REPORT: How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map

The rift in the Sinaloa Cartel has resulted in a realignment of criminal groups and openings for new conflicts in contested territories that will affect Mexico's criminal dynamics.

Authors: Sandra Pellegrini, Maria Fernanda Arocha

This episode is an AI narrated version of an ACLED report, presenting data-driven analysis of conflict trends and developments around the world.

For more from ACLED, visit ACLEDdata.com

AI-generated audio is used for ACLED report narrations only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, minor pronunciation or intonation errors may occasionally occur. Webinar recordings feature the original speakers.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:06

How the Sinaloa Cartel Rift is redrawing Mexico's criminal map. The arrest of Ismael Elmayo Zambada in the United States on July 25, 2024, marked a breaking point for the Sinaloa Cartel. Amid simmering tensions as a result of previous disruptions in its top leadership, the arrest of the former top leader led to an all-out war between two of the cartel's factions, Los Chapitos and El Mayo, to the extent that many have begun to question the cartel's continued existence. The rift has led to a spike in violence in the group's stronghold in Sinaloa, but it has also started to spread in territories controlled and disputed by the Sinaloa cartel, as other criminal groups seek to leverage the fracture for territorial expansion. The outbreak of clashes and attacks in September 2024, following El Mayo's arrest, contributed to 2024 recording some of the highest levels of violence involving non-state armed groups in Mexico over the last six years, and has since contributed to persistently high levels of violence across the country. Confronted with pre-existing and emerging conflicts, President Claudia Scheinbaum has started to implement her new security plan, which she unveiled upon taking office on October 1, 2024. The state response under the Scheinbaum administration has involved heightened deployments, intelligence-led operations, and high-profile arrests. These actions are partly influenced by renewed pressure from the Trump administration to reduce drug trafficking and migration, as United States politicians are contemplating unilateral military strikes against criminal organizations in Mexico. Although still in its early stages, there are few signs that these efforts have meaningfully weakened criminal groups. Instead, measures the government is undertaking suggest it may be reenacting the kingpin strategy used by President Felipe Calderón to topple criminal groups' top leadership, which risks fueling the emergence of opportunistic criminal actors. The fallout of the Sinaloa Cartel dispute has set off a broader realignment of criminal groups and openings for new conflicts in contested territories. To understand the significance of the Sinaloa cartel's rift and its impact on gang violence dynamics, it is necessary to understand how it came to garner such influence and how its internal structure has enabled its expansion across the country. The Sinaloa Cartel, its operations, and internal divisions. The Sinaloa Cartel, one of Mexico's largest criminal groups, has a federal structure that allows its factions and allies to maintain full operation autonomy and horizontal relations without a rigid hierarchy. In the early 1990s, the Sinaloa Cartel consolidated its operations under the leadership of former members of the fractured Guadalajara Cartel, Joaquin Guzmán, known as El Chapo, Ismael El Mayo Zambada, and Juan José El Azul Esparagosa. The criminal organization helmed by these three leaders established its strongholds in Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua states, particularly around the mountainous area known as the Golden Triangle, where the cartel controlled poppy and marijuana crops. With time, the cartel has diversified its criminal activities, involving itself in the production of synthetic drugs, extortion of agricultural industries, and other legal and illegal businesses. While these states have been crucial for operations, the cartel has also formed alliances with local criminal groups to expand its influence in strategic areas connecting to the northern border in Sonora and Baja California states, and the south in Chiapas and Quintana Roo states. The leadership of the cartel has been shaken on several occasions, notably after the arrests of two of the cartel's historical leaders and the suspected death of El Azul in 2014, leading to readjustments between the different factions. In 2016, Mexican authorities arrested El Chapo, who was later extradited to the U.S. in 2017. More recently, on July 25, 2024, El Mayo was arrested in the U.S., along with Joaquin Guzmán López, one of El Chapo's sons. Following the arrests of these high-profile figures, the leadership of the cartel's factions has been transferred to their family members. Currently, the cartel comprises two