Takaichi Goes to Washington

The main item on Sanae Takaichi's agenda during her recent visit to the White House, on March 19, was China: to shore up Japan's relationship with the U.S. ahead of Trump much-anticipated summit with Xi Jinping. But the Iran war scrambled her plans. Ian and Chang talk about how Japan has now found itself caught in the middle of Trump's war in Iran, the shadow of China on the US-Japan relationship, and the unintended consequences in East Asia of Pax Americana's irreversible deterioration.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:01

Hi, I'm Chang Che, and I'm an American journalist. My co-host Ian Bruma is a Dutch writer and specialist on the politics and culture of East Asia. Ian and I have spent much of our lives living and writing about the region. We both spent many years in Japan and write regularly about China, Japan, and the Koreas for publications like The New Yorker, The New York Times, and the New York Review of Books. Into Asia is a podcast where Ian and I will be discussing what we think are some of the most pressing issues in the region. From demographic decline to the impact of AI to the unresolved legacies of World War II. We're living through a time when old political assumptions are in flux, and we believe Asia will shape the 21st century, much like the West shaped the 20th. Welcome to Into Asia. Hello, listeners, and welcome. Today we're going to be talking about uh Sanae Takeichi, the Prime Minister of Japan's recent visit to the White House. From my understanding, part of the media the motives was that Takaichi wanted some kind of reassurance before Donald Trump's more high-profile scheduled meeting with Xi Jinping that was supposed to be in April. I think now it's May and June because of the Iran war. So I think Takeichi wanted to make sure, you know, she wanted to be the last person to talk to Trump just before the meeting because she's nervous that Trump is unpredictable and he might do some kind of crazy deal with Xi Jinping bilaterally without you know consulting Japan. Um and so I think that was kind of the main driver. I mean, what do you think was the sort of motivating force behind the meeting, Ian?

SPEAKER_01 1:32

Yes, I think that's that's absolutely true. Um uh she also is taking a leaf out of um Abe Shinzo, her predecessor, a mentor's book, that uh she's very keen to get as close personally to Trump as possible. And um, this is partly because Japan is um so completely dependent on the United States for its security, um, even more so than the Europeans are. And so um uh any opportunity to uh uh cement um a firmer personal relationship with this very very um as essential. Now, of course, she didn't know that the Iran War was going to intervene, uh, which made her visit to the White House uh far more perilous because, first of all, Japan is ex is very dependent on uh Middle Eastern oil and therefore uh for the flow of oil and tankers through the Straits of Holmuz. Japan has had a fairly good relation uh with Iran um uh for many years. Um, and she also knew that uh Trump was going to put a lot of pressure on uh America's uh so-called allies um to try and clear up the mess that he himself has made. And so he's contemptuous of the Europeans for having refused to get involved in this war. And she knew before she left for Washington that he was likely to put pressure on Japan, and indeed he had had already uh said such things that Japan should um take part in this and send minesweepers and that kind of thing. And this was going to put her into a very, very tight spot because she didn't want, doesn't want to alienate Trump in any way. Uh, on the other hand, um she is constitutionally unable to take part, to send um Japanese naval ships um uh while combat is still going on. Um that it's forbidden by the constitution. So she would have to turn him down on that. So I think the Japanese were terrified that this visit, because of the Iran War, really, uh, would end very badly for Japan and end up with Trump sort of ranting and raving at her for that that they weren't a dependable ally.

SPEAKER_00 3:54

There's something so on point about 2026 and meeting with Donald Trump when your plans for for uh your your summit just completely goes out the window because of the the United States decides to go into a war with Iran. I mean, you know, and I think that Japan probably feels like they're on the backfoot quite a bit. Um and you know, before before the Iran war, they were afraid that they may again be on the backfoot because you know Trump might give some kind of tacit agreement about Taiwan or something that might undercut what what Takai said in November last year. And I think that that is still kind of hovering in the visit, and we can sort of talk about that. I mean, there's been some really interesting sort of drama with the um director of national intelligence' uh threat protocol. They they released a threat um assessment that basically said that Takaichi strayed from protocol uh from the sort of uh party political line. Did you uh did you see that? And and what what are your thoughts about that threat assessment? Do you think that that was right? I mean, I remember we were talking about it before, and you thought that she just kind of said the quiet part out loud.

