Dariusz Jeziorny, *British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact (1933-1935): Analyses, Projects, Activities*. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2017

In this monograph, Dariusz Jeziorny explores British diplomatic relations from 1933 to 1935, shedding light on London's viewpoint regarding the Eastern Pact and highlighting the reasoning and actions of British diplomacy within the framework of both European and global matters. Was His Majesty's Government truly invested in the success of the initiative promoted by Moscow and Paris? Did it grasp the motivations of its advocates? How did it react to the resistance from countries that were reluctant to accept such a matter? Who were London's primary negotiating partners? Can the Foreign Office be regarded as capable of tackling European challenges, especially those related to Eastern Europe? Were the earlier conclusions in academic literature correct in assessing the roles of certain powers in the failure of the Eastern Pact concept? Jeziorny tackles these inquiries through an in-depth analysis of governmental documents located in the National Archives in London, particularly the general correspondence of the British Foreign Office. He offers a captivating glimpse into the inner workings of British diplomacy and its perspectives on the French initiative.

Transcript

SPEAKER_03 0:02

Hello. Hi. Welcome to the Dialogues in Holocaust Studies in the Second World War podcast. I am your host, Ari Barbalat. Today I'm honored to engage in a dialogue with Dariush Yejorni. We will discuss his recently published book, British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact, 1933 to 1935. Analyses Projects Activities, published in Stuttgart, Germany by Ibadem Verlag, 2017. Darius Jazorny serves as professor of contemporary world history at the University of Wuj in Poland. His research concentrates on the history of diplomacy, international relations, and political thought. In this monograph, Darius Jaziorny delves into British diplomatic relations during the period of 1933 to 1935, illuminating London's perspective on the Eastern Pact and understoring the thought processes and actions of British diplomacy in the context of both European and global affairs. Was his majesty's government genuinely interested in the success of the initiative championed by Moscow and Paris? Did it understand the motivations behind its promoters? How did it respond to the opposition from nations that were unwilling to accept such an issue? Who were the main partners for London in negotiations? Can the Foreign Office be seen as competent in addressing European challenges, particularly those concerning Eastern Europe? Were the previous conclusions in academic literature accurate in evaluating the roles of specific powers in the failure of the Eastern Pact concept? Yes, Yorni addresses these questions through a comprehensive analysis of governmental materials found in the National Archives in London, especially the general correspondence of the British Foreign Office. He provides a fascinating insight into the inner workings of British diplomacy and its attitudes toward the French initiative. Dariush, it's an honor to be in dialogue with you today.

SPEAKER_05 2:36

Hello.

SPEAKER_03 2:38

It's my pleasure to begin, can you tell us a little bit about yourself and your personal relationship to this topic and project?

SPEAKER_05 2:49

Okay, as you read, I am a professor of contemporary history at the University of Lódz in Poland. And I work here since 1993. I am a husband of Agatha. I have two sons, and it's my private life. And my special scientific interest is about the international relations, the history of diplomacy in the interwar period, especially the British foreign policy at the time.

SPEAKER_03 3:27

What does your book's title mean? Can you explain it?

SPEAKER_05 3:32

Yeah, the the topic is connected with the links between London and East Central Europe in the 1930s. We can say, and it was the initiative taken by French diplomacy and the Soviet diplomacy at the end of 1933. And my task was to present the reactions, a reception of the British diplomacy towards this initiative. It was, in my opinion, quite important because there was quite a lot written about this initiative, especially in Russian, some in Polish, some in German, some in French, but nothing in English, or almost nothing in English, because there was one book by Lisanne Rodica, who wrote this about this subject from the French, mainly French perspective. So basing on the French documents. And for the first time I was basing on the British documents. So it's quite interesting. And now the main thesis of the Soviet scientist was that the British were unwilling towards the whole initiative of the Eastern Pact, or at best, lukewarm.

SPEAKER_01 5:10

And I am proving that it was quite opposite. What was your guiding principle in conducting this research?

