REPORT: Al-Qaeda’s “new normal” in Yemen strategic continuity despite a leadership change

AQAP’s new leader signaled he would shift the group’s focus. So far, his early rhetoric hasn’t matched ground reality.

Authors: Luca Nevola, Sherwan Hindreen Ali

This episode is an AI narrated version of an ACLED report, presenting data-driven analysis of conflict trends and developments around the world.

For more from ACLED, visit ACLEDdata.com

AI-generated audio is used for ACLED report narrations only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, minor pronunciation or intonation errors may occasionally occur. Webinar recordings feature the original speakers.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:06

Al-Qaeda's new normal in Yemen. Strategic continuity despite a leadership change. Key takeaways. Since assuming leadership of Al-Qaeda's Yemeni branch, AQAP, Saad bin Atif al-Awlaki has largely maintained the group's strategic direction, pragmatic Houthi engagement, and low-level anti-STC insurgency. Despite counter-terrorism gains by the STC, a QAP remains resilient, with increasingly bold attacks and evolving capabilities that have resulted in cyclical flare-ups between the two groups. Direct hostilities between AQAP and the Houthis ceased in July 2022 and have not resumed. Indicators of cooperation, including drone use, prisoner exchanges, and shared smuggling networks, have increased steadily. The new AQAP leadership appears more attuned to local communities and actively encourages tensions between local tribes and counter-terrorism forces. In early June 2025, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a video featuring Sa'd bin Atif al-Auliki's first appearance since assuming the organization's leadership. In the video, Allahki, dressed in traditional Yemeni attire with a Junbiya, the traditional curved Yemeni dagger prominently displayed, outlines AQAP's strategic direction. The message is strikingly ambitious. Moving from a critique of the Gaza crisis, it frames global jihad as AQAP's central objective and identifies the United States and Israel as its primary adversaries. It also openly aspires to the establishment of an Islamic state in Yemen. References to global jihad are echoes of AQAP's past achievements, meant to resonate with its core constituency. But this ambition clashes with ground reality. AQAP is a weakened organization, grappling with limited resources, dwindling operations, and a reduced capacity to project force beyond its area of operations, or to conduct international attacks. The message casts a spotlight on Alaki and the extent to which he can credibly impose such a direction on the group. Considered one of AQAP's tribal leaders, he hails from the prominent Aulaki tribe in Shabwa. Alaki initially fiercely opposed the policies of his late predecessor, Khalid Batarfi, and the so-called Iranian shift. This shift entailed a pragmatic non-hostility pact with the Houthis, and an escalation of operations against what AQAP considers U.S. slash Israeli proxies in Yemen, namely the Internationally Recognized Government, IRG, and, in particular, the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council, STC. Accled data indicates that this shift began around the time of the death of Al-Qaeda, AQ's global leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the emergence of Saif al-Adil, AQ's second-in-command, who has close ties to Iran, as the group's de facto acting leader. Refer to the graph in the report for details. Challenging Batarfi's leadership, Al-Laki's Yemeni faction pushed for a resumption of hostilities against the Houthis. Accordingly, many scholars anticipated a shift in a QAP's strategic direction under Alaki's leadership. Yet no such shift has materialized, and strategic continuity appears to define a QAP's new normal. Within this broader continuity, though, the group's operational patterns are evolving in three key areas. Its engagement with pro-STC counter-terrorism forces, its covert cooperation with the Houthis, and its interactions with local communities. Cyclical flare-ups and STC counter-terrorism operations against AQAP. Since 2022, the confrontation between the STC and a QAP has followed a cyclical pattern, in which short but intense counter-terrorism campaigns have produced temporary territorial and operational gains, followed by periods of a QAP regrouping and renewed activity. Refer to the graph in the report for details. A QAP's resurgence in 2022, when their activity more than doubled compared to 2021, was less a sign of renewed strength than a reaction to the STC's expansion into a QAP strongholds in Shabwa and Abian under the banner of counterterrorism. This confrontation peaked between August and September 2022 with dueling operations, the STC's Arrows of the East and a QAP's Arrows of Righteousness, in