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IRAN WAR: One month. Global fallout. What comes next?

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One month into the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, the focus is often on the battlefield. But wars rarely stay confined to one region.

In this special extended edition of Conflicts of Interest, ACLED founder and CEO Clionadh Raleigh brings together regional experts from across the organisation to examine how the conflict is already reshaping dynamics far beyond the Middle East.

From Lebanon and Iraq to the Gulf and beyond, the panel explores how the war is spreading through alliances, militias, political networks, and economic pressures, and where new risks could emerge if escalation continues.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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SPEAKER_07

This notion that any conflict within the Middle East, let alone one involving Iran, would be over or resolved within a few weeks, was insane.

SPEAKER_02

Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_07

Welcome everybody, welcome back to Conflict of Interests. Here at the one-month mark for the conflict in Iran and in the larger region, we're going to focus at this point on how it affects the larger region and of course further afield. And as you may know, of course, when any war breaks out, we tend to focus on the main battlefield, the combatants, etc. But in this case, the confrontation between the US, Israel, and the Gulf effectively means that the entire world has been in some way. And of course, that effect is spreading through alliances, militias, political networks, and economic pressures. And it's triggering some instability in places that appear to be geographically far away. So today we're going to step back and ask a broader question, which is where else might be affected by this conflict and how will that effect be felt? And to explore that, we brought together several of Accolid's best regional experts from around the world to talk about what this could mean in their own region and what the actors there or the armed actors there want from this conflict. What kind of opportunities are they going to seize? What effects are being felt? And what are the biggest risks that may emerge? Luca, of course, a frequent guest to talk about the Gulf. Tiano, who's going to be talking about Latin America. Welcome to Tiano.

SPEAKER_03

Hi, Clina, thanks for the invite. It's a pleasure.

SPEAKER_07

Of course, uh Nasser, who will be speaking about Iraq primarily, but also mentioned some dynamics in Syria. Welcome, Nasser.

SPEAKER_04

Thank you for the invite.

SPEAKER_07

And of course, Nilhat, who will be speaking about Sudan in particular. Welcome, Nohat. Thank you for having me. And Pearl, welcome. Uh Pearl will be speaking about South Asia. Hello, good to be here. And of course, Basel, who will be speaking about Lebanon and has been speaking about what the incursion between Hezbollah and Israel has been doing this week in several other podcasts. So welcome, Basel.

SPEAKER_05

Thank you for having me.

