The News Items Podcast
John Ellis talks with interesting people doing important work. Some you've heard of. Some you haven't. All of them are worth listening to, at some length.
The News Items Podcast
Episode Eight: Ben Hodges
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Retired U.S. Army Europe commander Ben Hodges joins the show to deliver a bracing reality check: the next war won’t look like the last one, and it may already be underway. Drawing on his book Future War and the Defense of Europe, Hodges explains how cheap drones, energy choke points, maritime sabotage, and Arctic maneuvering are reshaping the battlefield faster than politicians can draft talking points. From Ukraine’s stubborn resilience to Iran’s shadow play and Russia’s pipeline pressure tactics, this episode maps the fault lines beneath today’s uneasy peace. Sobering, sharp, and uncomfortably plausible, it’s essential listening for anyone who prefers foresight to surprise.
Hosted by John Ellis
Hello and welcome back to the News Items Podcast. I'm John Ellis. I'm the founder and editor of two Substack newsletters. One is called News Items, the other is called Political News Items. You can find them both at news-items.com. We have a new website, so we encourage you to go there. It's a lot of work, but it's a lot of fun. Our guest today is Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who is now retired. He's the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe. He now consults for several companies on Europe, NATO, and the European Union. He is co-author of a great book called Future War and the Defense of Europe, which was published by the Oxford University Press. General, thank you very much for joining us today.
SPEAKER_01Well, John, thank you. And thanks for this privilege. Of course, I read new news items every day when it comes out. You know, lots of people put together articles, but the ones you always do seem to be uh the most relevant and the best in the qualities, which is why I agreed to do this, of course. So this book, Future War in the Defense of Europe, is the first book project uh of which I was ever a part. And thankfully, my co-authors, Professor Julian Lindley French, who's British, and then General John Allen, who you and your audience will know are retired Marine Four star. That was a writing team. And Julian, who had written several books before, he really guided us. And my role was to help make it American and to offer, you know, useful army sort of land warfare insights to the work. But just to make sure Julian deserves the lion's share of the credit, I learned so much in the in the writing of this book, it was much harder. There was more to it than I'd ever imagined, both the actual research and the writing and the going through the whole editorial process, but also finding uh publishers. I mean, this book was published after Russia had invaded Ukraine in 2014 before the large-scale invasion. So just not a lot of interest in digging into defense topics. So it was a different time.
SPEAKER_00I wanted to ask you about the status of the Ukraine war. Obviously, the Ukrainians have fought gallantly and with extraordinary uh, I guess, innovation. Where do you think we are? Where do you think it stands?
SPEAKER_01I am convinced there's no way that Russia can defeat Ukraine. I mean, it's just not going to happen. This this war started in 2014. So here we are after 12 years with Russia having every advantage. Uh, they still only control about 20% of Ukraine, well over a million casualties, enormous expenditure, and um with really not too much to show for it. Now, clearly, Ukraine also cannot knock Russia out of the war. I think we missed our opportunity to do that a couple of years ago by failing to even make that an objective. So we're at a situation now where uh the Ukrainians have figured out how to stop Russian land forces, and I don't see anything coming that would give me reason to think that that will change, that Russia will somehow eventually overpower or break through Ukrainian defenses. Uh it's just not going to happen. On the other hand, the uh Russians are continuing their onslaught every night with drones and missiles against civilian targets all over Ukraine. The power grid, of course, is a big part of that, but it's also, you know, apartment buildings and schools and hospitals and where people live. That's what they're targeting. It's the it's the modern equivalent of strategic bombing that you know we did in World War II, we did it in Vietnam, we did it in other places, other nations have tried it, and it never works. It never breaks the will of a population, and that's what's happening with Ukraine. Even though I I spoke to a Ukrainian friend of mine a few weeks ago who's in who's in the army, we've known each other for many years. I said, Well, how's your family? He said, Well, they're they're living in Kyiv, my wife and daughter, it's you know seven degrees in their apartment. And uh he said, but it'll be spring in just a few more weeks. So I mean that's the that's the attitude of Ukrainians. Now, another domain of the war, of course, is the uh maritime domain, and here the Ukrainians have completely stopped the Russians. The Russian Navy, the great Black Sea fleet, is is hardly a factor. They've been chased out of their base in Sevastopol. They just are not able to operate in any way that contributes to Russian success. And then this is by Ukraine that doesn't have a Navy in the traditional sense, you know, with surface warfare and all that. It's mostly maritime drones and long-range anti-ship missiles. And then finally, the I don't want to overstate Ukraine's capability. I mean, obviously they have manpower challenges, they have financial challenges, but it seems to me that they have developed or discovered a path to victory, which would be the destruction of Russia's ability to export oil and gas. And that's a combination of strikes against the uh refineries uh as they develop more and more long-range precision capability that can reach that far. If Europe and the United States and others would stop the Shadow Fleet vessels that are carrying oil, Russian oil, out of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, then I think the Russians' economy and their ability to continue the war would come to a screeching halt pretty quick.