SPEAKER_01 4:52

Well, we don't know exactly uh uh why she said what she said uh and and at that time. Um some people say it was sort of an off-the-cuff remark to um uh a comment made in the Japanese diet, and that it wasn't she hadn't prepared it and was therefore uh perhaps incautious. Um I do think she s said out loud what she and many other Japanese politicians think, including again her predecessor uh Abishinzo. Um but my I've always taken a slightly different view from many people on this. I think she said it, whether she said it on the spur of the moment or whether it was prepared or not, but she said it um partly because of Donald Trump. It wasn't just the fear of China and China's might and uh Japan's vulnerability, um in which Taiwan plays a very major role, because if Taiwan were to be seriously threatened or indeed invaded, that that would be a threat to Japan. But uh the Trump factor, I think, plays a big part in that she does want to change the Japanese pacifist constitution, she wants a stronger uh military profile, but uh up until now the Japanese were resigned to being dependent on American protection and American nuclear protection. With Donald Trump, they can no longer be sure of that. And so I think she was sending a signal to the Japanese um to sort of shape up and say, look, um we have to start preparing for a different world, in a way a little bit like the Canadian um Prime Minister Kani, who said, you know, we we no longer live in the post in the post-war. We're now entering a completely different era in which we can no longer depend on the United States as the guarantor of the security of the so-called free world. Um, things have to change. Uh and in his case, he said middle ranking countries have to start getting together and taking care of their own security and no longer rely on the United States in the long run. Now, I'm sure that the Japanese think that too, but with even more urgency, because there is no NATO in East Asia. The Japanese and the South Koreans um are entirely dependent on the United States.

SPEAKER_00 7:26

I mean, I think that there's an interesting dynamic at play here where Trump's pressure on allies to try and step up with their own security is having unintended consequences, right? Takei is making these claims as in in in some ways in reaction to what Trump is doing in Trump 2.0, which is to basically say, we're America first and you get you guys can, you know, everyone else needs to step up with their security. That's what angered China, right? And China called Trump, you know, immediately after Takaichi's comments, and Xi Jinping spent, I think, like half an hour talking to him about how this is not okay. And Trump had to basically call Takeiji and say, you know, you gotta, you gotta tone it down. So these are things that he's causing these reverberations across the global order that he that he doesn't know about. You know, the global order is fracturing, people are reacting, and it's causing these instabilities that he's not he's kind of causing, but he's also having to sort of, you know, ameliorate somehow. He's gotta tell Takaishi to tone it down. And that backdrop is interesting because I think that it clearly shows in general, the US hasn't really taken a side in the current China-Japan dispute. The US-Japan relationship is always kind of, you know, they always try to present an extremely united front, but we know that it's there's always a lot of distance between the two. And this was a clear distance, right? With with sort of the China-Japan relations being so so bad right now, and Trump trying to maintain a trade deal with China. And I think that that's, you know, one thing that we were looking for in the summit is how that would play out during the summit. And I don't know about you, Ian, but it seems to me like they kind of kicked the can down the road. I mean, the questions and the readouts don't seem like there was much progress on that front. It looks like the United States just kind of uh, you know, I think Trump made a qu made a comment that's like that the US, that the China-Japan relationship is kind of edgy right now. And and he said he didn't really say anything else. What do you think about that?