main factions, both of which are connected to the cartel's founding members. The faction led by El Chapo's sons, known as Los Chapitos, operates primarily in Sinaloa and has a strong presence in the municipality of Curiacán and on the Pacific coast of the state, as well as in Sonora and Baja California. Refer to the map in the report for details, where they have disputed territorial control with rival groups. The other main faction was led by El Mayo. After his arrest, it came under the control of one of his sons, who is known as El Mayito Flaco. The El Mayo faction dominates operations in Durango and rural areas of Sinaloa, and has a strong presence in Baja California, Sonora, and Zacatecas. Other groups have formed part of the Cartel Federation, and at times have competed with the Los Chapitos and El Mayo factions. Notably, the factions and cells that have maintained relevant ties with the founding leaders of the cartel are the Gente del Guano Criminal Group, led by El Chapo's brother Aureliano Guzmán Loera, known as El Guano, and one led by the Cabrera Sarabia family, traditional partners of El Mayo. By virtue of its federal structure and system of alliances, the Sinaloa Cartel has been able to consolidate its presence in several states, especially along the northern border. However, its presence along this strategic trafficking corridor has constantly generated rivalries as other criminal organizations have aimed to leverage the cartel's internal tensions to challenge its hegemony and its stronghold. Although the cartel had managed to maintain relative unity, the arrest of El Mayo, which his supporters blame on El Chapo's sons, marked a turning point. They claim the Los Chapitos leader, Joaquin Guzmán López, betrayed Elmayo to U.S. authorities in the hopes of gaining leverage for himself and his brother, Ovidio Guzmán Lopez. Both are facing charges in the U.S. The dispute sparked an open war that threatens the Federation's stability. Sinaloa's factional turf war spreads across the cartel's stronghold. Los Chapitos' alleged treason triggered an open conflict with the El Mayo faction in Sinaloa, the hotbed of the dispute. While the cartel had gone through internal disputes in the past, El Mayo and other cartel leaders were known for their role as mediators, who helped to reduce the risk of direct conflict between the factions. Following a period of adjustment after El Mayo's July 2024 arrest, during which limited violent incidents involving rival cartel members occurred, the factions engaged in a wave of clashes and attacks that started in earnest on September 9. Between July 2024 and March 2025, gang targeting of civilians and gang-on-gang clashes nearly quadrupled compared to the period from November 19, 2023 to July 24, 2024, the previous eight months, reaching a peak in October and November. The violence reached levels never seen in this state since Accled began coverage of Mexico in 2018. The escalation of the conflict seems to be driven by the Elmayo faction's interest in increasing its control in towns and cities along the coast, where the Los Chapitos faction has maintained more influence, in order to broaden the scope of its operations, which have traditionally been concentrated in areas bordering the state of Durango. Violent actions in Sinaloa had concentrated mainly in the state's capital city, Culiacan, which, even before the outbreak of the conflict, was the scene of disputes by these factions and smaller groups that fought for the control of extortion operations and the local drug market. However, violence has since spread into rural areas of the Culiacan municipality and other southern municipalities as the factions seek to redraw the borderlines of their respective zones of influence. Notably, after El Mayo's arrest, violence has intensified in the south along the Pacific coast, following the state's main roads, including the Federal Highways 15 and 15D, that connect Culiacan to the second main city, Mazaplan, which has an important touristic and commercial port controlled by the cartel. Refer to the map in the report for details. Sinaloa has become the stage of alarming levels of violence targeting civilians. Accled records a high number of killings since September, which is at odds with the Sinaloa cartel's reputation for using less overt violence against civilians. Civilians have been targeted in retaliatory attacks for their suspected links with any of the rival factions. Kidnappings and forced disappearances have also been on the rise, as these groups seek to instill fear and extort ransoms from relatives. Public displays of violence and targeted attacks on prominent figures believed to be connected to or critical of the cartel's leaders, including social media influencers, have served to advertise the strength of the different factions and intimidate their followers. The factions have further targeted politicians and political authorities to establish control over localities and diminish their rivals' political influence. Since