What's on the Table for Taiwan at Trump-Xi Summit?

As attention turns to Trump–Xi summit in mid-May, Host and TAG Senior Advisor Mira Rapp-Hooper speaks with Managing Partner Ambassador Kurt Tong about what’s really at stake for Taiwan. Tong argues that Beijing’s approach is often less dramatic and more durable than portrayed: China seeks steady forward progress toward reunification while reacting sharply to perceived “backward progress.” They discuss how Ukraine and the Iran war shape perceptions of risk, how U.S. distraction could influence Beijing’s calculus, and why Taiwan’s domestic politics may look polarized even as public preference tilts toward the status quo.

What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper is produced by Rivan Dwiastono, executive produced by Lauren Dueck, with editorial input from Prashant Jha. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. 

What Comes Next is a production of The Asia Group, and is powered by TAG AI, TAG's geopolitical decision engine for businesses.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

This visit to me shows that the KMT is confident enough in their ability to pursue the upcoming Taiwan election while still kind of getting out there a little bit on the accommodative communications with China side. I'm not anticipating a super huge, you know, you gotta give us something on Taiwan or you're not gonna get any commercial outcomes push from the Chinese side. Because they might end up just provoking President Trump.

SPEAKER_01 0:37

With President Trump headed to China in just over two weeks to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, all eyes will soon be turning back to Asia. And as they do, analysts will be asking what is likely to top the list of these two leaders when they meet? At the very top of the pile are questions related to Taiwan and its future. And there's no one better positioned to dig into those with me than our next guest. Kurt Tong is a managing partner at the Asia Group where he oversees the Japan and China practices. Prior to joining TAG, Kurt was a 30-year veteran of the Foreign Service, where he served as consul general in Hong Kong. Let's give a listen. Kurt Tong, thanks so much for joining me. And what comes next?

SPEAKER_00 1:18

Thank you. I'm excited.

SPEAKER_01 1:20

Well, let's go ahead and dive in, Kurt. I've been really looking forward to this conversation because as eyes are turning towards Beijing and beginning to anticipate this much vaunted, long-awaited meeting between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping of China, a question that we often get, um, you know, whether we're talking to clients or uh out in other various spaces in Washington, is what might happen when it comes to Taiwan? What's really on the table? And if these two leaders talk about Taiwan, what is that going to mean? Um, there's really no one better positioned than you to give us the context for where we are in this moment and help us understand the stakes. So before we start touching on anything that has to do with the summit itself, I'd love to start with a step back and ask you the question of what you think the PRC's strategy towards Taiwan is in this moment and how businesses and others should assess the global risk profile around Taiwan. That is to say, if they're thinking about what the risk is that there could be some kind of dramatic event, what does it look like this year? And what do you anticipate it might look like in the next three years or so?

