What to Expect from Trump-Xi Summit: A New Cold War, Managed Competition, or Détente?

As President Trump heads to Beijing for a long-anticipated summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Host and TAG Senior Advisor Mira Rapp-Hooper is joined by The Wall Street Journal’s Chief China Correspondent Lingling Wei to break down the mechanics behind the summit as well as the stakes and the signals that matter most. They discuss why this may be the highest stakes U.S.-China meeting in a decade; Xi’s “don’t blink, build leverage” strategy; and how protocol and optics play a big role in the summit. Wei argues this summit will set the tone of U.S.-China relations in the next few years. Will we see a managed competition, a new cold war, or a transactional détente?

What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper is produced by Rivan Dwiastono, executive produced by Lauren Dueck, with editorial input from Prashant Jha. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. 

What Comes Next is a production of The Asia Group, and is powered by TAG AI, TAG's geopolitical decision engine for businesses.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

I would love to hear a little bit more from you on how you see Xi Jinping's strategy in this moment.

SPEAKER_01 0:06

So his strategy is very simply put, don't blink, build leverage, make America come to you. This meeting will set the tone of the relationship for the next few years to come. Is it managed competition? Is it a new Cold War? Is it transactional the tongue?

SPEAKER_00 0:33

As President Trump gets ready to travel to Beijing for his summit with President Xi Jinping, we at the Asia Group are sharpening our focus on what we are likely to expect coming out of the summit. And our next guest is second to none in her knowledge of China and the US-China relationship. Ling Ling Wei is the chief China correspondent at the Wall Street Journal and is also the author of a book called The Superpower Showdown. She is an absolute crackshot reporter who has been covering in detail the US-China relationship since the trade war began last year. Let's give a listen. Ling Ling Wei, thank you so much for joining us on What Comes Next?

SPEAKER_01 1:11

It's great to see you, Mira. Thank you for having me.

SPEAKER_00 1:14

Really a treat. I've been looking forward to this conversation for many days now because I, like I think so many Asia and China watchers, have found your reporting absolutely indispensable this year. You've been on this beat for a very long time, of course, written copiously on China and on US-China relations. But I know that I've found that over the course of what has been a very dramatic year with a lot of ups and downs in this bilateral relationship, your reporting consistently really captures the nuance of what is going on inside US-China relations and indeed what each of the leaders, President Trump and President Xi, are trying to achieve in each cycle that we've seen them each engage in. So as we approach a historic summit with President Trump headed to Beijing, I'm really excited to learn from your insights about what we should be watching for. And with that, I kind of want to dive right in. Given that it seems like this summit is finally set to take place after many months of anticipation. Help our listeners understand how you see the stakes of this leader-level summit in particular.

SPEAKER_01 2:39

Sure, Mira. First of all, thank you so much for your very kind and generous comments on my reporting. That means tremendously to me. So to your question, I think this is really the highest stakes US-China summit in a decade. Not because anyone expects a grand bargain, but because the alternative to a working relationship is starting to look genuinely dangerous. Let's just uh take a quick look of what has transpired in the past year. We have seen tariffs ratcheting in both directions, uh, actual controls uh getting tightened up and in some areas loosened, and Beijing weaponizing critical minerals and real military activity around Taiwan. And the two countries that basically have spent a good part of the next uh uh the lot the past year and a half stress testing each other's paying thresholds. So the summit's job is really not to resolve any of that. Uh, it's an opportunity for both Trump, uh President Trump and China's leader, Xi Jinping, to figure out whether or not they can uh develop the kind of personal channel that can help prevent the next miscalculation from becoming a real uh crisis. Uh for the US, you know, real economic exposure on rare earth and pharmaceutical inputs have finally registered, right, at the highest level, meaning the presidential level. And for China, as we all know, the Chinese economy is much weaker than the official numbers suggest. And she needs predictability with Washington to focus on those domestic problems, but he cannot be seen at home as kind of having barcode. So the deeper stake is that this meeting will set the tone of the relationship for the next few years to come. Is it managed competition? Is it a new Cold War? Is it transactional deton? A lot of that, you know, um, we will see some signs of that, you know, from from the from the summit. Um, you know, sometimes, you know, I would discuss with my sources, you know, what what we should be looking for from this summit. And, you know, a lot of people are saying, don't just watch the joint uh the statement, the official statements coming out of the summits, also watch the body language, uh, watch what gets left out, and watch what happens 72 hours later in the Taiwan Strait.

