Peace Talks & Trust Issues: Iran, Russia, and the Wars With No End in Sight

On this episode of Conflicts of Interest, Professor Clionadh Raleigh and Bron Mills catch up on Day 88 of the Iran war — a moment defined more by paralysis than progress.

They unpack Iran's internet blackout, finally ending after months of restrictions, what it reveals about Tehran's grip on internal dissent, and why the latest round of US-Iran peace talks remains trapped in a web of competing agendas. Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, the Gulf states are pulling in different directions, and that fracture is poisoning any path to a genuine deal. Clionadh's assessment is direct: there is "no peaceful way out" of the current crisis.

From Iran, the conversation shifts to Russia. As drone warfare reshapes the Ukrainian battlefield, Clionadh breaks down what Moscow's mounting desperation actually looks like on the ground, and what it means for a war that shows no sign of resolution.

Also on the episode: Pakistan's renewed wave of suicide bomb attacks and the domestic security spiral no one is covering, the widening Saudi-Qatar-UAE divide over regional strategy, Trump's comments on Iran's football team ahead of the World Cup, and what it says when sport and geopolitics keep colliding.

Plus: the surprisingly difficult task of avoiding dead bodies on holiday.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:00

I think the question w is is kind of sat with would President Trump support Putin in his next move? Is he going to get involved in that? Who knows?

SPEAKER_01 0:10

Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_00 0:18

Hello everybody and welcome to another episode of Conflicts of Interest. I'm Cleaner Rowley and I'm typely accompanied here by Bronn. Braun, I'm coming from Northern California. Where are you?

SPEAKER_02 0:28

Kenilworth, England. Not quite as luxurious, I don't think, but very hot.

SPEAKER_00 0:34

Yeah. I I'm not hot, so so that's a good thing. Yeah, exactly. What is hot though, is the rest of the world. And I think the kind of lingering, ongoing conflicts that we're going to discuss today, none of which have any sort of resolution in sight, and all of which are getting worse in a somewhat indefinable way, but definitely getting worse. So what would you like to talk about?

SPEAKER_02 0:58

Yeah, well, I think it's it's worth noting how exhausting it all is to follow. And I think that as tiring as it is for us, I think we should spare a thought for some of the world leaders involved and how tired they must be, particularly one who appears to be losing his battle with consciousness more and more frequently at the moment. Day 88 of the Iran war, we're hearing that the internet blackout has ended for Iranians, whilst lots of headlines are focusing on the threats around the value of trust in these peace talks. And I know that the phrase peace talks doesn't always sit well with you anyway. But there's even suggestion in the last sort of few minutes that if there were a sort of draft deal in place, then Tehran would consider reopening the strait. So firstly, let's start with the internet blackout, because I think that that's the most recent thing to happen. What do you think has pushed them over the edge to flick the internet back on?

SPEAKER_00 2:02

Well, I think that probably this frustration with the kind of no-end in sight of this conflict, but I do want to emphasize that the internet blackout was not because of the conflict. The internet blackout has been in place since January, and it was because of the uprising of the Iranian population, often against the financial situation of the state pre-conflict. So this conflict itself, as you mentioned, it's on day 88. Most of those days have been in this kind of ceasefire, this unknown territory where no one trusts each other. You know, the risk of escalation is super high. There's seemingly no resolution that's different than it would have been on day one, even of the conflict, let alone day one of the actual ceasefire, where these variations there. In Iran, things are obviously getting quite difficult. So there's a few different avenues that you might remember that people were very eager to think would lead to an uprising in Iran, right? And I and I always think that it's incredibly short-sighted to presume that the population of Iran was going to try to overthrow this incredibly entrenched, now really militarized system that is leading Iran. And the internet blackout was the Iranian government itself's response to what happened in January, where thousands of people were killed. They're still actually killing people, you know, who'd been in prison because of those those protests in January and December. And this internet blackout has effectively really destroyed some of the financial basis and even just the, you know, the everyday life of Iranians. And it certainly has prevented how Iranians are going to communicate with the rest of the world about the circumstances within Iran at the moment. So I think it's welcome, of course, that there's this conduit to how normal Iranians are living their life, and we'll be able to have a have a longer peek into that. But I do want to make sure that we distinguish here between the conflict itself and then this particular result. But I and I also wanted to mention that there's always this strange lingering hope that somehow they're going to revolt. So, you know, whether it would be the Kurds or the Azaris, which was, you know, one of the one of the long shots that people were presuming early in the conflict would somehow rise up and take on the state. There's also this sense that if the blockade continues, that Iran is going to run out of storage for its own oil and gas. And so that also seems to be a little bit of a Hail Mary that's not going to particularly happen. There's also some talk, and there was some talk before again about the blockade limiting food and an increasing public discontent. And I think that what we've learned, both through this event and also others, is that the Iranian system can take an incredibly high rate of public discontent without it fracturing the IRGC system at all, right? At all. They have become much more, like I mentioned, entrenched and militaristic. And so the idea that these public concerns would affect them are extremely limited.

