Asia’s Security Reset: Taiwan, Japan, and the Future of U.S. Deterrence

Is the U.S. signaling a more limited security role in the Indo-Pacific? Host and TAG Senior Advisor Mira Rapp-Hooper sits down with Chris Johnstone, TAG Partner and Co-Chair of Defense & National Security Practice, to discuss an Indo-Pacific region at a strategic turning point. Following Chris’s recent travel through Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore, they break down what the Shangri-La Dialogue revealed about U.S. credibility, allied uncertainty, and the future of deterrence in Asia. They explore Taiwan’s deepening anxiety over arms sales, Japan’s emergence as a more proactive security actor, and how countries across the region are building more diversified, resilient defense relationship in response to a shifting geopolitical environment. 

What Comes Next with Mira Rapp-Hooper is produced by Rivan Dwiastono, executive produced by Lauren Dueck, with editorial input from Prashant Jha. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. 

What Comes Next is a production of The Asia Group, and is powered by TAG AI, TAG's geopolitical decision engine for businesses.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

Everyone, the South Korean uh defense minister, the Australian defense minister, Koizumi himself, all kind of hit this theme of we need to be more self-reliant and we need to uh to cooperate more amongst each other. Um, with the implicit message being, I think, frankly, a little less reliance on the United States right now is is probably our interest.

SPEAKER_01 0:27

As we reflect on the Shingra-La dialogue that's just taken place in Singapore and weighed through news throughout the Indo-Pacific, our next guest is exquisitely positioned to help us understand what's on the horizon. Chris Johnstone is a partner and the co-lead of the defense and national security practice at the Asia Group. Most recently, he was in the U.S. government for 25 years as a leading defense official on all issues related to East Asia, including two stints at the National Security Council, where Chris and I had the opportunity to work alongside one another. I'm really looking forward to speaking with him today. Chris Johnstone, thanks so much for joining us on What Comes Next.

SPEAKER_00 1:07

Great to be here, Mira, and great to see you.

SPEAKER_01 1:09

Well, I have been really excited for this conversation today because you just got back from a fairly epic set of travels through the region at a really important time. You were in Japan, you were in Taiwan, and you were in Singapore uh around the time of the Shangri-La dialogue. Um, so we have a lot to dig into today, and I'm really grateful to you for spending some time with us and sharing your insights.

SPEAKER_00 1:30

Happy to do it, Mira. Yep. It was a fascinating time to be in Asia.

SPEAKER_01 1:34

So maybe let's start with Shangri-La and we can kind of work our way back up. Shangri-La always sort of worth sifting through for its takeaways, but this one felt especially loaded in a lot of ways. Um, comes, of course, on the heels of President Trump's major visit to Beijing just a couple of weeks ago and the attendant uncertainty that that created about what the United States posture towards China is and is going to be. Um, and in particular, the question of how the United States will treat Taiwan going forward, in particular on the issue of arm sales, and we'll get to that in more detail. I'd love you to just start by unpacking for us what you think the mood was at Shangri-La and what the biggest takeaways were from folks on the ground.