SPEAKER_07

Excellent. I wanted to first give a very brief summary of what we're seeing right now. Of course, President Trump mentioned on Monday that there had been kind of a détente, if you will, just while they tried to figure out whether or not there was a way to resolve this conflict. That has gone extremely poorly because for several days people denied that they were talking to each other, even through intermediaries. But what we found in our daily coding of this conflict is that actually the number of events stayed pretty constant. And that was in part because both Israel continued their attacks, especially within Iran, but Iran also continued their attacks on Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi, and UAE in particular. And so what we're effectively seeing is that there's a there's a discussion about discussions happening, but the war in fact continues. And real concerns within the Gulf that their needs and their cost of this conflict will be disregarded for a quick American settlement, potentially. Another perspective is that the discussions announced on Monday were to calm the oil markets, or really the energy markets more broadly, and that the troops that are currently arriving into the region will set a new phase of the conflict in motion. And so there's really three ways we should see about what might happen this weekend. One is that there's going to be a limited ground invasion. Um, and Iran, of course, will respond. But they it's much more likely that that ground invasion will in fact it's it's unknown in particular, but please correct me if I'm wrong about where that ground invasion will be. It may be Karg Island, it may be some of the smaller islands within the Strait of Hormuz, or it may be, of course, into the Red Sea region in order to protect that that vital waterway that has become much more important recently. A second scenario is that Trump may push for an end at any cost, thereby kind of sacrificing both his Gulf allies and Israel to what is an emboldened Iran that certainly believes it's on a winning strategy here and and has the upper hand. Or see, there's the potential that this ceasefire, not ceasefire will be extended even longer. All three of those are potentials, and I'm curious about what everybody might think from their perspective about which might be more likely. But let's turn in exactly to what we wanted to kind of discuss for the larger region here, which is that there has been the possibility of expected reactions continuing, and expected reactions include things like Hezbollah, which Basil will speak to, and of course the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which Nasser will speak about. There has also been some expected reactions that haven't happened. So that's kind of unexpected reactions, and that will be the Hoofis, but also, of course, how prepared the Gulf was for some of these attacks and how they mean to respond. I think that there's an open question about how coordinated that response will be. Another possibility, a little bit further afield, that I think Nohad and Pearl and Titiana will be speaking about, is the opportunistic abilities that this conflict has provided conflict actors who are not directly involved in this conflict theater. And I think in particular, we can think about how the attacks in Ukraine have risen substantially over the last few weeks. We can think about, of course, what may happen to allies of involved parties, including the RSF in Sudan. I think Ethiopia's choices about how it's going to move ahead with some desired territorial changes will be under inspection. And of course, what's happening within South Asia, especially as they react to changes in the energy availability and the energy market. And then the third, which I'm curious about how people will think about this, is the possibility of further black swan moments. So the black swans are strategic surprises, and the Middle East is rife with them. We can think about how in the 70s, for example, you had the attacks on Israel by Egypt and Syria. We had, of course, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, so not directly in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, Hamas's um Hamas' attack into Israel now three years ago or coming up to three years ago. All of those represent drastic shifts in the strategic environment that may in fact be spurred by this conflict. And I'm curious about how people might think that this will lead to those into the future. But first, I'm gonna start with Luka, if I could. If you're looking from from Yemen right now, what do the key actors want from this conflict and and how are they hoping it it uh plays out?

SPEAKER_06

Well, the key actor with regards to this conflict in Yemen is of course the Houthis. And the one million dollars question I've been receiving during these weeks is whether the Houthis will be involved in the conflict, when and how, what kind of targets they could be aiming for. And my my opinion is really that the Houthis do not want to be involved in this conflict, and they hope that it will end as soon as possible. And the reason for this attitude is very simple and very pragmatic. At this stage, involvement in this conflict would carry significant costs for the Houthis and very little benefits for both the Houthis and the Axis of Resistance. So the main point for the Houthis is probably to avoid US and Israeli retaliatory airstrikes on their territory and on their leadership. And at the same time, they really don't want to disrupt the channels of communications that they have with Saudi Arabia, which could lead to a peace deal in the aftermath of the conflict in Iran. And indeed, the Houthis could be rewarded for remaining silent and not intervening in the current conflict. So at the current stage, the Houthis are mainly mobilizing through media activity, demonstrations, they are signaling that they are ready to intervene in the conflict, and they're framing their position as a form of strategic patience. But it really seems as if they are not ready to intervene in the conflict unless an uncontrolled escalation will happen in the region.

SPEAKER_07

Thanks so much. We'll come back to their relationship with Saudi Arabia, but also how Saudi is trying to contain what's happening here and look to the future, especially within the Red Sea. But first I'd love to turn to Nasser to talk a little bit about what is happening inside Iraq with respect to both the militias, but also how the Iraqi government is trying to contain what's what this conflict will do inside. Thanks.