SPEAKER_00 5:34

I think that is incredibly good advice. And I want to unpack it a little bit later in our conversation because that's very insightful. But I actually want to circle back to a point that you just made earlier on in that great intervention, Ling Ling. And that is the idea that the two sides have been testing each other's pain points over the course of this year, which I think is a great way of putting it. I would love to hear a little bit more from you on how you see Xi Jinping's strategy in this moment. You know, you mentioned the fact that he needs to see predictability in the US-China relationship because he needs predictability in the Chinese economy. The Chinese economy is not doing nearly as well as Xi Jinping might have hoped. But there are clear places where she and the Chinese still have a great deal of leverage, and critical minerals is um second to none in that department. You've written previously that she has developed over many years strategies for preparing to face off with the United States of America when the time comes, including on economic issues. And that he has over the course of this last year been playing out a strategy that requires him not to give any ground. As you said, not to look like he's buckling to any pressure at home. So, to the extent that you can, help us understand what you think more specifically, Xi Jinping wants to get out of this summit and the next few engagements he may have with President Trump over the course of the next year. And in particular, you know, you laid out a few bumper stickers that could describe this relationship. Is it managed competition? Is it new cold war? Is it tactical kind of um transactional détente? What do you think he wants to see by way of a bumper sticker? I I would sort of suppose that the transactional detente is maximally advantageous to him, but I'm really curious for your take on this.

SPEAKER_01 7:35

Uh short answer is that I completely agree with you, Mira. And all those questions you raised are such a great question. And, you know, um obviously I uh continue to do a lot of reporting on that. Um but uh based on my reporting so far, you know, your your your first question, I think, uh is about Xi Jinping's specific strategy deployed by Xi. So uh you're absolutely right. You know, Xi has been preparing for this Trump moment for many years. Uh his core insight, uh the insight he learned from the first Trump presidency is that the US negotiates against deadlines and news cycles and market ups and downs, and China negotiates against decades. So his strategy is very simply put, don't blink, build leverage, make America come to you. So uh let's just look at what happened last year, right? The real earth weaponization is a clear example of how she made America go to China, right? Um and ever since the first trade war with the United States, which started in 2018, she has talked internally about quote extreme scenarios and quote struggle. Um that's not just rhetoric, that's uh basically a bodish line, which means stockpiling grain, semiconductors, chip making equipment, gold, energy, you name it, basically also means building parallel financial plumbing, right? This this as the CIFIS, I'm sorry, uh the alternative. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, and and and all those things, you know, hardening the rare earths and processing chokeholds. So um critical minerals, as you pointed out, Mira, have become his demonstrated leverage. Beijing has shown uh with all those names I cannot possibly um pronounce, and and this rare earth expert licensing regime, Beijing has shown that they can throttle inputs the US tech defense EV industries cannot replace overnight, like gallium, germanium, you know, all those uh all those uh uh minerals, right? So given the strategy and how is he aiming to uh use that strategy for this coming summit? What do he wants from this summit and the ones to follow? I think number one, I mean, on the economic side, is rollback or softening of export controls, especially around equipment and AI chips. Um the Chinese are also interested in tariff relief. Uh, however, um that's not their top priority. And um also they also want very tacit US acceptance that China gets to be China, i.e., that their economic model, their industrial policy, and state-led tech development aren't on the table for negotiation. Um, and and the prize, the ultimate price for Xi Jinping, is some movement, not breakthrough, but some movement on US Taiwan policy. Even very subtle shifts matter enormously to Beijing because their near-to-medium-term goal is to destroy the pro-independence mindset in Taipei. Um, so can he give Trump what Trump wants? That's another related question. Um, I believe partially. You know, he can absolutely deliver some headline-friendly purchaser commitments like soybeans, LNG, Boeing, this the kind of stuff that lets Trump claim a wing. And he can dial back rare earth licensing requirements, but the regime will stay in place. Um, he can also probably do a real fentanyl deal. Um, what he cannot do and won't do is dismantle China's industrial policy and subsidies to strategic sectors or stops uh or um, you know, like stop subsidizing EV and battery exports. So basically, the architect of the Chinese economy is, in his view, non-negotiable. So we're going to maybe see some deals, uh, the kind of deals that look really big on optics, but really modest in terms of uh structure.

