IRAN WAR: Why Lebanon’s Hezbollah escalated while the Houthis held back

As the war around Iran continues to widen, attention is turning to the network of militias linked to Tehran across the region.

In this episode of Conflicts of Interest, Prof. Clionadh Raleigh is joined by ACLED experts Dr Luca Nevola and Bassel Doueik to unpack what’s happening on two key fronts: Yemen and Lebanon.

Why has Hezbollah escalated from Lebanon, while the Houthis appear to be holding back? What role do these groups play in Iran’s regional strategy, and how might their decisions shape the next phase of the conflict?

Drawing on ACLED data and regional expertise, the team explains how these militias operate, what they are watching for, and what their next moves could mean for the wider war.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:00

Hezbollah is a bit different from the Houthis. Hezbollah is a state within a state that has lost merely everything. What are the Israeli goals and American goals and are they aligned in the Iran? And I don't think they're aligned.

SPEAKER_03 0:14

The possibility of regime change is extremely low. This begs the question of what's the odd goal of these operations.

SPEAKER_00 0:21

That is to be determined, right? Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_01 0:31

Hello, everybody. My name is Kleina Raleigh. This is Conflicts of Interest. And today we have two very special guests who will be helping us uncover and unpack what's going on related to the militia supported by Iran within the wider region. We have Dr. Luca Navola, who is an expert on Yemen and all things Yemeni. And we have Basil Dwike, who is our wonderful Lebanese expert within ACLED. And welcome to you both.

SPEAKER_02 0:58

Hello and thank you for having me. I'm the Lebanon and Jordan researcher. I uh actively record political violence events across Lebanon and Jordan. Since the start of the war in Lebanon or the restart of the war on March 2nd, we've seen uh around a 400% increase of events in comparison to the pre-war period. We're looking at clashes that are taking place between Hezbollah and Israeli forces along the borderline villages. We're uh also recording hundreds of uh Israeli airstrikes that are taking place across Lebanon that has displaced at least one million Lebanese people. We've also seen the recurrent evacuation notices issued by the IDF against areas in southern Lebanon in an effort to push people to north of the Litani River, which Israel believes should contribute or become actually a buffer zone between the Lebanese state and the northern Israeli communities. So these are some of the signals that we're looking at at the moment.

SPEAKER_01 2:02

Well, thank you, Basil. That's super interesting. So, Luca, how are you spending your day today covering this and what signals are you looking for?

SPEAKER_03 2:10

Well, um, as you know, Klina, um I'm mostly focused on Yemen and the Gulf. So since the beginning of the crisis, most of the attention for my region has been on two completely different issues. On the one hand, we have the Houthis that have not yet joined uh the conflict. And so I'm constantly monitoring their messaging, their narratives, their rhetoric to try to identify potential signals of an escalation or potential red lines that could push the Houthis to intervene if they are crossed. And on the other hand, we have this unprecedented event where the Gulf countries are under attack. They are under fire, their energy infrastructure has come under Iranian attack, creating uh a global energy crisis. And so we are trying to understand what the impact is of the war on this energy infrastructure, on uh the oil experts, what are the economic consequences, how somehow also the conflict is being pushed into the maritime areas. That is something that we have started to cover more consistently at ACLAD and find new ways to provide the coverage of the conflict that is up to the new forms of warfare that we are observing these days.

SPEAKER_01 3:34

Brilliant. And to think, Luca, the last time we met, I was telling you that I was trying to convince my family to move to Doha. But anyway, maybe another time. So, Luca, do you want to tell us what's happening in Yemen, what the discussion is, and of course how the Houthis are going to be reacting?