SPEAKER_00Is the the fact that we have running down, I guess, uh munitions, uh you might say, does that make Ukraine more vulnerable, I guess, uh to Russia? Or does their unbelievable innovation in drone warfare uh make not you know leaves that to be not too much of uh difference?
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell, it it certainly doesn't help Ukraine that uh we are are going through so much of our air and missile defense capability, the munitions, that sort of thing, long-range precision strike. But the fact is, over the past year, the current administration had significantly reduced what it was actually providing to Ukraine, even reducing what it was selling to European countries to give to Ukraine. So there's just not as much left, whatever, however, it gets to them. So this is this is the time where Ukrainians, but also European countries who recognize that for them, Iran is not their priority, but helping Ukraine is their priority to help fill in the gap somewhat. Now, nobody can nobody else can make patriot, but there are other weapon systems that can be made, produced and provided to Ukraine, and also investing in Ukrainian defense industry. You've nailed it, their innovation, their ability to to test, their willingness to test and do new things is, I think, unsurpassed, but they're not yet where they can produce it to scale, to make the quantities of what's needed to really have that decisive effect. And so I think here's where European countries and European companies could invest in Ukraine as well as providing to them what's needed. So it doesn't help, but it it's not I don't I don't think this is going to doom Ukraine. Quite the opposite.
SPEAKER_00Can Putin do a deal ceasefire? Is that really possible given his status at home? If he does a ceasefire, I think uh he has to say to the, you know, the Russian right, so to speak, that it's only for a time and he'll restart the war uh, you know, uh after a quote decent interval. Is that is your sense that Putin necessarily has to continue the war? Because otherwise it'll create sort of an existential threat to him?
SPEAKER_01So it's a very good point and uh an important one. He has no incentive to stop. I mean, clearly he's not affected by casualties, and the Russians are still looking for potential bodies to put into the armed forces to continue what they're doing to try and wear down the Ukrainians and to maintain this narrative somehow that unfortunately the the U.S. administration um has accepted that Russian victory is inevitable. So he has no incentive to stop, especially if he sees that the American president is not really gonna put serious pressure on him, and if he if he thinks that the Europeans are not really willing to do what's necessary to help Ukraine see this through. As long as he believes that, then I think he's gonna continue. What would cause him to recalculate would be the destruction or significant degradation of his oil and gas exports. If he can't do that anymore, then it does really become a problem. This so-called war economy that they're doing, it is artificially propped up and they are using all of their resources. And so there's an it's not an economy that the population, I think, is willing to put up with. I know I hear this mythology that Russians can suffer more than anybody. And it's true they have suffered a lot, but it's because that's all they've ever had from the time of the czars. It's not like they had to they made a big choice to give up a lot for the army. It's the opposite. So I think another disincentive that Putin has to end this war is that if they haven't carried accomplished all the objectives he set out and talked about that were so important for Mother Russia, then he's gonna have a million unhappy veterans returning home to an economy that is in shambles. It'll be a mess. And uh you're talking about people who will have been through terrible, nightmarish combat situations. And uh, you know, the Russian army is not famous for having a deep concern about the welfare of their troops. And so I think he doesn't want to have that. So there's another disincentive to keep this going. So until either the United States and or Europe does what's necessary to really stop Putin's ability to continue fighting the war, then I think this can this will continue certainly throughout the rest of 2026 and on into 27.