SPEAKER_01 9:27

Well, it's always it always has been uh slightly edgy. I mean, think back to 2009, um, when almost for the first time since World War II, um the Liberal Democratic Party was not was not in power, and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan uh was was in power. And um uh Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to reset in a fairly cautious manner, reset slightly Japan's foreign policy goals. And his idea was that Japan had to become more slightly more independent, move more towards a new relationship with Asia, and be an equal partner with the United States. And there was talk of moving um uh US military bases um from Okinawa and that kind of thing. Now, the Japanese, the conservative Japanese establishment associated with the Liberal Democrats, who have have been in power for most of the time since World War II and still are, um, were very much against this. They wanted to stick to the status quo, meaning Japan would remain dependent on Americans on American support or American security. Washington took the side of the Conservatives and also stopped, tried to stop uh Japan's new initiatives to move more towards to to focus more on Asia and uh less on the special relationship with the United States. So that really came to an end then. Trump is very different. Trump himself uh uh is not a real proponent of Pax Americana, of the post-war order. He wants to break it. And what he seems to have in mind um is to basically divide the world into spheres of three superpowers. That uh Russia has its sphere, which would might include the Ukraine, probably does in Trump's mind, which is why he takes Putin's side usually against Zelensky. He sort of feels that that is part of Russia's legitimate sphere. He sees a future in which China has its sphere, and that would include East Asia and its periphery, and uh the United States uh controls the Western Hemisphere. I think that's how he sees the world, that the only powers that matter are the three superpowers and the periphery, the peripheral powers, the middle powers, in Khani's words, uh, should uh simply listen to what the big powers tell them. Now, this makes the relationship with Japan and Korea edgy, because um they are clearly very much in China's periphery, and yet they have this relationship, security relationship with the United States. And so uh, in some ways, if this is indeed the way Trump sees the post-PAX Americana world, the Japanese and the Koreans are a nuisance, which is why he tells everybody to, you know, take care of their own security and uh the American taxpayer will no longer pay for this, etc., etc. Now, the question is how China sees this development, how China sees the um the post-u-Pax-Americana world. Now, on the one hand, they welcome it. They want China to be the great power in Asia and East Asia. They don't want the Americans to be there interfering. On the other hand, if the if the choice is between the United States uh being the sort of the policeman of East Asia and keeping its uh allies, Japan and Korea and and and and Taiwan in order, um, or to um hand over uh the responsibility for um security to the Japanese, they might very well, or at least some Chinese, might very well prefer Pax Americana. They're more afraid of uh re-militarized Japan than they are of America continuing to play its role. I I I would imagine that these are things that are debated or thought about um uh in very small circles, of course, uh in Beijing. I I don't know the answer to this. But that that is why Xi Jinping would call um Donald Trump and say, keep your, you know, keep Japan uh in order.

SPEAKER_00 13:58

That's true. I do think that we can separate, though, like the kind of longer-term question of who is going to guarantee East Asian security, either the US or Japan, from just the question of Taiwan and sort of what positioning the US should have on Taiwan at this moment. I mean, right now, there's there's already been a kind of the strategic ambiguity policy that America has towards Taiwan is it's been a long time and it's it's starting to kind of fray. But famously, Biden was sort of had had made some gaffes about saying that he would defend Taiwan. And so from China's perspective, it seems to be a really great opportunity while Trump is still in a president, and and as you say, he has sort of asserted this kind of Western hemisphere. He's already kind of hinted at this idea that we're gonna end up we're gonna have control over the Western hemisphere, by which he's also kind of implying that China can have control over the eastern hemisphere. So I feel like in this case, it's he's just so primed to trade some kind of economic deal for something, uh some kind of improvement on the Taiwan issue, you know, like uh some kind of tacit shift, you know, Taiwan, you know, Trump recognizing that he opposes, you know, he he Trump saying that he opposes Taiwan, Taiwanese independence, like even that small statement to try and inch him towards that, I think would be a major win for the for the Chinese. And so I think that that is hovering for the May-June meeting. Uh, and and that's a that's a really scary thing for for Japan and Korea. So I think that that was the clearly the main goal for Takaichi was to back him off that.