SPEAKER_05 5:23

My guiding principle, I am just trying to answer the question about the British-Soviet relations at first at the time, because the Soviet foreign policy changed dramatically in 1933. And after the after Hitler's access to power, Moscow changed its policy dramatically, we can say. The first point was that it consisted of the countries of East Central Europe: the Soviet Union, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. And in the event of an attack of any of these countries against the other signatory of the Eastern Pact or the Eastern Locarno, all the following members were assist delivering assistance to the attacked country. So it was the first part of this Eastern Locarno concept. Yes. The concept was quite strange because it was the alliance, it was the pact on mutual assistance. However, it was assumed, it is first point, that one of these countries is the aggressor. So it's quite strange. But the second part was also also very interesting that the French agreed to deliver assistance to the Soviet Union when it is attacked by the third country. On the opposite, the Soviet Union agreed to deliver assistance to France when it was attacked by the third country. The third country is a language of diplomacy, but everybody knew that Germany is behind this name the third country. So when we read it today, they agreed to help each other in the case of the German aggression. However, looking at the map, we can see that there was no territorial connection between Germany and the Soviet Union. So it was necessary for the Germans, because the Soviet Union accused the Nazi Germany for the offensive plans against the Soviet Union on the part of the Nazi Germany. So if such aggression was planned, it should happen through the other country. And there are several possibilities. How to attack for the Germans. The easiest way to do it would be through Poland, through the Polish territory. However, in January 1934, the Poles and the Germans signed the special declaration declaring non-violent solutions of the problems between Berlin and Warsaw. So we can say that the bilateral relations between Poland and Germany beginning in January 1934 started to improve. That's why Germany could attack using the territory of Lithuania that was also between the Soviet Union and Germany. And in fact, the relations between Lithuania and Germany were very bad at the time. The other possibility was the German attack against Czechoslovakia. And it was possible because there was a strong German minority in Czechoslovakia, some three and a half million of people living of German origin living in Czechoslovakia. And in the nationalist ideas of Hitler, it would be great to have all Germans in one Reich, in one country. His slogan was ein Reich, ein Fear, and ein Folk, and the German folk should be together, according to him. So the attack against Czechoslovakia was very, very probable. And if he attacked Lithuania or Czechoslovakia, according to the assumptions of the Eastern Park, it's a pity that we don't have a map here to explain this on the map. All the countries that belong to the Eastern Lokarno should help the oppressed nation. How could it happen in the case of the Red Army? It should be done through the Polish territory. So yeah, it would be legal for the Red Army to transfer the troops to Lithuania or Czechoslovakia through the Polish territory. And when we are talking about the people or the countries who are unwilling towards the concept of the Eastern Pact or the Eastern Lakarna, it was mainly Germany, because Hitler didn't want to have his hands, you know, unfree. And the Poles, because in any case of the German aggression, the Red Army troops would go via the Polish territory in the frames of the international law. It would be legal that the Red Army is expanding westward. So the Poles didn't want the Eastern Pact too. Similarly, the Baltic states were very unwilling, especially Estonia and Latvia, because they were afraid of introduce of entering of the Red Army to the territories. So more or less, it was the concept of the of the Eastern Pact, of the Eastern Locarno, as you asked.

SPEAKER_03 23:50

Can you comment on German-Soviet relations as alluded to in this study?

SPEAKER_05 23:56

Okay. So as I mentioned before, in short, the German-Soviet relations in the 1920s were very good. There was so-called Rapallo policy executed by the German government. Rapalla was a small town close to Genoa where in 1922, in April, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicharin, and his German counterpart signed the treaty that renewed the diplomatic relations between these two countries. But these documents started the era of some ten years of very close cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. First of all, it was the political cooperation. They had the common enemy. And this common enemy was the Versailles system, and especially the country that existed between Germany and the Soviet Union. It was Poland. So both of them lost some territories on the coast of the newly born Poland after 1918. That's why they cooperated against Poland. It was the political basis of cooperation. Moreover, they cooperated in the military sphere because the Germans were restricted in their armaments. They were only able to have one hundred thousand professional soldiers, without the ministry for war or defense, without the general staff that could prepare the plans of military operations, without the possibility to rearm the German army, and they were deprived of the heavy weapon, offensive weapons like tanks, heavy artillery, machine guns, etc. Also in the fleet, some restrictions. So to train soldiers and to develop the industry, military industry, they could do it because Germany was under control, they could do it on the Soviet territory. So there were several territories rented in the middle of the Soviet Union, rented to the Germans, where they could train the pilots, the tankers, the chemical weapon, etc. So it was also connected with the training of the soldiers, which was done by the German officers for the Soviet officers, because the majority of the pre-revolutionary officers were in the 1920s released from the Soviet army. So they needed the new cadres of the officers, the true communists, we could say, because they were not able to train them on their own. So it was the second sphere of the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany, which was secret because the Germans were forbidden in the Versailles Treaty to do something like this. And the third sphere of cooperation was the economic cooperation. The Germans, when they revived economically after 1932, 23, sorry, 23, were able to export some industrial products, articles, and the Soviet Union became a wonderful marketplace. On the opposite, the Germans were receiving food and raw materials from the Soviet Union. So this cooperation was similar to the German-Russian cooperation that was going on before the Russian attack against Ukraine in 2022. So we can say this these two economies were very compatible. The Germans needed raw materials and food, and the Soviets needed high technologies and money because the Germans also were delivering credits to the Soviet Union, which was which were necessary for the five-year plans started by Stalin in late 1920s. So, as I tried to show, there were very, very close signs of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. And it became a little difficult when the Great Depression started in 1929, when the Germans introduced the customs for the agricultural products to save the agriculture in their territory. So it was in fact difficult for the Soviets who were exporting the agricultural products to Germany. So there are some confusions at the time that started. However, the cooperation was still very close until the beginning of 1933 when Hitler came to power in Berlin. And he himself at the beginning didn't try to stop the good cooperation between these two countries. However, he was not blocking the SR accesses against various people or organizations that were situated on the German territories. So sometimes it was also the situation that the Soviet or the Russian initiatives were attacked by the Nazis. That started to finish this good cooperation, and especially after the fire of the Reichstag on the twenty eighth of February 1933, the bilateral relations started to deteriorate very quickly because, as the effect of the burn of the Reichstag, the whole Communist Party of Germany was dissolved by the Nazis, and it really deteriorated the relations. So all the whole 1933 was the year when the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Germany were becoming worse and worse.

