What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper
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Mira brings a rare mix of policy experience and business insight. From senior roles at the White House to her current work at The Asia Group, she’s helped navigate the challenges of global competition. Now, she shares sharp, practical lessons drawn from her own experience and conversations with the world’s leading strategists.
What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper
Shangri-La Dialogue: Hormuz, Taiwan, and U.S. Credibility in Asia
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As the Shangri-La Dialogue begins, one question hangs over the region: can the United States still reassure its allies and partners in Asia? Host and TAG Senior Advisor Mira Rapp-Hooper sits down with Senior Advisor Kelly Magsamen to break down the signals that will matter most at the summit. They cover the implications of Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, questions over Taiwan arms sales, and how the ongoing Iran conflict is reshaping the strategic environment across the Indo-Pacific. They also examine what allies want to hear from Washington, how China may seek to position itself as the steadier power, and why side meetings may matter as much as the speeches for policymakers and businesses.
What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper is produced by Rivan Dwiastono, executive produced by Lauren Dueck, with editorial input from Prashant Jha. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe.
What Comes Next is a production of The Asia Group, and is powered by TAG AI, TAG's geopolitical decision engine for businesses.
Every day that the Strait of Hormuz is closed is a day that U.S. deterrence value in the region goes down. So watching that dynamic, sort of the diversification of security and defense relationships can be a strong indicator of the direction of travel for many of these countries.
SPEAKER_00As the Indo-Pacific gets ready to turn its eyes towards the Shankar Law Forum in Singapore this weekend, my next guest has more experience on this terrain than pretty much anybody else in the U.S. government. Kelly Magsman is a senior advisor here at the Asia Group and was most recently the chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Previously, she was also the acting assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Pentagon. Let's give a listen. Kelly Maxman, thanks so much for joining us on What Comes Next? Great to be here. Well, it's a real treat to talk to you as we get ready for the Shangri-La Dialogue to kick off because you have worked at the Pentagon on Shangri-La speeches and to prepare Secretaries of Defense for the Shangri-La Dialogue at the highest level and so very many times. Too many times. So it's really hard to match your expertise on what we're about to talk about today. But in addition to the process and sort of the pageantry that is Shangri-La, you're of course a consummate expert on all the geopolitical issues we're going to be unpacking over the course of this conversation as well. So a lot to dive into. My favorite topic. Indeed. So as we get started, I kind of want to go straight to the proverbial elephant in the room. This Shangri-La dialogue, excuse me, it's kicking off right after President Trump has left Beijing and his summit meeting with Xi Jinping. Yep. With huge questions hanging over the region about what the future of US-China relations will look like, what the future of the United States commitment to the region will look like, how committed the United States is to its allies. And in particular, a huge open question about whether the United States is now in the process of turning off at least temporarily arm sales to Taiwan. And while on some level, this is a set of questions allies have been grappling with for some time and over the course of the year, wondering how the US-Taiwan relationship would take shape amidst this clear endeavor to strike a rapprochement with Xi? It is a little bit different to see it sort of coming together in practice and seeing what is a pretty seismic shift out of Washington. How does this US-China dynamic play at Shangri-La and in particular? What questions do you think are top of mind for allies who are getting ready to head to Singapore?
SPEAKER_01Yeah. Well, in some ways, like you said, this is a kind of a question and a dynamic that hangs over, frankly, every Shangri-La dialogue. It's always the US-China dynamic that dominates the room. People are looking for any hint of changes in policy, any shades of gray, anything the secretary may say or the Chinese may say that's different from what they have said before. So I think this particular dialogue is going to be far more acute because of the circumstances of the summit hangover, but also the Iran war, which is still ongoing. So I think all of the forces that normally animate a lot of anxiety in the region around Shangri-La are just extra high this year. I would say more acute than they normally are. And I think for in the case of Taiwan, I think, you know, people are going to be listening for whether the secretary says something different on Taiwan. I anticipate the secretary is going to be very careful about what he says. He's probably going to hue very closely to what the president of the United States said in some of his messaging. He may be a little bit more ambiguous around certain commitments, I anticipate. Last year, Secretary Heggseth delivered a pretty strong message on China. I think that may be a little bit shaded this year, possibly. So certainly the region, I think, is very anxious. Obviously, Taipei is quite anxious. My advice to Taipei is just steady as she goes and really actually just put your nose down, focus on building up your defenses, focus on your resilience. Because right now the Trump variable and the US variable is so dynamic that it almost is, you almost can't even really uh uh align your policies or adjust your yourself based on one comment, because it can change within you know two weeks.
