different way of looking at how we prioritize as a government. Uh I agree with you completely. If we look at it from the GDP standpoint, well, yeah, we're pretty much on par with others and they are with us. Uh I just found it somewhat telling uh that there was a difference when it came to looking at the data based on what a government spends as a percentage uh of their actual uh government budget. And then then what struck me even more was, and the information I'm getting from for our listeners benefit was from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which many uh folks have referenced, including your your own think tank. Um and I was kind of struck by how China's defense spending, again, using the data of total government expenditures, that it's steadily declined since 2000 from 11% to about 5%. Um do you think this is reflecting some kind of efficiency or fiscal constraints uh or a broader shift toward uh long-term state building investment?
SPEAKER_01:Um no, I think it's a it's a um it is an artifact of what has been a rapidly growing Chinese economy, right? So numerator-denominator, right? So as the as the size of the Chinese economy has grown and grown pretty markedly, then the share of total expenditures on defense has gone down just because it's it's uh uh the the overall economy has been going up. Chinese defense spending uh has been increasing in an absolute sense, and an absolute sense.
SPEAKER_00:Based on GDP, right?
SPEAKER_01:Uh or or just absolute. Okay. Like if you want to think about um absolute, and this is it's difficult to do with China because they conceal a bunch of information, they lie about other information, uh, they have some information in some places, and then there's a whole issue of purchasing power parity, the exchange rate. But if you want to uh estimate the the size of you know Chinese defense expenditure, it's been growing, it's been growing pretty markedly, and it's it's getting up to somewhere close to what the US is spending. I don't want to argue how close, but it's it's getting close. And and if you don't, I'm not saying you don't believe me, but if you if you if you need more, you know, more convincing, just take a look at the output of Chinese uh defense spending in terms of modernization. Um the Chinese just christened their newest aircraft carrier uh just uh earlier this week or last week. Um they're pumping out uh ships, they are pumping out intercontinental ballistic missiles, they're undertaking kind of the biggest nuclear buildup uh going on on this planet right now. Um they are uh they've invested in creating artificial uh features in the South China Sea. They're buying lots of stuff. And so that tells me, as somebody who nominally has a degree in international economics, uh, that they're spending a lot of money.
SPEAKER_00:Okay.
SPEAKER_01:Right? And so um they're spending a lot of money, and they're spending a lot of money to a purpose, right? I mean, they're spending a lot of money elsewhere, but they're spending a lot of money towards uh a military purpose. So I think that's and they're able to bear that uh that burden because the Chinese economy has been growing. Now, should that growth, and I think that growth is slowing down, should it continue to slow down, well then it will become a greater burden, right? But um as the Chinese economy has grown, that that burden has shrunk. Similarly, look, the United States could, if the US economy were to grow uh, let's just say high single figures, we could afford to spend much more on defense, and yet the defense burden would go down, right? Because the numerical denominator the denominator denominator keeps keeps growing.
SPEAKER_00:Okay. Um you may be going out on a limb uh with this question or uh or not, but do you think China's focus on national defense spending is just to be a competitor, to be on par with us, or it has it's actually aggressively inclined, or it may actually be preemptively defensive in nature. They are actually, no, they see us as a threat, and they're just responding to how we perceive them as a threat. It's like going back and forth at this point.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, look, I think it and and it doesn't have to be just one of those things, right? And I think the reality is it's it's a mixture of things. So I uh some of the things that China uh is doing uh are uh when it comes to defense and defense expenditure, really are about um status. And I don't uh uh when I say status, I don't, I'm not minimizing that. I think status is extremely important. But uh they are benchmarking what the United States is capable of doing. The United States has the most powerful country, the most powerful military, and they are very consciously benchmarking and and seeking to acquire those capabilities for themselves, because a modern military is A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, and they're they're trying to acquire those capabilities. So some of it has to do with looking at the US, and I'm not saying in a hostile way, but we are the top dog, and uh and China wants to be at least on par, maybe also maybe the top dog, maybe you know, uh ahead of us, they're benchmarking. So that's that's part of it. Another part of it has to do with uh the Chinese Communist Party's enunciated objectives, and those objectives include uh, you know, they would say reunification, I would say unification or conquest of Taiwan. Uh and Xi Jinping has told his military to be ready to take Taiwan in in 2027. Now that to my mind isn't uh necessarily a ticking clock, and he hasn't already decided two years in advance, uh or five years in advance when he first said it, that that's what he's gonna do. But that is driving a good part of Chinese military modernization. It's not just a benchmark, it's what do we need to be able to uh to conquer, to coerce Taiwan. And then there's another element of it, too, that is about, I will say, interaction with the United States. Um, so again, you got this benchmark. So, like the benchmarking is hey, the United States has uh has nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Yeah, guess what? The the Chinese are building nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, right? That's that's a benchmark. Um, the United States is moving into sixth generation combat aircraft. Guess what? The Chinese are moving into sixth generation combat aircraft. But that third part about interaction is uh the Chinese are acquiring systems that are tailor-made to defeat particular parts of the US military. So China is not just acquiring aircraft carriers, but it's acquiring a whole suite of capabilities aimed figuratively and literally at US aircraft carriers. So there is a sense where they are very purposefully trying to defeat the US the US military. I think all those three things are going on at at the same time. So again, just on that on that naval part, right? They're both investing in aircraft carriers and they're investing a lot in the means to uh defeat aircraft carriers.