SPEAKER_03 3:51

Yes, I think from a Yemeni perspective, what is really interesting is that nothing is happening in Yemen in relation to this war. You know, right before the start of the war uh against Iran, the Houthis were messaging threatening to intervene in case of an Israeli attack against Iran or in case of a US attack against Iran. So it was widely expected that some kind of reaction from the Houthis would happen as soon as the attack happened. And this is also based on a track record, right? Because last year in 2025, the Houthis immediately reacted in September when the snapback of sanctions uh against Iran um happened at the end of uh September by targeting uh a commercial ship in the Red Sea. Similarly, in June 2025, during the 12-day war, they had threatened to intervene in case that the US decided to be directly involved in the war against Iran. So the expectation was that the Houthis would immediately intervene. Instead, quite unexpectedly, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Huthi and other senior members of the Houthi leadership expressed rhetorical solidarity with Iran. They declared that they would be willing to support Iran, but in terms of military operations or any other kind of practical commitment, they didn't express what is their position. They didn't even signal a clear red line that could lead to their intervention in the near future. The biggest escalation we have seen so far, at least rhetorically, was around the 5th of March, when Huth Abdulmaik al-Huthi said that they had their fingers on the trigger. And that was announced in response to a number of developments. One development was, of course, the expansion of the operations to Lebanon, and the other development was the arrival of the USS Gerald Ford in the Red Sea. So it's very likely that in response to these developments, the Houthis escalated rhetorically, but at the current stage there's no sign that they are willing to intervene anytime soon.

SPEAKER_01 6:18

So you're telling me that the Houthis are all talk at the moment.

SPEAKER_03 6:22

Yeah, exactly. Mostly what is really interesting is that also the kind of narrative that they're sharing is quite cautious. There's a number of reasons for that. Reasons related to their own interests, but also the strategic interests of the Iranian regime. The Houthis are weakened compared to their situation back in October 2023 when they first started the attacks against commercial shipping and Israel and the US started. They're weakened because the US imposed a deference terrorist organization designation on them. And this has greatly contributed to deteriorating their economic condition. Secondly, the Houthis are still talking with Saudi Arabia through back channel communication, and they are effectively negotiating with the Saudis on the so-called UN peace roadmap. And the financial support that the Saudis could provide to the Houthis is a lifeline for the Houthis regime that is cornered economically. There is somehow rumors coming from informed sources that there is a huge pressure on the Houthis not to intervene in this war and that they will be rewarded if they don't, because an agreement with Saudi Arabia could be within reach.

SPEAKER_01 7:44

There's one last question before I turn to Basel, and that is you're you're describing a very pragmatic Houthis movement, which is a positive change in some ways for the Houthis. But I'm wondering whether or not they've made a strategic decision that Saudi Arabia is to be the regional hegemon that they have to appease rather than Iran. So they're looking further down the road rather than pay back for all of the assistance they've previously gotten from Iran.

SPEAKER_03 8:14

Yeah, you know, the Houthis are very often described as Iranian proxies, but in reality, since the very beginning of the war, they have always maintained a very large degree of autonomy from Iran. Now, of course, it is true that they're receiving a lot of support from Iran in terms of expertise, training, technology, components, weapons, and whatever else, and that Iran made up this kind of support, especially during the Gaza crisis. But at the same time, the Houthis are the de facto authorities in Yemen. They're running the state, they're ruling over 25 million people, and I think that they are very pragmatically trying to survive and to gain the legitimacy that they have been pursuing for many years now. Now, in order to achieve these goals, of course, the most prominent interlocutor is Saudi Arabia, who's considered by the Houthis the real decision maker when it comes to the Yemen war. And so that's why the Houthis are currently looking at Saudi Arabia to guarantee that there the continuation of their regime in northern Yemen.

SPEAKER_01 9:22

It's almost a positive sign to see a group move from an insurgency mentality into one of a governing mentality. It often involves changing who you associate with, if indeed that is the plan on the Houthi side. Okay, Basel, let's uh let's chat about what's going on in southern Lebanon and in particular with Hezbollah. Uh, do you want to give an interpretation at the moment of what this war looks like from the Lebanese perspective and especially that group itself?