SPEAKER_00And we've certainly seen that in the Europe case, right? Where it seemed like the United States was undertaking a perfect withdrawal from Europe and all of a sudden perfect example. Both withdrawing troops from Poland.
SPEAKER_01Next thing we're now sending more troops to Poland. So that's that that is what I mean. I think there's probably a little bit of a discounted element to kind of what that messaging is because people know that it can shift quite significantly. Um, the Iran war hangover is going to be quite real. I mean, a lot of the Asian economies have been the worst hit, as you know. And so they're watching what's happening with the peace talks right now very closely. Obviously, yesterday there was a little bit of another dust-up in the Gulf. So, what happens to the Strait of Hormuz, how the United States addresses a pretty core global interest on freedom of navigation is going to be a big question around the dialogue.
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. So I want to come back to the Iran factor in just a moment. Um, because as you say, it, you know, it's not just about Iran, it's bigger questions about freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation. Exactly. Um, all of which are kind of shunted to the fore here. Um, but before we do, to your great set of points about US-China dynamics and and how folks are going to be reading the tea leaves and totally accepting what you say, that sort of best advice to Taipei is steady as she goes. Any Shangri-La dialogue is always a little bit of a reading of the tea leaves, um, certainly on the US side, but also on the Chinese side. Um, you know, you've given us good reason to think uh that we should probably expect Secretary Hegsack to use language this year that is perhaps a little bit more accommodating of the Chinese and perhaps looking to bring into the defense space um more kind of resumed mill-to-mill connections and other uh kind of policy items that would suggest a stabilization of the relationship in keeping with the president's trip to Beijing. On the US side, um, you know, you also said you expected some fairly careful language around Taiwan. I wonder what you think is most likely to happen on the Chinese side. Um, in particular because the Chinese used, you know, pretty serious language around Taiwan when President Trump was in Beijing. Not totally out of step with things they've said in the past, but like the hottest version of all of it, you know, dumped into readouts and said publicly. Are you expecting that the Chinese will need to take a strong stand on Taiwan at Shangarala, or is in some ways their position so evident that it's unnecessary for them to do so and they can actually sort of just step back and be the steady regional power?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, in some ways, China can just walk into this dialogue and actually do very little and portray itself as the more stable, normal, uh, principled global leader. Um, that'll be a very new dynamic for the dialogue. Usually it's quite the opposite. Um, I'll be interested to see whether or not they continue to repeat the sharp message uh that President Xi delivered uh to President Trump, whether they they don't I don't think they need to do that, but they could do that. Certainly they might do some of that in private. So there's always the public Chinese message and then the private Chinese message. And so what China is gonna say in closed doors with, you know, some of you of our partners and allies in the region, I think will be interesting to hear from them and their readouts. So I think they're probably gonna walk in quite confident that they can sort of pick off US partners and allies, you know, and sort of say, listen, like we're the we're the good guys, we're the ones that actually believe in a global order. You're watching the United States essentially try to unravel the order that it built, come our way, we can do some deals, you know, um, US is not reliable. I expect there to be quite uh sharp conversations in private, but the public piece will be interesting. And I anticipate they may try to continue Xi Jinping's messaging.
SPEAKER_00Interesting. Yeah, and that that all sounds exactly right to me. In in some ways, though, at the point that you have the US president kind of debating very publicly, canceling Taiwan arm sales, the job is done.