SPEAKER_00 2:38

Great. Well, Meredith, thanks again. And and um I have the privilege of being uh both the burden and privilege of being a relatively old guy uh who's been uh looking at East Asia stuff for for quite quite some time. And my first visit to Taiwan was back uh in 1987, spent a year there. It was actually the year that the government transitioned to democracy. It was a very interesting time. So with that kind of bias that I admittedly bring to the conversation, I think that the situation around Taiwan and Beijing's policy towards the island is um often or is less dramatic than is often portrayed and less subject to short-term changes than is uh is often proclaimed by a variety of observers. Fundamentally, I think that the leadership in Beijing, including uh Chairman Xi, are looking for continue forward progress from their perspective in having uh Taiwan be not a political threat to uh mainland China, uh, ultimately moving, even if ever so slowly, in the direction of recognizing the PRC as part of Taiwan's future, um, and trying to make progress towards their ultimate goal of reunification, but with an understanding that that is a long-term uh objective, that as long as they feel like they're making forward progress can be seen as a long-term objective. When when Beijing gets um unhappy or anxious about the whole uh situation is when they feel like they're making backward progress. And that was definitely the case in the years immediately after the um the troubles, if you want to use the Irish word, in Hong Kong. And uh it's also further reinforced by uh the view in Beijing that the United States may be um may be becoming more forceful in its support for Taiwan's ability to make decisions on its own about its future. Beijing would like to make the decisions and have Taiwan be the passive actor. Um, that's not realistic. People in Beijing know that. So that's my general sense is that they're they they want to be making forward progress. In the current situation, I think that the Beijing side has reason to believe that they are making forward progress. Um, in terms of the landscape in Taiwan domestic politics, uh the fading memories of the the Hong Kong story, uh the Ukraine uh experience with uh a large powerful country invading its uh neighbor that it viewed as somewhat illegitimate. The parallels are not exact between Ukraine and uh and the Taiwan-China situation, Russia, Ukraine, and Taiwan-China. But there are some parallels, and that that was a mixed thing for China, because on the one hand, it showed that the threat of uh military action is something that that can be happened even in the the modern world. Uh it's not something anyone would really want to have happen, but it's something that is not inconceivable, and that had an impact on everyone's understanding of the situation. But then at the same time, the military option as exercised by Russia was more of a failure than it was a success. So that um was one big chapter. The latest chapter I'd point to now is the Iran situation. I worry that that um that that folks in Beijing will see the United States investing heavily in uh the projection of military power in the Middle East as perhaps assisting, aiding them in portraying the United States as an unreliable um maintainer of the status quo, if you will. Or overextending. Yeah, sort of a back the US is kind of a backseat driver of the status quo maintenance exercise, right? With Taiwan the front seat driver. And and that um the US being distracted could be uh viewed from by Beijing as a positive. So all all of that is I think those those various factors are really critical in uh I I get a sense of of confidence, not in the sense that they're suddenly going to have a breakthrough success vis-a-vis Taiwan from the Beijing side, but the things are kind of trending in their direction. So um that's kind of how I feel things are, and then that may ultimately be reinforce the status quo or it could destabilize the status quo depending upon uh how things go.

SPEAKER_01 8:12

That makes a good deal of sense to me, Kurt. And in particular, if you think about one of the first things you mentioned, the fact that the leadership in China needs to feel that it's making progress towards this goal of reunification, right? Which is necessarily an amorphous goal unto itself, right? It's directional, um, it's about momentum, it is not a specific set of watch points. Um, there is a fair amount of flexibility in that calculus. Um, and as you say, if there are indicators that the Chinese leadership can point to, they can say that time is on their side, particularly um if in context it seems like the United States may be on shakier footing. Um, that said, and I I want to throw this out for our listeners just because it may figure into the conversation later. Um, Taiwan domestic politics, as we'll talk about in just a moment, and public opinion also factor into this equation. So in just a moment, I want to ask you a little bit more about Taiwan domestic politics, but also um just want to reflect the fact that Taiwan domestic public opinion increasingly indicates that the Taiwan people are not super jazzed about the idea of reunifying with the mainland, have a strong preference for the status quo. Um, you know, if put under pressure, under coercion, or potentially um, you know, under threat of invasion, uh, would be pretty willing to fight. So there are reasons to think that the Chinese leadership could look at the people on Taiwan and think they're not coming back into the fold anytime soon. Um, but there are other reasons to think that they might count on their side of the ledger, let's say an opportunity in the 2028 election to try to make progress under easier terms. And that brings me um to Taiwan domestic politics. And the next question I wanted to ask you about. The party chair of the Guomintang uh was recently in Beijing, Chiang Liuan. And I want to ask you what the significance is of that trip. Folks have been watching China's behavior really closely in recent weeks to see kind of how it would position itself vis-a-vis the US and Israel operation over Taiwan. But one of the earliest, kind of most consequential things we saw during this time period was actually this meeting between she and the chairwoman of the KNT in Beijing. Help our listeners understand why that visit mattered and what you think it indicates about China's strategy uh and how it engages with Taiwan domestic politics.