SPEAKER_02 5:26

Yeah. And in the same way, it's it's important to distinguish between those two things. It's also important then when we're looking at the internet being switched back on, that that has got nothing to do with whatever progress or non-progress might be going on with the peace talks themselves, right? So the new or renewed strikes from the states and Tehran describing them as a gross violation of the ceasefire. But then the other line today, then about how, you know, even a draft would would reopen the strait. And it feels like there's kind of some mixed messages going on at the moment. What do you think is going on from both parties and what their next move is or their hope for the next move?

SPEAKER_00 6:02

I think that they both have approached this. Actually, the three parties have approached this by trying to maximize what they can get. And so they're not actually thinking about ending this. Because at the moment, let's just say it's it's in a state where they're they're not happy with it, but they can live with it, right? That's, I think, where the Iranians have have gotten to, because they're they're still considered to have been to have bested, you know, the US and Israel. There was some real concerns this weekend about the draft of the potential agreement that came out. Some of the more glaring problems is that the US seems to have achieved absolutely nothing. Iran still acted like there were red lines, especially around, for example, their nuclear deposits, that they kind of put aside, even though they were apparently central to the US. But the most important thing there that I think shouldn't be, shouldn't be dismissed is that the US is trying to come up with some way can look like it has a win here. And it's decided that the normalization of engagement with Israel across the Gulf states is their claim that like we've we've used this conflict in order to normalize relations with Israel across the Gulf. And so the cost of this conflict has now somehow been deferred to Gulf states who were going to find that normalization, especially now, incredibly tricky. But also, the US is in some ways trying to use whatever leverage it currently has, which is diminishing quickly, on getting this goal, which is normalization with Israel, which I think is a good goal besides what's happening, but I think it's a terrible time. It can't be enforced, if you will. It can't be, it can't come from, by the way, we actually haven't protected you at all in this conflict that we started. And now what we want from you is to kind of destroy your domestic legitimacy by forcing upon you this relationship with the Israelis, which the Israelis also know is a kind of a poisoned chalice. So I think that it's an absolute mess. I mean, it really couldn't have been a worse outcome should the terms of the peace agreement that were suggested this weekend come to be.

SPEAKER_02 8:14

Yeah, I think an absolute mess is probably the best way I've heard it described in a while as well, because I think it's the only phrase that does all of the kind of collateral any justice. And there's been so many conversations as well, hasn't there, about the costs experienced in the states after the president was accused of saying he doesn't care what it costs to the American people, and then that's kind of escalated from there. So if we look at the the talks then and the progress there, being facilitated by Pakistan and their role in this, that's sort of where I think lots of the media is is sat with Pakistan. But of course, at the moment, as of last weekend with the um latest suicide bomb attack on a on a train, that is bringing to light again Pakistan's own security concern and their kind of renewed landscape. And so I wondered whether you might tell us about that group and and the activity there and what what influence, if any, that might have on the wider global role they're playing at the moment.

SPEAKER_00 9:12

It's not going to have an influence on that. So I think it's a it's a very important, I would say, indication of Pakistan's own very, very turbulent domestic politics. And I think Pearl did a really nice job of summarizing what was happening in that region. So I would I would highly recommend people uh go to her analysis for that. But I I did want to come back and just mention that you know the cost of this in the US is minimal, right? I'm here and I'm still like amused almost by the by the cost of fuel here compared to anywhere else, especially where you and I live, which is an income. I mean, it's an absolute joke to say that the US has some sort of a cost being imposed on it when every single story in the British media is that, you know, unemployment is up because of the Iran war, or, you know, you may not be going on holiday because of the Iran War. So I think that there is a little bit, I mean, on both sides of really trying to exaggerate the effect of this conflict on these issues. But the actual costs for this conflict are going to be borne by the Gulf. Right. And in particular, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and UAE, which I had kind of, as I mentioned in the last podcast, hoped for some sort of a détente. There's real problems here in that they are now faced with a massive security concern and an economic concern, like a real one, not I've got a few high gas prices, but your entire idea for your future economy and the, you know, the bedrock of your current economy, which is, you know, pretty uh resource-dependent, the entire bedrock of that is now in question. And what those states will do and how they will choose to go about securing the region and their own states. So here I'm talking about Saudi, Qatar, and UAE, they all have different aims, right? They've all decided to pursue their continued regional positioning very differently. And I think it is too early to tell whether they will all be successful to continue to kind of get back to the status quo that they had pre-conflict, or whether or not there's real problems, real significant internal and external conflicts that are going to be manifesting because of this issue with Iran, which is in no way, shape, or form going to be dealt with through this peace agreement.

