REPORT: How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?

Without two commanders of its key Arab alliances, the RSF faces deepening fractures and an emboldened Sudanese army.

Authors: Nohad Eltayeb, Ali Mahmoud Ali

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How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan? The recent defections of two senior commanders from the Rapid Support Forces to the Sudanese Army SAF highlight a rising trend of infighting within the RSF ranks. The defections expose cracks in the RSF's core alliances, as both defecting commanders, Ali Risk Allah, known as Safanah, and Al-Nur al-Goba are members of the Muhammad Rizagat clan, which forms part of the RSF's core Arab constituency. While the SAF will actively exploit these fractures to launch new offensives in North Darfur, continued foreign patronage and local grievances threaten to transform the war into a broader cross-border conflict. This fragmentation is the direct result of the RSF's reliance on a decentralized transactional alliance model that is being tested by increasing resource scarcity exacerbated by territorial shifts to less financially lucrative regions of the country. As the lucrative incentives that once united ethnic militias and former rebel groups dry up, local loyalties are superseding central command, sparking violent intra-coalition competition over remaining war spoils. ACLED data show that infighting among RSF allies has been rising since the RSF consolidated control over the Darfur region in October 2025 and comes on the back of a previous peak in June recorded after the RSF lost control of the central region in early 2025. Refer to the graph in the report for details. While the defections of Safana and Al-Nur al-Goba are emblematic of fractures within the RSF's core alliance of Arab militias that hail from Kordofan and Darfur, there are also signs of breakdowns in the RSF's tactical alliance with non-Arab former rebel groups operating in Blue Nile and South Kordofan under the Sudan Founding Alliance, SFA. Bolstered by a now expanded network of support from Mohammed Rezagat allies, it is highly likely that the SAF will reopen front lines in North Darfur within the next year, supported by its existing troops in the border town of Tina and the Zagawa community mobilized under the Darfur Joint Forces. However, while the SAF is actively exploiting these fault lines, continued backing from the United Arab Emirates allies in the region ensures that the RSF's breakdown will mutate the conflict rather than resolve it. Given the grievances of both ethnic militias and former rebels and the splintering of the RSF, this escalation risks igniting a wider ethnic conflict in Darfur and Chad that will be exceedingly difficult to contain. Since the loss of Khartoum, the same transactional incentive model that allowed the RSF to absorb local militia leaders among its core Arab constituency has been faltering under economic pressure, as it requires consistent resource extraction that is no longer available to the same degree in Darfur and Kordofan. This explains why RSF-controlled regions in Darfur and Kordofan experienced the most violence against civilians and looting over the past year. Refer to the graph in the report for details. While this is not new to RSF-controlled regions, the current attacks are largely extractive and persist even as overall violence has subsided in these regions. In West Kordofan and South Darfur, traders are consistently targeted and kidnapped for ransoms, which acts as an alternative source of income for local militias. Competition among local commanders has increased in urban stronghold regions, like Niala in South Darfur, refer to the map in the report for details, where resources and power are mostly monopolized by the Rizigat community, from which the RSF leadership hails. Here, inter-Arab conflict between the Salamat and Habania broke out in March over land, continuing a pattern of sporadic violence that has been prevalent since 2023. In West Kordofan, RSF clashes erupted between the Rizigat and Falaita Misuria, leading to the RSF killing the Nazir, native administration chief of the Falaita Missuriah on 28th January in El Fula. This event came after the Nazir's two sons were tortured and killed for refusing to forcefully recruit their tribe members. The province has also experienced disputes between the non-Arab Nur and Arab Missouriah, both RSF allied, that resulted in 32 reported fatalities on March 17th. Such incidents illustrate a wider pattern of discontent with the RSF leadership, and fighters have continuously claimed that groups outside of the ruling Rizagat community are marginalized in terms of weaponry and medical treatment. Under such conditions, militias are evidently retreating to their primary units of kinship and prioritizing ethnic affiliation to consolidate their local gains, leading to greater distrust among mid-level commanders. This is a major obstacle facing the SFA coalition's national level agenda and attempts to establish a legitimate government. The establishment of the SFA coalition to include new groups like the Sudan People Liberation Movement North, SPLMN, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilou in February 2025, adds an additional layer of contest, as it is predominantly from non-Arab Nuba communities in South Kordopan and Blue Nile, who have previously fought Arab RSF aligned groups. This new layer manifested in January 2026 when the RSF and SPLMN militias, both members of the SFA alliance, clashed in South Kordofan due to an exchange of accusations over betrayal in the battles of Habila and Dilling. Reportedly, the SPLMN groups had previously withdrawn from this area and had refused to attack these predominantly Nuba cities. This is another case where local and ethnic affiliations overpowered leadership decisions. Furthermore, the SPLMN's political capital in South Kordofan, Cauda, was the site of an intra-SPLMN conflict that erupted in March 2026 between Allied Nuba clans, the Otoro and Shawiah, amid land disputes and the Otoro refusing the RSF's use of Atoro land for mining operations. The dispute escalated in May 2026 to the level that SPLMN ordered Atoro SPLMN groups to surrender their arms, leading to intense clashes where Atoro villages were burned down by SPLMN. Ultimately, this escalation demonstrates how the SFA's overarching political ambitions are hindered by hyper-local struggles for resources, fracturing the coalition down to its most granular ethnic level. The SAF's success in using these internal divisions to its advantage suggests that a similar model will be applied to other regions under the SPLMN's influence. It used local mediators like Musa Hilal, the RSF leader's historical rival within Darfur's Arab communities, to negotiate with potential defectors like Al-Nur al-Goba, who is from the same Muhammad branch of the Reza Gat and had served under Musa Hilal in previous conflicts. Infighting and defections will likely spark where the SPLMN's non-Arab Nuba constituencies are growing frustrated by the SFA's attacks on their regions in South Kordofan. Such strategies are proving effective during a time of global economic shocks due to the conflict in the Middle East and increasing tensions with neighboring countries like Chad, which have significantly disrupted the RSF's existing supply routes. Under such conditions, and with tensions brewing in the wider region, the splintering of the RSF will drive local militia leaders to seek new opportunities, either through defecting to the SAF or returning to their origins as transnational mercenaries. The ongoing conflict has allowed these commanders to expand their illicit networks across volatile neighboring countries like Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. If the RSF's collapse precipitates a wider transnational conflict, local splinter groups may capitalize on the instability to generate new revenue by offering their services as experienced proxy fighters to cross border warring parties. This report was written by Accled's Nohad El Tayb, senior research assistant, and Ali Mahmoud Ali, Sudan researcher.