SPEAKER_00One of the new narratives is that the Iran war or really the shutting down of the strait of or moves, obviously it has raised the price of oil and gas, and everybody says that this is uh bonanza for Mr. Putin. Is is that true? Is that uh you know actually true?
SPEAKER_01It certainly is true. And I think from a purely financial standpoint, it's a bonanza for him. I mean, I've seen different estimates about how many hundreds of millions of uh dollars have already gone into uh Russian coffers as a result of this ability to export more oil. Now, I'm anxious to see if the administration follows through on what they said, and after 30 days, the amount of time that Treasury Secretary Bessant said um that this the sanctions would be lifted, do they go back in effect at the 30-day mark? I think this will be important to watch. I have to say, unfortunately, I'm skeptical that they will actually put those back into effect. And this, of course, has really annoyed the Europeans because the Europeans have been not perfect, but they have sanctions in place. And so here's the American side now relieving sanctions on the Russians. And this is a dream for the Russians. Their dream has always been to put a wedge between the United States and Europe, but to break apart NATO. And so these are the kind of things that contribute to the erosion of that cohesion that is so important. And it's an objective of the Russians, and we're doing it for them.
SPEAKER_00There was uh you know, the Strait of Hormuz, you know, it says that it's 20 miles wide, but actually uh it's sort of a dredged canal, probably a mile wide, and if you have tankers going through there, you can't have them passing each other. You have to go up uh in the canal, so to speak. Do you think it's feasible that an armada from President uh Trump said yesterday that Europe had to provide ships for opening up the strait? Is that is that a feasible thing? Can you actually open the strait?
SPEAKER_01This this is a difficult question because it's not just yes or no. As long as the Iranians retain the ability to either put mines out there frequently or occasionally, and as long as they retain some sort of ability to launch drones that could strike uh a tanker, then you won't you really can't say that the strait strait is open. I think that the the historical example I think of, and historical examples are not always great, but I think about the Gallipoli campaign in the First World War, where the Allies, you know, were the British and the French believed that if they just sailed their fleet up the Dardanelles, it would appear opposite uh Stambul, and the Ottoman Empire would collapse, and that would knock the Ottomans out of the war. Well, of course, uh the Ottomans had very well prepared shore batteries along both sides of the Dardanelle, and which comes from the Aegean up through the towards Stambul and the direction of the Black Sea. And they also had naval mines. So you had intrepid Ottoman sailors were able to get out there and put mines in the water that sank at least three different ships of the combined Allied fleet, and the Allies realized, okay, now we've got us we've got to secure the land if we're gonna do this, and thus started the Gallipoli campaign, which of course was a disaster that lasted about a year. That doesn't mean it will always be a disaster, but it's a challenge. And so you're talking about having to secure the Iranian side of the strait so that they can't have small boats bringing mines out there or launch drones from inside Iran. And I think you could do some of this with uh you know to have what General McChrystal called the unblinking eye, constant surveillance, looking for every time they saw a vessel going out there, but this would become very, very manpower intensive very quickly, in my view, as long as the Iranians believed that they could stop one or two of these tankers, and as long as the insurance companies believed that that threat was still there, and and the captains of the tankers believed it, this would be a challenge. Yeah.
SPEAKER_00I I mean one thing I think about is if you had if you were able to hit a tanker and it caught fire and you know, leaked oil or dumped oil into the strait, you could send somebody out in the speedboat and essentially have a cigarette lighter and set the whole thing on fire, right?