SPEAKER_01It's a bit of a gift.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, the job is done. Um, and it's not clear that Xi Jinping needs to use that sharp of language on Taiwan, even if he holds the line, um, because he's clearly gotten his message across to President Trump. And in some ways, that's the most effective wedge strategy one can imagine.
SPEAKER_01Oh, also, see, I don't even know that the Chinese defense minister has uh decided to go yet.
SPEAKER_00Good point.
SPEAKER_01That is still an outstanding issue. For many years, they've been downgrading their presence at Shanghai Law because they want to build their alternative security dialogue, as you know. Um, so it'll be interesting if they actually show up this year. I think that you know there could be strategic money to be made by the Chinese if they showed up at the at the defense minister level.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, it certainly would seem to me to be a a year where the wind could be at their backs if they decide to show. I'll be interested to see how they treat the Japanese in particular, um, given that Takichi has been out on the limb for some months and now the set of Taiwan comments um kind of continues to drive that way.
SPEAKER_01Well, I mean, I think that's an important point. I mean, it's not just the Taiwan piece that's hanging out there, it is the Japan-China piece and the fact that we haven't been as vocal or as visible in our support for the Japanese in that in that context. So that is also, I'm sure the region is quite keyed into.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, no, absolutely. So talk to me a little bit more about what you think the Iran, or excuse me, Iran uh dynamic is likely to look like. Um, you know, you mentioned, of course, um, that the fact that we're perpetually seeming to be on the precipice of some kind of deal, but then there's another desktop. Um, many Southeast Asian economies, South Asian economies in a full-blown crisis at this point because of energy shortfalls. And the basic connection of ideas like freedom of navigation um sort of coming to bear the longer the street of Hormuz stays closed. Um, I found it interesting timing that Tolam, um, the general secretary of Vietnam, is going to be the keynote speaker this year. Vietnam has been in an energy crisis, um, you know, up until this year or last year. We really saw Vietnam as an increasingly close partner with the United States, even though, of course, it had diversified ties, but we felt pretty good about the work that we did under the Biden administration to draw Vietnam closer. Um, but over the course of the last year, we've seen Vietnam racked by sky-high tariffs. Um, a very tough phone call that took place between President Trump and Tolam himself that sort of scuttled an incipient trade deal between the two sides. And now, of course, Vietnam is one of the economies that's hit the worst by uh these energy crises, where they've had to implement a number of emergency measures just to keep their economy from spinning out. So I wonder how you think his keynote is gonna go, and in particular, whether Iran elements could potentially feature significantly, given Vietnam's long tradition of sort of a non-aligned status and the fact that this issue of reopening the strait is literally existential for them.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. I mean, the Iran issue is gonna be very complicated for a number of these countries, but um, for Lam, you know, it's very interesting. He's the first Communist Party secretary to actually give a speech at Shangri-Law. So it's kind of a first in Shangri-Law's history. It's the second time Vietnam's actually delivered the keynote. Um, so it's an interesting choice by double I double-s. I think it's actually kind of a fascinating choice in the sense that it's the classic, to use an American phrase, swing state uh in the region. And to your point, there's been a lot of uh back and forth between them and China and then with us. So his messaging, I think I'm listening for kind of what he says about the US-China dynamic, you know, what kind of language he uses, whether it's more about, you know, peaceful accommodation, finding stability, or whether it's more sharp, you know, the around the Strait of Hormuz, if he says anything about freedom of navigation. I think a lot of these countries are just, they just want to cry uncle at this point when it comes to the Iran issue. So I think they're all hoping that there's gonna be some sort of diplomatic resolution, but it's a double-edged sword because they don't want one that's gonna also sacrifice freedom of navigation around the Strait of Hormuz or create some sort of strange arrangement where there's tolls being paid or environmental fees. So, like they're hoping for peace, but they also want a really good peace that's gonna reinforce their own interests in the region. Um, so you know, what he says, you know, he's been out there on the world stage quite a bit recently. He's been traveling a lot. Um, so I also think there's gonna be a little bit of his own sort of stature and messaging as it relates to the Vietnamese economy and his political force in the region. Um, but the Iran issue, you know, my concern on the Iran piece is that every day that the Strait of Hormuz is closed is a day that U.S. deterrence value in the region goes down. And because they're all watching us not be able to forcibly reopen it, that has huge implications for how they think about what would happen in the Straits of Malacca and other areas, the Taiwan Strait itself. So I think, you know, Lom's messaging is probably gonna be a lot of let's figure this out, let's come to a principled conclusion around the Strait of Hormuz, especially.