The News Items Podcast
John Ellis talks with interesting people doing important work. Some you've heard of. Some you haven't. All of them are worth listening to, at some length.
The News Items Podcast
Germany in the World, with David Blackbourn (Episode 17)
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John Ellis talks with historian David Blackbourn, author of Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500-2000, about five centuries of German history viewed through a global lens. They discuss Germany before there was a German state; the role of merchants, soldiers, missionaries, commodities and culture; the rupture of 1914; the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust’s international machinery; and the country’s postwar rebuilding, division and reunification. The conversation then turns to the German model today: dependence on America, Russia and China, Merkel’s legacy, Ukraine, the AfD, Europe’s economic sclerosis, and whether Germany can still attract talent and reinvent itself.
Hosted by John Ellis
Hello and welcome back to the News Items Podcast. I'm John Ellis. I am the founder and editor of two Substack newsletters. One is called News Items, the other is called Political News Items, and you can find them both at news-items.com. Our guest today is David Gordon Blackbourne. Mr. Blackbourne is the Cornelius Vanderbilt Distinguished Chair of History at Vanderbilt University, where he teaches modern German and European history. Prior to arriving at Vanderbilt, Mr. Blackbourne was the Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard University. He is the author of seven books, and the one we're going to discuss today is entitled Germany and the World, A Global History, 1500 to 2000. So the idea of writing Germany and the World over the course of 500 years strikes me as an enormously intimidating undertaking. What caused you to do it?
SPEAKER_00It is certainly an immodest undertaking. I think there are two parts to the answer, really. One is, as you'd expect, contemporary events. All history is contemporary history. This era of globalization prompted me to think about Germany in these terms. But history, the discipline of history, moves to its own rhythms, and I I was curious about what it would look like to step back from seeing the history of a country within its own, just within its own borders, and and as a sort of intellectual experiment. So it was driven by both of those. And the long time span is something dear to my heart because I wrote a piece a few years ago called Honey I Shrunk German History, where I regretted the fact that so much something like three-quarters of all the books and articles and conference papers on German history these days deal with the 20th or early 21st century. And I don't want us to lose that earlier period. So that's a variety of things went into the sort of the spatial and the temporal design of the book.
SPEAKER_01And you say it's German history through a global lens. What what makes that different than previous major works about Germany?
SPEAKER_00I think once once you look at the many, many ways in which Germans were active in the world, in Europe, but also beyond Europe, you know, you you s there are so many different ways in which Germans were active, as merchants, as settlers, as auxiliary soldiers for other people's armies, from the Portuguese and Spanish up to the famous Hessians who fought for the British and for the Dutch as well. Soldiers and settlers, missionaries, scientists. You get a sense of of a country which in the past was always seen as being landlocked in the sixteenth and seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. You know, the other Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British went out and and made their made their place for themselves as colonizers, and the Germans are seen as landlocked. But they weren't. They were there. They were sort of there within the folds of other people's empires all along. Which is why one of the things I think I coined the phrase the German Atlantic. Nobody really had thought about a German Atlantic, I think, before, because there's no German flag. It's the Germans are always there within other people's empires.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell And they're everywhere, right? I mean, one of the fascinating things about the book is that major characters in the book are commodities and spices and things that you I mean, reading German history, I don't think you know one would think uh commodities and spices would would be such a constant theme throughout the book, but it is.
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell Yes. I like the history of commodities, which in in some ways, this will be familiar to my history colleagues. In some ways, commodity history has become the new economic history. You know, commodities uh are great for telling a story. You know, where do they come from? How are they produced? How are they shipped? Who consumes them? And from pepper and spices and coffee and sugar in those earlier periods through to German Volkswagens and washing machines and Falker socks in the modern period, commodities tell tell a story. So that's one of the themes I I know you've you've you've read the book, one of the themes that sort of runs it's a running theme really through the book, uh the movement of goods, commodities, as well as the movement of of people, emigres and exiles, and the people I've mentioned, the soldiers, the merchants, and so on.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell Every country has its eras. What what are the four or five major eras of 500 years of German history?