SPEAKER_00 12:36

That sounds exactly right to me, Ling Lingman. I want to come to this question of Taiwan in just a minute, and and the fact, which I totally agree with, that this is an area in which seemingly very modest concessions can have huge reverberations and really matter over the medium and long term. But just to dig in a little bit more on what does she want and what can he give? You know, it sounds like you think no problem for him to give relatively large purchase agreements on areas like, you know, agricultural products, jets, I totally agree with that. Um, easy enough uh for him to give a little bit more on fentanyl. Uh we know that President Trump has been interested for quite some time in Chinese investment in the American economy. And while many members of his administration and the US Congress are very skeptical of Chinese investment, tell me if I'm wrong, but I would imagine it's not very hard for Xi Jinping to deliver a big investment package that might make President Trump happy. How easy do you think it will be for the Chinese side to essentially extract language from the US government that agrees to let China be China? Because as you have just laid out so uh carefully and well, the entire Chinese model rests on things like state subsidies of critical industries, um, you know, overcapacity, all of these things, which many American and Allied governments have objected to over the last many years. Do you see them as on track for the US side to make some kind of pronouncement, essentially, that this government is who it is, this economy is structured the way it's structured, and it's not going to change?

SPEAKER_01 14:17

I think that wouldn't be so hard. Um, you know, uh, correct me if I'm wrong, Mira. Um I do feel like there is a palpable sense of realization in Washington these days as well, that the US pressure cannot change China. Um, and you know, uh that's why uh USDR representative uh Jameson Greer has kept talking about the concept of having a board of trade, and Treasury has talked about setting up board of investment. And those mechanisms are not like, you know, uh in the good old days, so to speak, you know, US trying to get China to broaden market access for American products or for American capital. It's more about, you know, let's talk about the areas in which we can still do business. So um I do feel like the realization that China is not changing has set in um uh in Washington. Um, for Xi Jinping, his bet is really that Trump wants a deal more than he needs one. So whether that's true or not is the question of the summit.

SPEAKER_00 15:35

Again, completely agree and incredibly well put. I also agree with your prior analysis, Ling Ling. I actually think it's been at least two administrations running now that the US government has become relatively more modest in its belief that the United States or any other country is going to change China as a fundamental system. I think in the Biden administration, we were pretty clear in a wide range of national security documents that we did not see that as our objective. But one of the things that might be a little bit different here, or at least implicitly different, um, is that, you know, in prior administrations on a bipartisan basis, there was still a lot of concern about the sort of negative externalities of China's economic model on other countries and major policy interventions, including on a bilateral basis, to try to limit those or to mitigate the downside effects, such as, let's say, of industrial overcapacity. Um, so if we were to see kind of formal acknowledgement at the presidential level that things like that were not likely to change, that would actually be a significant accommodation in my mind over the course of this bilateral relationship and quite a departure from past administrations. But I don't know how you see that issue.

SPEAKER_01 16:52

Yeah, oh, 100%. Um, we did see from the Biden administration there a lot of dialogue going on between the two sides. And I remember having interviewed senior treasury officials under Biden about those dialogues. And the key focus spec that, right, Mira Kirkman Brown, was to uh keep telling China industrial overcapacity that you you are exporting overcapacity to other countries, really causing global imbalances. Um, you know, um it doesn't seem like China, you know, has uh done anything differently from from there on, but but I do get your point about you know the the uh issues like that uh being very high on on the on the agenda when the two governments, you know, uh interacted.