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, that's extremely well said. Um, I think also worth noting for our listeners, as I know you know better than anybody, Kelly. Vietnam, of course, is Health China Sea claimant. Absolutely. Um The Parasol Islands. Very fun. Very, very front, very front of mind. Um, you know, never as vocal as the Philippines when it comes to kind of going toe-to-toe with China. But again, in recent years, we had seen a number of instances um in which Vietnamese fishermen got really beat up by PRC counterparts, um, really subject to pretty intense coercion. It's hard to imagine Tolam really beating the drum on that side of issues now, given um the regional dynamics. But Vietnam's status as a South China Sea claimant, I think always in the background, and important to remember uh that freedom of navigation is not consistent with a toll system if one were to be implemented in the Strait of Hormuz, um, certainly not consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. So although Vietnam never um tends to stick its neck all that far out there, any references.
SPEAKER_01They can be a little scrappy sometimes.
SPEAKER_00A little bit. And any, you know, references to international systems. Yeah. References to international law are still making their point, right? Exactly. They, you know, when when they really um kind of get backed up against the wall, they are very willing to um stand up for international law.
SPEAKER_01I'm sure they'll I'm sure they'll repeat a lot of the ASEAN principles, you know, peaceful settlement of disputes, et cetera, et cetera. So I think you're probably gonna hear a lot of those themes as well.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. Okay, but uh but I love your point about every day the Straits of Hormuz remain closed. Um, as a real problem, deterrence to grades. Yeah. Um not to mention uh the munitions that have already been expended, uh, which will be top of mind as well for our partners.
SPEAKER_01And US force posture changes.
SPEAKER_00Yes. Yeah. Yeah. So on that score, you know, as folks head out to Singapore, is is it even possible to rock and stack which aspects of the Iran conflict kind of loom largest for them? Because in addition to the basic energy crises, the freedom of navigation issues, the closure of the straits, you know, the expenditure of US munitions in Iran is a huge deal. Again, repositioning US forces to privilege the Middle East once again, a huge deal, sometimes at the direct expense of Asia. Um, how do you kind of evaluate where partners are in terms of which aspects of this conflict are most concerning to them?
SPEAKER_01I mean, I think the most acute issue is the strait for obvious reasons of the economic issues and all the freedom of navigation issues. Um munition issues is pr is probably quite high. Um but it's it goes back to the main concern that the region always has. Does the United States have both the political will and the bandwidth and the capacity from a defense capacity perspective to actually lead and defend and deter in the region? And that's the underlining question that they always have every year. Um, so I think all of that is wrapped up into one big bow is when it comes to Iran, because Iran touches every dimension of that.
SPEAKER_00We were talking about this right before we started recording today, and I think it's such a good point. And I actually want to kind of draw it out a little bit more in the context of how one successfully writes a speech when you're up against such a strategic dilemma all the time, right? You were saying, I think really rightfully, that in many ways the charge to any sec def who goes to Shangarla is to try to prove in a new and different way that the United States is here to stay and that we can be counted on as a reliable ally and partner despite the time distance problems and all of the other challenges to us showing up in Asia. Talk to me a little bit as someone who has been a part of played a leading role in seven different shamral off, which is how you communicate that and how you communicate that differently every time. You know, not asking you to give advice to Secretary Heggsath, who obviously is up against some very specific variables this year. Um, but given the challenges to making that case, what does it look like to do it in a novel way each time?
