REPORT: Reengaging Damascus. Syria’s capital offers opportunity, but not without risk.

Damascus remains less exposed to political violence than other governorates in post-Assad Syria, pointing to a cautiously positive outlook despite residual security threats.

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Reengaging Damascus Syria's capital offers opportunity but not without risk. Damascus is Syria's most permissive operating environment for renewed international engagement, business activity, and investment after the transition from the former Assad regime. The capital is far less exposed to political violence than other parts of the country, reflecting tighter central control and relative insulation from Syria's main areas of conflict. However, residual risks persist, including isolated mass casualty attacks, targeted civilian incidents, protest-related disruption, and temporary movement disruptions around sensitive sites and key access routes. The July 7, 2026 explosions near the Four Seasons Hotel during French President Emmanuel Macron's visit illustrate this continuing exposure in prominent urban locations. Over the next six months, Damascus is likely to remain on a stabilization path, with violence staying limited and disruption remaining more episodic than systemic. This trajectory will depend on whether ongoing security consolidation can further limit residual threats, economic and redevelopment grievances remain contained, and reconciliation and accountability processes ease rather than inflame local tensions. Violence has become more frequent and fragmented, but not markedly more lethal. Despite Damascus's low baseline, violence increased across the full post-transition period. Events nearly tripled, rising from 52 in the comparable pre-transition period to 147. While reported fatalities remained broadly flat, the nature of lethal violence changed significantly. Before the fall of Assad, Israeli strikes accounted for over two-thirds of reported fatalities in Damascus. Since the transition, however, lethality has been concentrated overwhelmingly in attacks targeting civilians, with around 65% of these events involving gunmen with unclear affiliations, loose local networks, or other unidentified actors. This points to a fragile and more fragmented security environment, especially in the first year after Assad. Score-settling and sectarian targeting drive much of the violence against civilians. Post-regime score-settling has been a major driver of civilian targeting in the capital since the transition. Nearly one-fifth of reported fatalities in Damascus were individuals linked to the former government or security apparatus, while Alawite civilians without reported direct links to the former regime made up a similar share. This pattern points to one of the most serious risks in Damascus's post-transition environment. Where formal transitional justice remains incomplete or weakly trusted, unresolved demands for justice over Assad-era crimes have been redirected into vigilante retaliation against individuals perceived to have served in or benefited from the former regime. The targeting of Alawite civilians without reported direct links to the former regime underscores the risk of accountability claims expanding into collective punishment. This dynamic was visible on June 16 when crowds demanding the removal of alleged Shabiha, a term used to refer to pro-Assad loyalists and militia-linked figures, and former regime remnants gathered near the Alawite-majority Mazé 86 neighborhood. The mobilization turned accountability demands into sectarian pressure on residents that involved property damage, verbal abuse, and assaults on Alawite civilians before security forces intervened. Other prominent examples include the killing of four Alawite local council members in Damascus's Ish al-Warwar in April 2025, and the death of five workers from the same neighborhood reportedly detained at a police checkpoint and killed in June of last year. Other forms of violence against civilians in Damascus include attacks on nightlife venues, excessive force by security forces during arrests, checkpoint searches, and property evictions, targeted incidents against members of Druze and Kurdish communities, and criminal or opportunistic violence in a city where law enforcement, local disputes, and personal revenge can overlap. Explosive attacks remain rare but potentially high impact. Explosive attacks in Damascus have been infrequent but dangerous. They do not currently amount to a sustained bombing campaign, with only over 15 events reported since the fall of the Assad regime. Nevertheless, these attacks show that Damascus remains vulnerable to episodic explosive violence, including by extremist groups, that can be consequential. Among the deadliest incidents was the 22nd of June 2025 attack, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in Mar Elias Church, located in Damascus's Al-Shagur area. The group Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah claimed the attack, while Syrian authorities attributed it to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL. The threat is not confined to religious sites. State-linked institutions and officials are also vulnerable to extremist violence. Although ISO activity nationally has declined, falling from an average of around 29 events per month in 2025 to around 12 in the first half of 2026, the group has increasingly focused on the new authorities. Since announcing a new phase of operations against the government in February 2026, reflecting its opposition to the Shira authorities' cooperation with international counter-ISIL partners and its effort to exploit fragile security conditions in eastern Syria, ISIL has targeted Syrian government or security forces in 56 events, resulting in 46 reported fatalities. In Damascus, the group claimed responsibility for detonating a sticky explosive device on