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell That's a very interesting question, trying to define the periods for German history. It's more difficult, I think, than it is for other countries because there is no German nation state until later in the 19th century, although there are proto-forms of this. I would say, I mean, I divide the book really into four periods. Um this early period where within the Holy Roman Empire there are many, many different states, many of them sort of micro-states. Germans are playing a role in the world, but there is no overarching German entity, no German flag. So that's that's really the first part of the book. It's the very important role of Germans within a modernizing world. And think of think of the Reformation and think of the printing press, the two things that are made in Germany. Then I think there's a transition period of the late 18th and 19th century. Germany becomes identified above all as as the land of of writers and and thinkers. And that's there's a sort of nimbus of of authority that attaches to German culture, which lasts right through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Then the the nineteenth century, the age of nationalism, and I think nineteen fourteen. I I'm a firm believer that nineteen fourteen, the World War I, is uh an absolute break of cesura. And that raises questions that we probably won't go into about continuities. I mean I think sort of the world starts over in uh for for Germans in in 1914. So uh that the the twentieth century broken by World War II and the new beginnings after 1945 is is the is another chapter. Because you will be asking me later, I think, about uh what happens in the end of the twentieth century and what's happening today. But that's that's how I divide the the book.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell And 1914 because just because of the war or because of the consequences of the war?
SPEAKER_00Both. I think until the war there is still uh huge admiration for Germany, for its industry and its what are then the new industries, for its education, for its universities, all those American and British students who go to German universities to do PhDs. Admiration for its bureaucracy, its science, and for its culture, for its for its music. I mean, uh in the book I have, I think, the very touching story of Emily Bronte sitting in this cramped parsonage in the Yorkshire Dales, learning German so that she could read the literature of this of this culture in in the original language. That lingers through to 1914, and I think 1914 damages that reputation not terminally, but it it it really it really damages it severely. And then the consequences of the war, Versailles Treaty, the resentment in Germany, and this opening the door to to the demagogue, to Hitler and the Nazis, that I think it is something new. I mean, historians in Germany argue a lot about the degree to which there are forerunners of the National Socialists. And there are certainly examples of demagogues and of anti-Semitism and of populist movements before 1914. But it's the war and the consequences which really create the preconditions, along with and the depression, the preconditions for for the Nazis.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell, I mean everybody thinks that they know the history of of the 30s and then uh the Second World War, the Holocaust, etc. In the course of doing this book, what did you learn that made you think differently about the rise of the Nazis, the Holocaust, and the war?
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell I don't want to claim too much originality for the for the book. And I I think the book in many ways it highlights and synthesizes what we're coming to see as the, if you want, the global setting for National Socialism, both its origins and its practice. And see, above all, it's the most notorious instance, the Holocaust. I mean, when it comes to origins, it's it's significant that that Hitler admired Chiang Kai shek, he admired Atatürk, he admired Henry Ford and other American racists and anti-Semites. There is a global background to his his thinking, and National Socialism is one of a a number of fascist movements. I mean Hitler's initially a great admirer of Mussolini and very much a kind of junior partner, if you want, in the international fascist movement. It's only after the middle of the 90s that Hitler becomes indisputably Europe's leading fascist rather than Mussolini. And the brown shirts sit alongside the various green shirts, grey shirts, blue shirts of fascist movements all the way across Europe. So that's part of it. But you mentioned the Holocaust, which of course is the great testing ground now for thinking about National Socialism. I would actually say beyond that, that whereas once the French Revolution was the place where historians tried out ideas for how we explain the modern world, the Holocaust in some ways has now taken that position. What I argue, as I say, this is I didn't come up with this on my own. What I think is now broadly accepted is that although the Holocaust was a German directed enterprise, we cannot see it in its full scope without recognizing how it couldn't have taken place without non-German helpers who guarded the camps, who served as local police forces and militias, who rounded up Jews and put them onto deportation trains, and foreign insurance companies which helped to loot Jewish property and and so on. This is not in any way to weaken or undermine arguments about the the the German nature of this enterprise, but simply to spread spread the responsibility wider, and I think that's I think that's very much in line with the the way that modern scholarship is is going, both within Germany to emphasize the role of people who were not just Nazis and SS people, but ordinary Germans, but internationally to recognize the role of the many, many auxiliaries, non-Germans, who were essential to this process. There were very few Germans in the death camps, for example. Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01I was stunned to read that Hitler was a junior partner to Ms. Mussolini, that he was you know, that Mussolini was the the larger fascist figure and the and that uh Hitler was the junior partner up until, as you say, the what the transition that took place. What what changed that made Hitler the senior figure and Mussolini eventually a minor figure?