SPEAKER_00 10:50

Absolutely. And that's a that's uh exactly the right question, I think. My my own view on uh Taiwan's political landscape. People talk about Taiwan politics as polarized, but if you actually talk to Taiwan people, they're not polarized. The pa the parties are polarized, but the Taiwan people are quite uh unified in the view that that things are fine vis-a-vis uh mainland China, uh PRC, and we don't really want to change the relationship that much. Some of them want to expand trade and investment a bit more, some of them are a little more worried about the impact on Taiwan of doing that. Um, some of them want to talk tough, some of them want to talk a little bit softer, and what is um largely a tactical uh difference of opinion can sometimes be misinterpreted by foreigners as a strategic difference of opinion. So in that context, the the Blue Party, the KMT, led by uh Cheng Li Wun, she decided to go to Beijing. She was invited, I'm sure it was all very closely coordinated, um, between her party and the the hosts uh in Beijing uh to reaffirm the uh identity of her party as one that can get along with Beijing, thereby lowering risk. The one thing everyone in Taiwan agrees on, they don't want risk. They want status quo. The other side, the green side, is saying, well, we need to double down on deterrence in order to avoid risk. So our our our main attention should be concentrating on the deterrence factor and building up defense capabilities. And that's where the United States comes in as a as potentially to continuing to be the major uh supplier of materiel uh for that effort, as reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act. So political theorists, of which I'm not really one, I I took a little bit college about a thousand years ago, um, political theorists would say that you want to have both deterrence and confidence building measures in order to lower risk. So maybe both parties have something useful to say uh about how you maintain the status quo. Um, but there's an active debate over which is more important. Lowering risk by uh by communicating with the PRC, or lowering risk by having a clear and strong uh deterrent capability on a in a purely military strategic security sense. So this visit to me shows that the KMT is confident enough in their ability to pursue the upcoming Taiwan election while still kind of getting out there a little bit uh on the accommodative communications with China side. Uh my guess, and um this is probably gonna get me in trouble with some friends in Taiwan for saying this, but my guess is that the blue team feels like they can do that because the green team's not doing as as well lately on in Taiwan politics for pure mostly purely domestic reasons. Uh and so we may see as a result of this upcoming elections something that s feels like polarization. Uh, but maybe actually isn't as much polarization as people think think it is. And and some tightly contested and and and pretty com competitive elections coming up, but one one at the end of this year and then in early 2028, the big the big kahuna of the elections would be the presidential election then.

SPEAKER_01 15:03

So just to push on this a little bit, Katie, and I think that was a really useful rundown. What do you think China thinks it's getting when it invests in the relationship with the chairwoman of the KMT? You're sort of describing the differences between the KMT and DPP as more differences of degree than kind. Um, but you know, from our earlier conversation, it's clear that the Chinese are playing for progress. And it would seem pretty evident that they think a KMT leadership of Taiwan is potentially more beneficial to China than a continued DPP leadership. So, from your perspective, what do you think it looks like? Yep. What do you think it looks like for Beijing to keep playing through on that strategy and help our listeners understand if maybe Taiwan politics isn't quite as polarized as we think it is, how do we explain um the sort of incredible gridlock that has taken place in the LY, the legislative yuan, over the defense supplemental bill? And how does that gridlock get unstuck if indeed it does?

SPEAKER_00 16:17

Two questions. But the first one, I think, is Beijing um will see success over the next two years. I mean, it's quite obvious that they they like the blue team better than the green team, right? So success for for Beijing is the blue team winning uh the presidential election in 2028. And that uh, you know, is not a partisan statement. It's just a you know pretty clear uh observation. That the uh so how do they get there? Well, one inviting the chairwoman to visit Beijing and and sort of deepen the persona of the KMT as a relatively aging-friendly party uh is uh a bit of a a risk, but clearly not viewed as that big a risk in the current political laydown. So that's what I think the success looks like for Beijing. On the question related to the uh defense spending bill, the last few days or weeks, it feels like it's a negotiation between the parties. And uh there's a lot of people, I'm I am honestly, I mean, I'm not saying this to be uh this is not false humility. I am not the expert on this, right? But what I'm hearing from people is that there is a active discussion going on and that there's a certain degree of confidence it's gonna get sorted out, and that there's gonna be a significant spending bill passed. The the KMT is recently saying that they're uh okay with increased expenditure on on imports from the US government, but not uh commercial to commercial imports because they're concerned about uh how that is um monitored from uh an efficiency of expenditure uh perspective, right? Which is kind of a detailed position and a little bit of um uh what's what's the word? Um sort of slicing the th the issue rather uh narrowly, which feels to me like a negotiation. The chair chairwoman is rumored in the press to be interested in visiting Washington uh maybe even next month. That certainly the the question that she's gonna get if she does that is where's this defense bill? Because it we the United States, and like it's important to think about this from a US perspective for a sense. The US is definitely about the status quo. Status quo is good, right? And so we uh most Americans think status quo maintenance has to involve perhaps a certain amount of confidence building measures and and less likely to be upset about dialogue between Taiwan and China. The US the official U.S. government position has never been opposed to that. Um, but rather um you know continuing to maintain investment and deterrence as the important other half or perhaps even more than half of the balancing equation. And and so I'll be curious to see if the chairwoman comes how she's gonna answer that question if the bill's not passed before that time. Um but I don't know when it's gonna pass or exactly how, or what the what the negotiation um solution set is uh between the parties.