SPEAKER_04

Yeah. Actually, many things have happened. And also not only the Iraqi militias, a lot of actors now are involved in the conflict inside Iraq. Iraq now basically is a second front in this conflict, and this overlap of uh uh uh of uh these actors are turning the Iraq into a key area or a key before the tensions that were these actors are playing out. Iran has carried out drone and missile attacks, and they are targeting mainly the Kurdistan region. They are attacking oppositions, uh, Iranian groups on the border with Kurdistan, and they also targeting the security forces of Kurdistan, the Bishmarga. In my opinion, they aim mainly to keep pressuring the Kurdistan regional government to stop these groups from operating from inside its territory, and also to expand the battle and increase the cost of war against the US. Also, on the other hand, we have the pro-Iran armed groups, which is also targeting since the start of the conflict with Iran, targeting the US forces and also the international coalition interests. They have targeted more than 100 attacks through missile and also a drone. During these attacks, they hit strategic locations, military bases, embassies, including the US embassy in Baghdad several times, and also they have targeted energy infrastructures. So through these attacks, they are trying to signal support to Iran and also to put a pressure on the US presence inside Iraq. At the same time, we have also seen that the US Israel has also carrying dozens of uh airstrikes against these groups, I mean the pro-Iranian groups and also the uh popular mobilization forces, which is part of the official Iraqi uh army. They have killed so far more than uh 100 persons, including prominent leaders of these parties or these uh pro-Iran factions. And and and this actually, in my opinion, how things is getting more complicated now in Iraq. The Iraqi National Security Committee now is has authorized the army and the popular mobilization forces to defend itself against the US attacks. So uh basically these forces or these BMF units is officially part of the Israeli state. So when these groups are targeted, it creates tensions or problems between the Iraq and the US government. I mean Iraq and the US, even so that these Iraq and the US are still partners. So uh this actually at the end put the current take care uh caretaker government in a very difficult position because it's now facing pressure from the pro-Iranian factions on the one side and also another pressure from the US. And at the same time, the government is is is is trying also to maintain some level of internal stability due to the economic pressure and also the overall security uh situation.

SPEAKER_07

Thanks so much, Nasser. I really liked your assertion that it was a second front. And if we look at all of the activity that's happened in Iraq at the moment that has been spurred by Iran, especially, of course, in reference to its own internal security, it's making sure that the Kurds within Iraq are being held back and attacked quite openly. I wonder if you would say that we're in a position at the moment where Iraq's internal stability is being sacrificed for Iran's internal stability.

SPEAKER_04

Yeah, actually, as I said, now the pro-Iranian factions are now supporting Iran, and they are not only ideologically linked with Iran, but also they have a shared interest, and these interests actually back long decades ago since even the the Saddam Hussein regimes. So given this context and given what's happening inside Iraq from the violence, I think the uh the the the pro-Iranian factions are sacrificing the the stability of the Iraq, and it seems to me that they are willing to continue and willing to continue pressuring uh the US and continue attacking and increase the cost of the war on Iran, which also destabilized the government, which is led by the Shia government.

SPEAKER_07

Thanks so much, Nasser. It sounds, as you said, extremely complex. Let's turn to Basel very quickly. Basel, can you describe at the moment what the scenario is looking like for this weekend and beyond in terms of Hezbollah's engagement with Israel and its connections at the moment to what's happening within Iran?

SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Clean. And I think Hezbollah is a, or the war in Lebanon is a focal point of this war. Hezbollah is, if not one of the main actors, it is the main actor here. Because Hezbollah has been a proxy of Iran for the past, I don't know, three decades that has acted as an external deterrent for the Islamic Republic from Lebanon. And I really like the idea or the sentence you said about the sacrificing Iraq's internal stability for Iran's internal stability, because most Lebanese who are non-Shias in Lebanon believe that Hezbollah is sacrificing Lebanon's stability in order to ensure that the Islamic Republic will not fall. But we've been witnessing a lot of clashes happening across the borderline villages. We've seen these clashes occur in areas like Qiyam, Messi Jabal, and we've we're seeing that these clashes are intensifying. The Israeli forces are deploying more brigades to the Northern Front. They deployed the Golani Brigade, which is an elite brigade. They also deployed several other divisions in order to ensure that the invasion is going as it should go. They have managed to enter a couple of towns and occupy a couple of towns along the borderline villages, like the Faibe village. There's still fierce fighting in Qiyam, which is a focal point because if Qiyam is occupied by the Israeli forces, they'll be able to get into the Bikak Valley and actually somehow clamp on Hezbollah from two sides. We've also recorded something that's very interesting to us, and we're we're uh following this up on, is that the attacks against Israeli forces are increasing. Hezbollah has claimed numerous attacks, hundreds of uh sorry, tens of attacks a day, maybe 50, 60, and recently there were 80 attacks against Israeli forces. This is a big increase. It's a very significant increase from the 2024 uh war. I think Hezbollah is changing its operational uh or modus operandi. They're having these semi-autonomous groups that they're attacking Israeli forces that are not connected. Uh Hezbollah believed that in the 2024 it lost the war because it acted like an army and not like a militia. And now it's acting more of a militia uh trying to clamp on Israeli forces along the border. Also, they've been using more advanced weapons, more advanced missiles. Uh, I think they fired a missile recently that uh stretched 180 kilometers inside uh Israeli territory. There have been attacks that are going on in northern Israel that have killed a couple of Israeli soldiers. We still have uh a lot of Israeli censorship on how many soldiers have been killed and injured along the clashes, but it seemed that Hezbollah is is managing to achieve direct hits against Israeli positions along the border area.