SPEAKER_00 2:20

Yeah, uh great to be with you again, Mira. Yeah, the Shangri-La Dialogue continues to be the really the sort of the preeminent venue for experts, government officials, industry folks who gather once a year to talk about uh regional security issues. And it did not disappoint. First time I've been in several years, but it was a really interesting event. And I guess I I have, I think, kind of three um big takeaways, three three themes really that I that um registered with me. First was this this theme that you alluded to, real uncertainty about the U.S. role, U.S. commitment in the Indo-Pacific, coming right on the heels of President Trump's visit to Beijing, as you noted. Also in the context of the war in Iran, um, deep questions about the American role. And I think Secretary Hagseth really tried to do what he could to assure the region of U.S. commitment in response to a question he's he said, we can do both at the same time. But it's also the case, I think, that he was trying to sort of navigate a complex mix of messaging. Um, on the one hand, he's he sort of set out um uh continued U.S. commitment to what he calls a deterrence by denial strategy, very much echoing what's in the national defense strategy. But at the same time, uh, as he sets that out, he had very little to say about the threats that we are attempting to deter with that strategy. No mention of Taiwan, we can come back to that. No mention of the North Korean threat, no mention of things like the South China Sea, which generally feature pretty prominently uh in these speeches. Uh and clearly that's partly about not upsetting the current momentum in uh in U.S.-China relations coming out of uh President Trump's visit uh to Beijing. But it has a r uh it has the effect of creating a a sort of mixed and complex set of messages. The other thing, of course, that he hit very hard was um uh the need for allies to step up and make their contributions to this, to this deterrence by denial strategy. So a very heavy emphasis on defense spending, the quote unquote global standard. Uh he sort of systematically went through his list of allies and kind of where they stand in terms of meeting American expectations, um uh but uh the continuing this sense of a transactional approach to uh to alliances. So that's my first takeaway, right, is the uncertainty about the U.S. role in the context of Trump going to China and the Iran War. Second was, for me, coming out party for the Japanese defense minister, Junichiro Koizumi, who gave one of the best speeches of the event in English, took all the questions and answered them in English, articulated a very sort of proactive Japanese role uh in the region, and in many ways became a bit of a star uh over the over the two days. He um he even asked a question of the secretary after the secretary was done with his with his speech. So, you know, the sense of Koizumi kind of coming into his own as a uh as a leader, and we can talk more about that if you like. And then the third takeaway from me, which relates to the first, um was this stated desire by leader after leader uh to diversify security partnerships and to strengthen resilience and defense industrial base uh at home. Everyone, the South Korean uh defense minister, the Australian defense minister, Koizumi himself, all kind of hit this theme of we need to be more self-reliant and we need to uh to cooperate more amongst each other. Um, with the implicit message being, I think, frankly, a little less reliance on the United States right now is is probably our interest. So those were kind of the three um big takeaways I had, I had Mira. Happy to kind of, you know, uh dig into any of them, but what a fascinating time.

SPEAKER_01 6:40

Yeah, I mean, that's such a great rundown, Chris. Uh, you summarized that all so well, and there's so much I want to pull on. Um, maybe let's start on the first theme of relative uncertainty about the United States. Um, I then love to come to this sort of defense diversification push, um, which I think is really important. Um, and then I do also want to touch on the Japan Koyazumi piece um in just a little while. So, first things first, the kind of uncertainty about the US role. Um, in some ways, you know, Kelly, Maximine, and I spoke about this last week. The question at Shangri-Law has always been what is the United States role in the Indo-Pacific and how durable is it? And, you know, what can we count on? Obviously, this feels like it was a more extreme version of that dilemma. Um, and that our partners are not dealing with just the usual levels of agita, but that this may be uh not just a difference in degree, but a difference in kind. I wonder how much you perceived other countries thinking about how to position themselves vis-a-vis China in this moment versus the degree to which you saw this as uncertainty about the United States, which is to say, to what degree did you perceive that partners already saw themselves as needing to rethink their hedging postures versus to what degree are they really still trying to diagnose what's going on with the United States and its position in Asia? And I'll stop there for now.

SPEAKER_00 8:15

Yeah, great questions, Mira. I think what I'd say is I think it's a little bit of both. Um certainly, I mean, one point to make, you know, Secretary Hegsef um really emphasized in his speech uh the commitment to building a um uh a stable relationship with China, uh emphasized the importance of military-to-military dialogue um and and engagement more broadly. Uh parenthetically, the Chinese did not send a high-level delegation to the Shangri-La dialogue, second time in a row in which only a junior, a junior team was there, uh, and multiple speakers expressed disappointment about that. But Secretary Hegsef um uh you know expressed a commitment to to building a um uh a transparent and uh sort of frank um uh relationship with uh with the Chinese military and and his counterparts.

SPEAKER_01 9:09

Trevor Burrus One could argue, and sorry to interject, Chris, that this was a missed opportunity for the Chinese to send a higher level.

SPEAKER_00 9:16

So I think that's totally right. I think it was a huge missed opportunity. Uh I know that the Singaporeans sent a delegation to Beijing a couple of weeks before the event to make a hard push to get the Chinese to send a more senior group, uh, but the Chinese did not do so. I think their view continues to be that the Shangri-La dialogue is um uh just a venue for um others to beat up on them. But I think if there was any time when they could have made some diplomatic ground, it was this year and they chose to uh uh chose to let it go. Um but it but to It's an interesting point, Chris.

SPEAKER_01 9:53

I just want to harp on this for a moment because for all that, you know, uh friends in Beijing are are doing a decent job of of taking advantage of opportunities afforded to them this particular geopolitical moment, they don't always fully exploit the space. Um that's left to them. This is a great example of them not doing so. I would think that particular for Southeast Asians and you know, Shangerla is a heavily Southeast Asia facing forum for all that it's uh you know covers the whole region. Uncertainty swirling about the United States relationship with China and how durable US presence is gonna be in the Indo-Pacific, coupled with a strong, sort of open message from the PRC would have been formula for maximum success. I think that's right. So it's just worth kind of marking that on.

