Sudan’s next phase of war: fragmentation, spillover, and foreign patrons

As Sudan’s war enters its fourth year, the conflict is not fading — it is evolving, driven by shifting alliances, war economies, and regional opportunism that could reshape the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. While global attention is fixed elsewhere, the forces sustaining this war, from Gulf rivalries to cross-border militia networks, are evolving in ways that extend instability far beyond Sudan’s borders.

In this episode of Conflicts of Interest, ACLED CEO Professor Clionadh Raleigh and ACLED Senior Research Assistant Nohad Eltayeb unpack the drivers of this new phase of war: the UAE’s role in RSF supply routes and political pressure on SAF, how Chad’s border closure has driven up RSF transport and fuel costs, militia networks stretching toward Niger, and how fractured loyalties and fluid alliances are entrenching long-term conflict fragmentation.

Can a war built on shifting alliances, militia economies, and foreign patrons end through negotiation — or does fragmentation become the next phase of conflict?

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

The conflict labor market is going to change in Sudan.

SPEAKER_00 0:03

If the conflict causes, or let's say the violence in Sudan is not as lucrative anymore for these militias, the level of benefits decreasing, whether it's economic benefits or political, not very beneficial for these militias. They will be basically out of job. Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_01 0:28

Welcome to Conflicts of Interest, everybody. My name is Cleaner Rowley, and we are here today with the very brilliant No Had, who I depend on daily to set me straight and to give me very good advice and excellent materials. Welcome, Nohad. Thank you. Thank you for having me. Today we are going to talk about Sudan and not just because we forgot to talk about it earlier last week or two weeks ago when it entered into its fourth year, but more because I wanted to get your full opinion, I guess, about how the current conflict is going to affect this very important conflict that is a humanitarian disaster, of course, contributing to massive numbers of death, but also it has spread quite a bit throughout the Horn of Africa and involves a lot of the players that I think we'll be talking about quite a bit in the next few years. So why don't you give us a assessment of what's going on right now in its in its early fourth year?

SPEAKER_00 1:20

I think that um if we look at the overall picture of the conflict now that it enters its fourth year, I think it's entering a new phase where there's uh much lower violence compared to 2025 or early 2025, for example. There's a shift towards more remote violence and also an increased reliance on foreign actors in this conflict. So I think now what's happening in the Middle East will largely affect what's happening in Sudan through its different um supply networks and routes, but also what's happening domestically because of these international tensions is going to also motivate more defections and infighting because of the increased stress on both sides.

SPEAKER_01 2:05

Okay, so we have an Iran war in which the two main benefactors, let's say, of the Sudanese parties, the Sudanese armed forces, Saf, led by Al-Burhan, and the rapid support forces led by Hameti, they are being kind of traditionally assumed to be supported by Saudi on the SAF side, the Saudi team, let's say, and the UAE team on the RSF side. People have focused a lot on this war in the last three years, is the really well-developed supply routes from the region. Can you just give us an overview, especially on the RSF side, about how the neighbors are involved?

SPEAKER_00 2:42

Yes, I think uh the neighbors, which in this case we can call the UAE team, who are mainly Libya, Chad, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and now Ethiopia as well. All of these neighboring countries, when the conflict started, they were not all involved in the same way, of course. But over time, the RSF and the UAE managed to find alternative uh routes whenever um a certain supply route, for example, is disrupted because of the UAE's uh network and influence within neighboring countries. So this shows an amount or a level of resilience in the RSF's uh network of supplies over time. But now, with what's happening in the Middle East and the UAE facing a new type of pressure, this is expected to change in the next period. And the reason is that these neighboring countries will find themselves in a situation where, for example, in Chad, it's not just now a matter of the UAE being busy with what's going on in the Middle East, but also because the conflict in Sudan is now reaching its own territory. So it had to close its border, and now the RSF has to go through a different route, which increased the price of fuel in Sudan. And all of these kinds of uh consequences are felt within RSF-controlled regions and definitely in its ability to sustain operations. The same challenge we would say, which is economic consequences, fuel prices is felt by the SAF, but the SAF also has a bit of a geographic advantage because it controls Port Sudan, which is the country's main import and export region, it controls Khartoum, the capital, and generally that's the eastern side of Sudan, which is closer to the Red Sea. But the RSF now has to go through a long way to reach the front lines in southeastern Sudan, the Blue Nile region, and even it the source of its supplies is now very much disrupted because of these clashes.

