REPORT: How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?

Despite impacts on supply chains, the SAF continues its air campaign to weaken the RSF in Darfur ahead of expected ground offensives in August.

Authors: Nohad Eltayeb, Ali Mahmoud Ali

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How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines? In the past year, Sudan's war has transformed into a drone-dominated conflict, characterized by both sides rapidly adapting their aerial tactics and supply chains, and it continues to evolve. According to ACLED data, the Sudanese Army, SAF, maintains consistent, diversified air and drone strikes to systematically bombard strongholds of the Rapid Support Forces, RSF, and aggressively cut supply lines in the West. The RSF has transformed its weaponry from basic munitions to sophisticated strategic platforms, despite the constraints of recent supply disruptions. ACLED data show that the RSF now relies on less frequent but highly targeted strikes against vital economic infrastructure and military bases in SAF-controlled regions. Refer to the graphs in the report for details. Both sides are in a relentless race to recalibrate in the face of their adversaries' shifting technologies and tactics, even to the point of some drone-on-drone combat. On 23rd May, a SAF Akinchi drone fired a missile to intercept an RSF Akinchi in flight, the second instance of drone-on-drone aerial combat since the beginning of the conflict. Both armies now operate the same Turkish-manufactured drones, supplied through different intermediaries, in the clearest illustration of how arms flows bypass embargoes and geopolitical alliances. But the ongoing aerial asymmetry and the exploitation of air defense gaps suggest a trajectory where the SAF will sustain heavy air campaigns to weaken the RSF in Darfur before expected ground offensives during the rainy season, which typically peaks in August. Meanwhile, the RSF will likely consolidate its forces defensively in Darfur, focusing on limited high-impact strikes to hinder the SAF's advances as both sides mobilize in the border triangle in North Darfur. Even in the event of a de facto stalemate, the transition toward drone warfare ensures that the conflict can persist beyond traditional front lines, sustaining a state of perpetual but lower intensity violence. The SAF targets RSF supply lines and stronghold in the Allah. The SAF's diversified supply of weapons, which includes Iranian manufactured combat drones, Mahajar 6 and Ababil III, Turkish Pakistani drones, YHIA 3, and Turkish Bayrakhtar drone systems, has enabled it to project air power across multiple fronts simultaneously. This is a noticeable upgrade from the legacy air force that was used defensively in the beginning of the conflict in 2023. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Iran, the SAF has focused its reliance on Turkey and a Saudi-facilitated Pakistani pipeline. Although the latter deal was reportedly halted by Saudi Arabia in April, the rate of SAF air and drone strikes remained steady in May, with 70 strikes, in line with the previous two months. The SAF appears to have waged a deliberate campaign to significantly sever the RSF's supply of weapons and troops through the northwestern and western regions, forcing it to rely more on alternative routes through the eastern border. In May, it launched 17 strikes in Niala, an RSF stronghold in Darfur. This was the highest monthly total of strike events recorded in the city since the beginning of the conflict. The SAF also used drones to strike RSF fuel shipments and markets near the western border with Chad to cut cross-border fuel supplies. Around the same time, on May 15th, SAF airstrikes targeted an RSF convoy of combat vehicles coming from Libya that were reportedly on the way to El Fashir in preparation for military operations in northern Sudan. Moreover, tensions with Chad and the closure of its border complicated the flow of supplies to RSF regions in Darfur, causing it to reroute through the southern borders. Additionally, the SAF's regional allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have been increasingly pressuring Libya's eastern government, led by Khalifa Haftar, to stop supplying the RSF. By April, Saudi Arabia financed an arms deal for the Libyan National Army in an attempt to curb the UAE's influence in the region, further disrupting another node within the RSF's regional alliance network. The RSF turns defensive under supply pressure. Meanwhile, the RSF has been relying on a UAE-backed supply network funneling Chinese hardware through Libya and Chad since late 2024. By mid-2025, these systems achieved significant reach into SAF's rear positions in Red Sea, Northern, and River Nile states, forcing the SAF to strategically withdraw its aircraft to Eritrea. Over the past year, the RSF's aerial arsenal advanced from basic loitering munitions to sophisticated CH-95 strategic platforms, providing nationwide coverage. The depth of this supply chain became clear in August 2025 when the SAF intercepted United Arab Emirates affiliated cargo flights transporting Colombian mercenaries at the Niala airport. This reliance on external expertise has become a defining characteristic of the conflict. Ukrainian, Spanish, and Colombian operators have been embedded in RSF units since mid-2025, most likely tasked with operating drones. Recent reports identified Chinese BZK-005 UAVs, the largest drones acquired by the RSF to date in Niala, suggesting the UAE has sustained part of its supply pipeline despite the economic pressures of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there is an observed decline in the overall strikes launched by the RSF in the last three months, signaling significant supply disruptions. The rate of RSF strikes has notably dropped in previously active front lines in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, as both sides have been mobilizing forces in the Sudan-Egypt-Libya Border Triangle in preparation for clashes, indicating that it will probably be the next decisive battleground. Given the recent defections of senior commanders in Darfur and the mobilization in the Border Triangle, the RSF will likely withdraw from eastern regions to consolidate its forces in Darfur. Both sides have limited air defense systems, but the interception rates reveal a natural asymmetry. Over the past year, the soft defenses intercepted nearly 13% of all RSF drone engagements, while the RSF intercepted soft drones at a far lower rate, 2.3%. This asymmetry drives the tactics of both sides as the RSF adapts to its lower aerial capabilities by launching less frequent but highly targeted strikes on vital infrastructure. For example, it launched 10 strikes on Khartoum in May, including the airport, where it destroyed the SAF's air defense positions. Refer to the map in the report for details. When SAF's HISARA radar proved unable to detect high-altitude drones, the RSF exploited this gap by destroying one such system in North Kordofan on May 21st. The SOF also systematically targeted the RSF's deployed FK-2000 systems, with ACLED recording at least seven events destroying RSF air defense positions between August 2025 and February 2026. This limited defense capability will cause both sides to endure major losses if the conflict continues. While the UAE reportedly established alternative routes to restore the RSF's supply through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic, the RSF will be at a geographic disadvantage if the front lines shift to North Darfur, given the distance from the eastern and southern borders and SAF's continued bombardment of Niala Airport. Moreover, the RSF has increased security measures in its regions by restricting communications and cracking down on suspects linked to the recent defections, increasing the likelihood of internal dissent. The SAF will likely capitalize on the RSF's fault lines and continue its heavy airstrikes to weaken the RSF stronghold in Darfur, while advancing ground offensives in Blue Nile to recapture the strategic border town of Kermuk, where the remaining RSF Allied forces are stationed. This will lay the groundwork for the SAF to launch offensives in the desert region of North Darfur, aided by its new allies from former RSF commanders. Strained by internal defections and supply line interruptions, the RSF is expected to prioritize a defensive posture within Darfur. It will likely utilize its remaining resources for high impact attacks on critical infrastructure and military bases in soft controlled territories, aiming to maximize damage while obstructing the SAF's push toward Darfur. This report was written by ACLED's Nohad El Tayyeb, Senior Research Assistant, and Ali Mahmoud Ali, Sudan researcher.