SPEAKER_07

Thanks so much, Basel. It's super interesting. This is going to sound a little bit out of left field, right? But in many ways, Israel has been acting or has had the same trajectory as like Man City, right? Do you remember, um Do you remember Man City in 2023 had that uh well still does have um what's his name? He's very tall and s and Norwegian, and he was like he had just all of these in the Is it Holland? Yes, Holland, that's it. Thank you very much. So this is gonna be a real stretch, so stay with me, right? But you know how it was really difficult to know what to do with Holland in the first season because he just had so many interesting ways of attacking the goal, right? But Israel is in that position too, where I think the successes, especially against Hezbollah, and of course it's its incredibly disproportionate actions within Gaza, made people think that it, and of course, what it had done in June of 2025 in Iran, made people think that their strat their strategic positioning was incredible and that their intelligence would be able to overtake whatever kind of obstacle that these long-standing problems had placed in their way. But what we've seen with Hezbollah is is really the limitations of the decapitation strategy, which is being used currently in Iran, to seemingly no immediate effect at all. But also Nasser mentioned that they have a decapitation strategy there that they are trialing, I suppose, with uh with some of the Iranian-backed militias. And and what you've said there is worrying, both because Hezbollah has reacted by returning to some of its roots to be able to get around a standing, you know, massively defensive-oriented military, but equally that it has new weapons and new abilities to fight. So any thoughts about how they've managed to surge or resurge in such a different way than they had been previously approached intact?

SPEAKER_05

I think this plays into what Lucas said about the Houthis, the strategic patience phase. I think with all these militias within the access of resistance, strategic patience means re-arming, recalibrating, fixing their command and control structure, and then actually attacking. And this is what happened with Hezbollah. In November 2024, we had a ceasefire. The ceasefire was a big blow for Hezbollah. First, the Israelis have occupied at least five hills in southern Lebanon. Second, the Israelis were carrying out daily drone attacks against Hezbollah members and without any retaliation from Hezbollah. And third, is the political instability in the country and the new government and new Lebanese president that were pushing for the Lebanese army to forcefully disarm Hezbollah. And this is what happened in the south of the Litani River. The Lebanese army managed to capture a lot of tunnels. They managed to seize a lot of weapons. But it seems that even with the Lebanese army's seven-month, I think, or eight months, or even one year, I would say, one year plan to disarm Hezbollah in south of the Litani River, it took Hezbollah only, I think, about two weeks to establish operational presence or to re-establish operational presence in the south of the Litani. So if the Lebanese army was doing it in a peaceful way in one year, the Israelis were decapitating the group in two years. I don't think any military solution would actually work against Hezbollah. Since these people are ideologically driven, and since the Islamic Republic has not fallen yet, and it doesn't, it doesn't look like it's gonna fall anytime soon. I'm speaking about the IRGC, it seems that only a political agreement with with the group would actually help it disarm and give the and give the command and control structure to the Lebanese army rather than having Hezbollah militants fighting an ideological war on Lebanese land.