SPEAKER_01Well, uh certainly the Iranians have been preparing this for for decades, just like our great Navy has been thinking through the challenges of what would you do? And you know, the different types of sea mines, as we're all learning about now. You've got some. The one the popular image from movies is the big round ball with the spikes on it that you can see on the surface. But then you've got others that are tethered to an anchor of some sort on the bottom that are below the surface, and then you've got some that literally lay on the surface, on the bed of the strait, and then you've got other types of weapons that could be employed. And the reporting I've seen from Defense Intelligence Agency was that they had about 6,000 different types of mines. I don't know how many have already been destroyed. I would imagine that our Navy has been looking diligently for these things, the boats as well as the actual mines themselves. So I think if you if you're willing to apply enough resources to it and you and you have the time, then eventually our great Navy and other forces will be able to do it. But then you've you still got to prevent the Iranians from launching drones against a tanker that especially one I could imagine that would be particularly combustible, and what a massive problem that would create in the strait, depending on where it was hit. Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_00So the Iranian strategy seems to be two things. One is horizontal escalation, meaning they ship drones or they fire drones at other nations and allies of the U.S. at Saudi Arabia, Oman, et cetera. And the second is a sort of very sophisticated uh asymmetric campaign. If you were looking at this from the uh from the Iranian perspective, is that enough to draw out the war so that President Trump, thinking about the midterm elections, decides that the best thing to do is declare victory and go home? Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01Well, certainly the Iranians will be very aware of our electoral calendar and the domestic pressures that are out there, as well as pressures from other Gulf countries, from China, from Europe, and so on. So I think that they they will have thought through a lot of this. I think you've identified the strategy that they are using, and frankly, it seems plausible based on what we have seen so far that the uh U.S. administration and you know, and this is why I'm sure Richard and and others with whom you speak, we all talk about the importance of having a clearly defined objective. What is the purpose? What are we trying to accomplish? And if you don't clearly identify the strategic objective before you go into a war or before you start using force, then you can we know from history that the enemy always gets a vote, that things will not go exactly as you had imagined they would. And if you don't have that clearly defined instinct, then you start trying to uh come up with new policies or different things, or you start bringing in new forces because you're having to deal with a situation for which you were not prepared. I don't believe that they didn't think about the strait being closed. I guarantee you that the Admiral and all the Central Command staff, because that that's their daily life. I mean, they stare at that. They know that's a possibility. I just think that there was probably some belief that, you know, if we did this, you know, we bombed the hell out of them, then they'll quit and there'll be an uprising, and we'll have another Venezuela type situation somehow. I don't think I certainly, I'm gonna say it differently. I did not really appreciate the resilience of the IRGC and the regime, whoever it is that's actually in charge. I don't think the former Supreme Leader was actually in charge. I think it's more people inside the uh Revolutionary Guards Corps that are the ones, whoever's still left, and they're operating on that kind of a concept.
SPEAKER_00Right after the first Iraq war, one of the generals or one of the top people in uh in the U.S. Air Force said that the future of the warfare was aerial, that if you own the skies, you would eventually be successful. We have not, obviously, committed ground troops. What's your view of is this war winnable just with you know air superiority? Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, not not based on what I've seen so far. And that's no reflection on our pilots. I mean, nobody loves air power more than the U.S. Army because we have always benefited for decades of having our Navy, our Air Force controlling the skies overhead, and uh we never had to worry about the enemy's ability to attack our rear area or attack us from the air. Until now, of course, drones have have changed that. I think uh you know, the idea that you could that air power will eventually solve everybody's problem assumes that everybody has the same problem. When in fact, you know, the the enemy that we're dealing with now is not the same enemy as the you know when we invaded Iraq or Afghanistan or or other places. And so understanding the the nature of the conflict that you're entering before you do it, that's kind of the first duty of the diplomat as well as the general. And I think if we if we really truly understood how the Iranians are reacting now, then the and the particularly their leadership, what's left of their leadership, I don't think you could come ca you could come to the conclusion that you could just bomb them into submission.