SPEAKER_03 31:46

Can you comment on the Soviet German Treaty of Berlin of 1926?

SPEAKER_05 31:51

Okay, so it was one of the documents signed in really in April 1926, and it was the consequence of the Lokarno Treaty. The Soviet Union felt endangered when Germany started to negotiate, successfully negotiate with the Western powers. In the strategy of the Russian Empire, and it was also took over by Stalin's diplomacy, the Western world should be divided, fragmented, should be in quarrel. So in the case the Germans were in quarrel with the French, it was okay for the Soviet Union. When they started to negotiate and finally they signed the Treaty of Lukarno, the Soviets wanted to destroy this. And of course, the Germans didn't want to cut the good cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, Gustav Stresemann, who was the chief of the German diplomacy at the time, wanted to improve the relations with the West. And one of the gains of Strezemann according to the Treaty of Locarno was the German entering into the League of Nations. It was the international organization which was similar to the United Nations of today, we can say. However, it was a sign of the closer cooperation that could counterbalance the Locarno Treaty, the Locarno Treaties of October 1925. So the German policy was a kind of the policy of balance between the West and the East. So they achieved this, yes? It was not fulfilled the British hope that we can civilize in commas, civilize the Germans and make the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union looser than they were before. The Germans didn't want to lose the Soviet Union at all. So it was then the German part. The Soviet Union wanted to continue to divide the German relations with the Western powers, with the Western democracies. So they signed the Treaty of Berlin because of that. And it was one very interesting clause in this document. Normally, the non-aggression treaties have the clause, include the clause, that the non-aggression treaty ceases to exist when one of the signatories attacks the third country. Such a clause didn't exist in the Treaty of Berlin. So in fact, it was a kind of the green light for the attack of any of these two signatories against the third country. So it was quite exotic as a patterns of the diplomaty the diplomacy says, say that this special treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Berlin and Germany were was deprived of this special clause, which was normal in each non-aggression treaty. Why didn't it happen in the Treaty of Berlin? Because it was Poland that was the aim of the attack, in fact. Yes? So and and both countries wanted to weaken or possibly destroy the Polish state at the time.

SPEAKER_03 39:19

What insights are presented in this study regarding Adolf Hitler?

SPEAKER_05 39:24

Adolf Hitler. So the first half of the 1933, he was trying to destroy all the political parties independent from the Nazi party. And he was successful. In the middle of July 1933, Hitler destroyed all the political competing parties in Germany. The Nazis were alone as a political force in this country. And after doing this, he started more, we can say, offensive policy in the international relations. The first thing he did was leaving the League of Nations, which was interesting because it was the organization of peace. So for many Westerners, leaving the League of Nations was the sign that he had the aggressive plans for the future. Of course, he was saying that it was pacifistic, etc., etc. In words, Hitler was very pacifist. As a proof of this was this declaration with Poland, the non-aggression declaration. After signing this, he wanted to prove in the propaganda, in his propaganda, that he is the most peaceful chancellor of Germany in the history of the Weimar Republic because all the chancellors before were in quarrel with Poland. So he was saying something like this show me please which one could do what I did. I could solve the problems or the conflicts with the Poles. It was impossible so far. So it was in his propaganda. He was really effective, we can say. For the British, for example, the the Polish German non-aggression declaration was also a sign of peace. And the British Foreign Secretary congratulated Poland and Germany for achieving such a solution, because it was the hope to pacify the situation in Europe. And in a Polish German border was the worst. The situation was the worst. However, there was no altruism in Stalin in Hitler's plans. He was rather focused on having a buffer state on his side, on the east, because he noticed that his relations with Stalin, with the Soviet Union, were deteriorating. Because of that, he wanted to keep Poland close as a friendly country to have a battle state in the event of the Soviet invasion against Germany. So it was a plan to have a quiet western eastern frontier of Germany. If yes, if it's if the assumption is right, the question is so if he doesn't want to expand eastward as the former German governments wanted, where is the direction of the German expansion? And the natural expansion was to the south. So Austria and these three and a half million of Germans living in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was very eager to find some guarantee of security against Hitler's Germany. But what would happen later if Austria and Czechoslovakia is already over? The next direction of the invasion of the Germans, because nobody was doubting that Hitler's plans were offensive, would be the West. So France. And because of this, the French wanted to have some guarantee in the case of the German aggression. As we remember, the first such aggression happened in the Bismarck times in 1817, and the French lost the war with the Prussians, which effected in the reunification of Germany, 1871. The second attempt was in 1914 when the First World War broke out. And that one was successful for the French. They managed to stop the German invasion, but with the British assistance. So the French wanted to get some guarantees, and the British seemed to be the best candidates for the cooperation against the Germans. However, the British didn't want. It was the beginning of the Eastern Pact at this point. The British didn't want to be involved in any future war because of the financial situation, because of the economic situation, because of the debts they had to pay to the United States, because of the imperial policy. They were afraid that any future war would destroy the empire totally. So the British didn't want to have the French at all, at least militarily. That's why the French started to look for the cooperation with the Soviet Union, because they knew that the Germans hated to have the war on two fronts, as it was during the First World War, which was finally failed by the Germans. Yes?