SPEAKER_01 15:37

Well, also to thinking about Taiwan, um the Americans have have defended Taiwan for various different reasons. Um for a long time Taiwan is a military dictatorship, but the Americans stood by Taiwan um uh uh because out of because of anti-communism, because they wanted to keep uh to oppose communist China, they wanted to stop communist China from becoming too powerful. Then when Taiwan became a democracy, uh the rhetoric changed somewhat, and it was about defending a democratic government and defending democracy against uh powerful dictatorship. Um and it was of course, of course, also about defending the security of Japan and South Korea by having open sea lanes. But the idea that Taiwan should be defended because uh of because it's a democracy, I don't think that enters Donald Trump's mind. I don't think he cares uh at all about Taiwan being a democracy. I mean, he would be perfectly happy for China to take over um if it weren't for other security concerns and and and and and indeed Japan. Now, what is Takaichi's strategy? I think in the longer run, she is positioning or trying to position Japan for a post-PAX Americana world, which is why she wants the constitution to be changed, so that Japan can actually um uh send troops into combat um if necessary. Um she wants to beef up the army, she uh the military, she wants Japan to be much more independent in that in that way, but she also knows that this will take a long time. And so kicking the can uh down the road uh is the short-term strategy, or tactic maybe. And that is uh what she was doing in Washington. It was simply uh playing for time by uh in the same way, really, that the Secretary General of NATO, uh Mark Rutte, whenever he sees Trump or speaks about Trump in public, um he covers him in oily flattery uh so that Trump is less likely to break up NATO. And she does sh does exactly the same thing. I mean, when she said to Trump in the White House or at a press conference that Donald is the only one who can s uh guarantee peace and prosperity in the world, um uh and and and telling him how handsome he is and so on, she was obviously very carefully briefed by the Japanese foreign ministry. Pile it on, just keep him happy, flatter him, tell him how how good looking and how great he is. But uh everybody knows that this can work in the in the short term, and indeed it does seem to work. I mean, he does respond to flattery. When Rutte did this, um he backed off uh from Greenland and um and NATO and so on. And in this case, even though Japan hasn't sent any ships to the streets of Hormuz, he came out of the meeting saying, you know, Japan was great and a great ally and was doing its bit for to help America and Iran and so on. So it really does work, but it only works in the short term because he can change his mind uh five minutes later. And she knows that, but every five minutes is valuable.

SPEAKER_00 18:57

Yeah. So let's talk about Iran. I mean, so as you you have already mentioned this, but Japan is extremely exposed to the Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern oils through the Strait of Hormuz. They take about 95, uh over 90% of the crude oil through the strait. Um, and so Japan is has already released its emergency uh stockpile of oil. They I think they have like 200 or so days of that, um, but it's a delay tactic. And so it it's it's kind of a natural Japan is like a prime candidate for for taking uh, you know, Trump has been on about getting allies to contribute by you know uh bringing warships into the Strait of Hormuz, and Japan is one of the prime candidates. Um Takaichi had already been asked about this before she came to the US. She had said in the diet that she was going to tell Trump, you know, what Japan, you know, legally can and cannot do in the sort of framework under the constitution. I don't know how well you uh know like technically like what they're allowed to do. Like my understanding is that, you know, unless ironically, you know, like when she said that Taiwan was could could potentially be like a like an existential threat, right, or some kind of like survival crisis, like that would be the trigger for Japan to be able to send their military to the Strait of Hormuz, I think. Like by by defining the Iran war right now as something that's like a surviv a survival-threatening situation, which I don't think can be done. So do you know like what is feasible under um the current constitutional framework?

SPEAKER_01 20:31

Well, it keeps changing, and and um again Abe amended uh it and and or reinterpreted the uh constitution to mean that they could take part in in collective defense. But basically, constitutionally, they're only allowed to use um uh uh any kind of force if Japan is under direct threat. So if some if if uh another power were poised to, let's say, invade Japan or attack Japan directly, they would they could are constitutionally, they could then use military force to defend themselves. What they can't do is send any kind uh uh any kind of um uh military to take part in combat um outside Japan. And what uh Abe in his reinterpretation, I think I can't remember the exact phrase, but I think um he interpreted the constitution to say that Japan could take part in military operations if it was part of a collective uh defense. But again, uh Japan has never used any kind of military in any kind of combat abroad. So they that what they can do is send minesweepers and so on when uh a war is has been concluded and to sort of clean up and uh that kind of thing. They can send medical personnel, they can help out in some ways, but never to engage in direct combat. And uh so I I don't I don't think uh even if um uh uh the um oil supplies would be uh directly threatened by uh Iran, that doesn't mean that they can constitutionally send military can send troops to the Middle East to actually take part in combat. They can't do that.