SPEAKER_01 4:35

So the Iran war is having kind of a secondary effect on UAE's ability rather than, you know, how the rest of the world is is scrambling with fuel prices.

SPEAKER_00 4:46

Yes, very much. It's like a series of indirect effects that are now being felt, most of them economic, but also how the economic consequences will play out within militias allied to both sides of the conflict.

SPEAKER_01 5:01

In the early days of Iran, you and I would often talk about how internationalized that conflict became immediately. But really, Sudan sounds just as internationalized. It's just not something that we often think about because it's not as if there are bombs and attacks in all of the neighboring countries, but they're all involved in keeping that conflict going to some degree. So the Iran war has put UAE in a particularly difficult position due to its proximity, of course, to the strait, but also it received a lot of incoming in the last um 60 days that has limited its ability to project its influence outside of the region. And in particular, it's changed its relationship to the Sudanese war directly through supplies, like you were just saying. In addition to that, there's discussions about how Saudi and UAE are coming to the very obvious conclusion that their disagreements or their different teams in other very important strategic areas like the Horn of Africa, including Sudan, that is working across purposes now, where they actually have a bigger enemy and far more reasons to cooperate. So let's talk about how the UAE's changing geopolitics is going to likely have a major effect on this conflict.

SPEAKER_00 6:19

The main effect is to what level do these regional neighboring countries that play a very important role in the RSF being able to continue this far in the conflict, to what level are they going to be willing to continue doing this when the benefit from that is not as much as it was before? Because if the UAE ends up struggling to provide the same level of support for Chad, for South Sudan, for Ethiopia, then I don't think that these countries would be willing to facilitate things for the RSF in the same way as before. And Chad is the main country that we're already seeing that in because it also has its own internal dynamics linked to ethnic groups in Darfur and how elites there are kind of intertwined between uh both countries. So that's one thing. And also the main thing to consider is that the RSF's strategies are usually quite short term rather than long term. That's also a difference between both sides. And of course, it being a rebel group, it's now in this disadvantage because not only does it need to find alternative ways to survive in case the UAE is not able to provide that, but it also needs to manage a lot of infighting and defections and many things that we'll probably get into a bit later, because they are shaping a lot of the current conflict situation. And on the other hand, if we look at what the SAF is doing, there is a clear shift in its priorities. I think it's trying to capitalize on the situation in the Middle East by focusing more on like diplomacy. So Burhan recently had a Gulf tour, that was actually last week, where he went to Saudi Arabia, and people think that the Saudi Arabia visit is kind of um counterbalance the Berlin conference, which Khartoum's government sees the RSF as having its own lobbyists in these kinds of uh conferences. So the SAF is trying to counterbalance that by kind of getting Saudi Arabia on its side in these international conversations, particularly about humanitarian aid and the way it's distributed in the country, because SAF wants it to be through state institutions. And the other thing that it's doing is that also Burhan went to Oman, which is his first visit to Oman since uh he assumed office in 2019. And this was clearly to have an alternative to the UAE trade route to Sudan. A few months ago, the UAE severed trade relations with Sudan. So now they're trying to use Oman as an alternative to facilitate imports to Sudan through through Port Sudan. So all of these things combined are all signs that uh the SAF is trying to focus more on international lobbying to convince the international community that first of all it's sidelining Islamists, and the second thing is that with the RSF weakening in the in the coming periods, the SAF is going to try to portray itself as a legitimate government. And there's also a lot of like political discussions happening domestically on that. So yeah, I think that's that's going to be its strategy in in the next period.