SPEAKER_02 9:48

Yeah, thank you so much, Lena. Regarding Southern Lebanon and regarding the war, we all know that on March 2nd, Hezbollah fired six missiles on northern Israel, and that's that was the formal joining the war. We've been seeing now clashes happening alongside the border villages, especially in areas such as Qiyam, Messi Jabal, uh, Aytashab. These villages are some kind uh popular and they resonate with a lot of uh military analysts and intelligence analysts because these were the sites where clashes took place back in 2024 when Hezbollah opened the support front to Hamas in Gaza. So it's clearly intensifying. Yesterday, I think around 4 a.m. at dawn hours, the Israelis struck a building in Al-Bashura, which is an area outside of Hezbollah's known strongholds, like the southern suburbs of Beirut. I think at least 12 people were killed and 41 others were injured. This is quite surprising for the Lebanese in the previous times, especially in 2024. Multiple airstrikes targeted areas outside the strongholds of Hezbollah. But it seems that now the escalation is different. The war is intensifying. Today also the Israeli military announced that the IDF will launch a wave of airstrikes targeting the bridges along the Litani River. And this may create a shock for the Lebanese state because they're trying to somehow dissect Lebanon between the south of the Litani River, which they believe should be a buffer zone to protect the northern Israeli communities, and the other side of Lebanon, which is the Lebanese state, as they say. I believe that the Lebanese state has not done much to disarm Hezbollah because they've seen, in regards with all the airstrikes that happened in regards to this November 2024 ceasefire, that Hezbollah actually has recalibrated itself, it has rearmed and it has established operational presence in south of the Litane River, despite the Lebanese army's claims that they have control of that area. So this is a new round of escalation. Many Lebanese are fearful that this will lead to another occupation of southern Lebanon, similar to uh the one that took place back in 1982.

SPEAKER_01 12:07

That's great to uh to hear summarized, Basel. So I think that the resurgence of Hezbollah is quite a shock, not just to I think Israelis, but also to the rest of the world. We were told about 18 months ago, during a, as we all know, kind of a massive strategic coup by Israel, that they had decapitated both the leadership of Hezbollah, but they had also destroyed the ability seemingly for just rank and file Hezbollah to communicate with each other, to coordinate. And I believe Prime Minister Netanyahu said at the time that he had destroyed Hezbollah for several decades to come. So we're 18 months later, they are not destroyed. In fact, they have reconstituted themselves enough to be able to really threaten northern Israel and involve the Israelis in kind of a ground offensive, you know, as a second, a second front of this conflict. And I'm wondering how did this happen?

SPEAKER_02 13:03

So I believe that the 2024 war uh between Hezbollah and Israel was quite of a shock because the Lebanese believed that Hezbollah can take on the IDF, can actually inflict losses in Tel Aviv, despite the death of all these commanders. I think during the November 2024 ceasefire, Hezbollah restrained itself from firing any rockets against Israel or attacking Israeli military positions because they believe that they are giving some room and space to the Lebanese army and the new Lebanese president and prime minister to actually negotiate some kind of settlement. However, the UN recorded, I think, around 15,000 violations of that ceasefire with continuous Israeli drone strikes against Hezbollah members. So during that period, multiple Hezbollah officials were actually saying that eventually there is gonna be a war because if you don't stop those drone strikes, Israel is not restrained, if it doesn't withdraw from the Lebanese territory, we are gonna attack Israel. And I think the attack, the US attack against Iran, and playing into the the whole picture here, Hezbollah felt that it's in some place of uh existential threat because the fall of the IRGC means the fall of Hezbollah itself. So it it kind of it believes that this is an existential threat, and that's why it joined it formally joined the conflict on March 2nd.

SPEAKER_01 14:33

Okay, that's super interesting because if I'm gonna compare what you both have been effectively saying, is that the fall of the IRGC is going to lead to the fall of Hezbollah, or that's that's the expectation. But the fall of the IRGC would not lead to the fall of the Houthis, despite the fact that they're almost presented, along of course, with the Iraqi-based Iranian militias, as simply another arm of the Iranian state. So there's a very different relationship here, is what you would be suggesting.