SPEAKER_01 19:57

Also a very helpful answer. And likewise, I have been told by many contacts that there is some kind of plan for like it breaking the log jam and something will be done. Um, but this has obviously grown on for many months now. Um, so how how it exactly it gets solved, um, we will share more when we have it uh from the Azure Group, but we'll all be watching closely. Um with with that kind of uncertainty looming over things, um I want to talk in just a moment about Taiwan's economy in this moment. But before I do, want to hit, you know, pretty specifically the question of what is at stake and what is potentially on the table when President Trump and President Xi meet in Beijing. There has been reporting for almost a year now that would suggest that President Xi and the Chinese leadership have been trying to link ongoing trade negotiations with the Trump administration to issues related to Taiwan, um, attempting to kind of get the US government to pump the brakes on uh defense dialogues, other forms of security assistance, objecting to Taiwan arm sales packages, first maybe helping to delay them. Then once a historically large arm sales package did go through, objecting vociferously to it. There's also been reporting to suggest that at least for a time, um, she was playing with the idea of requesting a declaratory policy change from the United States on Taiwan, petitioning, um, for example, to get the United States to say that it opposed Taiwan independence, which would be a revision from its long standing policy of saying that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. Um, seemingly a minor change from the perspective of some observers, but one that would be taken as hugely significant in Taipei and possibly have reverberations for American allies in the Indo Pacific writ large. Give our listeners a sense if you would, Kurt. What you think is really in play here and how you anticipate Xi Jinping will try to manage and play the Taiwan issue when his he has his audience with President Trump. I think it's worth folks keeping in mind that this leader-level summit taking place in May may be just one of as many as four meetings between Trump and Xi over the course of this year if there is a reciprocal Xi Jinping visit to the United States and then two meetings along the sidelines of APAC and the G20. So assuming Xi Jinping takes some bite of the Taiwan apple, he's actually got a few chomps on it before the year is up. I'm really curious how you think he's going to use that time and space.

SPEAKER_00 22:41

Yeah. So the asks that have been reported uh as coming from the Beijing side are pretty standard stuff, right? Um looking at the last several decades, uh the the things that you cited around no um around declaratory statements, uh the pace and and uh nature of US arms sales to Taiwan. These have been topics in every leader meeting, um as long as I've been uh you know left middle school, which is a awful long time ago. Um I view this as one more meeting in the history of meetings between the US and China where the two sides will talk about Taiwan. And I personally expect the main body of that conversation to be an exchange of standard talking points, um without a huge amount of change and and outcomes. And and the reasons why I'm uh sort of downplaying this issue, at least for this summit, and I could be wrong, in which case I'm this is gonna be recorded and people can make fun of me. But this is my expectation, since you asked, uh, is they they are gonna have multiple bites at the apple for the Chinese side to address this topic uh over the course of the year, possibly if this meeting goes well. There's a lot of other things to talk about, uh, including Iran, uh including the economic issues that both sides are quite intent on focusing on um for this meeting. The other factor which is kind of unique to this current set of circumstances, as I was describing earlier, about the Iran War and its impact versus the Ukraine war and its impact, is this sense that if, you know, I mean it's it's kind of not very nice thing to say, but uh uh about what the Trump administration's doing uh in the Iran situation. But you know, the the I guess the cliche is if you're um I guess some really br brilliant person, Metternich or somebody, uh German guy said this once upon a time, a long time ago, and I'm not sure who, but when you're when you're your adversary is digging a hole for themselves, don't let them keep digging. And so injecting Taiwan, to me, it's in instinctively, injecting Taiwan into the conversation too heavily uh a couple weeks from now could actually backfire um for for for Beijing and and in their overall long-term view of this of this issue set. And so I'm I'm not anticipating a super huge, you know, you gotta give us something on Taiwan, or you're not gonna get any commercial outcomes push from the Chinese side. Because they might end up just provoking um uh President Trump. And both sides are are are doing a really fairly delicate dance of trying to attract the other towards issues that that that are that are their higher priorities or their more immediate priorities, then then perhaps these sort of long-term Taiwan issues. That's my take. I could I'm ready to be wrong, but I I don't think I am.