SPEAKER_00 17:45

Yeah, absolutely. I want to turn now, um, if we could, Lingling to the question of Taiwan, which you've written on extensively uh over the course of this year, um as well as your career. I think um, you know, really better than anyone, your reporting has documented uh over the course of the entire calendar year, really beginning late last spring, the fact that the Chinese leadership has attempted to use trade talks and the prospect of leader-level diplomacy to squeeze the United States for concessions on Taiwan. Um, and those concessions have come, could continue to come in many forms. Um, you know, you've written about uh delays and downgrades to defense dialogues, um, Chinese efforts to get the United States to uh delay future arm sales packages to Taiwan, um, and then leader-level phone calls, um, in which Xi Jinping has made very clear to President Trump, who has acknowledged that China has a fundamental abiding interest in Taiwan and appeared to center that issue over the bilateral relationship in a way that seems to be signaling that it is important for the United States to give something in this area. I totally agree with your analysis at the outset of this conversation, which is that, you know, I don't think it's likely we're going to see a joint statement that at this stage of the game proffers a radical change in American policy towards Taiwan. It would be hard for the Chinese side to affect because there's a lot of veto players in the US government. And more than anything, I think Beijing knows that Congress also takes a huge stake in the US relationship with Taiwan. And they're not interested in doing anything so flagrant as to activate Congress as a veto player in all of this dynamic. But as you sort of signaled, there's still a lot of gray area in which the leaders, when talking by themselves, could have a discussion about Taiwan that could result in Xi Jinping trying to extract an implicit concession that may look modest on paper, may look modest when it's reported, but still have significant medium or long-term consequences. So talk to us about what you think that looks like. And especially given that Xi Jinping may have a few more bites at the Apple this year, additional meetings with President Trump. How do you think this meeting plays into a broader strategy to try to squeeze the status of Taiwan over the course of his engagements with President Trump in this year and the following years?

SPEAKER_01 20:24

Thank you, Mira. Well, you asked perhaps is the most important question in the bilateral relationship, because, you know, as we just discussed, the space for a big economic and trade deal is so limited. Um for the Chinese, Taiwan really is the issue they care most about, and the one most likely to be quietly discussed or traded around in the corridors of the Great Hall of the People next week. You know, the the both sides may not just, you know, highlight the Taiwan issue in any public readout, perhaps in the Chinese, but not in the US. And um, and that's really exactly why we should be watching. Beijing's playbook for the past year has been to use every economic conversation as a vehicle to extract Taiwan-related concessions, you know, pressing the US assurances on opposing Taiwan independence, on arms sales, on official visits, even on the language Washington itself uses. You know, I was told that uh during some uh trade negotiations, uh, Xi Jinping's uh economics are Her Li Feng had with the Treasury Secretary fastened over the past year. Um, many times uh Lee Feng would bring up Taiwan uh Um Treasury Secretary Veston refused to engage because it's not part of the trade remit. But that's just one example of how the Chinese have been paying attention on the Taiwan issue and using all the opportunities they could get to press on this issue. So I think the base case for this summit is Taiwan will be discussed at length in the closed door portion for sure. And um public statements may stay vague. And you know, both sides may want to claim no concessions were made. But the Chinese side might claim that they, you know, urged the US to do X, Y, and Z, for example, urged the US to oppose, as opposed to just not supporting Taiwan independence and things like that. So what I will be reading really carefully is obviously that uh linguistic change, you know, has the US side moved from we do not support Taiwan independence toward we oppose Taiwan independence towards, right? But totally different signal, especially to Taipei, or moving from, you know, we um support um peaceful resolution, right, of the cross-strait matter, or we support peaceful reunification, with which is language favored by the CCP, or how she framed uh the Taiwanese leader, Lai Ching duo, uh, in her in his conversation with Trump. So we will see um if any of those things um occur or not. Um and um obviously any softening on or no change on arms sale uh packages to Taiwan, whether or not that that comes up. And um so uh so all those things are uh things I would be on the lookout for. And and you asked, um, will Xi Jinping keep pressing in subsequent meetings on on issues about Taiwan? Absolutely. Um, this is a long game for him. Incremental concessions are the strategy, really not breakthroughs. Each summit is a chance to nudge the language a millimeter uh closer to what China wants.

SPEAKER_00 24:38

That is so well said, Ligling, and get again just incredibly uh thoroughly laid out. I just want to circle back and sort of see your thinking on one piece of this because you know I really couldn't be more aligned, and I totally agree with you that this is truly the most important issue in the bilateral basis relationship that almost certainly will be discussed, um, but probably in ways that take us a little bit of time to fully divine and understand. As I see it, I think President Xi is going to continue to play through for incremental concessions every time he meets Trump, even if they're pretty murky, and even if it's not really clear what was conceded or not, because ultimately the game here is to influence Taiwan's domestic politics, and in particular to weaken the hand of the pro-independence party, traditionally the DPP, implicitly strengthen the hand of the KMT ahead of Taiwan's 2028 presidential elections, which he hopes will be unfavorable to the DPP and therefore put him as the president of China in a better position in his thinking to squeeze a different leadership into negotiating some change in Taiwan status over the medium term. Does that accord with your thinking about his strategy?