SPEAKER_00 22:20

Yeah. It doesn't seem that she even made a commitment about minesweepers or surveillance or intelligence mission. You know, those kinds of things that you what might be allowed into the constitution. But what was really I think the fascinating thing was that just I think yesterday or two days ago, the Iran foreign ministers said that Japan, they would let Japan through uh the Strait of Hormuz, Japanese ships this through the Strait of Hormuz. So there's this kind of fascinating dilemma now for Japan, you know, because Japan, as you say, they have had um a diplomatic relationship with Iran. Iran has offered Japan uh safe passage through the strait. And at the same time, you know, Japan has to think about, you know, sucking up to Trump because they what they really care about is China. So it's a fascinating situation because they have they they they have 90% of their crude oil through the strait. They would love to just have straight passage now, but then it looks the optics of that looks awful in front of Trump. Who you want to pretend like you're on their s his his side. I mean, what do you what do you think about that?

SPEAKER_01 23:25

Yes, well, that's exactly what why I think they were terrified um uh when uh Takaichi went to Washington. They were terrified it would go very badly wrong. And end up with him sort of ranting at her in the way he did to Zelensky. And she solved it uh basically through flattery. Uh but of course that's not a long-term solution. Um it it it worked this time, but those dilemmas that you mentioned have not gone away.

SPEAKER_00 23:52

I think that they're trying I think that Japan is trying to play both sides because I think that there's diplomatic channels towards Iran asking for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for Japanese ships. And at the same time, Japan is had signed on to a pledge, basically, saying that with a bunch of other European countries, five European nations, so Japan and five European nations expressing that their the readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts on Hormuz, which is vague, but that's you know, in the broad theme of we're on the side of the allies. So I I don't really know what Japan is doing and and what it will end up, you know. I I'm I I think the the main question that I have is are they going to take Iran up on their offer to have Japanese ships just go through the strait? And how would they be able to sell that to Donald Trump?

SPEAKER_01 24:40

That's indeed a huge question. I s I suppose one thing that they could do is that Trump seems now to be thinking, and of course he he wants to walk away from this war as quickly as possible because it's it's it it could damage him very badly in the midterm elections with uh gasoline prices going sky high and so on. So he'd love to walk away and claim victory, and then then what he would say is, you know, um uh the Europeans and others, you clay clean up the mess. Uh you're dependent on the str oil going through the Straits of Hormuz. So uh, you know, it's up to you now. I think he'd love to do that. Now the Europeans, reluctant though they may be, but they would at least still be able to use some kind of military force to try and open the Straits of Hormuz if Iran insists on keeping it closed. The Japanese cannot do that, but what they could do is once the conflict is over and Iran agrees that ships uh will be allowed to go through the strait again, there's probably still quite a lot of work to do to clean up mines and uh and and all kinds of stuff that is there that could still cause a great deal of damage. There they can play a role. They could they they can then send minesweepers because it's not. That would not be a question of um of taking part in combat. But I agree that the the dilemma on the one hand, making sure that the Japanese can still get oil, on the other hand, looking like a loyal ally of Donald Trump's is going to be very, very difficult.

SPEAKER_00 26:16

What did you think about the comment that Trump made when the journalist asked him, why didn't you notify Japan about the Iran attack? Trump was like, Well, you know, we wanted it to be a surprise. I mean, who knows better about surprises than Japan? You know, Pearl Harbor, why didn't you notify me about Pearl Harbor? I mean, it it's such a ridiculous comment, but clearly, like, it just popped into his head and he just said it out loud. But to be fair to him, I think that he was just trying to say that he w wanted the you know, this this war to be a surprise. He didn't want to notify allies because he was afraid that it might leak. What what do you think?