SPEAKER_00Yeah. That's that's very that's very hard to answer. I mean I I think the partly it's the the sheer kind of energy and speed with which the Nazis uh implemented their policies after after 1933 and the the huge propaganda effort that went into things like the the Autobahn and then into the uh hosting the the the Olympics, of course, in in 1936. I think what accompanied this changing roles of of the junior partner and the senior partner is also the resonance that Nazi racial theory and the Nuremberg laws played with fascist parties elsewhere. I mean the British Union of Fascists, to take an example. In the early 1930s, they were still emphasizing Italian fascist slogans of corporatism and so on. They really start to mimic and echo Nazi racial language increasingly from say around 1935. I mean, I'm not sure that I have a uh straightforward answer to that, but I w I would certainly say that the sort of the energy dynamism that the Nazis project internationally is is an important part of that.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell I was fascinated as well by a a nation now decimated by World War II, uh surrender to the Allies, and you know what there they are, then now been divided into East Germany and West Germany. And how did it rebuild? How did it uh come out of devastation? I mean, there's no other word for it, in such a short period of time, relatively speaking.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. And it's uh big question, and it's it rebuilds in two very different ways, both of them successful within the blocks that they belong to. The answer is that each was embedded firmly within its within its block. It's not if we take the Federal Republic, the the Germany that I I identify obviously more strongly with, the one where I spent time I first went there in the uh in the 1960s as part of a a school exchange. And the great turning point initially was Adenau deciding that he would identify with the West. I mean there have been a number of turning points, and that was the key one in in the 50s, that Germany would no longer go its own way, but would identify itself with the West, with Atlanticism. And I think subsequent turning points, Philibrandt in the 1970s, with the decision to go for rapprochement, the Ostpolitik with Russia is another turning point, just as you will come to this later, I think, but the tremendous importance in the early years of Helmut Kohl's decision that unified Germany would embed itself within uh European within the developing European Union in order to to disarm fears about what Germany could become. But going back to Adna, that that lays the foundations for for the emergence of a uh of economic dynamism, the so-called Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle. The current common sense of historians is that we shouldn't overemphasize the degree to which West Germans were getting wealthy in the nineteen fifties. Much of it was coming really in the sixties and even the seventies. But compared with, as you say, the utter devastation and the the black market, the well, the the ruined the ruined landscapes that are familiar to anyone who's seen photographs of that period. It's a remarkable turnaround. And without going into too much detail, I mean the the East Germans, in retrospect, we can see all the failings of the system. But not only sympathetic socialist commentators, but institutions like the World Bank consistently saw the GDR East Germany as a relatively successful socialist economy relative to to other parts of the Soviet Soviet bloc. But I don't want to go on too long, so let me hand it back to you. Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_01Well, I wanted to get to the 1990 and German reunification. Helmut Cole, I think, goes to or speaks with President, then President George H. W. Bush and George H. W. Bush and Secretary Baker, Secretary James Baker, are initially, I think, a little wary of reunification, uh, but eventually Bush and Cole, I don't know quite how you describe this, but they decide to go ahead, if you will, Cole being a critical figure, obviously. Can you describe to us how that came about? I I just think it's an amazing shift in European history that, you know, you have these two states now reunited with the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly thereafter. You know, the Germany is no longer a neighbor, it's buffered, and therefore the threat of Russia diminishes, at least in theory.