SPEAKER_00Aaron Powell My last podcast with Richard Haas, uh we made the title of it, It Takes Three to Tango. If you look at the from this or look at this from the uh Israeli perspective, how do you think they've look at it and what are they trying to achieve?
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell So you know, the Israeli side, I I have to believe that they see this as an opportunational opportunity, where Iran is as weak as it has been in decades. And so you can imagine that their desire to eradicate the threat uh of Iran's uh ability to have a nuclear weapon to ever really threaten Israel for decades to come, as well as to eliminate Iran's uh support for Hezbollah and any other proxies. So the temptation for the Israelis has got to be do as much as they possibly can as long as the uh Americans are willing to stay to continue doing it. I think that's that's a part of it. You know, there's a lot of a lot of people believe that uh Prime Minister Netanyahu also does not have uh an incentive to end the war either, not only because of the popular support he's got. It typically happens in Israel, regardless of how unpopular the Prime Minister may be, if they're at war, almost everybody supports it. So he's able to uh address some of his domestic challenges as long as they're bombing Iran or or Hezbollah. What's interesting to me, I'm trying to figure out at what point do the American objectives and the Israeli objectives begin to separate. I've spoken to two uh retired senior Israeli guys in the last two weeks, and uh I got the impression from them that they believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu would do whatever President Trump said, that he would quit when Trump said, Okay, that's it. That may be the case, but I I can't tell yet if they if the objectives are fully aligned.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. President Trump is vastly more popular in Israel than in So in theory, if Trump says no more, uh and BB's re-election campaign really depends on, you know, being in sync with uh President Trump, then it is it seems to me possible that the Israelis will stand down. On the other hand, you know, as you say, it's a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. And I think they'll do every everything possible to keep the war going. Is that accurate?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I I think as long as they have the logistics to continue doing that. I mean, they give them credit. They have launched thousands of sorties, they have used an enormous amount of ammunition, they've taken a lot of incoming strikes from Iran. So, I mean, there is a limit logistically to what they can do, but that they will have a they will have their finger on that. And so I just I just don't know, of course, where that is. Gaza is still is not still unfinished business. Hezbollah, Houthis, so there's a lot to be done. I think that they're gonna, exactly as you said it, uh John, is get rid of as much Iranian capability as they possibly can, and then they'll have to resume doing the mowing the grass type uh approach to to contain it, which I think is their forever fate anyway.
SPEAKER_00Aaron Powell One of the things that's come up is that there would be a large special forces team that would go in and get the material, the nuclear material in whatever sites they think uh the nuclear material is. Is that realistic to put those boots on the ground, if you will?
SPEAKER_01Well, of course, as we have seen over the past years, the our special operators, both the people who fly them in and extract them, the ones who communicate for them that support them, the women and men that do all this are, I mean, it's unbelievable what they're able to do. And of course, the intelligence on which they rely is essential. I'm gonna guess that uh they have for the longest time since last summer have been trying to pinpoint the location of where do we think the enriched uranium might be, whether it's in one place or if it's been distributed, hidden. This is not gonna be a big gigantic semi-attractor trailer with a sign on it. I mean, it's gonna be difficult to find. But I imagine they've been looking for it. But of course, the Iranians would know that either U.S. or the Israelis or somebody would be out there looking for it. And so this will be an extremely dangerous and and difficult mission. If it can be done, these are the people that that can do it. But for me, the key would be having the confidence of the intelligence that you know where it is and and what's protecting it. I think that'll be the key. And that's ascertainable, if you will, by DIA and CIA and Israeli intelligence and I think you know um we we have learned over the last several months that the from public sour open sources, how much the Israelis had penetrated the the Iranian side and the government and IRGC and military. I mean, they really the incredible fidelity of intelligence that they've had on uh Iran for over the past year, which is what enabled so many uh successful strikes. As always, intelligence is never one thing. It's it's a combination of signals, human intelligence, imagery, various other means of detecting what is you think is out there, and then trying to pick through all of this to form a picture and and have a level of confidence that you would be willing to commit our special operators to to go in and get that. I think they they probably have been working on this for months as a possibility. So yes, it's feasible that they would have some sense of where it is, but the ones who are looking for it would know that the Iranians would be trying to make it impossible for them to find the President Trump, uh I guess two weeks ago said that uh the Iranians should surrender and lay down their arms.