SPEAKER_01 25:58

We're 100% aligned. How refreshing it is to talk to someone who with whom you're like 100% aligned. Um, but oh, kidding aside, more seriously, I really, really agree um, you know, very completely with what you just said, Mira. China's strategy really is multidimensional, right? It's not just military, even though military is a big component of the Chinese strategy. And um, so as you said, the audience is not just the Chinese audience or the American audience. For a large part, the audience for the later this year, next year, in the coming year, is the people in Taiwan, the voters, right? So um, so that's why anything Trump says when it comes to the Taiwan US Taiwan policy is important because a lot of uh analysts, smart analysts actually questioned what's what's the big deal? What's the big deal Trump says this and that? You know, he's he changed he changes his position all the time. Well, it is a big deal because if indeed uh Trump can seize on the linguistic uh asks put forward by uh China, that would be a big signal to Taiwan and could have the potential of swaying uh political elections in Taipei. And China might, you know, move uh closer to their goal, their alternate goal is to take over, take back control of Taiwan without really firing a shot.

SPEAKER_00 27:44

Again, once again, violent agreement. We're gonna have to find something in the remaining uh exchanges of our conversation which to disagree, uh, because listeners like to have a little bit of tension. Um, totally agree. Um, so this will be one in which I want to circle back uh uh with you if you're open to it after the summit concludes, because there's gonna be so much to parse about what did and did not happen, I think, on US Taiwan issues. Um, but again, I think it's gonna be one of those where it's not easy to score the second the summit wraps up. It'll probably take several days and frankly a lot of time of readers reading your excellent reporting to try to divine what actually transpired in the corridors of the Great Hall of the People. Hopefully there are at least translators present so that we can figure out uh what exactly was said. I want to touch quickly, Ling Ling, on an issue that uh is a little bit lighter uh in its tone, but certainly still really important to both leaders as they head into the summit. You wrote a great piece a couple of weeks ago that really called back for me my time at the White House because your piece was really illustrating how intensive logistically, in terms of protocol, in terms of menus, um, in terms of formalities, a US-China leader level meeting is. And to some extent, all leader level diplomacy is incredibly intensive when it comes to protocol logistics. Um I worked on many leader-level visits myself as a senior director of the White House, but I was covering the rest of East Asia and not China. So I had a front row seat, but did not myself uh take on any of the preparations for meetings between President Biden and President Xi. I noted, however, in your piece that you quoted one of my wonderful friends and colleagues, uh Rick Waters, who noted that Chinese leader level preparations often were traumatic for those who had to work on them on the US side. So just help our listeners understand why are these exigencies so important in the US-China relationship specifically, and especially important to Xi Jinping? Why does he care about the way his body is framed in a photo, where his hand is and the handshake, how they walk down the red carpet, and what do those optics signal to the Chinese government and the Chinese people that they are seeking to protect?

SPEAKER_01 30:06

Sure. Um, you know, you experienced all that. I I you know can't express even greater admiration for what you did. Um reporting on that story, Mira, really made me realize all the hard work that goes into planning for such a summit. Um, so our questions um with China, the protocol is really the substance. You know, anyone who's worked those summits knows the cliche and is a cliche because it's true. Uh, on why matters for Xi Jinping. Uh, you know, we know that he has spent 15 years elevating himself domestically as a peer of any US president. And the Chinese system reads every gesture who walks first, who's at the door, who's at the table, as a signal of relative status. A snob is really a story, a deference is also a story. Um, so and on the US side, you have got Trump, who's probably not as alert to optics or protocol as as she is. So you have these two leaders who are um, you know, uh both care intensely about the picture, uh, advised by uh by two systems that pre you know prepare for those things potentially very differently. So that could um potentially lead to um some issues um, you know, when they actually meet. Um, but we'll we'll see whether or not it happens. Um so you also ask about why it gets so you know charged with the whole summit planning process, why it gets uh so charged with China specifically. Um I guess my answer would be the Chinese system has a much longer memory and much smaller margin for what counts as respect. Um, you know, a joint photo with the wrong flower arrangements or flag arrangement, uh uh a translation stumble, um uh, you know, a casual trombicide. You know, any one of those things can become the story domestically in China and you know force Xi Jinping into a more kind of rigid posture. Um the the flip side is also true. If the whole thing goes well, it creates a kind of diplomatic capital, you know, Xi Jinping uh can spend later uh in private with Trump. So um I I you know I always uh from reporting the last story, I've heard many people tell me that the hardest negotiation in any US-China summit isn't the policy, isn't the agenda, it's really the seating chart.