SPEAKER_01It's very hard to do it in a novel way each time, but actually that's okay because there is some importance to consistency. Um, so usually, you know, Shangri-Law speeches, they're actually my least favorite speeches because they tend to turn into a very long laundry list of all the things we're doing in the region, which is actually quite important. Um, but you have to have a thematic through line. And usually that's tied to the principles around which you have a vision for the region. Usually that's tied back to the national defense strategy or the national security strategy. So usually there is that through line in every speech. And then you try to put a different spin on it every year. You have a different, we had network defense, I think was the Ash Carter, uh famous Ash Carter speech. Secretary uh Austin had integrated deterrence. So at least it was grounded in some sort of strategy or vision for the region. I think, you know, I don't I don't know what Secretary Heggsith is gonna say. I anticipate, you know, they're probably working on it as we speak. Um Secretary of Defense speeches usually come together in the end game. Um, but I think you can anticipate a few things. One is I think you're gonna probably hear, you know, some of the similar themes around Allied, you know, allies stepping up for their own defense. So I think the Secretary will probably have some messaging around that. I think that maybe, you know, there'll be some thematics around, you know, uh defense industrial-based cooperation. That's a very big focus of his. Um, so I think you'll hear a lot of those kind of similar themes. What he says specifically about Iran, I think will depend on where we are in about a week from now. Um, and I think what he says about US-China relations, I think will hew very closely, as I said earlier, to the to what the president said. But usually when you're building these speeches, you try to wedge in, you know, demonstrations of our capacity and our will. So with whether it's a new policy initiative, a new security assistance announcement for the region, some sort of organizing effort. Um, you have to mention every ally, because if you don't mention every ally, they get very upset. I know that. I forgot to mention Thailand one year. It was very bad for me. Um but you know, you mention your allies, you talk about the cooperation you're doing. It's a lot of showing what you're doing to reinforce a perception in the region uh that you're there, you're present, you're gonna stay, you're building, you know, capacity. Um, those are gonna be the main dynamics.
SPEAKER_00Can confirm as someone who had the pleasure of receiving your very good speeches when you sent them over for White House clearance, that we would sit there with like little checklists, making sure that everything we cared about was in the speech. So there is this element of kind of bushally Christmas tray that happens. Um, but I think you've said it very well that the idea is to take all of that showing of what you're doing and organize it around a theme or a framework or strategy that can sort of, you know, come up directly against that argument that the United States doesn't have staying power.
SPEAKER_01Yes. And I think, you know, interesting, this is the first year uh after the issue of the new NDS. So Secretary Heggs may pull some of those thematics into the conversation as well.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, and it'll be interesting to see how exactly that goes down because of course the kind of central organizing principle in the NDS was the first island chain. The first island chain includes Taiwan, right? So if we're being super careful about Taiwan, that's one of the terms I'll be looking at to see if he uses the term first island chain or if he finds another way to talk about where exactly our commitments lie in the region. Indeed. Um well, on that score, um, you know, you mentioned a couple of different initiatives uh that well-known secretaries of defense proffered in their speeches, and in particular, um, Secretary Austin's integrated defense concept, which you of course worked on very closely as well. You also mentioned um that Secretary Hagseth might say a bit about defense industrial-based cooperation, um, which I think would be very welcome. Um, maybe uh, you know, defense acquisitions reform, um, which this Pentagon has been very focused on. If you were giving advice to folks listening in from the private sector about what they should be listening in for, what would constitute kind of relatively significant signaling for private sector partners? What kinds of initiatives or framings would suggest that there's maybe an opening with the Pentagon to cooperate or accelerate cooperation in new ways?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I think, you know. Private sector, obviously, anything the secretary announces in his speech, any new initiative, especially around defense cooperation or industrial base coordination, maybe he mentioned something around FMF and FMS reform that's been high on his agenda. Um, so anything new in that regard, there's the Piper initiative. So if there's any new announcements on Piper, that'll give you a sense of kind of the strategic direction of the department in terms of where they're going to prioritize security assistance efforts or cooperation efforts in the region. Um, you know, I think also, frankly, watching what happens on the sidelines, uh, not just what's happening in the speeches. So who's meeting with who? Uh, so you know, watching kind of who are the Japanese meeting with, who are they prioritizing their engagements with, who are the Indians meeting with? Are there any trilaterals that happen on the margins that are going to, you know, issue some sort of new security initiative that, you know, three countries will work on. I understand we're not doing very many trilaterals on the margins of this summit, but other countries have been doing them without us. So watching that dynamic, sort of the diversification of security and defense relationships, can be a strong indicator of the direction of travel for many of these countries.