SPEAKER_00 10:41

And the the the delegation that they that they sent took the usual combative approach in in the questions that that uh they made at the various speakers. And I think so it was it was a yeah, definitely a missed opportunity. I think one consequence I I thought of, you know, um the Secretary of Defense um sort of soft pedaling and being non-specific about threats was that in some ways our partners were more specific about the threats than we were. So for Koizumi was very direct with the Chinese and pushing uh in pushing back on this Chinese narrative about remilitarization uh in Japan. He was he was and he said very explicitly, um uh China's uh activities in the region are a source of deep concern. The Philippines Secretary of Defense, Teodoro, uh was very explicit in calling out um uh Chinese misbehavior in the South China Sea. He basically said, um uh the the incidents that we see, there's these are not the fault of Vietnam or Malaysia or Brunei or B uh or any of the other claimants. They're China, it's China's actions. Um so in some ways, uh ironically to me, uh partners were more explicit in calling out what they're concerned about than the United States was. The other interesting dynamic that I that I observed, which I think is interesting, is um uh the way, the contrasting ways in which um the US and then many um regional partners talked about conceptions of regional order, right? So the secretary was uh uh sort of very firm in saying we have a a realist uh approach focused on building a durable balance of power in East Asia. We're not gonna be distracted by the idealism of pursuit of a rules-based order. Very dismissive, as I think you know, Mira, in in sort of past approaches uh by previous administrations in this regard. Um, but virtually all of the Asian speakers uh continue to advocate for precisely that rules-based approach um to order. Um uh Deputy Prime Minister Morls, um the Vietnamese, uh Do Lamb, General Secretary, others all talked about rules, norms, institutions as as key to protecting the interests of small and mid-sized states. So that that that sort of contrasting um conceptions of how of how the order in Asia should be constructed was also another, I thought, interesting um dimension of the dialogue.

SPEAKER_01 13:34

That's a fantastic observation, Chris. And it's in some ways unsurprising, right? We we know this is the second Trump administration's perspective, is very clear, as you say, in the NDS. Um, but it does miss a lot of things in creating this dichotomy uh because for many countries in Asia, you know, regardless of size, rules, norms, institutions, um, you know, basic sort of bumper stickers like freedom and of and openness are actually very realist. They are other ways of saying we wish to protect the status quo that has benefited us and we want to stand together against changes that are inimical to our interests. So, in some ways, by creating this sort of false dichotomy between realism and a rules-based order, we miss the boat on what Asia actually wants and has been very clear in telling us it wants for over a decrease.

SPEAKER_00 14:26

That's really well said, Mira, that that actually the the approach pursued by many of our of our partners is actually quite realistic in its in its conception, especially when you consider that they're most of these are sort of small, mid-sized powers trying to preserve some autonomy in a in a complicated environment.

SPEAKER_01 14:47

Yeah, absolutely. But I I also want to pull on the thread, Cred, Chris, that you mentioned about allies calling in a much clearer and more aligned voice for more networking, for defense diversification, presumably for stronger cooperation amongst one another. I think it's important because as you and I have heard in many rooms over the course of the past 18 months until very recently, our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have been quick to tell us that there is no plan B. There is no blackup plan to the United States if the United States becomes unpredictable. Because in their perception, the cost of replacing security support, intelligence support, other forms of defense assistance from the United States are so prohibitively high that they're almost too staggering to even begin to contemplate. But it's important that we see this conversation taking place at Shangri-La, in particular after President Trump's recent trip, because there's good reason to think that they should be diversifying and should be pulling more closely together and should be thinking through what their options are. And their counterparts in Europe have been doing so for the better part of a year and actually making up some ground. Um, so I wonder in particular if sort of given the star power that Koizumi brought to this show, as well as this overall thrust of allied diversification and alignment, if you saw Japan emerging as a leader of that diversification and resilience effort, if it felt more evenly distributed, or how else would you characterize it? Because I think this is an important turning point.