SPEAKER_01 9:27

That's really fascinating because I'd like to take a step back and think about how the whole world is focused on the diplomacy and the geopolitics between Iran and the states and how that's playing out, well, or not playing out in Pakistan. But all of these same countries, that's maybe the first layer. But the second layer is what are they going to do about each other? What are they going to do about Sudan? What are they going to do about all of their other, you know, at the moment, very pressing concerns. And what we've seen in this conflict more than anything is that Henneti or Al-Burhan are trying to use the very modern form of lobbying and diplomacy to counterbalance each other on the international stage. So Hameti, for example, you know, goes on an East African tour even just two years ago, you know, when he was on the up. And then Burhan, of course, is now trying to consolidate his position. But I'm wondering if you would think that Brahan requires his presence in Saudi Arabia in order to try to correct for the discussion last week, which was that Pakistan can't send an arms deal or can't finish an arms deal with Sudan because Saudi doesn't want them to. And Brahan is also, you know, feeling the constraints, if you will, of his own partners, not just Hameti feeling the constraints of his.

SPEAKER_00 10:44

Yeah, definitely. Definitely. I think that the army is definitely feeling these constraints, and especially the deal that you just mentioned between Pakistan and facilitated through Saudi Arabia, which was uh supposed to take place as well. So I do think that this is part of uh why Burhan felt the need to make this visit. But I think the Saf is also just not putting all of its eggs in one basket. I think there are multiple fronts that the Saf relies on. Egypt has the most military involvement uh in terms of like uh trainings and support. Eritrea also as well. But then, as we mentioned before, these neighboring countries are also very dependent on what happens between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. So I think that the SAF will also have a large effect on its ability to continue military operations without that kind of guarantee. And that's maybe also why what's happening domestically indicates a shift towards preparing for a potential political dialogue. So this is also happening right now in Sudan, which is both sides, uh whether it's the SAF-allied groups or RSF allied groups, are now focusing a lot on projecting this form of dialogue, which I think could be a step for them to prepare for uh a potential ceasefire. And maybe if that happens, then the question would be what would happen to all of these allies, like all of these local allies. So this is also a major issue for for SAF, which is that even if something like this happens, even if there's a ceasefire, even if both sides in this war don't really have the appetite to continue anymore or the resources to continue in the same way that they were able to before, there will be this question of many competing factions within their allies. And that's also going to be a huge challenge for for the SAF in in any kind of political process.

SPEAKER_01 12:32

That's actually a great place to land in because one of the things that is interesting about you know many African conflicts, but especially Sudan, I would also say to Guy to in Ethiopia uh in the past few years, is that the African dominant contenders, in this case the RSF and SAF, have really benefited from broadening the camp that they are working with. And in many ways, this was fought not just on the ground in Sudan, but between these alliances that they were building locally, but certainly internationally. So broadening the camp is interesting in that it provides a lot of lifelines to get you from one difficult stage to another. But when those international camps retract and you're left with what's happening within your own country, all sorts of new types of conflict tends to emerge out of desperation, out of, as you say, internal competition. And I'm wondering, you know, one of the things about the Sudanese conflict, especially given the region that it's being fought in, is the way in which both parties did not engage in any sort of jihadi alliances or action or rhetoric. So it is obviously extremely popular in the Sahel Belt more broadly. So I'm wondering, with the retraction, especially of UAE, who, you know, so adamantly anti-Jihadi, and to some extent Saudi Arabia so adamantly anti-uh jihadi itself, what do you think the chances are that a new type of alliance structure potentially related to this growing threat on the continent finds its way into Sudan as a way to internally compete? But equally, what do you think is going to happen to the violence amongst both parties as they end up really fighting a Sudanese war in Sudan amongst Sudanese allies?