SPEAKER_07

That's really fascinating. I mean, for all of the comments here about what's happening within the larger region, what we've seen is an evolution of groups to respond to the threats at hand rather than being um bounded by what what people might expect from them. But equally, I think one of the coming back to the Holland analogy, right? What we have there is that Israel and the US are also in a position, and especially with the leaders they currently have, where they don't feel bounded either by, let's say, the typical expectations of how states would approach even non-state armed groups and threats. And so we have a new dimension opening up about how these groups are going to start engaging with each other. And it seems unquestionable that it will lead to much more violence rather than, as you suggested, Basel, that there's non-military solutions for it.

SPEAKER_05

Just one point on that, I think the issue, one of the main issues is that it's religiously driven people are fighting religiously driven people. And this is what we've seen within the Netanyahu government. Netanyahu always says if force doesn't kill them, we're going to use more force. Smotrich, also the finance minister, said the new borders of Israel is the Litan Erev. So there and also Defense Minister Israel Katz he was saying that the Israeli military will control until the Litani Revit, until Ahizbollah is disarmed. And we all know if they control on ground on that area, they're going to control aerially all of Lebanon basically.

SPEAKER_07

Yeah that's a really good point. I really hate religious conflict if only because my typical assertion that people will revert to moderation even if that moderation involves violence is thrown out the window and that just drives me insane. But let's turn further afield because we could get engulfed in the Gulf very quickly. Let's turn to Pearl Pearl can you tell us a little bit about how South Asia which is of course maybe too broad of an area for you to focus on entirely but what's going on there and how are they reacting to the to the economic threat primarily but potentially further further ahead what might it do for stability?

SPEAKER_00

It's in South Asia this also does not feel like a conflict far away. People refer to it as the conflict in West Asia not in the Middle East and that sort of reinforces the geographic proximity and what many feel about Iran or the Gulf's relation to the subcontinent and the prevailing mood is which hasn't changed since the start of the war and that has been that they want this to end. They want it to end quickly and they want it to end without antagonizing any of the major players. If you look at Iran, India and Pakistan who are the two main regional power brokers they have good relationships with the US, with Iran and with the Gulf states. So they really just want this to end and all the talk about diplomacy was perhaps wishful thinking on part of countries in South Asia because it they do not want a regime collapse in Iran. They do not want the Gulf economy to be battered. They just want things to go back to as they were an uneasy piece. And it is it is because of the economy it's they rely on it for oil and gas imports, for fertilizer with a large agricultural sector. There are also huge diaspora population in the Gulf states and in Iran they're migrant laborers and inward remittances form a core part of the economy especially in some of the smaller countries like Nepal or Bangladesh. And if if that stops or if these people come back to countries where there really aren't any jobs for them, then that would trigger instability we have seen in the area that economic grievances have the power to mobilize people. 2022 anti-government demonstrations in Sri Lanka or the more recent ones in Bangladesh and Nepal they were all underpinned by economic grievances.

SPEAKER_07

And that's why everyone's keeping very close eye on what happens thanks so much that's very that's very useful to to hear can I just ask about a recent pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia might spur unintended involvement despite wanting moderation and uh the uneasy peace to return. If Saudi Arabia takes this to where it looks like it's going to which is that this is a problem that has to be solved now rather than kicked down the road again, what does that mean for Pakistan?

SPEAKER_00

Trouble um it's the worry is sectarian strife. Pakistan has one of the largest Shia populations outside of Iran and support for Iran or rather antipathy to the US and Israel it crosses sectarian divides. So even if you might think that the Sunni aspect or the Sunni side may prefer alignment with the Gulf that that may not necessarily be true because this war is very much seen across the region as one of the America and Israel's making but if so it would mean difficult choices for the government and if they are forced to do that they they would be worried about the s implications for sectarian harmony in the country just um last week you had the field marshal Asimunir, a Pakistan's army chief have a rather touchy dialogue with some of the Shia religious leaders where he basically said what's happening in Iran should not be used as a pretext to foment instability in Pakistan. And that that that is the worry that everyone has I would say Pakistan will try everything it can to not have the pact activated. Obviously this is before they had this formal arrangement but previously Saudi Arabia did ask for Pakistan's help in attacks against the Houthis and the government passed, so the parliament passed a motion and refused to give that help because they wanted to continue striking this fine line. So they they will try that as for as far and as long as they can that's really fascinating.