SPEAKER_01 46:37

So it was the origins of the Eastern Pact, we can say.

SPEAKER_05 47:27

However, as I told you before, the British didn't want. Not only because of the political and economic reasons, as I explained beforehand, but also because of the military reasons. The British started the so-called 10-year rule in 1990. The 10-year rule meant that we do not expect to participate with the British. We do not expect to participate in any future world for the next 10 years. That allowed the British government to cut the money for the rearmament. So they saved a lot of money on the rearm disarmament. They were liquidating some units. They were releasing soldiers home. They were also liquidating the warships, which was the best proud of the British Army, the fleet, because they wanted to save money because of the indebtness to the American banks. So because of that, the British didn't want to declare anything that would force them to be a part in any future war. They were simply unprepared. And that made the French confused. And the economic and the demographic potential of France in comparison with Germany was really smaller. Okay, so it's another puzzle of this diplomatic game because we can say that the diplomatic history is a puzzle. So the British, in their mind, wanted to pacify the situation in Europe. The German-Polish conflict was the worst German danger. The British didn't want to guarantee this frontier. However, the French had the alliance with the Poles since February 1921. And in fact, the British were afraid that the French could be involved in any future war in Eastern East Central Europe. So for example, German-Polish war. That's why they negotiated the Locarno Treaty. And this treaty in fact deprived the French to lend assistance to Poland in any case of war between Poland and Germany. The Germans were not treated by the British as an enemy. In fact, they saw the situation in Europe through the kind of outsider, as they didn't belong to Europe in their eyes. Everything which was what was in Europe was overseas for the British. In their eyes, the French had the strongest European army. The Germans had only 100,000. The Poles, who are allies with the French, had 300,000 of soldiers. So in fact, French seemed to be a kind of the dominating power. And they remembered what happened in the Napoleon's times when the French dominated Europe, how distractful it was for the for the for the for the British. So they wanted to pacify the situation in Europe through the balance of power. To achieve this, they had to balance the French by the German reconstruction. So they didn't treat the Germans anymore as an enemy, like the French did, but they wanted to use reconstructed Germany as a counterbalance to the French domination. So in the 1920s, Germans were never treated by the British as an enemy. So for the French it was dramatic, yes, because their point of view was very different. However, in the 1930s, the British were mainly focused on the disarmament conference that was started in 1932 in February. And they wanted to disarm the French to the level of Germany to gain this balance of power. However, in the beginning of the 1930s, the Great Depression was a very important factor of the international relations. And because of that, of the Great Depression, the radical forces in Germany came to power. The Nazis had never formed any government before, so there were no scandals with the participation of the Nazi politicians. They said that we have very quick recipe, how to get rid of the crisis, how to rebuild our economy and the political position of Germany. On these slogans, they were winning the elections. And when they came to power, and when the first anti-democratic movements started in Germany, also anti-Semitic expressions by the SRSA started, so the Jews were beaten on the streets. It was really like wild country. And we can see this especially in the documents of the Foreign Office. Some diplomats, especially the permanent secretary for foreign affairs, Sir Robert Van Sittard, so the person number two in the British Foreign Office, started to write the memoranda about the Germans and especially the Nazis, which were very, very, very unfavorable towards the Germans. So it was it was the viewpoint of many diplomats in the British Foreign Office at the time. He was using the words like barbarians, etc. Teutonic barbarians, etc. So the language of these documents was very tough, we can say. So that was the situation. However, they never believed that the Hitler's regime was a peaceful one. No. Because of the awareness, they wanted to stop Hitler.