SPEAKER_00:Um your mission, the the uh Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments mission focuses heavily on future U.S. defense strategy, and much of it has centered on China. Um and no. Do you think there is a risk of confirmation bias? Uh whether it involves China or Russia or whatnot. Um in your line of work, how do you as an organization ensure that you're not engaging in confirmation bias?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, look, it's a great question. Um, and I think one always has to be concerned about that. Um, in the case of uh uh of China, however, I would say um, and here I'll personalize it. I I won't I won't you know talk uh about the organization, but just I'll personalize it. Like I think with China too often I feel like you know I've been the voice crying out in the wilderness. It's not like it's not like confirmation bias. It's that a number of the challenges that we face today are challenges that we that were challenges that were visible, say, going back to the late 1990s, um, but that um the system hasn't really addressed. So, you know, in my case, it's literally over a quarter century um calling attention to some of our vulnerabilities and some of the challenges we're facing relative to China. Um, and not that nothing has happened, but probably too little and and not as not as timely a manner as I would have hoped. Um so from that perspective, that's again, that's another sort of uh depressing part of my job. It's not uh uh it's not stoking an arms race, it's it's it's not being listened to as as much uh as as one would would hope. Um you know, I I yeah, I just think that the um uh the system that we have, and this is our democratic system, is not uh is not is not primed for rapid action. Again, I go back to the the Churchill quote of well we'll we'll do we'll do the right thing after we've expanded all the other options. I think that is unfortunately and fortunately, uh that's just the way our system is uh is uh is is uh is constructed. But look, more more broadly, one of the things that, and here I will say we as opposed to me, we uh focus heavily on is really trying to understand how the Chinese think, how the Chinese military thinks, how the Chinese Communist Party thinks, um and it's not exactly the way that we think. And so we try to uh, and nor should it be, right? Um uh so we really try to understand the way Chinese decision makers make strategy, same with Russian decision makers, on their own terms. And I think that's a that's a very valuable way to guard against confirmation bias.
SPEAKER_00:Um speaking of China uh directly, and for purposes of the question, you know, treating it as a you know, not only an adversary but potential threat, do you think we uh give too many of our corporate citizens, meaning our Fortune 500 companies, uh too much of a free hand uh because of their investments in China, their presence there. And should we perhaps not place more limitations on them because in one sense they are helping fuel uh or resource our adversary?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah. I think it's a very good point. You know, uh a good a good Marxist would know the uh would know the quote, you know, that capitalism will uh you know uh will sell the noose that communism will use to hang it. Um and uh there is that there is that tendency. And uh so I do think there is there's a very strong case to be made for you know thinking about business investments through a national security lens. Um I also think you know, by and large, a lot of companies that invest in in China, well, they wind up doing so on terms that are more favorable to China than those companies. Many of them wind up regretting it. Um so I yeah, that is that is something that is of concern to me. I think a at least a partial decoupling of the US and Chinese economies makes a lot of sense. And by the way, it it's going on on both sides. I mean, uh some of it's going has been going on across administrations on the US side, it's also been going on on the Chinese side as well, uh, for all sorts of reasons. Um and it's going on for national security reasons, it also goes on goes going on for economic reasons. I mean, as China develops the terms of trade shift and and it's you know it can be less attractive to do business in China, uh, and say more attractive in in Vietnam or other places, uh, again, depending on the business. Uh, but yeah, I think we we need to pay very close attention to that.