SPEAKER_00Trevor Burrus, Jr.: One of the things I'd I'd I'd like to start by saying is that we always talk about lessons from history, learning from the past. But one of the things that professional historians can take pleasure in at these great turning points is to look at the light which the present throws on the past. And I I remember that year, 1989-90, very, very well. I was in Stanford as a visiting professor, and we were having regular lunchtime gatherings, and we had no idea what would happen. Will East Germany disappear? Will it will there be some kind of reformed socialist state of the kind that the reformers, figures like Christopholf, would have preferred, or will it simply disappear? We didn't know. History was, as it always is, open-ended until events actually happen. And I actually felt that I learned a lot about Bismarck and unification of the 1860s and the 1871 settlement from 1989-90. And I think I'm not not alone in that. No, I mean, you're you're right to emphasize the turning point, and if George H. W. Bush had some nervousness, it was as nothing compared with the nervousness of of Mr. Gorbachev, but also of the French, and not least of of Margaret Thatcher, who had profound misgivings. I think she gave up her opposition. I think Mr. Gorbachev gave up his opposition earlier than uh earlier than than Margaret Thatcher did. I think a combination of reasons explains how it ended as it did. Partly just the lack of state capacity in East Germany, made it hard to imagine that that state could continue to exist as an independent entity, and the people of East Germany increasingly, and for economic reasons, wanted to uh wanted to join the West. And as for the international dimension, Timothy Garten Ash, who was one of the great experts on on this, talks that's slightly I won't say that he's a cynic, but he does talk about the way in which the Federal Republic, in a sense, bought off the Soviets with very generous uh economic aid packages and so on. I think a combination of a charm offensive of economic of ec economic incentives and the sheer implosion of the East German state. At a certain point in the spring of 1990, it became clear that there would there would be reunification, and then the only question was on what terms? And I think essentially the terms on which it took place were very much those of the old Federal the old Federal Republic, so that it was an absorption of East Germany on the terms set by by West Germany.
SPEAKER_01So Germany is reunified, the threat, if you will, of the of the Soviet Union slash Russia diminishes with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of history has arrived, and this sort of, I don't know what you would call a Davos consensus emerges. And the German model is U.S. for security, Russia for energy, China for markets. How much of that is is accurate? And uh what what impact did it have on policy making amongst the policy makers in Germany?
SPEAKER_00No, I mean that's uh there are a number of celebrated quips about Germany. One is Henry Kissinger's Germany's too big for Europe, too small for the world. Interesting comment. And then the one that you cite uh is I think Constanza Steltson Müller, this commentator, said that Germany outsourced its defense to the US, its uh its energy needs to Russia, and it its uh economic export needs to to China. I think it's an accurate description, um, was it it describes what would later become problematic once the perhaps the complacency of the nineteen nineties about the end of history and globalization was bound to lead to some kind of convergence and the Chinese and Russians would eventually get with the program. A complacency in Germany that of course was was shared in the in the Western in the Western world. You know, Monday morning quarterbacking is you know, is is easy. I mean it it worked. It worked as a model, and I would say that in the German case there is a pattern in the history of the Federal Republic, the old Federal Republic, and it continues after 1990, this desire to to be friends with everyone, to be part of every multinational agreement, to be in NATO, to be in Europe, to have good relations though with the Russians too, have good relations with the Chinese. This desire to I mean it's it's part of a I think a quite conscious throwing off of a of a bad, dark history. And so the reunified Federal Republic fits perfectly. It's a kind of poster child for that globalizing complacency of the nineteen nineties and the early twenty-first century until suddenly it's upended by a whole series of crises. The recession, the the Russian Empire increasingly showing its fangs, COVID. Um I mean a whole series of of shocks to the system, which we may go into in detail, but yeah. It is I would say that Germany not only shares, but is a particularly powerful illustration of that, of of the complacency of that era. And the description of of the dependency on those those three countries is absolutely accurate, I think. Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_01My friend Walter Mead wrote a famous essay when she described the blue model as big government, big comp big corporations, and big labor working together to you know improve living. standards and you know, progr make progress on every front, and that it worked for a long time and then it didn't. It it broke down. The German blue model seems similar. What when did you think that sort of began to break down? I'm I'm curious as to you know, now it seems like the Germany's economy has no sort of venture capital dynamism, if you will, despite having enormous intellectual capital, and I think a lot of people think that the reason for that is Volkswagens of the world, BS BASF, etc., in concert with the labor unions and in concert with the political system, have sort of gamed the system to their advantage at the cost of uh, you know, innovation, dynamism, whatever you want to call it. Is that is that roughly true?