SPEAKER_00 16:26

Yeah, I look, I think that's uh that's another great question. I think uh the first thing I think it's important to emphasize um Secretary Heggseth had a really active diplomatic schedule while he was on the ground. Um he had multiple bilateral meetings, including with countries like uh countries like Thailand and Vietnam, um and uh as well as with Japan and others. So it he was only on the ground something like 36 hours, but he packed in a lot, and counterparts in the region were eager to see him. So I don't want to create the impression that uncertainty meant distance from the United States. Not at all. There was a lot of effort to engage uh the American Defense Secretary as you as you would expect. What was different, though, about American engagement is, you know, in my time at the Department of Defense, we always used the Shangri-Lact uh dialogue as the venue for minilateral convenings. We did an annual US-Japan-Australia meeting of defense ministers. We did an annual US-Japan ROK convening of defense ministers back in a time when it wasn't easy to do those things. Um uh but in this case, the administration chose not to do, to do very little of that. There was a meeting of the AUKUS defense ministers where they announced a significant deliverable related to Pillar 2, which was good. Uh, but otherwise, no trilateral engagement. And it seems that basically the frame of this administration is um uh the juice needs to be worth the squeeze. In other words, there have to be outcomes that warrant getting us together. That's just a very different approach um uh to these venues. And I think it it contrasted with, I think, uh to your question, Mira, the Japanese approach where Koizumi convened uh a trilot with the Australians in New Zealand together. He convened a trilot with some uh Southeast Asian partners. Um I think there definitely was a sense that that Koizumi and the Japanese were trying at least to a degree um to fill the space there and to promote themselves as sort of a a catalytic force for deeper intra-regional comp uh cooperation, even if it doesn't um include the United States. So that was that was definitely a feature of this time. And and frankly, I expect that we're gonna see, we're gonna see more of that.

SPEAKER_01 18:57

That that's all very reasonable and and sounds right, Chris. Um, you know, with with uh a couple of other threads that I want to pull on, uh I wonder if if I could just raise an issue that we haven't quite touched on yet. I'm curious what the role of the Iran conflict was in this Shangri-La dialogue. Obviously, you know, Shangri-Law is overwhelmingly Asia-focused, Asia-facing, but some of the most profound energy crises faced anywhere in the world since this recent war with Iran started have been faced in South Asia and Southeast Asia. And with the war dragging on um with not an obvious deal in sight, many more countries uh could find themselves in fairly dire uh economic and political shape. And of course, related to the Strait of Hormuz is the basic question of what the United States' role is in continuing to maintain freedom of navigation in what is uh becoming a much more contested world very quickly. So I wonder if you could just draw out a little bit more how you saw the Iran issue playing with this audience in particular, and whether there was a consistent set of messages that you were hearing as they all kind of gird for the next phase of this conflict.

SPEAKER_00 20:13

Yeah, certainly the backdrop of economic pressure and the energy crisis was was prominent throughout um the discussions I heard over the over the few days. One particular area that the Secretary was pressed on related to uh the Secretary of the Navy's comments on arm sales to Taiwan, in which he uh essentially said that um arm sales to Taiwan are on hold because of the munition shortfalls um in the United States stemming from the Iran War. The Secretary is quick to dismiss that linkage. And I think actually it's uh I I think actually in this case uh that was right that um the decisions on arm sales to Taiwan are not particularly connected to the munition shortfalls we're seeing. Uh but certainly this sense that the conflict in Iran is stretching American resources, uh impacting the um uh the credibility of the American military presence. I mean, one of the themes the Secretary of Speech was we're gonna speak softly and and and carry a big stick. Um well that that's good, but if you if there are questions about how big the stick really is, um because you've been swinging, I'm stretching the metaphor here, but because you've been swinging it in at other parts of the of the world, um uh you know, it it sort of it it it it undermines your message. So certainly that question of how Iran impacts um American leadership, credibility, credibility deterrence um in the Indo-Pacific, these were all things that were that were definitely in the background. Trump and and at times discussed explicitly by the participants.

SPEAKER_01 22:04

Well, I mean, I think that's a really good segue, Chris, to uh the prior stop you'd taken on your very long journey, and that's the question of Taiwan arm sales. As you mentioned, um, the Secretary of the Navy told Senator McConnell that the United States had paused arm sales to Taiwan already because of reprioritization to the Middle East. Now, that is a different decision, as you rightly point out, than the possibility of President Trump saying that he has paused arm sales to Taiwan out of deference to China, which he signaled while still on Chinese soil two weeks ago that he was seriously considering doing. But even without that policy decision having been taken, I think it's worth noting that an explicit consideration of pausing arm sales to Taiwan at China's behest is already a major change in US policy. A key part of the catechism that the United States maintains on Taiwan is the diplomatic understanding known as the Six Assurances, which states very clearly the United States will not bargain its arm sales with Taiwan, with the PRC. So I wonder if you can just tell us a little bit more, number one, about how Shangri-La dialogue participants were reacting to the overhang of this possibility. And number two, what you heard on a high level from our partners in Taipei who are now sort of in suspended animation, waiting to understand more about how this form of support that is truly existential to them will play out in the coming months.