SPEAKER_03 56:43

How does your study shed new light on Soviet foreign policy in the early 1930s?

SPEAKER_05 56:49

Okay, that's a very difficult topic, we can say, because there are different approaches towards the Soviet foreign policy. How can the historian behave? Of course, the historian must base on the documents which are available. But the documents produced by the Soviet historians were a piece of propaganda in the times of the Soviet Union. They produced a whole series of documents called Dokumenti Vnichni Politiki SSSL, which is documents on foreign policy of the Soviet Union in English, but they're mainly the propaganda pieces. So what was the conclusion from these documents? The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is always peaceful. There is no discussion. Good intentions. And many, of course, there's the Soviet historians and the historians of the countries that belong to the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II were repeating this kind of the viewpoint. There are also some historians available in the Western world, also in the English-speaking world, like Roberts or Kalley, who are repeating the same. We are basing on the Soviet documents, and we are sure that they are they had a peaceful police. The other approach is connected with the we can say anti-Soviet interpretation. However, these historians had the problem with the access to the post-Soviet archives because it is still, until now, closed for the historians. The historian receives only the documents that the archivist is going to deliver. And so there is no access to the full basis of the documents of the Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s. And it's the problem. Because the historians could only base when there were some negotiations or talks, diplomatic talks, with the other countries on the documents produced by the other side of these negotiations. Especially the German documents were very helpful. Because officially there was the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1930s were very bad. The diplomatic relations existed, but were, you know, like that. However, in the documents available in the German archives, there were, and the historians wrote about this, especially the Russian historian Waszyansky wrote the article on the on the Soviet efforts to improve the relations with Germany, with the Nazi Germany in the years 1935-47, which was connected with the mission of the Soviet councillor for trade in the embassy in Germany, David Kandiwaki, the Georgian diplomat. And that proved that they were the attempts to improve the situation, to improve the relations. Unofficially, but they were the efforts. So it was the first moment when the historians received some other viewpoint on the Soviet foreign policy. And in the first years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the historians had some access to the post-Soviet archives, and the same documents of these negotiations with Germany, for example, were available for the historians, which was then closed when Putin came to power. So they were closed again again. So it is difficult for the historian to find out what was the real policy of the Soviet Union. However, the historians are smart, and in the years of the 21st century, there were some new collections edited. And the newest ones are edited in cooperation of the Russian and German historians. Everything was financed by the German side. And it shows that there are still documents unknown before for the historians, which shed new light on the Soviet foreign policy. The new light shows that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was aggressive. However, it was the policy was packed in the pacifistic, pacifistic rhetoric. And in fact, as I showed, analyzing the concept of the Eastern Pact, it was a peaceful concept, totally peaceful concept. We want to stop the German aggression. It was the official line of the Soviet Union. However, in fact, the truth was different. The truth was different. It was the real meaning of the concept of the Eastern Pact. So yeah, I think this is the new light on the Soviet foreign policy at the time.

SPEAKER_01 1:03:25

Can you comment on Soviet-Polish relations as alluded to in your study?