which a QAP ultimately bore the brunt. The STC's operation secured some key gains, including the capture of AQAP's main stronghold in the rugged mountain valley of Wadi Awimran, though at the price of heavy losses, such as the death of Abdulatif al-Sayid, head of the Security Belt Forces in Abian. Subsequent counterterrorism campaigns, including Operation Swords of Haas in mid-2023, and renewed security operations between December 2024 and July 2025, again reduced AQAP's operational footprint. Refer to the map in the report for details. At the peak of this push, the STC advanced into southern Abian and the coastal areas, with the aim of dismantling smuggling networks. However, these gains proved fragile. In September 2025, the STC's operations reached their highest activity levels since August 2023 and produced the largest territorial gains on record. Yet, most of the areas secured during this phase lay south of Wadi Oimran in zones previously cleared by the STC, underscoring the ephemeral nature of territorial control and AQAP's ability to re-emerge by exploiting persistent security gaps. Indeed, a QAP's operational trajectory during this period reflects a pattern of adaptation rather than decline. Following a brief low point in late 2023, amid rumors that Batarfi had been poisoned, the group rebounded sharply in early 2024, coinciding with Alaki's appointment as leader on March 10, 2024. The new leader embraced the strategy set by his predecessor, identifying the STC as the group's main enemy and depicting it as a proxy of the U.S. and Israel. Yet, he found himself operating in a markedly different security landscape and adopted a distinct modus operandi, drawing on increased support from a QAP's local Yemeni militant networks. While Batarfi confronted a more aggressive STC, emboldened by the launch of the counter-terrorism campaign and its gains in Shebwa governorate, Alaki faced STC forces in a posture of territorial consolidation. Entrenched in the small village of El-Bukheira at the mouth of Wadi Awamran, they focused on holding ground through patrols rather than advancing into AQAP areas. Furthermore, AQAP's constituency appeared emboldened by the appointment of a local Yemeni commander with strong tribal ties, as confirmed by local sources interviewed by the authors. Together, these dynamics translated into a reconfiguration of AQAP's operations, characterized by more direct assaults against STC troops, growing boldness, and a renewed focus on Abiyan governate. Under Al-Laki, armed clashes increased by 55%, while IED attacks fell by about 70%, compared to the same period under Batarfi. These figures indicate a recalibration of the group's battlefield approach, marked by more targeted forms of violence and reflecting increased confidence. The decline in IED attacks appears to reflect a deliberate shift away from indiscriminate or low-impact targeting, such as vehicles and checkpoints, in favor of more selective use of explosive devices. The terrain of Al-Buquaida and Wadi Alimran proved conducive to this shift. With STC forces concentrated along the valley floor, and AQAP fighters operating from elevated positions on the surrounding slopes, refer to the map in the report for details. AQAP could easily carry out sniping attacks. Between March 2024 and January 2025, ACLED records around 35 sniping attacks against STC soldiers. These high-risk operations that require close-range fire surpass the total number recorded in all previous years combined since 2015. Concurrently, AQAP increased direct strikes on higher-profile targets, such as STC leadership and military sites, thus replacing Batarfi's earlier emphasis on vehicles and convoys, which were comparatively easier to target and more accessible. Another strategic shift involved the use of cars rigged with IEDs. Under Batarfi, only two such attacks occurred in four years, and they were used exclusively in an attempt to decapitate the STC's security leadership at sites deep within STC-held territory, away from AQAP operational areas. In contrast, Alaki attempted to maximize STC losses by targeting their barracks. AQAP's two car bomb attacks in August 2024 and October 2025 killed at least 20 STC members and injured over 30. The August attack was the deadliest of its kind since 2015. Concurrently, Al-Laki started using drones in Abian, rather than Shabwa, to strike the enemy's internal lines. These patterns are particularly salient in the context of the recent political crisis in southern Yemen. This crisis led to the dissolution of the STC and Saudi Arabia's assumption of direct control over the IRG's political and security architecture. During the STC's brief advances in Hadramaat and Almara in December 2025, a QAP was unable to significantly exploit the situation. However, the subsequent suspension of UAE