SPEAKER_00The response to that was no way, and we expect reparations, which is sort of a um hot button with the American right wing. Who who can if you look at this from you know the point of view of China, the Arab states in the Gulf, is it possible, I guess, to get them to commit a vast sum of money to help Iran rebuild in return for uh their agreeing to a secession of the conflict?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, that certainly is feasible. I mean, uh the Iranian side, whoever actually is is in charge will have an interest in number one, staying in power and being able to control their population. But at some point they're gonna have to generate income. I mean, they're gonna have to have financial resources to do basic stuff. And uh they were already in deep, deep trouble of water in Tehran before this even started. So, I mean, they're gonna have to be able to do certain things. And I could imagine that some of the enormous wealth that is in the region could be used to help find a way towards a a settlement where everybody's able to declare some sort of victory and you get things going again. Yeah, you know, no nuclear weapons, no support for terrorism, oil's allowed to go, so no disruption of that, all of these kinds of things. And the the loser in all of this, of course, are the Iranian people, because their life is not going to get any better. They'll just be dealing with the aftermath, a lot of destruction and probably some retribution from the whoever's still left in charge. But this because the war has escalated horizontally, uh I like your phrase, you know, you've got enormous damage that's been done in Lebanon now because the Israelis have really gone after Hezbollah as a branch of this operation. The the Gulf states, you know, that have been seen, particularly the Emirates, as a safe, reliable place to put your money, to get energy, even to go on holiday, you know, that their reputation has been severely damaged. So they'll be they'll have an interest in some sort of return to normalcy if there is such a thing, but also being able to protect themselves in the future. I can imagine the Chinese playing a uh significant role here because obviously, as all your listeners know, that the Chinese depend for much of their energy comes through the strait. And with the president scheduled to go to Beijing here, I think in two more weeks or so.
SPEAKER_00That's right.
SPEAKER_01If he still goes. I guess last night he said he may delay it.
SPEAKER_00Right.
SPEAKER_01So we'll see. I mean that that's that's a a factor as well.
SPEAKER_00So one thing uh as you point out, water is almost as important as as uh oil and gas for existence, really, both for Iran and for, say, Saudi Arabia. If the Iranians blow up uh the desalinization capability that they that they have in Saudi Arabia and that provides I don't know what it is, like eighty or eighty-five percent of their water, if the Iranians blow that up, then everybody in Rihad has to leave because there will be no water. And same sort of applies to the same does apply uh to Iran. If you bust up those two dams that that bring the water to Tehran, then everybody in uh Tehran has to leave as well. Is is that something that either side can really do, or is that sort of the one place that no one will go?
SPEAKER_01It's it's clear to me that both sides have the capability to do it. But uh you know, if you're i if you're in a war, you're you should be thinking always what um what objective am I trying to accomplish and what do I want it to look like when this is all over? And so for the Iranians, is it gonna be better for them if Saudi Arabia loses its water? I mean, even though obviously the Saudis and the Iranians have hated each other forever. I mean that that's a different kind of you do that, then it creates a different sort of set of circumstances. And and it I think that works both ways. That's why the US, for the longest time, has refrained from attacking uh Carg Island, because you always needed that everybody needed the oil that the Iranians pumped through that place or shipped through that place, and you still need a viable Iran when this is all said and done. So there's been a they've refrained. Uh the Israelis, the US have refrained from destroying the oil infrastructure there. So I think I would say the same thing about the water. Now, you know, these these are uh these are the Iranians are they support for the most heinous terrorist uh organizations on the planet. So it's not like they'd be out of pity for the poor Arabs, they wouldn't do it. But I think from a strategic standpoint, do they really benefit from doing that? And I don't think so.