SPEAKER_05 1:03:31

Okay, so it's another problem. And we can say that the Soviet-Polish relations improved in 1932, when the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty was signed in July 1932. It was a typical non-aggression treaty. So the the the both sides agreed that way they are not going to attack each other, they are not going to exert any pressure, economic pressure against the second signatory. So it was it was very good for both sides. The question is, why was the Soviet Union willing to sign such a document? Because in the 1920s the Polish side several times renewed efforts for signing the non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, and the answer was always negative. As is proved by the Russian historian Oleg Khan, who had access to the Soviet archives, the Soviet leadership was divided. Maksim Litvinov, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, was against signing the non-aggression treaty with the Poles. However, Stalin was supporting this idea. And Stalin was, of course, the stronger one. So the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression treaty with Poland, and it was also advice of Karl Radek, one of the communists, treated in the middle of the 1920s as a Trotskist. So he was sentenced to be out of Moscow for some years. Then he appealed to Stalin to receive him back for the service of the party. And he was given such an opportunity to make a special group of journalists and diplomats, which was called the Information Office, Information Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. It in fact it was a competing ministry for foreign affairs competing for the Litvinov's official commissariat for foreign affairs. And Radek advised Stalin to start closer relations with the Poles, which could be started with the Treaty of Non-Agression. In fact, Stalin chose this concept. So it's far east, a part of China, northeastern China, where in September 1931, the Japanese forces simply occupied the whole province of China, and in the frames of four months, they conquered the whole territory territory of Manchuria, and it made the situation of the Soviet Union on the Far East much more difficult because now the 2,000 kilometer-long frontier, direct frontier between Japan and the Soviet Union appeared on the map. So Stalin was also afraid of the war on two France. That's why he agreed to conclude the non-aggression treaty with Poland. It was supported by the French. So the French supported the Polish Soviet treaty. But the Poles gave one more condition for that. The Soviet Union should also conclude the non-aggression treaties with all the Western neighbors of the Soviet Union, which means Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Romania. And in fact, it happened in the in 1932. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland signed the non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union. Romania was not able to do this because of the problem of Bessarabia, which was the part of Russia before the revolution, Bolshevik Revolution, which during the civil war in Russia was occupied in 1918 by Romania. So that the Soviet Union has never acknowledged this state of affairs, that Bessarabia was a part of Romania. And because of Bessarabia, the non-aggression treaty with Romania was not possible. And now we can say that the honeymoon started in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. There is a lot of gestures that had to confirm the other countries that the bilateral relations between Moscow and Warsaw were very good. Like the pilots from Poland flew to the Soviet Union. The pilots from the Soviet Union came to Poland. The artists of Poland were on the Moscow scenes. The Soviet artists came to Poland, etc. The journalists from Poland went to the Soviet Union. The journalists from the Soviet Union came to Poland. By the way, there are very interesting, very interesting conversations in 1933. And one thing made this very well-developing situation very bad, namely the approach of Poland and Germany. So the non-aggression declaration between Berlin and Warsaw of 26th January 1934 was the end of the good relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. So this Hone Moon finished. Since then, the the the whole Soviet propaganda was directed against Poland again, as it was before July 1932. And now the Soviets were accusing the Poles that they are cooperating very closely with the Germans in preparation of the German aggression against the Soviet Union. So the idea of the Soviet propaganda was now there is the hidden protocol behind the non-aggression declaration, the Polish-German declaration. In fact, it it was not non-existing. However, the Soviet diplomacy and the Soviet propaganda was spreading that news. There is the hidden clause behind the official parts. And now, beginning since January 1934, in spite of the prolonging the non-aggression treaty till the end of 1945, so the initial date for the non-aggression treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union was three years. So it it should be finished in July 1935. However, now it was prolonged till 1945. In spite of this, in spite of the Yusuf Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs visit to Moscow, the relations started to deteriorate. Now the question is why? Because there is no intention on the Polish side to deteriorate the relations with the Soviet Union. The Polish leaders wanted to have something like the policy of equal distance between Germany and the Soviet Union. So this moment that they started the quarrel, I mean the Nazis and the Communists was a chance for Poland. Beforehand, there was the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany against Poland. Now they were in disagreement. So Poland improved their relations with the Soviet Union and improved their relations with Germany. The Polish diplomacy didn't want to have closer relations with the Soviets against the Germans, which was proposed by the Soviets. And they didn't want to have closer relations with the Germans against the Soviets, which was proposed by the Germans. And the Polish refused both offers. Yes? Equal distance, better relations, but equal distance, no alliance against the other neighbor, stronger neighbor for Poland. So any idea of entering the foreign army on the Polish territory against the other neighbor would be the end of the Polish independence, in fact. It's difficult to imagine that we could still maintain our independence having the Red Army on the Polish territory. And the opposite. It would be impossible to become or to maintain the independence, having the German troops on the Polish territory preparing the invasion against the Soviet Union. So from the Polish point of view, both offers of the stronger neighbors were the disaster. But in the Soviet propaganda, it was the plan, the secret plan, which was connected with the Hitler's book Meinkampf, which was directed against the aggression or expansion of Germany, was in this book planned against the Russian territories. And Alfred Rosenberg, who was the ideological leader of the Nazi party. He was a German from the Baltic states, and he had the idea that Poland would give up Gdańsk and the Pomerania to make German territory reunited because you know that the East Prussia was divided from the rest of the German territory by the part of Poland, by the Pomerania. And Poland, according to Rosenberg, should give up this territory of Pomerania and free city of Gdańsk. And in spite of this, having some gains in the Ukraine, which was would be the effect of the combined Polish-German aggression against the Soviet Union. Of course, it would be stupid from the Polish point of view, but in the Soviet propaganda, it was the real plan, and they are accusing the Poles for having such. Okay, yes. Now we are talking, we were talking about the powers: Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Poland was not maybe a small state, but still much weaker than the former ones. However, there were the other countries existing in the East Central Europe, in East Central Europe, like the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, or Finland. And we can also mention the other countries which were not involved in the Eastern Pact concept, like Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, or Greece. All these countries had their role in Europe. However, from the British point of view, they are not important. So in fact, they were we can say disregard, disregarded these countries. They were not treating these countries seriously. They treated these countries like they have to follow us. Yes? So it's the lesson, it's the lesson that the great powers disregarded the smaller countries. Not only the small ones like Estonia or Latvia, but also Poland. Czechoslovakia was weaker than Poland. You know, the the first telegram in 1935 was sent by the British legation in Prague to the headquarters in London in May 1935. So very late. In the same time, the embassy in Paris sent 370 telegrams to London because they had some important facts to share of the headquarters. So they existed, but they were not important for the great powers. And I think these small countries were aware of this, that they were not important, and they should not oppose. On the other side, they had the troubles with the stronger partners, like Baltic states or Poland or Romania had troubles with the Soviet Union and their plans of expansion. Also, the Germans had some plans of expansion. In fact, they fulfilled these plans, yes? So they annexed Austria as an Anschluss, they destroyed Czechoslovakia. Finally, in September 1939, they attacked Poles. The smaller countries were looking for some assistance, were looking for some guarantees, and had difficulty to find some. And the great powers didn't help. Why not? Because they had no interest to help. The French wanted to have some Polish help in the case of the war with Germany, but didn't want to reciprocate in the case of the German attack against Poland. The British were not interested in the Central European affairs because of reasons I explained beforehand. They didn't want to have any war. In fact, the East Central Europe was not interesting for the London. They had the interest in the Western Europe, they had the interest in the Far East, the business in China to defend Australia and New Zealand against possible Japanese aggression. It was the interest of Britain. Or they had the interest in the Mediterranean Sea to have a good route from London to India through the Mediterranean Sea. So in the case of the Italian aggression, which happened in October 1935 against Abyssinia, quite close to the British Sea routes, it was the point of interest, not East Central Europe. So the great powers disregarded the smaller ones and were even dangerous for them, which shows that which is visible in the next years of international relations, and finally in the second world war.