El Mayo's arrest on July 25, 2024, Accled records at least 10 targeted attacks against political figures in Sinaloa, some of whom are believed to have ties with one of the cartel's factions. The number of such attacks surpasses the levels recorded in the previous eight months, in a state where the relative hegemony of the Sinaloa cartel contributed to fewer attacks, even during electoral periods. Outside of Sinaloa, the cartel's turf war has also affected Sonora and Baja California, where ongoing disputes between allies of each faction involved in cross-border drug, weapons, and human trafficking escalated. After the outbreak of the infighting following El Mayo's arrest, violence in the neighboring municipalities of San Luis Rio Colorado in Sonora and Mexicali in Baja California has intensified amid disputes between Los Rusos, allies of El Mayo, Los Chapitos, and Los Salazar, a former partner of Los Chapitos. Refer to the graph in the report for details. There are also growing signs that the dispute between rival factions could be spilling into other areas, such as the state of Durango, where violence levels have been relatively low in recent years. In the eight months since El Mayo's arrest, attacks and explosions perpetrated by non-state armed groups have increased, spurred by the greater use of drones. ACLAD records at least 15 actions by armed groups that included the use of a drone charged with explosives, more than double the number of events recorded in the eight preceding months. Rival criminal organizations seek to exploit the Sinaloa cartel rift. The consequences of the Sinaloa cartel's rift extend beyond internal dynamics, as other criminal groups leverage the cartel's strained operational capacities to make territorial advances or forge new alliances. One of the groups seemingly seeking advantage from the Sinaloa cartel's internal rift is its main rival, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, CJNG. Since the Sinaloa cartel's fracture, ACLED data point to an intensification of the conflict between the two cartels in areas of illicit activities. A notable example is Tijuana, Baja California, where clashes between non-state armed groups and their targeting of civilians increased by 16% between July 25, 2024 and March 31, 2025, compared to the eight months prior. The surge has particularly affected the city's northern districts along the U.S. border, where the Sinaloa Cartel and other criminal groups, including the Tijuana Cartel and CJNG, which has expanded in the state since at least 2014, compete for the control of cross-border trafficking activities in this critical corridor. Similar dynamics are also at play in Manzanillo Colima, where the dispute between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel over control of the port, a key hub for drug trafficking, has intensified. Meanwhile, in the Huahicori municipality in Niarit, the Elmayo faction of the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG have both sought to secure the route connecting the state of Sinaloa with Sacatecas, a crucial link between the Pacific Coast and the Northern Trafficking Corridor. The escalation in violence in localized and highly strategic areas suggests a deliberate effort to concentrate their warring power and assert dominance in vital trafficking points. However, the CJNG's behavior in other areas under dispute with the Sinaloa cartel is not uniquely offensive. In Chiapas, gang-related violence decreased by 51% between 25 July 2024 and 31 March 2025, compared to the previous eight-month period. Refer to the graph in the report for details. This happened even though Chiapas has been the epicenter of a turf war between the two cartels over the control of migrant trafficking routes from Central America. While the decrease can be partly attributed to state-led efforts to curb insecurity and increased collaboration between state and military forces, the CJNG may also have adopted strategic patience. It is either waiting for the Sinaloa cartel to weaken or is seeking an arrangement with local power brokers to preserve its key operations without resorting to violence. Part of the reason for this may be that the U.S. designated the CJNG a foreign terrorist organization, FTO, alongside the Sinaloa cartel and four other Mexican criminal groups, exposing the group to heightened scrutiny from the Mexican government. At the same time, it remains actively engaged in turf wars and clashes with security forces in the state of Michoacan, which provides an additional incentive for the CJNG to maintain a low profile and concentrate its efforts on high-priority fronts. Nevertheless, Chiapas and other highly contested areas remain at risk of a violent escalation in conflict. In Sacatecas, violence has remained constant since the onset of the Sinaloa cartel's inter-Nesine conflict, despite the convergence of CJNG's interest and territorial expansion in this state since 2020. As criminal dynamics shift, the CJNG might seek to take