counter-terrorism operations and the withdrawal of STC aligned forces from Wadi Awamran, Mudiyya, and surrounding areas open a window of opportunity for a QAP to regain ground in Abian. While repeated STC campaigns have historically kept AQAP in check, they have not fundamentally degraded the group's operational capacity. At present, the group's activity remains at relatively low levels, suggesting a deliberate wait-and-see approach following the recent political and security realignments. In this context, AQAP is likely to prioritize consolidating its presence in its historical areas of operation, while potentially seeking to expand its reach if new security gaps emerge. At the same time, the disappearance of its main adversary, the STC, raises open questions about how the group may recalibrate its targeting strategy in the midterm. A QAP and the Houthis. Concealed cooperation? Claims of cooperation between the Houthis and AQAP have proliferated in recent years. However, the extent to which this relationship is substantive and how it may evolve in the context of the crisis in southern Yemen remains open to question. Historically, documented interactions between the Houthis and a QAP have been largely limited to prisoner exchanges. Since 2022, however, tacit cooperation has expanded to include mutual non-aggression, links to a regional illicit economic network involving Al-Shabaab, and the Houthis' purported provision of drone technology to a QAP. By contrast, claims that a QAP and the Houthis have formed a strategic alliance and coordinate their attacks against STC forces remain weakly documented and difficult to verify, reflecting the narrative interests of several actors, including the STC itself. Prisoner exchanges are often interpreted as evidence that the pragmatic relationship between AQAP and the Houthis is deepening. These exchanges are not new. Several occurred between 2016 and 2021, suggesting that such channels existed even during periods of active hostilities. Indeed, since June 2022, at least four documented prisoner swaps have taken place. While these exchanges indicate the existence of open communication channels, they do not in themselves constitute evidence of a strategic alliance. A more substantial and recent indicator of cooperation is the emergence of a smuggling network linking the two groups. United Nations expert reports on Yemen document smuggling between the Houthis and AQAP, linking both groups to a broader trade network that also includes Al-Shabaab in East Africa. This network has become an increasingly important lifeline for all three groups, enabling them to bypass international sanctions and diversify their weapons procurement channels. Several Yemeni and international sources report transfers of drone technology from the Houthis to AQAP, viewing this as a tangible indication of cooperation between the two groups. AQAP launched its first drone attack on May 12, 2023, around a year from the last corroborated violent interaction between AQAP and the Houthis. Refer to the graph in the report for details. Since then, the group's annual drone usage has increased by over 300%, according to ACLED, despite the targeted killing of AQAP's senior drone expert in April 2024. This exponential increase suggests access to a sustained source of drone procurement, with the Houthis representing a plausible supplier. Although AQAP may also have procured at least some of its first drones through looting government depots or purchasing them from local smugglers. A QAP primarily relies on multi-use drones, dropping grenades, basically off-the-shelf commercial quadcopters with minimal navigation systems. Indeed, only two attacks out of 48 recorded by ACLED involved the use of suicide drones. This conservative pattern suggests limited and uncertain access to drone supplies. Operationally, QAP drone attacks take the form of low-intensity harassment attacks against STC targets, meant to amplify the group's threat profile. Usually, these attacks cease when the STC escalates counterterrorism operations, suggesting risk aversion and a strategy of calibrated escalation. Refer to the graph in the report for details. Claims of links between the Houthis and AQAP are sporadically reported by pro-STC and pro-IRG sources, often citing the alleged presence of Houthie officials alongside AQAP militants. Pro-STC sources have also claimed instances of coordinated attacks on different fronts, including concurrent Houthi drone strikes on Lahija's Quraysh front and AQAP activity in Wadi Awimran on January 7, 2025. However, their frequency does not demonstrate consistent coordination, and hard evidence remains lacking. The security vacuum created by the STC's withdrawal is likely to facilitate an expansion of smuggling activities along the southern coastline, one of the most recent focal points of