SPEAKER_00You know Europe as as well as anyone, I guess. How are the Europeans looking at all this? What's their take, if you will?
SPEAKER_01I think first of all, there's uh a recognition that Iran has been the source of problems for pretty much everybody over the past decades. So there's a acknowledgement that somehow we we had to do something about Iran. You couldn't just let it keep doing what it was doing, partly because of what they were doing to their own people, as well as the work they were doing on on a nuclear weapon or the belief that they were doing that, and then the constant combat against Israel either directly or through proxies. So European countries have always been concerned about that. On the other hand, almost every European news source I read or hear, or European with whom I speak, are very frustrated with the United States right now that uh the U.S. would would start a war that would have knock on effect with everybody else because of the shock to the oil and gas that everybody else depends on. And so they're not happy about that, obviously. And then for the president to say, hey, you guys have got to take part in uh opening the streets up. And they're like, wait a minute. You've been you've been telling us how terrible we are for the past year. You've insulted us, shown disdain for our soldiers who served alongside your soldiers in Afghanistan, and now you you want us to just send our Navy to help open the strait. You know, you're not invited to the party, but you're invited to the cleanup. I mean, that's kind of how it uh it looks. And I think there's one other thing that has really caused frustration, and I think we, the U.S., we're going to end up regretting this. We've taken for granted that the bases we have in Europe, that we could just kind of come and go and use them when and how we want. And all of these bases, whether it's in UK or Spain or Italy or Germany, Greece, Turkey, these are all sovereign territory of allies. And I think the administration has taken for granted that we could just do whatever we wanted in and from these bases. And uh I think I don't know that we should be taking that for granted.
SPEAKER_00The last time we did a podcast, you said that, and I'm asking you this question because our largest uh uh group of uh of subscribers to news items are, as it turns out, Norwegian. We have over 150 Norwegian subscribers. But the last time we did a podcast, you said that northern Norway was vulnerable to a Russian attack. Do you do you still hold that view?
SPEAKER_01I do. It was a former Norwegian army chief. I was talking to him when I was still in the army, and I said, uh Odin, of of course his name was Odin. I said, Odin, what is the uh what's the most important strategic part of Norway? What do you worry about? And he quickly drew like a little cartoon map of Scandinavia uh and the uh the high north, and then he drew a circle around the top 10% of Norway that that right there is the part. If the Russians ever got control of that very northern part, it would enable them to significantly affect shipping through the from the Atlantic up into the Arctic, and vice versa, with long-range weapons, with air defense weapons, it would it would change the strategic situation in the Arctic. And he said that's why they pay so much attention to it up there. And of course, Norway has Svalbard Islands, which are several hundred kilometers north of the northern part of mainland Norway, but this is Norwegian territory. And there's some sort of an agreement with the Russians that they can be there, but it is Norwegian sovereign territory. And of course, the Russians are constantly pushing the limits of what they're doing there. And there are plenty of indications that cables have been cut going to Svalbart and interference with the various types of communications equipment that are up there. So to me, this is a very plausible scenario where the Russians conducting gray zone operations might make an attempt to even seize Svalbart, which could change the geometry of the Arctic. And uh now you're talking about sovereign territory of a NATO ally being seized by the Russians, and the Russians then daring us. Would you really want to get in a nuclear war over this pile of rock with a very tiny population called Svalbard? And and I think the Norwegians recognize that this is a a vulnerability, and it's why the alliance is waking up to the need for a coherent Arctic security posture.
SPEAKER_00General, we've I think taken up more than we promised of your time. But we thank you very much. We will mention again your book, Future War in the Defense of Europe. And I guess are you're in Frankfurt, right?
SPEAKER_01That's correct. I live in Frankfurt, Germany. I I stayed here after I retired eight years ago.
SPEAKER_00What caused you to stay there?
SPEAKER_01My wife is German American and she's very influential.
SPEAKER_00You do what she says. Anyway, thanks so much for your time, and uh we look forward to talking to you again.
SPEAKER_01Thanks to you and Dale. I appreciate the the privilege.