SPEAKER_02 11:43

Yeah. And I mean, we were talking about the relationship between those Gulf states before the the current war. Like that that has been something that has been certainly on your mind for a while.

SPEAKER_00 11:56

Yeah, and I mean, just, you know, yesterday and the day before there were discussions about how Qatar is again kind of trying to put this themselves in a position of appeasement, if you will, through all of the parties. They're going to be hosting this talk with the Pakistanis, as you mentioned, and others. And Qatar is just kind of like, all right, can I buy these guys off so we can continue our own, our own trajectory? Saudi Arabia is, of course, trying to use the power that they have with the US to try to be like, are you going to actually guarantee our security here as per agreement? And UAE is saying to themselves, listen, I can read the writing on the wall here, but is UAE is reading the writing on the wall and saying, listen, Israel is the right partner here, and in a very aggressive stance towards Iran is the right positioning and posture. And all of those contradict each other to some degree.

SPEAKER_02 12:51

Yeah, no, absolutely. And then from the Israeli perspective, we're also hearing about their intensified strikes on Lebanon and how significant those have been. I think it was reported that they've launched more than 120 airstrikes across southern and eastern Lebanon. So one of the heaviest bombardment in recent weeks. So what role is that having to this kind of regional, everyone's got their own agenda and are, you know, having peace talks over here but escalating over here? What's the significance of that?

SPEAKER_00 13:23

So, as we know, Israel wants to be a spoiler for this peace process, in part because it cannot let what the tenants of the supposed peace process at the moment with Iran and the US go forward without trying to maximize its ability to make it seem like it was worth it, right? Like there's no question Hezbollah is a big, big, big issue, continues to be a big issue despite the 2004 and 2005 assaults, uh, which we've discussed before, especially with Basel. And they need to maximize what they can get in this period, in this window that they're kind of allowed to, right? And I would even say that they will continue with this assault, even well past any sort of formal agreement that the US and Iran come up with, which includes Lebanon, as per a demand of the Iranians. But I mean, let's just say what's the worst case scenario here if you look at it from the Israeli perspective, which is that this peace agreement comes to pass, a ton of money gets sent to Iran. A ton of money, right? And what is Iran going to do with that? They're gonna flood it in Hezbollah, they might send a few dollars to the Hofis, they're going to try to rebuild their relationships with those militias in Iraq, potentially in Syria. So they will continue doing exactly the destabilization campaign that they always have, but now with the knowledge that really maybe no one's coming for them anymore to try and stop them. And so Israel is in a position whereby if they don't try to eradicate this threat as soon as humanly possible, they are left with very few options about how to deal with it later. And like I said, it really couldn't be worse than broader tenants of this type of agreement, especially when we're thinking about the future of the Middle East, the future of the Gulf, but also what shape instability will take in the Middle East if this type of agreement comes to pass.

SPEAKER_02 15:22

We've spoken before, haven't we, about how just before this current war in Iran, it seemed that anyone who had any sort of expertise or experience in the Middle East that was involved in the US government sort of didn't have a job anymore. And then this this started. And you were saying at the time that it's like Israel, well, like what do they want out of this? And they obviously would have the regional knowledge. And so the way that it's maybe played out is probably not going to be a surprise to them. And so what do you think of the claims that people are making when they're sort of flippantly referring to the states as the United States of Israel? Do you think they've been played? I think that everybody's saying that is a gobshite.