SPEAKER_02 15:03

I would say so. I believe Hezbollah is a bit different from the Houthis. Hezbollah is a state within a state that has lost nearly everything now. It's losing its financial institutions, it's losing its social institutions, its people are driven from the villages, the the its support base, it's driven from the Shi't villages in southern Lebanon, it's driven from the southern suburbs of Beirut. They're putting more strain and tension on hosting communities that if any displaced or uh displaced people from the Shia community have any connections with Hezbollah, they're being actually targeted by drone strikes. I feel it doesn't have so much political leverage like it used to have before, like in 2006 and 2008. I also believe one thing a lot of people or a lot of analysts actually say that the fall of the IRGC will lead to the fall of Hezbollah. Hezbollah started as a resistance against Israeli occupation and then turned into this non-state actor that's one of the strongest non-state actors in the world that joined the conflict in Syria and in Yemen and sent advisors to Iraq. Well, with the demise of the IRGC, Hezbollah could lose a big portion of its support, its financial and military support. But there is there may be some remnants of the resistance, quote-to-encounter resistance in Lebanon against the Israeli occupation that we are foreseeing taking place right now.

SPEAKER_01 16:26

What do you think, Luca, about the Houthi reaction to the potential, and it's very much only a potential fall of IRGC?

SPEAKER_03 16:35

Well, I think that the relationship between the Houthis and Iran is very much a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the the war started in Yemen, the relation was very weak and it grew increasingly stronger as the war unfolded, right? But the Houthis were capable of taking over state institutions back in 2014 and 2015, basically exploiting domestic Yemeni networks and local alliances, for instance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. And the Houthis have endured over 10 years of war, during which a coalition composed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries was unable to basically eradicate the Houthis from northwestern Yemen. So, in my opinion, they are going to survive an eventual fall of the Iranian regime or of the IRGC, also because during the past years, they have been able to create their own stockpiles of drones and missiles. One of the reasons why they are probably not intervening right now is also not to deplete the long-range arsenal they have accumulated during the past months. And that is basically a guarantee of deterrence vis-a-vis the Gulf states, vis-a-vis the UAE, vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, and vis-a-vis the international community, because the Houthis have the potential to threaten shipping lanes in the Red Sea. And 52 days of war carried out by the Trump administration and previous operation Poseidon Archer under the Biden administration was not successful in completely degrading their long-range arsenal, pointing to the fact that the Houthis are resilient and they will probably survive the fall of the Iranian regime.

SPEAKER_01 18:36

Of which, you know, there's the IRI, which is almost this informal umbrella organization that's claimed a huge number of strikes, both on US personnel and infrastructure within Iraq, but then also further afield, they're taking responsibility of really acting in absentia, of course, for the umces or the IRGC in attacking some parts of the Gulf. And how the Iraqi state is going to manage the fact that this IRI umbrella group of several militias is often coordinated or certainly pulled from the popular mobilization forces, which is of course is the Iraqi state's paramilitary forces, and they are paid for, uniformed, etc., by the state itself. Any thoughts on where Iraq stands vis-a-vis either what's happening in Lebanon or in Yemen as a testament or remnant of the Iranian state?

SPEAKER_02 19:32

I think, if I may, I think Iraq is kind of, it looks like Lebanon to a certain extent. You have this state within a state, the IRI within the PMF and the PMF within the Iraqi state as well. I think there is a connection there, but I also believe that Iraq is far more complex. The situation is far more complicated than when it comes to Lebanon. We've seen also in regards to the Kutz force, we've seen that the Kutz force is actively fighting with Hezbollah and Lebanon. And this this is actually very interesting to see because we we've been seeing also Iranian operatives being killed by Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon. So I think this also plays within the bigger picture of the regional war that's happening now. What about you, Luca?

SPEAKER_03 20:18

You know, I think I agree with the fact that the situation in in Iraq is probably more similar to what we observe in in Lebanon, right? Because whereas the Houthis captured state institutions, and probably the Houthis government is stronger than the internationally recognized government. In Iraq, we have the Shiite militias operating alongside state institutions. And somehow we always observe this kind of tension between the fact that they belong to the popular mobilization forces and the fact that they are also operating as militias. Now, in past years, they have been extremely capable in using facade groups or new formations to claim plausible deniability. And overall, it seems to me that the kind of attacks that they are carrying out is very different from what we are observing in Lebanon based on the fact that the Iraqi militias are basically doing a controlled escalation. This is a form of harassment directed against the US bases or other US-linked assets, but it's not going to have an impact as strong as the one that we might see in Lebanon, for instance. So this is a form of harassment in support of the AINS, the Iranian regime, and we see a very strong connection between the Iraqi militias and the Iranian regime, also based on the shared religious sect to which they belong, because Hezbollah, the Shi'ate militias, and the Iranian regime all belong to the Twelver sect of Shia Islam, whereas the Houthis belong to the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam, and there are profound theological differences. So the connection is very strong, and it really seems as if the militias are reacting to Iran. Whereas the Houthis are acting more autonomously and Hezbollah is more in line with the Iraqi militias.