SPEAKER_00 23:38

Yeah, I was in Taipei for um uh for a couple of days before moving to Singapore and met with a a a number of um friends, counterparts on the DPP side, on the KMT side, scholars, um uh some others. It's hard to overstate the level of anxiety that I felt um uh that they're experiencing on the relationship with the United States. Um my sense is that um for the most part, counterparts viewed the summit itself as having gone okay, but then public comments that this that um the president and others uh made afterwards in some news interviews um uh served to sort of really uh um raise questions uh about about the the sort of the future of American support for for Taiwan. A lot of focus on this this arm sale package that is pending, concern about how long it will be before that package moves. Um when I was there, counterparts were talking about raising the possibility is there a way to break the package into small pieces to enable it to begin to move in the in the coming months. Maybe that'll happen, maybe it won't. Um but I think uh perhaps more than than anywhere else really in the region, I think our friends in Taiwan feel very uh very exposed at present uh and were eager for signs of American support. It was uh again noteworthy to me uh that the the that the Secretary in his um in his accounting of allies and partners that were stepping up uh and doing more for their own defense, that that list did not include Taiwan, even though I think it would be fair to say that the uh Taiwan, in terms of spending anyway, uh has significantly stepped up in the last year or two. Uh so this was definitely the backdrop. Then it comes in the context of looming local elections um in Taiwan. It comes in the context of the visit of the KMT chairwoman uh to Washington, which it will take place here next week. Um uh so there's a there's a heavy domestic political uh element to to this as well. Um but but I think perhaps more almost than anywhere else, the question of the future of um of American commitment is top of mind among friends in Taiwan.

SPEAKER_01 26:19

It's all very well said, Chris. Um and of course, while allies, partners, including Taiwan, are used to the eccentricities of this administration, the fact their approach is a bit heterodox. Um, I think there are also some trend lines that have given cause for concern to suggest this could be more than just a blip, which is part of what they're wrestling with. In particular, the fact that President Trump clearly intends to have President Xi visit the United States in September, and then they have the possibility of seeing each other at least twice more this year, suggests that it's a huge priority for the White House to keep this diplomacy on track. And if you're Taiwan, you know better than anyone that if you're prioritizing diplomacy with China, the PRC will and very manifestly already has used Taiwan arm sales as a bargaining chip to try to dissuade the United States from its traditional position on Taiwan. So that diplomatic calendar does not occur well for you if you're Taipei. Hence the question that you were getting about whether it might be possible to break that package up into pieces. Um, I'll just say on that point, you know, you know better than anyone. Bureaucrats are very good at that if they think they can get it done. Like they'll be taking hard looks at those questions right now. Um, but what we know for sure is that it's clear that the American president's prioritizing his relationship with Xi Jinping. So not unfortunately a surprise to hear that there's deep concern in Taipei. I wonder if in all of this you heard anything in Taipei that suggested that they were in any way part of this diversification thinking that you heard elsewhere in Shangri-La. Um, there obviously isn't any other country in the world at present that sells arms to Taiwan, um, although theoretically many could. Um, but did you hear an inclination to try to seek closer partnership with other regional states at this moment of uncertainty for Taipei?

SPEAKER_00 28:16

I think there's certainly a desire to Mira. Um uh it's, you know, not easy, of course, um to pursue sort of actual deeper cooperation with with other partners, particularly in Asia. Uh um, but I will say, I mean, uh one thing that I definitely heard was, again, similar to what I heard from others in the Shangri-La dialogue, a desire to uh really build out and strengthen the defense industrial base at home. And there, you know, Taiwan has a lot to be proud of. The drone industry, um, you know, Taiwan-made drones are being used on the battlefield in Ukraine to tremendous effect. Uh, and there's great pride about that in Taiwan uh and a desire to build on that and expand on it, and to the degree possible, and one of my one of my government counterparts said this explicitly, to the degree possible, reduce the reliance on large FMS arms packages uh with the United States. Now, the practical realities around that are pretty challenging. Taiwan's a small island, um, not a not a not a large economy in the same way that Japan is, for example. So um the real options are are more constrained. Um, but Taiwan has built and is building um uh a truly competitive drone industry that at least creates some foundation for deeper defense industrial collaboration going forward. And I expect they're gonna try to pursue and build on it.