SPEAKER_00 16:03

But so Israel has a view of this region, which I think is certainly shared by the US, but it's about containing these threats, right? Containing and eradicating the threats to the existence of Israel for sure, like on that particular end of the spectrum. But equally, that there is a there is a possible future for the Middle East that has a shared prosperity and relative safety. Now, that's been an issue, certainly facing Israel, but also, of course, Syria, Iraq, as we all know, for a long time now. But now the Gulf states are looking at as what does in what does constant instability look like and what does it do to your economic prospects? And it's terrible. It's it's quite literally terrible. And in some ways, this is the wake-up call that the Gulf has got to contend with if they're going to try to have a much stronger global positioning, which is that how are we going to deal with problems in our own neighborhood that we have kind of hoisted off to the US or to Israel to try to deal with, despite the fact that they are in many parts our problems. Either we're on the receiving end or we're encouraging or rather kind of acquiescing to an incredibly destabilizing regime in the region. So separate to that, what I would say is that you know, there is another alternative route, which is just as violent and terrible, which is that, you know, the Iranian regime suffers far more attacks and falls, right? If that were to happen, it would be incredibly destabilizing. It would be far worse than Syria, and no, definitely far worse than Iraq, just because of its size. But I really want people to to understand here is that there is no option out of this that is peaceful, right? You're what you're doing at the moment is you're you're dealing with the threat straight on, or you're trying to kind of massage it over time or distribute it over time, but you are dealing with a massive conflict reality that will need to be faced. Yeah. How do they do that? Well, I mean, it's kind of like choose your poison, right? So is the point are you taking your poison now or are you gonna take it later in like after it's kind of drip-fed to you for for a long time? Listen, that's that's well beyond my decision point. There's it's tragic and it's horrible either way. And I would struggle to say that there's any sort of upside to either, but there are different downsides. It just depends on what people's appetite are, which is one of the reasons I'm so worried about this different approach that the Gulf states have taken to this, because they're not on the same side about how they want to deal with this threat, which will of course be the way in which Iran can continue to grow this threat to its neighbors, to its own people, to the world.

SPEAKER_02 18:58

So probably slightly further down, but definitely more recent on Trump's to-do list will be a request, as we understand it from the news today, from Russia for some more support as far as uh air offense said. Yeah, and this has kind of caused a lot of questioning in the press today because of what happened over the weekend, and that was a devastating attack and the bringing out of the hypersonic missile that raised a lot of eyebrows about, you know, the the intensity of that, and then it's you know, please can you help us? And then to add to that, they've also said um so the Russian government have told the top banks and its Federal Reserve that they should shoot down Ukrainian drones themselves as well as handling those costs. And that isn't something that I've heard before in as a as a tactic, you know, every man for themselves, please take this into your own hands. Is it a desperate time to be Russia?

SPEAKER_00 20:01

I would imagine it it is pretty desperate. Um the, I mean, despite the fact that I think that they've gotten quite a bit of cash now from alleviating some of those sanctions related to oil, it has very few friends, right? It its campaign in Ukraine has continued to slog on. The Ukrainians, the Ukrainians were in a little bit of a position, a little a little bit like the Iranians, where they just needed to be able to continue in order to look like they were viable winners here. And they've certainly done that at great cost. And of course, they they suffered some debilitating attacks this weekend that should be mentioned. But all of those acts that you've just said are the acts of desperation on Russia's part. They're certainly not ones where they have a handle on this conflict or how to approach it. I think that it's reminding me a little bit of was it early on in the conflict with Iran, you know, when the especially I think it was during the first days that the strait were affected, and Trump was just like, oh, deal with it yourselves. They were saying that to the European countries, just deal with it yourselves, right? Which is that I've caused this problem, I have no idea how to solve it, and I cannot be arsed with with your complaints about what I've done to the global.

SPEAKER_02 21:17

No one will be able to tell that I don't know what to do about it, because I'll just tell you to do what you need to do.

SPEAKER_00 21:24

Yeah, because it's it's not amateur hour, it's not that. It's just we've reached this stage of desperation whereby the Ukrainians have, as we've said before, they've really surprised, I think, both the world and and to some degree like even their own internal systems by being extremely proficient at this very, very important technological development of drone warfare. And, you know, it's very insidious drone warfare because it's very difficult to protect yourself from it or even know the scale that you would build the protections, right? And so I would imagine that Russia, you know, not famous for its flexibility or its adaptability, is is finding this very, very troubling.

SPEAKER_02 22:08

And it's interesting you say about Ukraine surprising the world because when the war started, or the full-scale invasion, I was still working in news and I remember reporting what was going on, and it was a bit surreal because it's not, it wasn't, war wasn't something as normal as it is now at that point in time. And so at that point, experts were saying that if you're comparing what it's the economies or the military power or you know what what they're made of, that Ukraine could probably last about 30 days. And then I think I read this morning that we're on like 1,550 something.

SPEAKER_00 22:45

Yeah.

SPEAKER_02 22:46

As far as that goes. And so I think we've we've covered as well before, haven't we, the how it kind of stays in one place, certainly when we're talking about how we do the conflict index at at GLED and how it's not really moving very far. But is that just demonstrating Ukraine's sticking power?