SPEAKER_01 26:07

It's it's uh a good uh maybe counter-cyclical take, uh, and certainly we'll we'll leave it to our listeners to judge. Um, but to your point, you know, not only about um, you know, potentially the US officials in Beijing, President Trump himself not being a taker of trying to make a specific ass, the Chinese government can also well calculate that if there is some dramatic Taiwan disruption coming out of this leader level meeting, they also potentially activate the US Congress as a veto player in this dynamic. Um, and if they assess things are going relatively well, uh a more subtle approach may indeed prevail. So um that makes good sense to me. Uh, I know we're coming to the end of our conversation, Kurt, but before we begin to wrap up, I really want to get your take on the state of Taiwan's economy and the state of the US-Taiwan trade deal. Um, and in particular, to ask you how you see the war with Iran having impacted the Taiwan economy in the last several weeks, how it will continue to do so if there is no immediate solution to the war, and how durable you think this US-Taiwan trade framework is likely to be. Um, of course, top of everyone's mind when they think about Taiwan's industry includes very much its semiconductor industry. So curious in particular how you see that trade framework continuing to shape this all-important strategic industry.

SPEAKER_00 27:40

Yeah, sure. So the Taiwan economy is in great shape right now, or was until a month or so ago. And that's driven by enormous competitiveness in in microelectronics, but also increasingly a um a spillover effect on the broader Taiwan economy. So Taiwan's consumption numbers in in uh recent months and quarters have been pretty strong. And uh, you know, good solid uh consumption-led growth in addition to um outstanding performance by their major major exporters. So the Iran uh event is Taiwan was in a better situation to weather in a purely sort of economic growth sense, the the external shock coming from the Iran war than some other economies. That said, it has um rather, I'd say, it's fair to say, insufficient uh energy reserves and and a serious energy vulnerability that has led the government to really scramble to try and make sure that they've got uh what the energy supplies that they need to keep the lights on, and even triggered some apparently some internal debate about whether to restart uh mockball nuclear plants. That that's now an active debate, once again. So the um the energy piece will drive a certain amount of inflation in the economy, just as it has in every economy, but probably not to a disproportionate degree. And then there may be some some specific uh uh chemicals, you know, derived chemicals from inputs that come out um to a large degree out of the Gulf, the petroleum-derived uh uh chemical inputs to the microelectronics industry that some observers are worried about. We'll see how that that plays out. The the the the trade deal is I think has some really fundamental um strengths to it, which will outlast however long the US maintains a high tariff uh um posture towards towards Taiwan. So the three the three elements of the deal are the US uh puts high tariffs on Taiwan, but not as high as they might be. Uh some reduction of non-tariff barriers uh in Taiwan, not enormous reduction, but but some some leftover homework from previous efforts to open up the Taiwan market in specific sectors, including agriculture. And so that's a good thing. And I believe that Taiwan will implement those measures faithfully. Um the you know, there's detail there that needs to be watched. Uh but the most important element of it is the U.S. expressing to Taiwan, we really want you to invest a lot in microelectronics manufacturing in the United States, both in terms of building facilities, but also transfer technology and and making the U.S. stronger in that area. The the main decider of the pace of that investment and technology transfer is the Taiwan companies themselves, specific you know, most importantly, TSMC. And they've they've shown a willingness to bring the US, if you will, into the circle of trust, along with Japan, for production of uh you know very high-end fabs, not the highest, which they're going to keep on Taiwan, naturally, um, but but very high. And that's a enormous mutual benefit equation for the United States and for Taiwan that I think is highly sustainable over the over the medium and long term. Now that the that process has started, I think it'll continue to snowball, and we'll see more and more integration of Taiwan industry and US industry in that really important field, which is great. Um so it was uh odd, if you could want to put it that way, the way that this uh investment wave was triggered. Um and there are claims of government uh role in steering it and deciding where it's going. I think it's more so than the Korea deal or the Japan deal, it's actually quite private sector led. Uh and that's a good thing. It makes means it's very sustainable and and and probably a good thing. The tariffs, you know, may hopefully will get reduced at some point in the future. It may take many years for the US to get around to realizing that taxing its imports is not the best uh economic policy. Um, but um uh both parties are are guilty of of um indulging in that, the uh yes parties. But uh but I think this investment part is quite quite robust and and and gonna be strong um for for years to come.

