REPORT: Demobilization or pause? Bolivian cross-sectoral demonstrations ease but may re-escalate

Several factors have contributed to the decline in roadblocks and mobilization, but the truce reached between some sectors and the government remains fragile.

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Demobilization or pause. Bolivian cross-sectoral demonstrations ease but may re-escalate. On June 20, President Rodrigo Paz declared a nationwide state of emergency and deployed military forces on the street to remove anti-government roadblocks after large-scale cross-sector demonstrations broke out in Bolivia more than 50 days ago. First, against a controversial land reform, before broadening to grievances linked to fuel shortages and prices, wage demands, and rising inflation. The decision comes despite the lifting of several roadblocks as part of ongoing negotiations with some of the mobilized sectors, including the signing of an agreement with the Bolivian Workers' Central the night prior. Both negotiations and early operations under the state of emergency to restore traffic contributed to a significant decrease in the number of roadblocks, down to 12 from the 150 reported in May. However, sectors excluded from the discussions, or groups whose demands are less easily accommodated, are likely to push for renewed demonstrations and generate unrest at a more localized scale in the coming weeks. At the same time, while the state of emergency and removal of roadblocks are likely to ease discontent among sectors that want economic activity to resume, its declaration at a time when mobilization was already loosing steam suggests it might be a prelude to targeted operations to arrest former President Evil Morales in Chaparé, Cochabamba, as well as a tougher government response toward the most radicalized sectors, which is likely to lead to localized outbreaks of violence. A fragile truce leaves room for an escalation in mobilization. Several factors have contributed to this decline in roadblocks and mobilization, even prior to the declaration of the state of emergency. Firstly, roadblocks have disrupted food, medicine, and fuel supply chains, further straining Bolivia's economy and pushing the population to the brink of exhaustion. On May 18, during the fourth week of mobilization, a growing number of counter-mobilizations against roadblocks emerged, and tensions persist between mobilized actors and those asking for roadblocks to be lifted. Transport workers in Santa Cruz have notably threatened to demonstrate if the government fails to clear traffic. While the clearing of roadblocks helps alleviate public discontent, efforts to remove the remaining roadblocks are likely to generate localized friction in the coming weeks. Secondly, the mobilization has brought together a broad range of actors, but has failed to rally under a unified leadership or a shared set of demands. This made it vulnerable to fragmentation once the government began sectoral negotiations, as seen when some teachers and transport workers sectors withdrew after reaching agreements on 6th and 16th May respectively. Likewise, the 19th June agreement, which the government signed with the COB, further weakened the movement's mobilization capacity, allowing the government to declare a state of emergency and clear the remaining roadblocks while facing limited resistance. Yet, the very same fragmentation complicates a unified agreement and demobilization today. Lastly, even if the government has largely relied on negotiations as a demobilizing approach, made possible by the rapprochement of Vice President Edmund Lara with Paz, this strategy is in constant tension with the use or threat of coercive measures, thereby contributing to weakening the movement. Authorities attempted to neutralize prominent figures from the mobilizing sectors by issuing arrest orders against leaders such as COB leader Mario Argoyo, Tupac Katari leader Vicente Salazar, and mining leader Andrés Paye. The use of coercion culminated in the declaration of the nationwide state of emergency on June 20, although Paz originally refrained from doing so. But despite the removal of roadblocks and prior decline in mobilization, the truce between some mobilized sectors and the government remains fragile, and paradoxically, the same dynamics that contributed to partial demobilization could drive re-escalation in the coming weeks. Where could mobilization and violence re-escalate? The government has engaged in negotiations with key mobilized sectors, including the COB, to pacify the country, agreeing to refrain from prosecuting leaders of the mobilized sector, and to evaluate the release of detained demonstrators, among other demands. However, the movement remains fractured. Key social organizations like the Tupac Katari and Bartolina Sisa Indigenous and Peasant Organizations, as well as the coca growers of the Tropico de Cochabamba, have thus far not agreed to demobilize, and a breakdown in negotiations or internal divisions could trigger a localized escalation in demonstrations and violence. Despite the removal of all roadblocks in the La Paz department, refer to the map in the report for details, future demonstrations remain likely. As the country's administrative center and the home of key mobilizing sectors, La Paz is a pressure point for securing concessions from the government. Although the COB signed an agreement with the government, the Tupac Qatari and Bartolina-Sisa organizations have rejected the deal and criticized the COB leadership for breaking the unity pact behind the mobilization, and only called for the temporary lifting of demonstrations while they consult their bases. These organizations often operate through provincial representation and local consultations, which could slow demobilization in the department even after compromises are reached with the government. Both demonstrations and the removal of roadblocks have thus far been mainly peaceful. Still, there is an imminent risk of escalation in the Cochabamba department, where most roadblocks remain two days after the state of emergency was declared. Refer to the map in the report for details. And where tensions converge due to the presence of Morales, who has taken refuge in his stronghold to resist an arrest warrant for human trafficking. On June 17, coca producers and sectors aligned with Morales announced the intensification of roadblocks and checkpoint controls to identify suspected intelligence personnel, and some of their demands, including Paz's resignation, appear less negotiable. Coca growers from the Tropico de Cochabamba are expected to meet on June 22 to decide how to respond to the state of emergency, leaving open the possibility of escalation. Demonstrators in Cochabamba also retain significant disruptive capacity, including hampering traffic along the roads connecting the La Paz and Santa Cruz departments. Attacks by demonstrators against transporters using stones and dynamite in Javini on June 21, and the throwing of stones at security forces in Cruce Aguirre on June 20 suggests that tensions between mobilized sectors, the rest of the population, and security forces could escalate. Paz has further warned Morales of his imminent arrest. While Morales's mobilizing capacity has proved weaker throughout this wave of demonstrations than in the past, a special operation to remove him from his stronghold in the Cochabamba department's Chaparé province, where most pro-Morales demonstrations have been concentrated in recent years, is likely to cause a localized escalation. The prospect of state intervention has become increasingly plausible following the declaration of a state of emergency and the removal of roadblocks, which could facilitate security operations. It would also resonate with the government's inflammatory rhetoric toward the protest movement, as the PAS government is framing the most hardline sectors that have rejected negotiations and asked for his resignation as narco-terrorists, a narrative echoed by United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. This rhetoric has gained further significance following the recent signing of a US$20 million agreement with the U.S. to fight drug trafficking, at a time when the U.S. keeps signaling support for military intervention against suspected drug trafficking members across the region. There have also been reports of emerging armed groups warning against the use of force to clear roadblocks, notably around San Julián in Santa Cruz, where previous attempts to remove roadblocks led to several clashes. However, the government's clearing operations of the San Julián roadblock under the state of emergency have thus far not triggered escalation. This recent wave of demonstrations in Bolivia and the removal of roadblocks under the state of emergency have remained mainly peaceful thus far. Yet previous waves of demonstrations in the region, including Chile and Ecuador in 2019, Colombia in 2021, and Peru in 2022 and 2023, have shown how heavy-handed security responses can contribute to further escalation, highlighting the importance of calibrated state responses during periods of mass unrest. As such, the pursuing of negotiations with sectors that remain mobilized will be key in determining the future trajectory of unrest in Bolivia. But so will the state's response in the coming weeks.