SPEAKER_07

I didn't realize you could just say no thanks I'm I'm cool for helping very very good thank you very much Pearl then let's turn to NOHAD we have a slightly different situation there which is that the UAE who has been kind of on the outs with Saudi Arabia recently especially over their actions within the Horn and and Sudan specifically has been supporting the RSF and that conflict remains unfortunately largely ignored because of these regional this regional war is also about to go through some some big changes because of the lack of external engagement. But uh but please tell us more.

SPEAKER_01

Yeah I think um for the main actors and the key players in the Sudan conflict whether it's the Sudanese army or the RSF they of course the effect on them is directly linked to the extent to which the Middle East partners whether it's the UAE on the RSF side or Saudi Arabia on the South side the extent to which the resources that they can offer in this conflict will be strained by what's going on in the Middle East of course and the tricky situation is that the UAE has invested a lot in the Sudanese conflict and the wider region actually it has been going on since um the Arab Spring it's been supporting non-state actors in Libya in Yemen of course and now in uh Sudan also in Somalia so the situation is it's it's probable that of course the ongoing conflict will affect the level of support that the UAE can offer for the RSF. But at the same time this impact the extent to which this impact will be felt on the ground is still questionable because the RSF is actually very reliant on the support from the UAE whereas on the other hand the SAF is of course backed by Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Egypt, Turkey and also Iran and this has also positioned it in a bit of a tricky situation with it's now the association with Islamists and the US designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group. Although this designation I think is not very related to the conflict in Sudan it's mostly related to what's going on in Iran. So this kind of designation could play out in several ways. The SAF on one hand this is an opportunity for it to distance itself even more from the Islamist factions in the army and this has actually been ongoing. We see that the leadership for example Burhan has been actively distancing himself from Islamists. And also practically it has an opportunity because the SAF controlled region in Sudan to the east has direct access to the Red Sea through Port Sudan and everybody here of course mentioned the increased interest in the Red Sea security. So the SAF also has an opportunity to position itself as the more reliable security partner in this in this situation. But at the same time it still faces pressure from the whole narrative about Islamists backing the army which is of course quite beneficial for the RSF and the UAE it can be considered as a bit of an opportunity as you mentioned from the Iran conflict. So this is all of course just the the first layer of supporters of the key actors and then the second layer is the regional implications of course you mentioned earlier Ethiopia has been very interested in its own access to the Red Sea so everybody's also anticipating a conflict to break out between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in the case that this happens it will be a kind of an instant effect through the Sudanese conflict because both Ethiopia and Eritrea have now their own local militias aligned with either the RSF or the SAF. So this will kind of create a situation where this the conflict in Sudan can be the main battlefield for these parties but also a way for them to either support or counteract the actions of their own local militias. So yeah it's um it's very expected that in the case that something like this happens it will be a wider regional conflict. I don't expect the conflict in Sudan to end because of decreased support from their patrons in the Middle East I think it will probably continue at a much lower rate and it will fragment and become much more localized due to that.

SPEAKER_07

Right I mean I think tricky covers it maybe not fully about what the number of variables that are at play within the horn in Sudan more generally but I'm glad you mentioned Ethiopia because it suggests that one of the key ways that that the horn must manage this is to become a lot more um a lot more amenable to alliances shifting quite quickly. If Saudi Arabia and UAE can see a common cause and no longer feel like they want to support opposing uh opposing entities whether it's in Sudan or between Somalia and Ethiopia etc you'll see that that a number of the strategic considerations of these main actors will need to shift very very quickly. And Ethiopia is probably the best case in the sense that it has three particular conflicts that it looks like it is either about to engage in or are on the horizon. That's within Tigrai, Eritrea and of course over the recognition or not of Somaliland. And all of those involve their own constellation of actors that are also involved in this conflict that we're speaking about now. And so it's very difficult if not impossible to understand where everybody is going to line up next week let alone in a month or six months from now but but I think it it's quite clear that a lot of things will shift. But the direction in which they'll shift or the permanence of that shift is is all to play for. Now let's go into a totally new realm. Let's go all the way to Latin America Titiano you've been very very patient and I'm wondering about what you think that despite being quite far away what some of this instability amongst of course not just the energy sector but also the kind of distractions that this conflict offers to a very important region of Latin America.