SPEAKER_01 32:42

And robust in part, um, Katie, because not only is it very private sector led, as you say, um, but it's so industry focused, right? There's a lot of good to sort of be wrought from the Japan and Korea investment funds. Um, but those are very large dollar figures, which the two governments then have to work assiduously together um to actually place those bets and make them work for both sides. Um whereas in some ways the US and Taiwan, through this investment agreement, did hard work up front, even though it's somewhat intuitive, which uh industries you'd want to work with on Taiwan to really make sure they were targeting um a lot of that investment. Um and that potentially leads to smoother implementation in the years to come.

SPEAKER_00 33:26

I think that's right. And it's more technology led rather than it's not as much about the money, it's more about the technology, and that means it's more about mutual benefit.

SPEAKER_01 33:35

Yeah, totally agree. Before we let you go today, Ambassador Kerchong, and this has been a wonderful conversation. Any black swans or watch out force that you think our listeners should be thinking about uh when it comes to Taiwan politics, Taiwan's economy, or risk of any kind around Taiwan, not just headed into the summit, but over the course of the next three years or so?

SPEAKER_00 34:02

Uh the the main one I think I'm I would focus on in the near term uh is actually the defense spending bill in Taiwan. That, you know, we've talked about that already and astutely, but certainly hopefully, and you know, we're we're being optimistic uh about that. I hope that's right. Uh I hope that's uh correct. Uh, but it's not a done deal. And and if it drags on uh forever, month after month after month, and is not successful, then that I think creates will create greater instability both in Taiwan domestic politics, maybe a bigger sine wave even in Taiwan-China relations, and certainly in US Taiwan relations. So I hope we're right about that. Um it's I don't know if it's black swan or uh gray rhino or what what what species it is. Um the you know, one thing that that we we should mention that um is gives me some encourages me a bit, and I wanted to mention this is that so far, uh, you know, it's we're only on in month four of uh the PRC's hosting of APEC, and Taiwan is an APEC member, but so far that's gone quite smoothly from from Taiwan's perspective, which shows again a kind of a long-term vision about things um from the PRC side. And ultimately that is really uh important. And that kind of uh balanced, um non-provocative, long-term oriented status quo cognizant type stuff is is what I think we should be uh applauding when it happens. So uh hopefully my somewhat boring um old man status quo-oriented analysis is correct. And uh uh uh I think this has been a fun conversation.

SPEAKER_01 36:02

It's been a terrific conversation. You brought us a ton of great insight. Uh and needless to say, on this issue in particular, I will take a status quo bias any day of the week. So once again, Ambassador Kurt Tong, thank you so much for joining us on what comes next.

SPEAKER_00 36:16

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01 36:17

As I reflect on my conversation with Kurt Tong, or KT, as we call him at the Asia Group, I'm struck by his relative confidence, although of course caveated, that China's strategy towards Taiwan has more of a status quo bias than analysts often ascribe and is often lower volatility than analysts are inclined to believe. Nevertheless, as we think about what China's strategy might look like, not only going into this meeting with President Trump in May, but over the course of the next few years, that conversation with Kurt targeted out for us a very logical and rational strategy for Beijing to be playing. And that is one that seeks to bring about an election outcome in Taiwan in 2028 that is more favorable to Beijing, to try to win its preferences on easier and more favorable terms to it. So as I watch this leader level meeting between the United States and China on how Taiwan may be discussed over the course of the coming weeks and Beijing's moves towards Taipei in the coming months, I'm going to be keeping in mind the question of what its strategy is for 2028. Today's episode was produced by Refund, Do We Ask to Know, executive produced by Lauren Dewick with editorial input from Prashant Ja. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. What comes next is a production of the Asia Group and is powered by Tag AI, Tag's geopolitical decision engine for business. See you on the next episode.