SPEAKER_03 1:21:18

Can you comment on attempts to form a Baltic Scandinavian bloc against the Soviet Union?

SPEAKER_05 1:21:25

Yeah, it was the fantasy of Moscow. It was the fantasy of Moscow. Of course, the Scandinavian states built the bloc of the neutral states. So Denmark, Norway, and Sweden wanted to be neutral in any war that could happen in Europe. Finland wanted to join this bloc. It was the ambition of Helsinki to join this bloc. The rest of the Scandinavian countries, I mean Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, didn't want it because they knew about the conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union. We have to remember that Finland before the revolution was the part of Russia. There was no independent Finland before it. So it was the ambition of the of the Scandinavian states. As far as the Baltic states are concerned, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. One of the historians writing in English wrote about the history of these countries in the 1930s, the whole chapter, and the chapter's title was Life of the Hunted. They knew that they were in danger because of the Soviet expansion. When Hitler came to power, there was also the problem of the German expansion. There were the strong minorities, German minorities in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, especially in Lithuania, and Hitler wanted to use these minorities to have more influence in these Baltic countries. So in fact, these countries were rather small, very weak, and in danger. So any idea of creating a block, offensive block against the Soviet Union was just a fantasy. Yes, but it is a usual tool of the Soviet and now Russian propaganda that everybody wants to attack Russia or the Soviet Union in the history. Just to excuse the Russian society that we have to be, you know, not very demanding society, because we have to strengthen the economy of the country, strengthen the army, because only in this case that we have the strong army, we will be important in the political relations on the international scene. So it is it is in fact the tool of the Soviet rearmament to find out the mysterious offensive blocks against the Soviet Union.

SPEAKER_01 1:24:48

But they will not exist.

SPEAKER_05 1:25:19

The French and the Soviets tried to block, especially the French, tried to block the German expansion. Having creating created the eastern part, the German expansion to the East World would be blocked. So it would be impossible. On the West, the French treated the existing Lucarno Treaty as a kind of the guarantee. Austria remained but nobody wanted to fight for Austria and Austrian independence. So even Austrians the big part of the Austrians didn't want to have the independent Austria. So in fact, when this effort failed to block the German expansionism in 1935, there was no new effort until 1939 to build some blockade against Hitler in Europe. So in this way the the failure of the concept could be could be a a kind of the reason of the Second World War, the in in the origins when we look for the origins of the Second World War. Simply the countries that were anti-German were you know simply disorganized.

SPEAKER_01 1:27:09

What insights are presented here regarding Winston Churchill?