SPEAKER_03

Thanks Leonardo it's been fascinating and I mean a lot of what Pel said resonates when it comes to sort of the positioning and the understanding of this crisis from many Latin American countries. This is a matter of rather alignment with the US and fear or or consequences for US intervention in Latin America itself. First of all this crisis has proven that sort of Iran links and alliances and relations with the region were more symbolic than anything else. Of course Venezuela after the intervention in January has completely shifted its relations with the country has even refrained from even expressing concerns about the situation. Cuba and Nicaragua have sort of um put out mild statements but of course are dealing with their own pressure from the US and I think the only country that's really spoken out has been Brazil but more for its role in the BRICS and in its um sort of advocacy for a multipolar war than the actual relations with the Iranian regime. But talking about stability I think some countries are indeed gambling with their own internal stability in light of the greater good of the alignment with with the US thinking particularly of Argentina and Chile Argentina has even offered military support to the US in this war. These are countries that are likely to be heavily affected by the uh sort of disruption in oil trade and the rising oil oil prices um and gambling their own you know internal discontent that could fuel sort of a breakout in protests um uh with this alignment with the US but there are of course um other countries that are sort of facing the second uh more indirect consequence of US uh interventionism not only in the Middle East but in the region. The US has um sort of kept its eyes on the region, kept it in the radar, sort of launching this initiative called the Shield of the Americas sort of to keep the region aligned with the US and pushing the countries in the region to sort of threat to deal with hemispheric threats in a more militarized way and that's translated into greater military action within those countries. But I would mention a couple of things more which is on one hand regarding the interventions you have Venezuela which stands as the basically the Latin American winner of this whole confrontation the Dusty Rodriguez administration is cashing in on rising oil prices. It's projecting its image as sort of the successful experiment and then the possibility that you can have if you reset the relations with the US and it's even presenting the country as more stable and safer to invest in oil infrastructure and supply than the Gulf itself which is a sentence that was even unthinkable, unconceivable to think just a few weeks back. And on the other hand you have Cuba which is certainly sort of hoping that the Trump administration understands that when dealing that not all countries are Venezuelas and when dealing with sort of more bureaucratic, ideologized embedded regimes can have more complicated outcomes than than a swift military operation that replaces an hostile leader with a more amenable one. But at the same time the US has not scaled back pressure on Cuba and while it's focusing on the Middle East the situation in the country is really leading to a full-fledged economic collapse and a and a great humanitarian crisis. So it's not sustainable and unless sort of the the Trump administration decides to settle for something less radical than regime change or of some sort and I would say even quickly the the internal situation could turn into to chaos because really the people are not being able to even get access to water to electricity to food and to medicine. I would just end by saying that probably another winner of this war will be organized crime because there are particularly two commodities that are attracting a lot of interest from organized crime groups across the region and these are oil and gold beyond drugs of course and when we talk about oil the rise in oil prices first of all will affect enormously oil importing countries such as Central America and the Caribbean so weakening their ability to sort of provide their security forces with sufficient resources to even operate and that could create opportunities for organized crime groups but also oil producing countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Mexico have huge and complicated phenomena or oil contraband, oil theft, extortion to the petrol sector um and these all are all set to increase I think in in in this current situation. And gold as well which has become the safe haven in this ever more instable world has also fostered illegal gold mining activities across the region which in turn are fueling conflict between organized crime groups.