SPEAKER_01 22:08

That's so fascinating, both, because one, it seems like they've all been told to operate with their comparative advantage, right, within whichever zone they're in. But that in Iraq, especially, the number of militias, as you mentioned, makes the situation quite complex. But it's it's curious that the one thing that can unite those militias is Iranian guidance and Iranian support, but not the Iraqi state. Do you know what I mean? Like it's a it's a very dangerous position to be in if an external state is what's the m not only the motivating force, but the connection between all of your potential militias that you are using effectively for situational security in the state. Very dangerous. And I suppose I'm curious too about your comment about the religious element. There's been some assessments, let's say, of the of the Iranian state recently, which is that it's really not a theocracy in any way. Effectively, it's a military dictatorship that has a figurehead, a theocratic figurehead at the top. There's also rumors, and I must specify that they are rumors, that the current head at the top that is yet to be assassinated after after yesterday's assassination, and I want to put that in in some sort of a time-bound form. But Moshtaba Kemeni, there's rumors that he's in a coma and that he is unaware that he's the supreme leader. And that suggests all sorts of problems for any negotiation that may or may not be happening. If the Israelis keep on removing anybody that anybody can speak to, and the person who's apparently in in charge of the state is not conscious. What's your assessment at the moment of where the war within Iran is going?

SPEAKER_03 23:50

Well, to this point, I think that you're correct in assessing that the Israelis are delete targeting the political leadership. And as we have seen during the past years, this is a strategy aimed at empowering the more radical factions within the regime, and especially those factions more connected to the military. And somehow this will lead to an escalation in a sense in the war and will make it extremely difficult after the war to find a pathway for negotiations because it's unclear with whom then the US could negotiate in this situation. Now, this could make sense if the ultimate aim was a regime change, but it seems that based on how operations have been conducted so far, the possibility of regime change is extremely low. And so this begs the question of what's the odd goal of these operations.

SPEAKER_01 24:45

That is that is to be determined, right?

SPEAKER_02 24:47

Yeah. Well, from my end, I always uh think of the Iranian state or the Iranian Islamic Republic of as a mix between negotiators and strongmen. You have the strongmen that's that are theologians, let's say, and including the Supreme Leader, who are clearly aligned with the IRGC, not on all the topics, but most of the topics. And you have the negotiators like the president uh Masud Pezishkya, and you have people in the political spectrum like Kalibaf and Larijani, who was killed yesterday. And I I I feel that, as uh Luca mentioned, that as long as you kill the people that you can talk to, you're only gonna make the regime more hardline against you and your allies, and this will only lead to more escalation on ground, as we as we've been seeing now. Also, I think the death of Larijani in itself is a political knock for the Iranian regime. He was a central guy. He was really managing what's left of the Iranian state with the IRGC. He was very influential within uh Hezbollah as well. He has visited Lebanon a couple of times and he has met a lot of leaders, including the Secretary General Naim Khasan. And I think this is a blow for the regime, but it's also making the IRGC more hardline. And I think that this will only take things further on the battlefield.

SPEAKER_01 26:12

So that's a really interesting comment, Kevasel, because if the same strategy is being used by the Israelis against the RGC as was used against Hezbollah, it may in fact come to the same outcome, which is that it's been a failure. It might criffle them a little bit, but it's a failure to eradicate them from the system. So my question to you is what do you foresee as the relationship or the kind of command and control structure between an Iranian-backed IRGC that's weakened, but still adamant about wanting to be in this conflict? And what Hezbollah will hear as either commands or or suggestions for continued action?