STC counter-terrorism operations. A potential territorial advance by AQAP could expand the geographical scope of its drone attacks, enabling the group to target IRG forces further inland, even without acquiring longer-range systems. By contrast, deeper operational or military coordination between the two groups appears less likely in the short term. The fine line between co-opting and coercing local communities. A QAP's enduring presence in Yemen has been sustained by its effective engagement with local communities and its deep embedment within tribal structures and customs. The organization's difficulties under Batarfi's tenure were partly attributed to his lack of tribal connections, whereas Aulaki's solid tribal base could bolster a QAP's local credibility and acceptance. Ultimately, the contest between a QAP and its opponents is also a fight to win over local communities and secure their support. The relationship between a QAP and Yemen's tribes is constantly negotiated, and rather than exerting control, the group often seeks coexistence. A QAP members frequently retain their tribal affiliation and may seek refuge in their tribal areas. Yet, such arrangements are volatile and shift with local interests and power dynamics. A case in point is the Al-Ali bin Ahmad branch of the Alaki tribe in Shabwa, which in 2014 affirmed the primacy of tribal identity over an allegiance to a QAP, tolerating a QAP's local members' presence while barring its gatherings and foreign members. In September 2023, however, it publicly reversed this position, categorically rejecting the presence of what they called terrorists. Recent confrontations between pro-STC forces and AQAP are concentrated in areas broadly associated with the Dathina and Upper Al-Laki tribes, particularly Al-Fahan, Al-Rubaze, and Al-Kumush, refer to the map in the report for details, which have a long history of internal rivalries and shifting political alignments that predate the ongoing counter-terrorism operations and continue to shape their relationship with AQAP. The Kumush categorically banned AQAP in 2016, but the situation is less clear-cut among the other tribes, reflecting overlapping political affiliations and long-standing tribal rivalries. Tensions between the Rubezi and Fathan offer an interesting case study. In September 2021, a QAP fighters fleeing Albaida to Mudiyya district in Abian killed a Rubazi tribesman before seeking refuge in Fathan territory. The incident sparked a feud between the two tribes, mirroring their divergent political alignments with the STC and a QAP. The Rubazi are broadly aligned with the STC. They endorsed the STC's self-administration declaration in 2020 and are home to Ahmed El-Rubazi, vice president of the STC's Advisory Council. Accordingly, several tribesmen from the Rubezi tribe have joined counter-terrorism operations, prompting direct retaliation from AQAP. In a rare instance of tribal targeting, an AQAP drone struck a gathering of Rubese tribesmen in May 2024, injuring a civilian. This is an extreme example of direct AQAP intervention to deter tribal meddling, whereas the organization usually resorts to threats and deterrence. In contrast, the Faithan clashed fiercely with the STC after some of its members were accused of planting an IED in Wadi Itrib, which killed four security belt soldiers on January 23, 2023. The STC responded by besieging and shelling Al-Bukera village, killing nine civilians, and violating what is regarded as the sanctity of local homes, sparking strong tribal reactions, including a gathering of Abian's central tribes. Although tensions eased after an agreement on January 27, critics accused the STC of using security campaigns to suppress tribal opposition, and discontent persisted, with renewed calls to expel the STC from Moodyah district. In the aftermath of a QAP attacks, pro STC forces have often ramped up. Oppression of tribes under the guise of counter-terrorism. Arbitrary arrests disguised as counterterrorism operations have been carried out in several areas, prompting tribal condemnations, such as that issued in July 2024 by the Tawassal tribes in Shabwa, and armed confrontations, including clashes with Al-Walid tribesmen in Moodyah, where the SBF raided a village under the pretext of carrying out a counter-terrorism operation after villagers protested their presence. Overall, these cases illustrate how the repression of tribes and civil society can ultimately backfire and serve a QAP strategy by fueling resentment toward the STC and discouraging local cooperation. In parallel, a QAP is proactively fueling these divisions. Since its revival in late 2023 following the Gaza crisis, a QAP's media branch, El Malahem Media, has been extremely active. The release of confession videos depicting people it alleges are STC spies has conveyed the message