SPEAKER_00:So do you think the U.S. gives enough weight uh to the perspectives of our neighbors within the Western Hemisphere, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, um, when it's defining uh it's the the defense strategy for the states? Or is the U.S. collaborating effectively uh within the Western Hemisphere to balance global priorities?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, uh it's a great question. And you know, in in my experience, all too often uh the United States, we we have felt um inhibited in dealing with our neighbors in Central and South America and and uh to the north in Canada. Um Mexico is a good example of that. Um Mexico in recent decades has had uh a troubled history, right? A troubled history with narco-terrorism, with with a whole with a whole bunch of uh issues. And I've often thought that if Mexico were located somewhere else, let's just say like in Central Asia, the United States would freely deploy a whole bunch of uh of tools to help that country uh deal with narco-terrorism, secure its borders, do a whole bunch of things like that. But because we're neighbors and because of America's history with Mexico and Mexico's history with the United States, we're all too often inhibited. And the you know, the the cry of Yankee imperialism is just comes too easily to the lips of too many Central and South American uh governments. And on our on our side, we wind up being very uh very inhibited. Now, sometimes that can be good. Like I think you know the United States uh played a crucially important role in helping the government of Colombia defeat the FARC. Uh but it was a it was a crucial role, but it was very much a low-key behind-the-scenes backseat role. And there was a case where we didn't try to do too much, we worked very closely with our Colombian allies. Um, but in many other cases, you know, I I've seen that that collaboration just be inhibited by our by our you know by our common history, and it's a shame.
SPEAKER_00:And we've also made mistakes in the region, like you know, with Chile, so to say.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, that's part of that history. That's that's that's that's right.
SPEAKER_00:Um moving towards emerging challenges and geopolitical adversaries uh aside, what challenges do you see the Department of Defense facing?
SPEAKER_01:Well, I will give you one uh that uh doesn't get a lot of attention, so maybe it'll you know it'll be of interest to uh to your listeners, but it's also kind of in keeping with what we've talked about uh before, which is I think a huge challenge that the Department of Defense faces today and will face in the future has to do with building intellectual capital. Again, back to the the centrality of people. Um building intellectual capital to suit the the world of today, and whether that's regional expertise, whether it's expertise in emerging technologies, um that's a huge challenge. I you know, again, the the Pentagon that I served in uh was populated by just some amazing public servants. And I like the term public servant better than civil servant. I like the the Commonwealth term as opposed to the the US term because it really puts puts front and center what what it's all about. It's about public service, right? Um, you're not serving civilization, you're serving the public. And we had an outstanding group of public uh public servants. Um, you know, uh hiring freezes, government shutdowns, retirements um have really winnowed down that that expertise. And so I think rebuilding that expertise is gonna be a multi-year, maybe even multi-decade enterprise.
SPEAKER_00:Hmm. Um Are there any particular misconceptions uh in the media or public discourse about national defense that you'd like to address?
SPEAKER_01:Oh my gosh. Uh, how much time do we have? There's so much. Well, look, let me just let me just touch on one. And again, this is one that um I am aware of uh, you know, on a like a day almost a daily basis in my job, but uh I wasn't nearly as aware of before I came to this job. And it and it has to do with the relationship of uh between government and private industry. Um back when the United States did amazing things in the early Cold War, you know, we talked about the Atlas Missile Program, you could think about the um the the you know the Apollo program, you could think about you know the um any number of things, those worked because government and and industry worked hand in glove. And there was a lot of trust. And unfortunately, too often these days, government and and industry just think about things very differently. We have too many people in government who don't understand the basics of our free enterprise system, they don't understand the basics of supply and demand. And we have folks in industry, particularly in some of the newer defense startups and tech startups, that don't understand the realities of dealing with the US government. And those realities include uh, you know, the budget cycle, they include um, you know, the fact we're just coming out of a shutdown, all the things that obtain when you're dealing with the government that uh you don't have to deal with when you're when you're just dealing with private customers. So I I think uh building greater trust and understanding across that divide between government and industry uh really is you know, really is central to our effectiveness going forward.