SPEAKER_00 14:15

Yes, I think actually the last point you mentioned is something that I expect to happen in Sudan, which is with the withdrawal of international actors, then it's going to go back to purely what's happening uh inside Sudan. And there's a really huge risk of fragmentation of the conflict itself. So instead of it remaining just between SAF and RSF and their allies, it's gonna be much more localized than that. And so also I think I think something that we also usually talk about is how the idea of Islamists in Sudan is quite different than what's in the Sahel, for example. I still think that that's the case in Sudan, but I think there is a risk of some sort of spillover between the Sahel region and Sudan. An example to illustrate that would be if we talk about the recent defection of a commander in the RSF, Annur Gubba, who's a very influential person in the RSF. So everyone expects this particular defection to have a huge impact, even more than the one that we saw last year or the year before, which which was the reason why the SAF was able to regain Khartoum, for example. So this defection, this guy has like his value comes from his network, which is a network that's not just in Sudan, but it reaches to Chad and some people say even to the Sahel region. And that's how the RSF was able to use its social networks, which is mainly based on tribal relations in these in these areas. Through these networks, the RSF is able to recruit from as far as Niger, for example, to join their conflict in Sudan. But this is mostly just a transactional thing, like it's not ideological, it's very different than what's going on in the Sahel, for example. But if the conflict then pauses, or let's say the violence in Sudan is not as lucrative anymore, like not very beneficial for these militias. And if what's happening in the Sahel becomes uh more active and reaches towards this region, then I I expect that the Darfur region will definitely be intertwined in this whole thing because there's an existing war economy. It would be very difficult to manage that. For whatever government that comes uh to Sudan after this, it will be difficult to manage these the lower local violence that could spread even outside of Sudan because of these relationships that militia leaders have with neighboring countries and and so on. So, yes, I think that it could uh definitely spill over, but I still think that both sides of the war will try to refrain from using any sort of like ideology because all of their allies actually have competing ideologies and ethnicities and so on. And for example, the RSF and SPLM North. The SPLM North is known to be a very anti-Islamist group. It's uh it's now an RSF ally, which m a lot of people think is quite counterintuitive given their history of conflict. So this is just an example of how or why both sides try not to focus on any sort of like ideological narratives and they're trying to move away from them in in this conflict.

SPEAKER_01 17:22

I think that's a great way of putting it because quite a number of people, even with the Iran war, for example, want to go to ideology first to explain actions. But really what we're seeing is that the ideology fits the situation rather than the situation, you know, contorting itself in order to reflect an ideology, and Sudan more so than any other. So if we're left with effectively opportunism as a way in which you can explain the retraction of some militias back to the Sahel, or rather, the the conflict labor market is going to change in Sudan. There's there's no question about that. Even if there was some sort of resumption of arms or support, the conflict labor market is going to change. So you have militias going back to the Sahel, you have the RSF needing to be far more dependent on its control and abilities internally, and the SAF having to demonstrate its ability to hold territory for periods of time that would lend itself to governing that state. What do you think it's going to look like in terms of violence? So do you think that the RSF will continue enacting quite harsh violence, especially amongst the civilians of Darfur? Have we seen that before when there's been a retraction of support or when there's been a surge of support?

SPEAKER_00 18:38

Yes, that's actually a very good question because like uh this weekend I was also looking into the data to see what happens specifically after the RSF kind of goes through a a weak period, which is after a defection, or maybe if the staff gains some territories, the way that it retaliates is usually through more violence. And it's specifically the violence is not just directed towards civilians, which is to be to be fair, that's the typical RSF method, which is more violence against civilians. But then there's also retaliation to to kind of manage its own groups because the RSF is like uh it's a very decentralized army, so like mid-level commanders are from different tribes and different ethnic groups, and they tend to like compete with each other, and that competition actually shows in the public discourse and social media and things like that. So after the defection of the last commander, the RSF is retaliating against his ethnic group. That's that's something that the RSF typically does, which is it's self-destructive in that way, kind of. Um, but for them, of course, it's to make a point, but then in the overall long-term situation, because it still hasn't really managed to unite all of these forces, whether it's through shared vision for how to rule Sudan or even the the sort of like uh economic benefits that they get or local political leadership or things like that, it hasn't been working out very much because there's more in fighting now than there was before. But also another thing to note is that if we compare, for example, uh the overall violence in in Sudan, if we compare the first quarter of 2026 to first quarter of 2025, there's been like a 50% decrease in violence. So it's definitely not the same as uh last year. And the reason is that, first of all, there's more like reliance on drone warfare, which is also a global trend. But also, because of their decreased capacity in sustaining attacks and offensives and armed clashes, they're now moving towards more different tactics, for example, infiltration or inciting these defections. And I think that the SAF is very experienced in that. Actually, most Sudanese people always say the SAF's strategy is like uh divide and rule, which is it goes into the RSF's own constituencies in Darfur or Kurdufan or wherever, and they find someone to be their guy in this region, and then that person handles the local negotiations. And this is exactly what happened with the Slav defection, which was due to Musa Hilal's uh influence, who's a notorious previously RSF uh person, but now he's sapphalite. So so this guy is the reason why something like this happened. And this same model is now applied in different regions where the RSF has influence. So that's why I think both sides are now shifting to different tactics. It's not just the same level of violence that was done before. But regarding the RSF, maybe to answer your question, I think they will do more, they will resort to more violence against civilians, just because with the level of benefits decreasing, whether it's economic benefits or political, then these militias will just find have to find their own way. And their own way is usually to just control their own very local territory, set up checkpoints, control. Collect taxes from people, terrorize people. I think it would be a lower violence, but definitely we'll still be there.