SPEAKER_00Or I have mixed feelings about this. I mean I read figures like Wolfgang Gunshau for whom I have great respect, and others like him who emphasize precisely this. And there's there's clearly some truth in it. Germany privileged the older industries in which they were very good. I mean the the exports to China, you know, f forty percent of Volkswagen's uh income came from exports to to China. They were very good at pharmaceuticals and automobiles and equipment. I mean Siemens is still a globally significant country, one of the largest in the world it builds, you know, it builds wind turbines, it builds subways in Riyadh, it builds it builds the get uh CAT scanned on in in hospitals. Yes, Germany got left behind when it came to biotech, AI, and that's partly a European phenomenon. One of the explanations for it, I think, is the absence, if you compare the EU with either the US or China, they have single capital markets. The EU has eight different currencies, one of which is the Euro, and then you've got, you know, you've got the the British pound and the Swiss franc and the Norwegian krona on top of that. It's been regarded as plausible the arguments that it's simply impossible for any bank in Europe, whether it's the largest bank in Germany or France or Britain, to fund a Meta or a Nvidia or Apple on the scale in which they can be or or indeed the their Chinese equivalents, ten cents and so on. Impossible to fund them to the same degree. So partly this is a matter of the absence of a single capital market in Europe. But they have been left behind and there are certain arguments to be made about bureaucratic bloat. I was in Germany we just got back actually just on Sunday night and in Berlin there are so many construction sites and talking to a friend there, um the friend was saying rather caustically that the reason for so many construction sites is that you you have to acquire a permit to construct a construction site but then you have to acquire another permit to construct a construction on your construction site at one institution I won't I won't name it, but a cultural institution in the German capital where their main building is closed for renovations. They're they've been told that it should be ready for them to reoccupy in 2031. But they think that this may be a bit optimistic because it's only five years away. So even as a good old social democrat as I am I recognize the problems of bureaucratic rigidity. They are of course not unique to Germany some of what people argue about Germany would be familiar to readers of you know Ezra Klein and the abundance you know getting stuff built it's so hard. And I I would add a particular German problem which is this austerity obsession and I think it goes back to the inflation period this fear of funny money. And as you know I mean of of all the G7 countries Germany has by far the healthiest public finances. I mean if you compare it with the US or Britain or France, they're all basket cases really by comparison with Germany Germany should have used its money to spend it wisely on RD, on infrastructure, getting those railways and bridges repaired, especially the railways it's now a standing joke in Germany the Deutsche Bahn, everybody has stories about cancellations and delays. The Germans joke about it. So they should have spent the money they should have boosted domestic demand more rather than just being the export behemoth. So the critique the critique of the sort of the the sclerosis is accurate but let me just end by briefly stating the case against Germany is still the world's number three economy. It's the world's number two economy if you measure it by GDP per capita after the US It has global brands which everybody recognizes it's reinvented itself in the past I think it can do so again. Germany is, I think, taking steps now to free itself when it's freed itself from the Russian energy source, retooled its ports to bring in liquefied natural gas. And I think both Scholz and now Merz have been trying very hard to connect with other trade partners with India with the Saudis and the Emirates with Latin Americans. So all is not lost. I mean I I think it's possible to be too pessimistic about the German economy on the politics of the Blue State you know Winston Churchill once said famously democracy is the worst system of government ever invented except for all the others and I I would say social democracy is the worst system ever invented except for all the others. I'm a a fairly unrepentant social democrat. You'd have to say that social democracy is not thriving at the moment but that's that's not just a German story and perhaps perhaps you'll want to come on to the the the politics before we end this.
SPEAKER_01Well I did want to ask I mean Anula Merkel is a huge figure in the post uh in the 21st century. What accounts for her rise, I guess, and then what accounts for her extraordinary longevity politically and and then one should say something about the legacy because there is a there is now a sort of nostalgia wave, I think, for the Merkel years.