SPEAKER_02 26:52

I believe that the Israelis only know the language of force. They've always been, like with the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since his trying to be elected in 1999, he always had this uh dream of becoming the full force in the Middle East. And then Ehud Barak came in 2000 and withdrew from Lebanon through a political settlement. But here I think this question aligns with what are the Israeli goals and American goals and are they aligned in the Iran? And I don't think they're aligned. I think the US wants to preserve some kind of a country that can operate with deals with the US while the Israelis want to actually destroy what's left of Iran, so it takes it 30 to 40 years to maybe come back and rebuild itself. So I I believe with a weakened IRGC, Hezbollah would still exist. And we've seen that two years of uh force against Hezbollah did not work. Only a political settlement would work. I feel it's would would be the same with IRGC. This will only go further. Only a political settlement might actually stop the chaos that's happening there and actually get energy prices back back intact around the world.

SPEAKER_01 28:01

Yeah, I'm wondering about, I suppose, the slightly longer term view, which was that US bases in the region had two functions. Of course, one was to protect many of these places in the Gulf, etc., against the aggression of Iran, whether it's these proxy forces or in fact their their long and medium-range missiles that we know have been so devastating recently, or in many cases short-range missiles. And instead of protection, these US bases have now made them become a target. There's also the recognition that there's been a hierarchy of interest in the US, and Israel is certainly at the top at directing this. But I I wonder whether or not the US is prepared for the fact that its outcome, which I agree, Basel, was designed for a weakened and compromising Iranian regime, is now largely off the table because of the ways in which the leadership has been decapitated and the rest of the Gulf is still left massively exposed, not only to domestic or even neighboring threats, but to an Iranian regime that maybe can't be contained.

SPEAKER_02 29:06

Actually, I really believe that the Gulf states, the GCC, will have a long conversation with the US after this. Rather than being protected by the US, they're actually being targeted because of the US. And what comes into mind when we're speaking about this is that even Trump himself said that we didn't foresee that the IRGC will attack the GCC in case of a war ignites with Iran, which is actually fascinating because Iran said multiple times that it will target all US assets and Israeli assets in the region. With the death of the political leadership, as you mentioned, this will all will only go up the escalatory ladder. I'm not sure what do you think about this, Luca?

SPEAKER_03 29:47

What you're saying is very interesting because um, on the one hand, uh it is true that even in late 2025, I had conversations with Gulf interlocutors, and most of the people I talked with were convinced that, for instance, Iran would never shut down the Strait of Hormuz because they all thought that it was an extreme uh move, that it would uh basically disrupt their relationship with the Asian markets and with the Gulf countries. And so everybody agreed on the fact that we would not see the Strait of Hormuz been shut down. So I'm wondering if Trump is sincere when he says that he did not expect an Iranian retaliation against GCC countries. Many scholars agreed on the fact that this kind of retaliation was extremely unlikely, but it points to the fact that Iran really felt an existential threat following the Israeli attack that uh happened a couple of weeks ago. And uh I completely agree with you about the fact that uh this war will completely reshape the security architecture of the Gulf and of the region. Already after the 2019 Abuke attack that target oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia had started thinking that the US were not providing security guarantees. The talks between Khalid bin Salman and Trump back in November 2025 were supposed to provide new security guarantees to the Gulf countries and renew the cooperation with the United States. And instead, what really happened was that Iran was triggered to attack Gulf countries and the US are basically not reacting in a very effective way. So what is likely to see in the midterm is that GCC countries will try to strengthen internal cooperation and find alternatives to the US security umbrella in the region that has proved to be inefficient.

SPEAKER_01 31:44

Well, why don't we get together in another 10 or 12 days? Because of course this conflict has broadened pretty substantially just over two weeks that it's been operational, but we'll get together again in a similar amount of time and assess where it's now devolved or evolved into and maybe get some answers to what's going to happen. Thank you so both so much. It's been really informative, and you're both excellent guests on conflict of interest.

SPEAKER_03 32:11

Thank you, Kleina. Banky Glea.

SPEAKER_00 32:14

You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest, brought to you by ACLED with Professor Cleaner Raleigh and Dr. Katrina Dowd. New episodes are available every fortnight. Follow ACLED socials for more in the meantime.