SPEAKER_00:And that kind of connects a bit or relates to what you were saying before about building intellectual capital. Uh yeah, yeah. Uh true to the podcast name, could you share a bit of Lanyat and Unexpected Insight, Habit or Lesson that's helped you navigate uncertainty, complexity throughout this time?
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, that's a uh that's a that's a tall, tall order, right?
SPEAKER_00:Uh um but let me I I tend to demand a lot of people.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, no, well that's how you that's how you get you know good out of people is is is uh demand excellence. No, what I would say is um the the the things that I have regretted most in terms of decisions, not again, not in terms of career choices.
SPEAKER_02:Yes.
SPEAKER_01:Uh by and large, I don't I don't regret anything I've I've done uh when it comes to career choices, but when it comes to decision making in a in an environment of uncertainty and complexity, the things that I regret the most uh are instances where I didn't act sooner or act more strongly or more forcefully. Um I don't have regrets about uh being the boy who cried Wolf, right? Uh I don't I don't have those regrets. The regrets are if I had just spoken out a little bit louder, a little bit earlier, maybe it would have made a difference. No, maybe it wouldn't have. But I think you know, if if you if you do it and then you live with the consequences, then you have the satisfaction of at least, hey, I did it. And um maybe it didn't work out, maybe I wasn't listened to, but at least I did it. So the times, and again, there haven't been a huge number, but I I can, you know, I can I can think of some where I wish I had been a little bit, you know, louder, a little bit more vociferous, uh, maybe shaken, you know, shaking my boss by the shoulders, uh, figuratively, not literally. Um uh those that that's those are my regrets. So kind of going back to what I said earlier, we we don't live in Stalins, Russia. What what are what's the worst thing that's gonna happen to you? Uh and usually the worst thing is something that has to do with a bruised ego. Um at the worst, maybe maybe it's losing a job. Okay, but but you lose a job and you get another job. And I I don't, you know, uh your ego will recover, but the things that you that you believe you should do and don't do, those are the things you've got to live with for the rest of your life.
SPEAKER_00:Very true. Um on the on the more personal side, and uh I always like to um you get to know someone by eating what they eat, you know, and listening to their music, reading uh some of the literature they enjoy. Anything that you'd like to share with the audience, a favorite piece of literature or whatnot?
SPEAKER_01:Um my gosh. Um again, we could go on for so long on this. Um I look, I believe um, I I love literature, I love history. Uh I just think look, there is so much to be learned uh from reading autobiographies. Or or or biographies, right? Um I I think, you know, I'm always fascinated in, you know, a person's journey and their, you know, their their thinking. So um, you know, Ulysses S. Grant's autobiography is really one of the great autobiographies of uh of all time. Um he never he didn't want to write it, you know, he wrote it while he was dying so that his family could have money after he passed, um, which is uh a far better way to write an autobiography than you know to get elected president or get the Nobel Prize prize or something like that. And um so the the you know the autobiographies are biographies of leaders. Um so I mentioned Grant's autobiography, but there's also the Ron Chernow biography of Grant, that's just a again a fantastic book. Um I would offer those up among you know among uh uh worthwhile things, things to read. If you want to learn about leadership, if you want to learn about decision maker, decision making, read things that decision makers have actually written about you know how they grappled with with different choices that they had to make.
SPEAKER_00:Well, speaking of decision makers and leaders and their writings, uh Churchill was quite a prolific author and uh a historian. Um, but that's a topic for another time. Uh Dr. Mankin, and thank you for your time, uh sharing your insights as well as your service. Uh to our listeners, thank you for joining us in Brungart Law's Lanyat, where we provide a little extra perspective because the devil is always in the details. Please join us again next week and invite others to follow along. Also, please give us your feedback and suggestions via the link. Dr. Mankin, again, gratitude.
SPEAKER_01:My pleasure. Glad to be with you.