SPEAKER_01 22:07

With drones, you get, you know, obviously more of that type of violence, but but sometimes an intermittent decline in some of the more direct violence like VAC. I have a few scenarios I want you to give me your thoughts on, but I'm not suggesting any one of these is going to happen. I'm just, it's a little bit of a thought experiment. If the RSF is feeling like at this exact juncture, at this moment, there's not going to be a huge amount of support or certainly easy support from neighboring supply routes and UAE, etc., the RSF thinks to itself, why don't we go back to basics? And you remember their basics was to be loaned out effectively to other conflicts to support allies that would pay them or offer them support in the future. So what do you think the chances are that both Chad and Ethiopia say, we actually have a few things we need sorted in this country, so we're going to borrow your strength for a while, and then we'll return to the Sudanese conflict once that's a little bit clearer about a better way ahead to challenge Saf and El Barhan. But in Ethiopia, for example, we have an election coming up in September. We have a lot of saber rattling about taking, especially uh a coastal region of Eritrea, or challenging the TPLF who have in Tegrae, who have made a real mess of what's happening within the northern region. And the national government in Ethiopia with Abiy Ahmed is already believed to be training RSF members in Beneshogung, which is the border region between Ethiopia and Sudan. What do you think is stopping them from saying we actually need you here rather than back in Sudan, contesting a fight that is in a total stalemate at the moment? So you you have your local allies hold off the worst in SAF, you come and help us here, and then we'll make sure that we support you later when there's more of an opening within Sudan.

SPEAKER_00 24:02

Yeah, I think that's an interesting scenario. I don't think well, I think it's it's possible, and the reason that it's possible is not just because of the relationship between Ethiopia and the RSF in the ongoing conflict, but also because of the relationship between the SAF and Tigray forces who are now being trained in Sudan. Some of them actually participated in clashes in the central region, like near Khartom and these regions. There are more like training camps being set up in Gadarev, which is the eastern region next to Ethiopia. And this could also be more reason for the Ethiopian government to say, well, maybe the RSF now has some experience in fighting such groups and would be able to help in something like that. So yeah, I think it's uh it's definitely possible that it could happen. But uh it also very much depends on what happens in Ethiopia, as you mentioned. It could be that it's now postponed due to due to what's going on in the Middle East, so that's that's an option. But if such a conflict is is more imminent now and and close to happening, then it would also depend on the level of offensives going on in Sudan at that time because the staff is also preparing for a lot of offensive in multiple fronts in Kurdofan and Dunar. But I do think it's possible, yes. Specifically because if the RSF finds itself in a situation where it can't do much to change what's happening in Sudan, then it would definitely go back to its usual business, which is we're mercenaries, we'll we can fight for you if you if you pay us.

SPEAKER_01 25:34

I think that the situation in Ethiopia is ripe, I guess is how I'd put it. And I don't get the impression that they're going to wait for a resolution of the Iran war in order to reinforce that they want something out of their alliance with these Gulf parties. And the Gulf wants something out of their alliance with the parties on the Horn of Africa, not just for economic reasons, but also for laying the groundwork for what next year is going to look like and for what the year after is. And so I think that the pressure is on in the Horn to make the first move and to see who is going to align with whom about achieving some sort of very significant, I think, territorial change, governance change within key regions. So I'm worried that that's far more of a possibility that the, you know, the RSF operates as some sort of a rear guard, or as you were just saying, you know, soft troops who I don't think can be loaned out to the TPLF. If only because, like, to be honest, I think that's a pretty kind of lousy alliance to have. It's certainly not the stronger of the alliances, even with Eritrea. I don't think it's the stronger of the alliances. But there is nothing more than the horn loves than a super complicated, overly fragmented, too complex conflict.