advantage of the redeployment of Cabrera Sarabia forces, a Sinaloa Cartel affiliate aligned with El Mayo, to neighboring Durango, where they are thought to support El Mayo against Los Chapitos. The CJNG is not the only criminal group likely to exploit the Sinaloa Cartel's fragmentation. In Sonora, the cartel's factions face pressure from the Sonora Independent Cartel, an alliance formed in 2023 by three Sinaloa cartel offshoots to stop the cartel's expansion. Another group, La Linia, has reportedly taken advantage of the relocation of Sinaloa Cartel's forces to Culiacan to intensify its incursion in Chihuahua against Los Salgueiro, a cell affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel. Refer to the map and graph in the report for details. This drove a resurgence of violence and the displacement of local residents in the Sierra Taraumara region, particularly in the Guadalupe y Calvo municipality. State Response. Is this the end of Hugs Not Bullets? Upon taking office on October 1, Scheinbaum inherited heightened violence levels that many have attributed to the security strategy of her predecessor and mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, AMLO, whose hugs not bullets policy prioritized social programs and prevention over a militarized response. Shortly after coming to power, Scheinbaum unveiled her security plan. While Scheinbaum's plan remains aligned with AMLO's approach, domestic demands to contain the escalation of violence and U.S. pressure to stem drug trafficking and migration flows have contributed to a change in tone from the federal government. ACLAD data from Scheinbaum's first six months in office point to a change in trend. Armed confrontations between non-state armed groups and security forces experienced a 33% increase compared to the previous six months. This increase has remained largely confined to Sinaloa and has been driven by the internecine fighting in the Sinaloa cartel, which prompted a heightened security response from state actors as early as September, well before Scheinbaum swearing in. Initial efforts to contain the rise in violence in Sinaloa were followed by the government's heavy-handed security response in the first quarter of 2025, during which clashes were concentrated in states bordering the U.S., especially in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, and in traditional hotspots of violence such as Mitracan. Armed clashes have further increased alongside intelligence-driven operations, which have been closely aligned with the federal security strategy, as is evidenced by a surge in the destruction of criminal assets such as narco-laboratories, drugs, and surveillance systems. The federal government's response and the intensification thereof in the first quarter of 2025 were largely shaped by President Donald Trump taking office in January. He swiftly designated several Mexican criminal groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, as FTOs and pressured the Mexican government to curb migration and drug trafficking flows under the threat of tariffs on Mexican products. The U.S. pressure prompted the Mexican federal government to deploy 10,000 military and National Guard officers and to launch Operation Northern Border on February 5. As a result of this security operation, Mexican authorities have reportedly arrested thousands of people and have seized over 1,900 weapons and 25 tons of drugs as of 3rd April. The arrests of criminal group leaders conducted by the Mexican authorities in recent months suggest that the Mexican authorities may gradually mirror elements of the same kingpin strategy implemented under President Calderón's administration, which consisted of taking down top leadership to dismantle criminal groups. Although these efforts may serve as a valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with the U.S., they have sparked debate about their efficacy in curbing organized crime and potentially contributing to further violence. Criminal organizations may also be adapting their tactics to survive under pressure. In Sinaloa, the spike in clashes between security forces and armed groups since September 2024 has coincided with a decrease in gang-on-gang violence and targeting of civilians in the first quarter of 2025. Similarly, federal authorities highlighted a 27% decrease in intentional homicide between October 2024 and February 2025. While these figures could be attributed to the success of security operations in the area and indicate a degree of de-escalation of the conflict, they also signal that criminal groups may have opted for other expressions of violence, such as forced disappearances, which have skyrocketed in Sinaloa in the first quarter of 2025 relative to the same period in 2024. Other forms of pervasive criminal activity have begun gaining momentum in the state, including extortion, in order to finance the Sinaloa cartel's war. In practice, these shifts are indicative of the rapid adaptability of criminal groups and could well apply