SPEAKER_00I mean she it's interesting isn't it the uh the the fact that these powerful female leaders have so often risen in parties of the center right rather than parties of the center left and so she fits she fits that pattern. She uh she her reputation was above all that of a safe pair of hands. Merz was the more right wing rival and was seen, ironically perhaps from today's perspective, Merz was seen as a more difficult, divisive, prickly figure, more ideological, more right wing. So she was a technocrat and extraordinarily talented at marginalizing critics, acquired this reputation as a safe pair of hands, and you can probably hear the bot coming I mean I I knew you'd ask me about Merkel and it occurred to me a str a strange analogy was with Otto von Bismarck that after he'd gone, people said, oh why don't we have leaders like that anymore? He was such a powerful dominating figure and the people who came after were so much lesser. But it's I think fairly apparent to historians now that for all Bismarck's genuine qualities, many of the problems of his succ that his successors faced were problems that arose because of him and because of his twenty years in power. And I think I do I I don't know that anybody else has made this analogy, but it is certainly the case that people are now pointing to various problems that Merkel left behind. I mean there's two very impulsive decisions that she made it's strange this this sort of Mutti, the safe pair of hands twice behaved very impulsively once after Fukushima that Germany will instantly get out of nuclear power, which in retrospect was a a foolish decision, very foolish, and I think the environmentalists would accept that but the other m this is more controversial, the other is the complacency with which in August 2015, when Germany proceeded to admit one million Syrians, a shuffled us we we can do this, criticized even at the time actually by some social democrats as going too far too quickly, throwing off the Dublin protocols and and opening the door to AFD to the to the far right. But I mean the larger point before I go on too long but the larger point I think is people now talk about a wasted golden decade. After the Eurozone crisis, after the financial crisis, so let's say from 2009 for the next ten years, Merkel's in power and things don't change. That's when Germany should have been trying to make more of a transition towards EVs, AI and so on. So wasted opportunities. So she is a great powerful figure, but I would just add one other thing as someone who liked the old Federal Republic, which had two major Christian Democratic leaders who were from the Rhineland, Adenauer and Kohl, they were from the Rhineland and I think had a kind of sense for Europe and especially for the French connection but not only that Merkel didn't have coming as she did from the former East Germany. So fans of Angela Merkel, including the 35,000 people who bought her autobiography on the first day will probably not like what I've just said but I I have criticisms. Yeah. And there are huge lines for her to sign the book. Yeah it's the Merkel nostalgia you know the nostalgia for the for a an imagined better Germany and of course it it was in many ways a less fraught and crisis ridden Germany.
SPEAKER_01So as we were going back and forth you said to me that you thought I would ask about Ukraine and of course I was going to ask about Ukraine but the Ukraine that I was thinking about was Crimea in 2014? And th that was seems to me a hinge point in modern German history. Am I right about that or is it not is it not that important?
SPEAKER_00I think it was, although it's I think because of the sheer overwhelming presence of of the war since February 2022, some of the earlier stages of Soviet attacks on Georgia and then the the seizure of Crimea and what turned out to be the fruitless efforts of Germany and France with you know with the Normandy Accords and the Minsk Agreements and so on broken by Putin, they tend to be overlooked. I think you're right that um the West should and here again Merkel is important, the West should have been more critical of the Russian threat earlier. But you can always understand why in the German case there is a reluctance to be critical of Russia as of the Soviet Union before the tradition of Ostpolitik um the thing that I mentioned earlier the most obsessive German desire to be friends with everyone East and West. So I I have some sympathy for Merkel's unwillingness to take a bolder stance. But I think you're right that that shouldn't be forgotten, even as we recognize how Germany has stepped up and been a very important leader and a leader within Europe when it comes to supporting Ukraine since February 2022.
SPEAKER_01I think the German support for Ukraine in the current conflict, which has now amazingly gone longer than World War I was astonished by that little fact. It's been remarkable given the political pressure from the right as what what accounts for it? Why has the the leadership been so I mean not obviously not a hundred percent, but more than anyone else in Europe, Germany has stepped up. What what are the political dynamics of that aren't they or I'm not quite sure I have the question right here, but given the rise of the right in Germany, it would seem that the leadership would be more circumspect or flexible or whatever the right word is about supporting Ukraine, but the the German government has been almost uniformly strong.
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell Yes. It's it's it's interesting that that you do frame it that way. It it it isn't often framed that way and it really makes you think I mean one one answer would be political will, which we shouldn't underestimate that German leaders have have not taken the path of least resistance is a matter of political will and all credit there. But I you you could in fact trace this back to the way in which since reunification German leaders have bit by bit nailed their colours to the mast when it came to supporting humanitarian interventions, which of course for a long time Germans uh refused to refuse to take part in any kind of out of area operations and there was even a question of whether the Supreme Court in Germany would permit them. And that's all been resolved and I mean one of the things I write about in the in the book is how from I mean from the time of Kosovo onwards, step by step, Germans have come to assert the importance of international initiatives to support essentially democratic democratic sovereign states against aggressors. And that includes Kosovo it includes other examples, for example Afghanistan. So it's there's an ideological background which is a background of bit by bit stepping away from the the desire never to engage in ways that could be criticized with the outer world. And it's also a question of political will.