SPEAKER_00 26:51

Yes, I think that complex is the word that I now try to avoid using because I use it so much to describe this region. But yeah, it's uh it's the one way to describe it. And and especially because as the conflict prolongs, alliances shift more and more. But also, this is one thing that we can also say that this region is characterized by, which is alliances today can definitely change tomorrow, depending on a lot of factors. I think it's as you said, like whoever makes the first move, then that will determine what's going to happen. But in the case that, for example, Eritrea and the South not being the strongest alliance, as you said, then maybe the Tigray forces would find themselves in a different type of predicament. So that also changes the alliance structure even within Ethiopia and and Eritrea.

SPEAKER_01 27:41

Yeah, I would just say, just say on that, like I think the TPLF are entering a world of pain. So too, of course, are the Ethiopians and the Ethiopians who are going to be fighting this next conflict, but they're far worse off than they were in in 2020 when this kicked off. I'm not entirely sure what the strategic logic is of this, or in fact, in fairness, many other global conflicts at the moment. But things are rapidly changing, I think. One of the things that's particularly notable about the conflicts and alliance structures in the Horn is that they take on this very like front face backdoor kind of impression, which is that deals are happening based on what's happening on the battlefront, but they're also happening based on like, you know, backroom deals that you only see the result of or hear about later rather than see it play out. So it's like the 80s again.

SPEAKER_00 28:30

Yeah. And actually, I do have a question for you that I was thinking about when I was trying to imagine what would happen in like the post-war Sudan, for example. And if there is some sort of political process that's that's going to happen, I still find it difficult to see any sort of scenario that would be not extremely worse than what the situation the Sudan was in, maybe in 2019 or 2020, when it had the Juba peace agreement, which was a peace agreement between former Darfur rebel groups and Khartoum and all of that. But it was kind of a disaster, I would say, because it did work for a bit, but then such power-sharing arrangements also end up motivating other armed groups to have their own say and have maybe if they access the means of violence, then they could have a say in what happens, and you would have just an endless cycle of conflict every few years, maybe, or in the peripheries, or something like that. So yeah, I'm curious if you think that there's some sort of like political process whereby like all of these groups can can say, oh, this is good enough for us, or something like that, or do you think that it's just not very realistic?

SPEAKER_01 29:42

No, how do you flatter me thinking that I think that any political process is worth the paper it's written on? As you know, I think that they're all failures, right? They might be immediate failures, they might be long-term failures, but they often don't consider that the conflicts themselves are not a competition of grievances that got represented through fighting. It is the opportunities and the competition that is always going to be present in order to engage in violence. It's just whether or not it's going to be lucrative enough or the costs of engaging with violence are going to be higher than the benefits from engaging in violence. And at the time of many of these peace agreements, the cost is either too high or the exhaustion is too high, whatever the case. But those cost estimates change then over time, right? Where it becomes totally fine for Musal Halal to walk into an agreement with the RSF, which is considered to be extremely unlikely two years ago when there was this tiny little center in Darfur that was not going to be touched. Yeah, I think that you know, with a peace agreement, with any political process, you're living on borrowed time until those cost parameters change.

SPEAKER_00 30:53

Yeah, yeah. That's a good point. I think maybe globally now the costs to enter a conflict is not as high.

SPEAKER_01 31:00

Super low.

SPEAKER_00 31:01

Yeah.

SPEAKER_01 31:02

Yeah. Super low. And that's why we're seeing shifts in conflicts where the cost had kind of been established, just like Sudan, but now those costs and benefits and alliance structures who had kind of managed those costs are rapidly changing, and you will always see a shift in what the conflict looks like as a result. All right. Thank you, Nohat. This has been really this has been super educational. Thank you very much. Thank you. I hope you are a regular guest here at Conflicts of Interest. Thank you. Thank you for having me. You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.