SPEAKER_05 1:27:16

No, Churchill was at the time so-called backbencher in the British House of Commons. He was the conservative politician, he was the member of the parliament, but in the in the Conservative Party, he was very unpopular because he was very strictly saying that we have to do something with the Nazi Germany, is a very dangerous country, and we have to focus everything, every force we have to counteract Hitler's offensive actions. To do that, he was very loud in calling for quick rearmament of Britain, which was very unpopular at the time, because the British society was very peaceful. They didn't want any new war. So any party which was a very uh which was present on the uh on the British political scene was claiming we want peace, we want peace. We want peace, it means we don't want to spend money for the new armaments. However, Churchill was proclaiming, and a small group surrounding him, was proclaiming this very unpopular slogans of re-armament and having the alliance with the French against Germany, if it's possible also with Italy against Germany. Italy left this bloc after the invasion against Abyssinia in October 1935. So Churchill was no longer willing to have any hopes for Italy. It was visible that they are rather tending to start closer cooperation with Germany. So in this new situation, starting since 1936, Churchill started to proclaim the other member of the alliance against Germany. It was the Soviet Union. In early 1920s, Churchill was very anti-Soviet, and the Soviet propaganda called him and his colleagues De Hearts, the British De Hearts, so very unsympathetic name. And in spite of this, Churchill started to proclaim it is necessary to have the alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against the Nazi Germany. And in fact, it happened. So the negotiations started in the spring of 1939, never finished. The political treaty was concluded. Very few people remember about this, that on the 24th of July 1939, the political treaty alliance was concluded between France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in Moscow, and it was supported by Churchill at that time. However, the Soviets were very smart and they didn't only want to have the political treaty, but they had the demands that this political treaty should be amended by the military military alliance. It didn't happen. So he was a very strong personality. Because of this strong personality, he was not allowed to be a member of the government. Simply, the leadership of the Conservative Party, Stanley Baldwin, and then Neville Chamberlain were not simply ready for cooperation with such a personality like Churchill. And Churchill was really very, very strict in his anti-German feelings in 1930s. So he was a very dedicated anti-Pizer.

SPEAKER_01 1:32:16

And it was his role at the time.

SPEAKER_05 1:32:31

Okay, so the diplomats, yes. I mentioned about the diplomats, the British diplomats. We can say about three Lawrence Collier, Ralph Wigram, and Robert Van Sittard. Robert Van Sittard was already mentioned. He was the person number two in the British Foreign Office. He was very, very anti-German. In his documents, he was attacking the German mentality that is always tending to the war. And he was also supported by Lawrence Collier. Lawrence Collier was the chief of the Northern Department, to which the you know the whole foreign office was like uh had divisions, departments, territorial departments, and different departments were dealing with different countries, and the Soviet Union was subordinated to the Northern Department. Lawrence Collier was a very interesting diplomat because he was a chief of this northern department, and he was always supporting any idea of cooperation between the Great Britain and the Soviet Union. So I didn't discover why, but he was always familiar with the cooperation with the Soviet Union. And Ralph Wigram was a chief of the Central Department, to which Germany was subordinate, subscribed. So they saw the worst danger for Britain in Germany, and there was danger for the future peace in Europe in Germany. So they wanted to do anything possible to make the Eastern Pact happen. So very strong anti-epizars, very strong anti-epises.

SPEAKER_03 1:34:38

As a final question, I would just like to ask you where you've devoted your attention since completing this book.

SPEAKER_05 1:34:46

Okay. In fact, uh I was not dealing with this problem anymore. Now I'm rather focused on the British attitude towards the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War. So I moved a little bit in the years, and now I'm much more focused on the problem of the British diplomacy and the Soviet intervention in Spain. So 1936, 1939, it's much closer to the dedicated to the origin of the World War II.

SPEAKER_03 1:35:25

As we end today, I'd like to emphasize how appreciative I feel for your articulateness and erudition throughout the course of today's dialogue. I can hardly thank you enough for trusting me with your work, with your time, and with your attention.

SPEAKER_05 1:35:41

It was nice to cooperate with you, really.

SPEAKER_03 1:35:47

As we sign off today, I'm signing off as Ari Barbalat, your host and the dialogues and holocaust studies in the Second World War podcast. Today it has been my blessing to engage in a dialogue with Darius. He has warned me regarding his recently published book, British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact 1933 to 1935, Analyses, Projects, Activities, published in Stuttgart by Ibadim Verlog in 2017. Dariusz Jezwarny serves as professor of contemporary world history at the University of Ludge in Poland. His research primarily concentrates on the history of diplomacy, international relations, and political thought. In this monograph, Darjusz is warny, delves into British diplomatic relations during the period of 1933 to 1935, illuminating London's perspective on the Eastern Pact and underscoring the thought processes and actions of British diplomacy in the context of both European and global affairs. Was his majesty's government genuinely interested in the success of the initiative championed by Moscow and Paris? Did it understand the motivations behind its promoters? How did it respond to the opposition from nations that were unwilling to accept such an issue? Who were the main partners for London in negotiations? Can the Foreign Office be seen as competent in addressing European challenges, particularly those concerning Eastern Europe? Were the previous conclusions in academic literature accurate in evaluating the roles of specific powers in the failure of the Eastern Pact concept? Yes Yarni addresses these questions through a comprehensive analysis of governmental materials found in the National Archives in London, especially the general correspondence of the British Foreign Office. He provides a fascinating insight into the inner workings of British diplomacy and its attitudes toward the French initiative. Thank you wholeheartedly.