SPEAKER_00 23:02

Yeah, I mean, like, listen, attrition and exhaustion are two very, very well-established military strategies. They were both ones that I think Russia had assumed it could use very well against the Ukrainians, both of which tend to be heavy on the civilian costs of conflict, right? So you just keep everything going until everything is effectively destroyed by this conflict. But what they haven't realized is that, you know, that tactic can equally be used by Ukraine. And I think that what we're seeing at the moment is this exhaustion within Russia about how they've chosen to deal with it because they are not adaptable at all. I mean, one of the one of the aspects of this conflict that has been so surprising is its almost medieval quality of, you know, very, very small levels of frontline movement throughout the many years. And then, of course, you have this super kind of almost certainly modern but almost futuristic use of technology and drones by Ukraine that has, you know, has really turned the tide. So I really want to be clear, drones do not win a war for you, but uh they can be important, of course, in in this strategy of attrition and exhaustion.

SPEAKER_02 24:14

Yeah, no, absolutely. And so I think as far as the the news goes, those are the kind of two main talking points at the moment. And I think the question is is kind of sat with would President Trump support Putin in his next move? Is he going to get involved in that? Who knows?

SPEAKER_00 24:29

I mean, like, that's a fool's errand to be guessing what's going to happen there. But I will say this, which is that there's a the unit of there's always a lot of speculation about like when I'm writing a talk at the moment that I'm planning on giving next week, which is the wars of 2027. And as you just pointed out with the conflict index, they will be in the same place they are now, right? But it's not the places so much, it's really the positioning and the kind of the form of conflict, the likelihood it will continue to evolve, with not necessarily even in response to domestic considerations or local considerations, which is what we usually think about, but really about alliances and how the international community is either much more willing to have a higher degree of very fatal conflict that they are expecting, if not using, to shape their own circumstances. But it's so it's not the places, it's the form.

SPEAKER_02 25:25

Yeah, no, absolutely. And then what we're working on with the team at the moment is quite a nice piece about the World Cup around the corner, right? And these countries that you're seeing line up in groups, and you think, hang on a minute, aren't they busy right now, like with these enormous wars that we're watching unfold everywhere? And so as a team, we've kind of been chatting about the links that those kind of sports, I know we said Eurovision before, but how like bringing together. And I remember that story about World War II that I think they used as a John Lewis advert or something, stopped and had a kick about. So I think that that is an interesting one. It'll be it'll be interesting to see how it all kind of plays out on the field. And then just as we've been recording, it's it's come out that Trump has said that Iran's national football team are welcome to participate, but for their own life and their own safety, he says they probably shouldn't stay in America. To which the president of Mexico has said, I don't see a problem, you can stay with us.

SPEAKER_00 26:19

I guess if all their I mean, if you can make their matches there, you know, if he said can organize that, which is doubtful. But I mean, I wish that there would be a better ending to this. But it's a little bit like the Olympics. You know, there's there there are cases in which any country hosting has to deal with these with these geopolitical kind of monsters that that emerge every once in a while. And uh certainly the US engagement with Iran is is today's, right? Or Israel. You know, we were talking before about how Israel has also been disinvited to a number of things, or certainly shunned. And uh so I guess this is the sports version of it.

SPEAKER_02 27:01

Yeah, and it is a bit of a kick in the teeth. So I'm Welsh, as you know, and then the the team that I'm working with on it are Italian, and so neither of us are involved in any way at all, because we didn't qualify.

SPEAKER_00 27:12

You know what I used to tell Ezra when he was young? He'd be like, Well, why isn't Ireland in there? And I would say, Ireland's too good, right? It's so embarrassing for the rest of the teams to have to play Ireland that like we've kind of as a country made a decision that we would we would step aside and let let these people kind of play. And Sam would be off in like off in the corner being like, You just have been out lying to him, and I was like How long did that work for? Yeah, ages, ages, because I would be like, they're so good, they're at they're not in the Euros either. Well, do you know what I will say is at least you've got rugby. Yeah, I was trying to get Ezra into rugby recently because um he seems like he might be he might be growing up to to be built like it, but Sam is just adamantly against it. And on your point here about like the you know, the power of sport to bring people together, I've been to a lot of football tournaments where where people have come to blows over their five-year-old children playing football. So I'm not sure it's quite the you know, the genteel the genteel engagement.

SPEAKER_02 28:20

No, I think I think that that's probably true to the the current associations with it. I don't think any of the current football-related interactions would make it into a John Lewis Abbott.

SPEAKER_00 28:30

Yeah, that's true. But on in better news, Ladybird has managed to not touch any dead bodies while abroad, as per requesting relief. But that's a kind of dish at the moment. I think that like what we're we're seeing, no resolutions and just kind of the continuous kind of machine of politics produce more and more conflict and competition in these places rather than any sort of resolution.

SPEAKER_01 28:55

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