the vehicle of the head of the Justice Palace Department in Babila on June 16, 2026, seriously injuring him. This threat has also been visible through disrupted activity around the Capitol, including the March 2026 diffusal of an ISIL-rigged car bomb reportedly prepared for detonation at a sensitive location in Damascus. Several other attacks remain unclaimed, suggesting that the explosive threat extends beyond incidents clearly linked to known extremist groups. This was underscored by the July 2026 bombing of a cafe near the Palace of Justice in central Damascus, which killed at least nine people and wounded 20. Days later, two explosive devices were detonated near the Four Seasons Hotel during President Macron's visit, injuring at least 18 people. Other unclaimed incidents in Mazeth, an area in southwestern Damascus with military and security-linked sites, as well as dense residential neighborhoods, as well as in the central and eastern districts of Al Shagur, Babsharki, and Al-Wuroud point to a low-frequency but disruptive risk around sensitive, state-linked and symbolic civilian targets. The consequences have ranged from temporary disruption to mass casualty violence, refer to the map in the report for details. Episodic instability in rural Damascus can affect access to the capital. The capital's operating environment is also affected by security dynamics in rural Damascus governate, which fully surrounds the city. Since the fall of the Assad regime, ACLED records almost three times as many events and reported fatalities in rural Damascus as in Damascus governate. For Damascus, the most immediate implications are for access and movement, especially around the airport approach and the capital's southern and southeastern perimeter. Yadamana, Sanaya, and Ashrafyat Sanaya are Druze-populated areas near the capital, where the post-Assad authorities' effort to restore security control has collided with local demands for self-protection, distrust of Damascus appointed forces, and fears of sectarian targeting. In April 2025, this dynamic briefly created a direct access concern when locals in Yaramana blocked the main road to Damascus International Airport after killings and kidnappings on the Saweda-Damascus Road. Clashes in Yaramana and Ashrafyat Sanaya later that month prompted curfews, security deployments, and Israeli strikes. Separately, two fatal shootings on Damascus International Airport Road in November 2025 point to occasional localized insecurity on the airport approach on the capital's perimeter. Overall, the pattern does not suggest sustained disruption of airport access, but it shows that movement around Damascus can carry increased risk during periods of localized insecurity. Airspace-related incidents also show how risks around Damascus can affect the capital's operating environment. Unlike several regional states that were directly exposed to missile and drone attacks during the Iran-Israel-U.S. Syria largely avoided being drawn into the exchange of fire. Damascus and its surrounding areas nevertheless experienced indirect spillover. ACLED records 27 interceptions, falling debris or airspace-related incidents across Damascus and rural Damascus, the majority of them in rural Damascus, since 28 February. These caused no reported fatalities, but debris injured four civilians in Ayn Turma, and one incident forced the Otaiba power station out of service. Demonstrations remain largely peaceful but politically sensitive. Public mobilization has become much more frequent in Damascus since the transition, but it has remained overwhelmingly peaceful. Refer to the map in the report for details. Between December 8, 2024 and June 2026, ACLED records over 155 demonstration events in Damascus, compared with only three in the comparable pre-transition period. This suggests that public mobilization has so far been largely tolerated in the capital. Demonstrations can still escalate when sensitive grievances draw hostile counter-mobilization or are interpreted through former regime loyalties. An April 2026 protest at Yusuf al-Azma Square over electricity prices, wages, and patronage-based appointments illustrates this risk. Pro-government supporters attacked demonstrators and accused them of backing the former regime. Security forces contained the confrontation by cordoning off the protesters and separating the two sides. The incident shows how economic or governance-related protests can become politicized, especially where demonstrators are framed as aligned with the former regime. Mobilization in Damascus has centered on three main issues detainees, accountability, and former regime justice, economic and governance-related grievances, including utility prices, salaries, employment status, market regulation, and transport sector competition, and real estate and urban development disputes. For businesses and other international actors, these issues can create reputational exposure related to former regime links and operational friction around labor, services, regulation, transport, property, and investment. Protests against Decree 66 and the Morota City Project in Maze and Kafersouza have focused on property rights, compensation, displacement, contracts, and investment agreements. Beyond reputational and business friction risks, the primary operational concern from demonstrations is temporary access and movement constraints around sensitive or busy urban areas. Most demonstrations are concentrated in central, symbolic, and administratively important areas, including Al-Salehiya, Mazet, Sarujah, the Old City, Kafersouza, Kanawat, and around Umayyad Square. Many of these locations are in areas used by businesses, diplomatic missions, hotels, and offices, and along major urban routes, making demonstrations relevant for movement planning. Near-Term Outlook. Damascus is likely to remain on a stabilization path. Over the next six months, Damascus is likely