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell I want to follow up but in a different sort of way which is the AFD which is rising in the polls at least has taken a pro-Russian view of the war. I think that's fair to say well my question is is is that viable politically can you be pro-Russian in the current German environment given a war that's gone on longer than World War I, clearly a war of choice on Putin's part and given the massive unpopularity of President Trump pre and now post the Iran war, if if indeed the war Iran war is over, which I don't suspect it is, but i is is there a sort of ceiling for the AFD or is there room for them still to grow? I hope there's a ceiling.
SPEAKER_00It hasn't been a straightforward linear rise. There's a volatility to the vote for AFD as I think there is to equivalent movements. I mean as you know this is AFD is the German version of what's happening in in many other parts of Europe. I mean in in the Netherlands, in France and in the country that I was born in with reform, restore, reclaim all these far right movements which have almost eclipsed the Conservative party I think I believe, but maybe I want to believe that AFD has reached its natural scening now. What I am heartened by is the way that the firewall has held of the the other parties. And I mean there's a striking example in Turingia one of the former East German lender where AFD is stronger as you know than in the West. There's a coalition there of not only of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats but also of this breakaway left-wing group, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance. Those three have half of exactly half of the seats and they are in coalition government which is tolerated by De Linca, the far left party. All of this to um to marginalize AFD which is the largest single party. There have been some Christian Democrats who've talked about admitting AFD to government on the grounds that they will give them some power and they will behave more moderately. I think that the model there is is Maloney in Italy. A dangerous argument I think because AFD is considerably to the right of of Maloney. I mean it wants to leave NATO and the EU and is um a racist party. These Christian Democrats who've talked about bringing into power are very much very much a minority voice and I expect that to remain the case. I mean it's a I'm not complacent, but I I mean it it is a it's a dangerous party and it it has to be met with political arguments and not I I've had various conversations in the last two weeks in Germany with Germans who've who would like it to be banned. I think that's terrible politics. You can't ban can't ban a party that millions and millions of Germans vote for out of frustration and anger. You have to you have to meet them with arguments and there are various fronts on which I think they should do that. So I don't know if they've reached the peak.
SPEAKER_01I I hope they have I was interested to read in the FT I don't know when you know last week or so that Der Linke, is that right the left wing party? Der Linke has attracted a large following among the youth of Germany which I guess is defined as eighteen to twenty five or eighteen to twenty nine year old people. Is that is that true?
SPEAKER_00Yes. I mean I think wh ha this again is the German variant of something that's uh a l a a larger phenomenon in in the West. I think of the way that the Green Party in in Britain, which is basically now it's like De Linka. I mean it's a it's not an ecological party anymore. It's a party of party of the left-wing labor exiles and of the the trans activists and uh and of Muslims in fact. Or you think of the Democratic Socialists of America and the uh success of of some charismatic left-wing figures. Uh and De Linka has attracted, yes, youth who are clearly dissatisfied with boring old social democracy. And I understand that. I mean it one of my one of my hobby horses is that once upon a time in the 1970s all the charismatic politicians were social democrats. Willy Brandt, Olaf Palmer, Goff Whitlam in Australia, all your Australian listeners will instantly nod, you know, the most transformational figure. And now we have Keir Starmer and Olaf Schultz. These are not charismatic figures and the and the Social Democrats seem to have run out of ideas and the youth but some of the youth are going to AFD as well. Let's not forget that. So that's that has its counterpart in other countries as well, doesn't it? Including including this one youth going to the more left side of the Democratic Party but also some youth attracted to MAGA.
SPEAKER_01Yes yeah no it's interest i the politics here are interesting because Gallup did a poll of public figures do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of X, Y, and Z. And the two public figures that were had net positive favorable ratings were Pope Leo, no surprise there, and the other was Bernie Sanders. Everybody else was negative. So it's this it's you know there's there's something going on on the left and Sanders obviously is himself and he's run twice for president and has a following and is seen as I hate the word but authentic. Yes but but the a man who is elected to the U.S. Senate from Vermont and runs on the independence socialist line is not something you would expect in the U.S. I wanted to ask you one last question. One of my hobby horses I guess you would say is that the Trump administration's attacks on expertise on academic institutions, on science broadly speaking has made a lot of PhD candidates, a lot of PhDs, a lot of faculty members, a lot of the smartest people in the world basically, think about relocating, leaving the U.S. and going to work in England or France or Germany or Canada or whatever. Is is is that is Germany reaching out to attract the I hate the word reaching out. I'm sorry I used it. Is German is Germany putting out a welcome mat? There you go welcome mat to the brainiacs of America to get them to come?