SPEAKER_00 33:16

I think that's absolutely right. Um and it was such a great story. So anyone who hasn't read it yet uh should go on uh the journal's website and read um the sort of protocol exigencies uh that are all being hashed through right now. Again, um, like you, I admire and do not envy the teams on both sides who are in the hot seat preparing for the summit. As we wrap up today, uh Ling Ling, and in just a minute, um, I would love to ask you to just speculate, although I know this is an unfair question. If you had to outline today the story that you think you're going to file after this summit wraps up in Beijing, what is your base case for that story? What do you think you'll be reporting out of this summit? And where do you see the biggest confidence interval or margin for error in what might happen? I think we've had violent agreement on so many issues, to include the fact that it's easy for the Chinese to agree to large purchase agreements, probably to some investment. We probably won't see anything all that sticky on critical minerals, although there'll be a gesture, there'll be something on fentanyl, there'll be something murky that takes place behind the scenes on Taiwan that you're gonna have to run down. What are the other variables that you're thinking about as you prepare to write that story? And what do you think you'll be concluding as the visit wraps up?

SPEAKER_01 34:43

Uh again, great question. Also, really hard ones, but also touches upon the work we're trying to do now to prepare for the summit, right? Um, I think, you know, one likely headline I we will be writing would be something like, you know, tactical truths, extended, not a breakthrough kind of story. Uh, very warm optics, modest deliverables, uh, both leaders claiming a wing uh to their domestic audiences, and maybe a very quiet agreement, or not so quiet agreement to keep the leader-to-leader channel open. Um, so we may say the typical Trump infusive remarks on she. Great relationship, very smart men, um, a memorable line or two about she personally. Um, we may expect, we should expect she to be more reserved, uh, more formal, but also visibly comfortable. You talked about the deliverables, the big agriculture and an energy purchase packages potentially, and Boeing potentially, uh, a fentanyl enforcement framework possible, um, you know, uh, and also um maybe AI, a uh AI on the agenda, whether or not there will be a working group set up on each side to talk about AI safety or mandatory risk reduction as another watch point for us. Um fake language or manage competition responsibly, perhaps. Um, and you know, basically, you know, what I'm expecting is that what we know is that both leaders, they're transactional, they respect leverage, uh, they perform leadership for domestic audiences. So um that can be the basis of a workable channel or a personal personalistic uh relationship that papers over real differences between the two systems.

SPEAKER_00 36:53

Tactical truths extended and a personalistic relationship that papers over differences. You heard it here first, and keep following, keep reading Ling Ling Way as this summit unfolds. Ling Ling, thank you so much again for being with us today. It's been a real treat. Thank you so much.

SPEAKER_01 37:10

I really enjoyed our discussion.

SPEAKER_00 37:13

As I reflect on my conversation with Ling Ling, I am struck certainly by the degree of agreement and overlap in our analysis. But more than that, in Ling Ling's really trenchant and thoughtful analysis about Xi Jinping's strategy for his relationship with the United States. She's reported extensively on his preparations for a showdown just like the one that has occurred over the course of the last year. And her tagline that he should give no ground and allow America to come to him does indeed seem to have been coming to pass over the course of the last many months. I'll also be taking away from it her admonition that for Xi, this is a medium and long-term game, and that Xi Jinping is playing for extremely modest, seemingly not breakthrough caliber concessions each and every time he meets Trump to move that strategy forward. Today's episode was produced by Rivon Duwiastino, executive produced by Lauren Dewick, and has editorial input from Prashanth Jaw. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. What comes next is a production of the Asia Group and is powered by Tag AI, Tag's geopolitical decision engine for business. We'll see you on the next episode.