SPEAKER_00I think that's a great point. You mentioned uh Secretary Carter's network security concept. And of course, um, in many ways, what we've been working on in the years since is really trying to accelerate not only the United States networking with its partners throughout the Indo-Pacific, but networking in those partners to one another. And particularly at a moment where the United States is kind of uniquely unpredictable and where the region's seen a bit of a shock to the system in the last few weeks when it comes to the basic question of who the United States stands with and who it stands against. Um, the sort of natural thing to see would be redoubled defense, intelligence, and other forms of sensitive cooperation amongst our closest partners with one another. For my money, I'm really curious to see if the Japanese meet with the Koreans. Um, that's been uh one of the pleasant surprises of this last year and a half, is despite the fact that we got new leadership in both Japan and the ROK, the rapport mom between those two countries has really stayed on course, um, in large part uh thanks to IJ Myung and Takeichi, who've really kind of clasped hands and made sure that they don't allow distance between them, despite all the sort of political incentives in each country to maybe let that happen. But it's my understanding that thus far that while the leader level dynamic has been really strong, there hasn't been quite as much energy um behind some of the defense cooperation um as we saw uh when we had the chance to work with both of those partners in the Biden administration. So I'd love to see some new defense initiatives between the two of those countries.
SPEAKER_01I would too. I mean, they we made such strides uh during the last administration, and that needs to continue. I mean, quite frankly, for the region. I'm also watching the Europeans, who shows up from Europe, because there's increasing uh ties between the Europeans and the Asian partners, especially on defense industrial cooperation. So also watching what who the Europeans are that show up, who they meet with is another really strategic signal.
SPEAKER_00That's that's a great flag. And any thoughts um or kind of expectations around India? Um, you know, for for all that India is such a critical partner, it's obviously been a tough year for the United States and India. Any sort of interesting uh permutations or expectations you might have for how India plays this Shangri-La?
SPEAKER_01I think that I mean the Indians, you know, they come to Shangri-Law, they meet with a lot of folks. We'll be interested to see who what level they come this year and the dynamic, you know, there. Um, but you know, I think it's gonna be all these countries are gonna be running around trying to meet with each other because to the point you just made about the United States, I think they're all gonna have conversations about how to manage this current global transition that we're in.
SPEAKER_00Beautifully said. Kelly Maximin, as always, a pleasure to chat with you. Great to talk to you. As I reflect on my conversation with Kelly, I am thinking a lot about two bifurcated pieces of advice that she gave. On the one hand, listening to the speeches coming out of Secretary Hag Seth and senior Chinese officials may tell us the most about where the US and China are in this moment with respect to their posture towards one another. But if one really wants to look at how the region is reacting, we should watch closely and listen to what comes out of sidelines meetings. Those meetings between ministers and other senior officials that take place not in the formal proceedings, but on the outskirts, may tell us much more about how the region is scrambling to build resilience amongst itself at a time when the United States seems more unpredictable and US-China relations are changing by the day. What comes next is produced by Refund Dewey Astono, an executive produced by Lauren Dewick. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. What comes next is a production of the Asia Group and is powered by Tag AI, Tag's geopolitical decision engine for business. We'll see you on the next episode.