SPEAKER_01 26:53

That is what he was trying to say, but from what I have read, Takaichi was angry at the Japanese journalist uh who asked the question. And I think that's very unfair to the journalists because it's a completely fair question. I mean, you c you cannot, as a as a responsible um superpower, simply go to war, not only without notifying your allies, especially if you're going to ask those allies to help you later, but also without notifying Congress. I mean, even in the Iraq, in uh the Iraq war, ill-conceived though it may have been, um, President Bush did try and uh get the Allies online, and he did uh involve Congress, and he did try and sort of pave the way to make it look legitimate and so on. Trump did none of that. So it's a completely legitimate question. And the response, well, you know, it has to be done in secret, and we're not going to tell you. This has become the stock response to any question, including from the the American press, about what America's goals are. And people are not asking Trump to give away military secrets or to um uh discuss tactics, but it's legitimate to ask the administration what the strategy is and what the what the what they're trying to achieve. And this is where they're very cagey because the this changes from day to day, sometimes from hour to hour. Sometimes it's regime change, sometimes it's about oil, sometimes it's about nuclear weap uh nuclear weapons. And so it's it's it's it's very it's an entirely legitimate question to ask A what the strategy is, and B why the Allies are not um involved in this, even though you know the Allies are asked to take part. Um now, how how serious is uh a crack like that about Pearl Harbor? I think the Japanese take it in their stride because uh you sort of expect it from Trump now. If Joe Biden had said something like that, or even Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan, it would have been, you know, all over the world press, and there would have been a diplomatic incident, probably. But in this case, people shrug their shoulders. I mean, that's he said so many outrageous things. I mean, it doesn't come as a surprise. So I think the people think it's entirely in character.

SPEAKER_00 29:23

That's true. Yeah, the tolerance has just gotten a lot higher. So to kind of summarize this, the U.S. wanted Japan to pitch in and send warships to the strait. They did not make a decision on that. And so, in a way, Japan kind of came out of this, you know, relatively uh the the winner in that they didn't have to make any commitments on Hormuz. Although, you know, they're they're they've already made the deal um to invest, you know, billions of dollars in the United States. And so that that is still, you know, on schedule. Um several of the nuclear plants that they've uh uh agreed to has has already kind of started to break ground. And so, you know, Japan is is is trying to play up their their end of the bargain. Um, this is from the previous uh some negotiations with the terror with tariffs, even though the Supreme Court has struck down the tariffs as unlawful, Japan is still going on with that. But the last question I have is did Japan get the reassurances that it wanted on China with Donald Trump? And I will say that the only real empirical uh outcome that that tr that Trump has mentioned is that he's he he just kind of off the cuff said, I'll speak Japan's praises to she. I think he said that. Um, and I don't know what that means. Um, but of course, the general uh vibe of the of the summit was was extremely you know jovial and happy, and and they they they sent a picture of Takeichi like almost in a kind of dancing pose. So what do you think about um you know that question? Like, do you think that Takeichi has come back to Japan with with the reassurances that that she wanted?

SPEAKER_01 31:10

No, because I don't think such reassurances are possible with this president because he changes his mind all the time. I think it's very important uh to that we discuss in our podcast in now and in future, but that we reflect on the post the post um Pax Americana world, because that is what we're we're entering now. And everybody knows it. And it probably had to happen anyway, but Trump has has speeded it up because he has no he's he's not committed to it. For the time being, the the United States is still protected, is still guaranteeing Japanese security. But um we don't know how long that's going to last. And I think she was probably happy uh at the end of her visit uh to Washington because things didn't go very bad, didn't go badly. But in the long-term problem, and this concerns the the Chinese as much as it does the Japanese, the long term, I think, is that we're faced with two different futures in Asia. One is that this that Pax Americana continues, which is highly unlikely, but that's it's possible that for a while it will still continue. Or in the longer run, Japan and South Korea will become nuclear powers. And the question then is which would China prefer? Of course they prefer uh for America to leave and Japan not to become a nuclear power, but I think that's unlikely to happen.