SPEAKER_00Would will you permit me a quick comment about Maine? I have to believe that there is something in between 78-year-old Janet Mills and Graham Platner. There's something different in both age and politics and that to me is is a problem. But I would say that wouldn't I as an old as an old social democrat who's looking for new leadership in people in their 40s and 50s. But the welcome mat is certainly there. I mean one of the most wonderful ironies of history to me is the significant number of young liberal Jews who are relocating from Israel to Germany. Talk about talk about ironies of ironies of history. I'm not aware that there is a that there's active attempt to reach out. I dislike the phrases you do. You know this Anhold Ipsos nation brands survey I mean it's a horrible idea too that nations are brands. But Germany scores very very highly on those as you know first or second place. There are many things that um that attract people to this to this cultural nation, this wealthy nation. I think German cultural diplomacy is very effective. It's uh you know there are 150 Goethe institutes around the world. There is a certain magnetism and it's most obvious when it comes To cultural figures like musicians and conductors. I think three-quarters of all the orchestras in Germany are conducted, you know, the music directors are non-Germans and non-Austrians. I think that along with Canada, Australia, Britain, and other places, uh, Germany will capture some of that, some of that talent that emigrates. But some of the neoliberal critics of Germany argue that Germany itself is losing its more creative figures because of this rigid bureaucracy. So maybe swings and roundabouts.
SPEAKER_01One of the themes of of your book is the uh is the importance placed on and on intellectual capital, or another horrible phrase, but universities, research, uh intelligence generally by brought together throughout the nation's history or when it unified, obviously. And and since it's been it's been a real home to intellectual activity, scientific research, etc.
SPEAKER_00Yes.
SPEAKER_01That continues, right? I mean that that's that's not stopped.
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell Not at all. And you were talking about youth as a group, and I not long ago read an interesting survey, an international survey of 15 to 24 year olds and whether they were optimistic about the future. And not surprisingly, I think, many of that generation in the US and France and Britain were pessimistic. German youth, 15 to 24 year olds, were relatively optimistic. They compared more with Moroccans and Brazilians than they did with French and Americans Americans of the same generation. And one of the reasons for that was that they really believed that education uh would permit social mobility, that they could have lives at least as good as their parents' lives if they worked hard and were educated. And that was that made Germany an outlier among the advanced capitalist countries. So that is very much in line with what you're talking about, the um the importance attached to education, culture. Yes. And one of the things that I admire about this country as well.
SPEAKER_01So what's your next book, or is that it?
SPEAKER_00Aaron Ross Powell The next book, which is nearly finished, is a much shorter book. I I'm I'm done with long books.
SPEAKER_01I mean for your sake, not for my For my sake, thank you.
SPEAKER_00I appreciate the amendment. Um it's a book called Wheels of Power, and it has three chapters, and it's it's the first book I've ever written which is focused on the National Socialists, and it's literally about the use of wheels in the seizure of power and then the regime and the Holocaust, that is to say, the use of um motorbikes and trucks and cars for propaganda and violence in the seizure of power. I mean it's more than it's not a history of technology. It it's it's the wheels and their economic and social and cultural significance. Then I talk about the Autobahn and the Volkswagen project, and then, of course, the uh the death trains. So it's it's wheels. Wheels of power.
SPEAKER_01That's the name of the book.
SPEAKER_00Watch out for it. Yes. I'm not sure what the subtitle is, but that's definitely going to be the main title.
SPEAKER_01When is it going to be published?
SPEAKER_00It's the due date for the manuscript is next spring, and I will probably shock my agent and the publisher by delivering ahead of time. So I would think at the earliest next fall, possibly even the spring of 2028. But uh say it is I've I'm nearly finished with a good first draft now. It'll be a 70,000-word book, much shorter than Germany in the world.
SPEAKER_01All right. I think we've taken uh more than enough of your time. Thank you very much for doing this. And we would urge our readers to buy Mr. Blackborne's book, which is entitled Germany in the World of Global History, 1500 to 2000. It's enormously impressive. It was described actually by Timothy Gartnash, is that right? Gartenash as magnificent, which I thought was accurate. Thank you very much for doing this.
SPEAKER_00Well, thank you very much for having me on your podcast. I've enjoyed it very much indeed. Thank you.