to remain comparatively stable, with violence staying limited, demonstrations mostly peaceful, and disruption occurring more episodically than systemically. The outlook is cautiously positive, particularly given the decline in violence in Damascus in 2026, see graph in the report for details. Whether this trajectory holds will depend on how domestic consolidation, unresolved accountability, and redevelopment grievances, residual extremist threats, and regional spillover risks evolve. Key factors shaping the outlook. State and law enforcement consolidation. Consolidation of state authority is likely to be the most important domestic stabilizer. A key part of this is the strengthening of interior ministry-led policing and law enforcement, which is gradually shaping how the state manages arrests, checkpoints, anti-crime operations, public order, and civilian-facing security. This has thus far involved more regular training, expanded police structures, internal disciplinary mechanisms, and the gradual replacement of some military checkpoints by interior ministry-controlled positions. For Damascus, this could help contain localized violence while making security practices less ad hoc. Transitional justice and accountability. The credibility of transitional justice will shape whether accountability demands move into institutions or continue to fuel retaliatory violence. Syria has established national mechanisms for transitional justice and locating missing persons, while high-profile Assad era cases have begun. If arrests of former regime and security-linked figures are tied to better and more transparent investigations, fair trials, credible evidence gathering, and clearer communication with affected communities, they could help move demands for accountability away from localized revenge and into state institutions. The same judicial capacity will also be needed to investigate retaliatory violence, arbitrary attacks, and abuses against Alawite or former regime-linked communities. ISIL and extremist threat. ISIL and other extremist cell activity is likely to remain constrained but not eliminated. The authority's current counter-terrorism capacity draws in part on the experience HTS developed in Idlib, where it built an intelligence-led apparatus for identifying ISIL networks, disrupting plots, and dismantling cells before the transition. Since the transition, this capacity has been expanded nationally through raids, weapons seizures, disrupted plots, and growing coordination with international partners. Despite strengthened counterterrorism capacity, isolated attacks by ISIL, other extremist cells, or loosely affiliated actors against symbolic targets remain possible, particularly against religious, minority-linked, state, or crowded public sites. Economy and redevelopment. Economic strain and development-related disputes are likely to remain the most relevant sources of public mobilization and reputational risk. Major investment announcements in tourism, real estate, and infrastructure projects support the cautiously positive outlook and reinforce the capital's role as a focal point for re-engagement. But these projects could also generate friction where they intersect with land ownership, compensation claims, employment expectations, or contested urban redevelopment. Furthermore, many announced projects remain at the level of pledges, and even more concrete deals will take time to deliver tangible benefits. If visible improvements lag, economic and governance-related protests are likely to become more frequent, disruptive, or politically sensitive. Regional spillover. Renewed regional escalation could disrupt Damascus's operating environment even if the capital avoids direct conflict. Human rights groups have warned that Israel has effectively turned Syrian airspace into an active interception zone for Iranian missiles and drones, including reported interceptions over populated areas, shifting the risk of falling debris onto Syrian civilians who are not party to the conflict. Renewed regional escalation could affect Damascus through short-noti disruption, aviation confidence, insurance assumptions, transport routes, and security-sensitive sites. Implications for businesses and investors. For businesses and investors, Damascus is Syria's most viable entry point for cautious re-engagement. The capital's lower level of political violence, stronger central control, and concentration of administrative, commercial, and infrastructure activity make it more permissive than much of the country. But this should not be read as a uniformly low-risk environment. Risk is likely to remain concentrated around specific sites, routes, partners, and project types. The main operational exposures are likely to cluster around sensitive government or security-linked sites, symbolic or religious landmarks, crowded central areas, and occasional access constraints around the airport approach. Projects linked to real estate, redevelopment, compensation, land ownership, or displacement histories will require particular scrutiny, as these issues can turn investment into a source of local grievance. Businesses should therefore assess not only the general security environment, but also the specific profile of each project, including its visibility, location, reliance on key routes, local acceptance, and exposure to unresolved property or compensation claims. Reputational risk will be equally important. Companies will need to conduct careful due diligence on local partners, contractors, and intermediaries, especially where they are perceived as politically connected, linked to Assad era economic structures, or involved in disputed property and redevelopment processes. Overall, the risk environment supports phased and site specific re engagement, provided it is backed by partner vetting, movement planning, community sensitivity checks, and contingency planning for episodic disruption.