SPEAKER_07

That's super interesting Tatiana it just sounds like everybody is trying to kind of use the situation to their advantage from their very different positions within the larger scheme. But I guess Delsey in particular seems to be playing a good hand especially because I think many people thought that the success in Venezuela emboldened Trump to think that the Iranian situation would be a lot more straightforward. Of course you know this notion that any conflict within the Middle East let alone one involving Iran would be over or resolved within a few weeks was insane. But um it seems like clearer minds are now thinking about the investment this requires unlike of course what's what seems to be happening in in Venezuela. But one of the things I think everybody has mentioned that I wanted uh people to reflect upon in our last point here is this seems to be a middle power conflict. You know, somewhat inadvertently they didn't ask for it. But each and every one of you mentioned how a middle power or what would be considered a rising middle power is key to determining the trajectory of what's happening here directly. And I'm curious about whether or not you see you see a future here where where some of those middle powers retain enormous influence and graduate into more more global powers or whether or not the global powers effectively lose enough of their abilities to coordinate across the world so the middle powers and the global powers become a little bit more equal, leading to of course multipolarity where we would expect a lot more conflict. But I'm curious. Floor is open.

SPEAKER_06

Well perhaps I can start I think that based on what we are seeing currently in in the Gulf what is pretty much certain is that we will not see a clear winner in the current war, but rather a conflict that will redistribute influence in uh in the region. And in this redistribution of influence the US risks a gradual erosion of their primacy in the Gulf, especially as a security provider. I mean Washington's credibility already took a blow back in 2019 when there was an attack on the uptake oil infrastructure and Washington did not respond or defend the Gulf countries and more specifically Saudi Arabia in that case. And so now the credibility of US security guarantees is being tested again and it seems that GCC countries may look elsewhere for security guarantees. Of course Saudi Arabia already struck a deal with Pakistan um but um I I think that after this conflict we will see uh a heightened focus on intra-GCC security and an attempt at overhauling the whole security architecture of the region trying to involve some countries that emerged as regional powers despite the fact that they are being antagonized by the global powers. Quite paradoxically I would say the end result of the last two years or three years of conflict since 2023 is that we have the Houthis and Iran emerging as unavoidable interlocutors in security conversations in the region, especially in regards to maritime security. So there have been attempts since at least 2020 to come up with a regional architecture that would guarantee security across Babal Mandab and the Red Sea there was an Iranian proposal to create a regional coalition under the acronym of Hope that would secure the Strait of Hormuz yes very pressed but so far we have seen no results but I think that it's increasingly clear that without the cooperation of the local actors it would be impossible in the future to secure these very important waterways in the broader framework of asymmetric warfare. What is clear right now is that even if the US deployed troops to the Strait of Hormuz to the Babalmandab Strait um it's impossible for international patrolling coalition To secure these waterways because a few drones, one missile attack is enough to heighten risk perception and push insurance companies to raise the price of the insurances, uh, war risk premiums and whatever else. If you have a look at the number of transits through the Red Sea, right now, we are around 200, 250 per week, uh, which is the same number, the same exact number that we had during the Gaza crisis. And this number has always remained the same. It doesn't react to the number of attacks, to the frequency of the attacks, because overall the situation in the region is perceived as risky. And for this reason, war risk premiums remain very high, pushing shipping companies to reroute through the Cape of Good Hope. Military solution to this kind of issues, but only uh a very long gradual dialogue at the regional level on how to best secure the waterways.

SPEAKER_07

I think that in a previous, um a previous podcast between myself, yourself, and Basel, we talked about tragic realism, basically worst-case scenarios. And um that seems to certainly be the likely immediate and certainly medium-term outcomes for almost all of the cases we've talked about today. And it will keep us very busy. Um, and we hope that some of the audience will return for our thoughts on this in the future. But I want to thank everybody extensively for their really excellent and insightful commentary. It's been it's been a delight and pleasure to work with each of you.

SPEAKER_03

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

unknown

Thank you.

SPEAKER_03

It's been a great pleasure. Thanks.

SPEAKER_02

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