that local communities are infiltrated, with the aim of deterring popular cooperation with counter-terrorism forces. Meanwhile, a QAP seeks to co-opt local communities, or at least ensure they remain neutral. In February 2023, Aulaki, then the emir of Shabwa, released his first ever video message, urging tribesmen in Abiyan and Shabwa to join a QAP against the STC. More recently, he has stopped demanding ransom for the release of people kidnapped by a QAP, accepting tribal mediation instead, likely indicating a new course in his relationship with the tribes. With the withdrawal of STC forces from Abian and Shabwa, AQAP is likely to recalibrate its engagement with local communities, shifting from mobilizing against a common adversary to consolidating its social and political embeddedness. Local sources interviewed by the author point to a symbolic shift on the ground, with STC slogans replaced by AQAP ones. In the absence of STC pressure to stigmatize cooperation with AQAP, local communities may be less inclined to actively marginalize or expel AQAP-aligned members, thereby lowering the social barriers to the group's integration into tribal networks. Toward a new AQAP narrative in southern Yemen? The anticipated strategic shift under Aulaki's leadership doesn't appear to have materialized. Since early 2024, AQAP has operated within a framework of strategic continuity, a new normal characterized by pragmatic cooperation with the Houthis and low-level insurgency against pro-STC forces in Abian and Shabwa. Yet the organization is not the same as under Batarfi's tenure, and several indicators point to a latent threat that could suddenly erupt. After initial successes, STC counter-terrorism operations struggled to deliver a decisive blow, with new territorial gains appearing short-lived at best. At the same time, the new AQAP leadership appears more attuned to AQAP's Yemeni militant networks and to local communities, with signs of increased recruitment among the tribes, as noted by an informed Yemen analyst. The non-aggression pact with the Houthis provides AQAP with a secure rear area, while enhanced cooperation in arms smuggling could give the group access to new technologies that enable it to carry out unprecedented attacks. The crisis in southern Yemen calls into question both counterterrorism efforts and AQAP's strategy. The United States remains a prominent counterterrorism actor in Yemen. Washington's drone strikes have surged under the Trump administration, targeting AQAP leaders and operatives that remain concealed beyond active theaters across several Yemeni governates, including Merib, Hadramaut, and Al-Mahra. However, historically, UAE-backed forces, including the SBF and the elite forces, played a pivotal role in counter-terrorism operations. Ongoing reforms within the IRG's military and security apparatus are now set to merge these forces into a new structure, as confirmed by the recent establishment of the National Security Forces, a unified security body led by Abu Zara al-Mahrami that incorporates the SBF. Against the backdrop of mounting instability within the IRG camp, there is a tangible risk that counter-terrorism priorities will be pushed into the background. Meanwhile, a QAP is already exploiting the ongoing crisis by expanding into new areas in Hadramat after looting arms depots left vacant by withdrawing STC forces. The group portrayed the STC's pullback as a victory, but the latest developments also deprive a QAP of a central foe in its propaganda. In recent years, a QAP invested significant resources in constructing a narrative that casts the STC as its primary enemy. With this framing now weakened, a QAP will face pressure to develop a new narrative and recalibrate its strategic objectives in Yemen, potentially leading to increased attacks against IRG forces. Furthermore, insurgent attacks against the IRG could be readily attributed to a QAP, offering the UAE a convenient cover for any spoiler activity aimed at damaging the Yemeni government. AQAP's new leadership appears intent on boosting AQAP's morale and projecting ambitious goals. While foreign operations or the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate remain unlikely in the near term, it is plausible that high-profile attacks, including car bombs, will increase in both frequency and scope. The withdrawal of the STC creates a greater operational space for AQAP and may incentivize the group to signal its new strategic posture. In view of the growing coordination between AQAP, the Houthis, and al-Shabaab in Somalia, leaving AQAP unchecked risks compounding instability in southern Yemen that may reverberate across the wider Red Sea security environment. This report was written by ACLED's Luka Navola, senior analyst for Yemen and the Gulf, and Sherwan Hindrin Ali, Middle East research manager.