SPEAKER_00 32:40

Yeah, it seems to me that Trump is, like you say, he doesn't believe in Pax Americana, but on the other hand, he kind of just wants Asia to stay the way the he kind of wants the status quo in Asia, right? I mean, based on the pattern of what happened in November, you know, Trump didn't say, yeah, go Japan. You know, you're you're taking you're taking your security seriously. I mean, he could have said, look, this is a good sign that Takaichi and the Japanese government is taking their security seriously. This is the world that we're entering. I mean, he could have had this kind of forward-looking vision that is consistent with his post-PAX Americana theory. And he could have just picked up the phone with she and said, I'm sorry, you're gonna have to deal with it. Because, like you said, he could have told Shi, you know, you either want, do you, do you want Japan or me? You know, you can you I mean, do you want Japan or the US? You can you have you can only pick one, right? You can't have none. Um, but instead, he immediately you know hung up the phone with Xi, called on the same day, called Takaichi and said, You gotta tone it down. Um, tone down your rhetoric. So it seems like he wants you know, he he wants to have his cake and eat it too. Uh I mean, do you think that I'm interpreting that right?

SPEAKER_01 33:53

Yes, probably, but it's very difficult to um discern any kind of strategic um uh logic in in what Trump is thinking or doing, because uh I don't think he has a strategy, because it it it it appears that he doesn't really think very much beyond next week. I mean, his the way he sees the world is is how it's gonna look on TV and how he's gonna look, and um and that can change very, very quickly. And so I don't think there that he thinks strategically. And um, you know, people who strategies can of course be wrong, um uh and but most presidents have had a strategy. I don't think Trump really has one beyond this very vague idea of dividing the world into uh uh you know basically divvying it up uh between three superpowers. I think that's vaguely in his head. But apart from that, I don't think he has a real strategy. And so it's very difficult for a country like Japan to deal with that. Uh you know, they're stuck with a status quo, but they realize it's not gonna last. And so um again, I I have I I I have very little sympathy for a lot of um Takaichi's politics, um, but I sympathize with her dilemma. And um and I th I I sympathize with her attempt to gradually move Japanese public uh opinion towards thinking seriously about what the post-American world will look like.

SPEAKER_00 35:34

So, in a way, her her line at the the her flattery line in the beginning of the summit where she says that Trump is the only one who can you know guarantee peace around the world, maybe she's saying she she's kind of saying, look, you know, the ball is in your court. Next time you're with Xi Jinping, you can choose to sell us out, or you can choose to, you know, stay the line. So in a way, it's a kind of it's up to you. And in a and and which is kind of true, right?

SPEAKER_01 36:02

Yes, that is true, but I I I don't think one should read too much into it. I think that the the the first goal was uh you know to keep this uh great big bully happy so that he doesn't sort of uh do more damage. And as a diplomatic maneuver, uh that worked. Now it's it w the problem is, and this again is very much like uh Mark Rotter, the Secretary General of NATO, he's been criticized for flattering Trump in in such a sort of gross manner. But from his point of view, uh you could say, well, his his job is to keep NATO together, and you can only keep NATO together with American leadership by flattering, yeah, America. Yeah, him rather than me, but I mean if it somebody has to flatter this man. And and and on the other hand, there are those who say, well, um the uh uh bullies always respond to people who stand up who stand up to them. And uh and it's it's a mistake to simply flatter him because uh you you can play for time that way, but you don't solve anything. And um both are true. That is probably true. Uh on the other hand, you can't afford simpl to alienate him unnecessarily. And uh I think both Rethe and uh Takaichi have concluded that it's better to play for time um than anything else because they have no other options.

SPEAKER_00 37:30

Alright, great. That's a good place to end. If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe, leave us a review, or share it with someone who might find it interesting. You can find more conversations like this on my Substack, and follow the show wherever you get your podcasts. I'm Chain Che. Thanks for joining us, and we'll see you next time.