to other areas under intense security scrutiny. There is also growing skepticism around the efficiency of operations targeting criminal assets, including the seizure of drug laboratories, which rarely lead to the arrests of members of criminal groups and are very likely to trigger the movement of those groups to establish their production operations elsewhere. Alongside the reorganization of criminal groups, the concentration of security operations along Mexico's northern border risks leaving other areas vulnerable to escalating criminal disputes, particularly in the country's center and south. Perhaps most strikingly, though, the arrest of Sinaloa cartel leader El Mayo and the subsequent wave of violence between the cartel's factions serve as an example of how these operations have the potential to lead to gang-on-gang violence. Further U.S. pressure on criminal groups and possible demands for the arrest of high-profile leaders, particularly the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel, may foment further fragmentation with the potential to worsen levels of violence. As a result of the fragmentation of large groups, local criminal groups are likely to grow autonomous, which could lead to a new phase of violence. A violent escalation in the making. The fracture within the Sinaloa cartel marks a structural turning point in Mexico's criminal landscape. There are rising signs that it will have repercussions well beyond the cartel's traditional strongholds. Some journalists have questioned whether the cartel as a cohesive identity will continue to exist. Another plausible outcome is the cartel's deliberate excision of its weakened cells, allowing the organization to survive, albeit in a different form, as its internal structure and system of alliances shift. As the Sinaloa cartel is forced to draw on its resources to sustain its internal power struggle, it has become more vulnerable to external threats. Other groups, such as the CJNG, smaller criminal organizations, and newly formed alliances, could exploit the Sinaloa cartel's weakened position and continue their own territorial expansion. The Mexican press has reported that the CJNG might have forged a new alliance with Los Chapitos against Elmayo's faction, with the aim of redistributing areas controlled by Elmayo. Other sources indicate that the CJNG might take its time before choosing a side, as it waits for the factions to wear each other down. Either path signals a shift in criminal dynamics that could fuel further violence. However, the CJNG is not immune to pressure. The discovery of mass detention sites in Jalisco, believed to belong to the CJNG, and increased scrutiny from U.S. authorities suggests that its expansion may face growing obstacles, leaving space for local criminal actors to assert themselves more aggressively. Meanwhile, under pressure from the Trump administration, the Mexican government appears to be responding to organized criminal activity and violence in the country using familiar kingpin style strategies, which carry additional risks of further fragmenting the criminal landscape and creating power vacuums. In this volatile context, the security response has become part of the shifting dynamics, influencing territorial contests and emerging alliances. Along the northern border, which is strategic for trafficking activities, there are already signs that local criminal groups may be gaining in strength and autonomy. Sustained criminal disputes are likely to persist until a hegemonic force emerges. A potential future scenario involves heightened risks for civilians, as violence threatens to reach new areas. The intensification of the conflict in Sinaloa has exposed civilians to heightened violence for siding with the wrong group and rising levels of extortion as criminal groups seek sources of revenue to finance their warfare. Were violence to spread further, the prospects for civilians would be gloomy. Similarly, political figures are particularly vulnerable to shifting power balances in their localities, as armed groups seek to consolidate their territorial control through criminal governance and to mitigate law enforcement operations against their interests. More concerning is the possibility that U.S. pressure on security developments in Mexico could extend beyond threats of economic sanctions. The U.S. Ambassador to Mexico has not ruled out the possibility of concerted or unilateral U.S. intervention on Mexican soil, at a time when surveillance drone flights in Mexico are on the rise. Such a scenario would amount to a full-blown return to the Kingpin strategy, an approach that has historically led to criminal groups splintering and intensified violence in contested and localized territories, the consequences of which may run against the Mexican government's stated goals. This report was written by Sandra Pellegrini, Accoled's senior analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Maria Fernanda Arrocha, AccLED's Central America Research Manager.