SPEAKER_01 29:54

That's a great segue, Chris, to the final question I wanted to ask you today, um, before I know we have to let you go. And that is to the question of how industry should be thinking about the geopolitical picture in the Indo-Pacific at this moment, um, which is obviously fraught, but continues to present substantial opportunity. Um, as just one example of kind of this networked defense system that we're increasingly seeing allies pick up amongst themselves. We saw a historic decision by the Australian government, still just a few months ago, um, to purchase uh the Mogami class frigate from Japan. Um, really big deal, right? And the product of what has been years and years of closer defense and security cooperation between Japan and Australia. You're pointing right now to Taiwan's burgeoning drone industry, its applications on the battlefield in Ukraine, but also a region that will have been watching kind of the new way of war that is taking place um in the seas and skies around Iran, not just around Ukraine. So as you kind of slice and dice this picture and think about what industry needs to know, what are the trend lines and what are the openings in this picture that present real room for growth and opportunity?

SPEAKER_00 31:10

Yeah, I think the opportunity is that given the security environment that uh that countries in the region confront, um uh everyone is gonna be investing more in defense capability going forward. That's true globally, frankly. It's true in Europe, true in the Middle East. Um, but the spending profile in countries across the region is gonna is gonna continue to grow. And that that's the opportunity for in the defense sector. Um, what's also clear is that they're gonna be new new participants um in this market and that and that countries are looking for new opportunities for cooperation that diversify where they get their defense equipment from and how they get that defense equipment. I expect Japan is gonna become uh a more important player in this in this space. South Korea already is a significant defense player uh uh globally uh in include and in Asia as well. Japan is gonna be the newcomer here. In addition to the Mogami case, Mira, there was also um announcements during President Marcos's visit to Tokyo just a couple of weeks ago that Japan is gonna be transferring uh uh second uh used destroyers to the to the Philippine Navy, the talking about other potential sales of surface-to-air missiles, for example, anti-ship missiles. So the Japanese are slowly gonna enter this space as well, uh, and they will find eager suitors, um, uh those who want to find new new partners to uh to sort of build out where they get their equipment from. I think the the key thing for for U.S. industry, for example, to sort of just be mindful of this trend, that there is this broader desire to diversify, to reduce dependence on the United States. There's deep frustration around uh delivery timelines associated with foreign military sales. So there are lots of reasons why uh countries are um are seeking to diversify. At the same time, they also know that uh the most advanced, the most sophisticated, the most innovative defense equipment continues to come from, often from the United States. And so I think it's the uh the ability to think about partnering in new ways through co-production arrangements uh in Australia, in Japan, um technology transfer arrangements, uh perhaps uh investment in manufacturing facilities in countries uh in the region uh to build equipment. Everyone is gonna want more control of their supply chain for equipment as they seek to build resilience. Um the challenge will be to uh be flexible and innovative in how how defense industry partners uh with these um with counterparts in the in these countries, um, whether it's with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, or others.

SPEAKER_01 34:06

Chris Johnstone, brilliantly said, brilliantly laid out, and a pleasure to talk to you as always. Thanks so much for being with us.

SPEAKER_00 34:13

Thank you, Mira. Really great to be here. I've looked forward to doing it again at some point.

SPEAKER_01 34:18

As I reflect on my conversation with Chris Johnstone, I'm struck that I do think we'll look back on these few weeks and months as a bit of a watershed moment in the Indo-Pacific, where accelerated defense investments are made by individual allied and partner countries, and they dramatically ramp up their efforts to network with and build resilience with one another. While it has been the case that for the last little while, many American allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have cleaved so closely to their alliance with the United States that they couldn't see what would come next for them in an effort to build resilience. Uncertainties about America's position towards China, its durability in the Indo-Pacific, and whether or not it will continue to sell arms to Taiwan has sent a set of messages to these partners that is likely to have path dependency long after the Trump administration leaves office. What comes next is produced by Refund Do we Astino, an executive produced by Lauren Dewick. It contains music by Cody Martin via Soundstripe. What comes next is a production of the Asia Group and is powered by Tag AI, Tag's geopolitical decision engine for business. We'll see you on the next episode.