Geopolitical tension rises on creeping escalation

Global geopolitical tensions are growing amid a creeping escalation of the conflicts in the Middle-East and in Ukraine. Listen to a discussion on the dangers to global security and energy supply as very few countries seek to de-escalate conflict zones. This week’s pod also touches on the upcoming EU elections and positive signs in Germany as power demand seems to have bottomed out and turned a corner.

Host: Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel

Guest: Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group

Transcript

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 0:07

Hello listeners and welcome to the Montel Weekly Podcast, bring You Energy Matters in an informal setting. This week is a bit of a mixed bag. We will address the ongoing crisis in the Middle East and the consequences for Europe. Global gas markets. We also plan to discuss the upcoming EU elections and the impact any swing to the right could have on the energy transition. Finally, we take a deep dive into Germany. There's been a lot of talk of de-industrialization, but what is the current situation in the country? I'm Richard Sverrisson and helping me to discuss the ramifications of the current geopolitical situation and much, much more is Henning Gloystein of Eurasia Group. Welcome back, Henning. Great to have you on the pod again.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 0:48

Thanks Richard. Great to be here.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 0:50

Absolutely. So if we start off, before we go into the nitty gritty, some of the details here, if we look at the sort of global geopolitical situation what are your kind of worst fears here? What could be the three worst scenarios?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 1:04

The worst scenarios really are scary, but, so what really worries me and us at Eurasia Group in analyzing geopolitics is we are approaching midyear point now. And the two conflicts, the one in the Middle East around Israel's invasion of Gaza and Russia's invasion of Ukraine are constantly and steadily escalating. There has been no serious or credible deescalation effort or success since the start of the year. There, there's just week after week, something gets a little bit worse. Versus what it was the previous week. And in terms of what really scares us there is where does this lead at some point in a conflict. The only way around this is either one side gets totally defeated or you find the a Venn diagram overlap where both sides are willing to compromise. And at this stage, neither conflict looks likely to see any form of conflict conflict resolution or compromise. And that basically means that they are currently escalating and we've escalated a lot. And one of the worst scenarios. I mean, in, in the Middle East it is still an outright regional war, which involves Iran Israel and maybe some other players in Hezbollah, in, in Lebanon. This is, it's not out of the question. We don't think it'll happen, but it's, like I say, it's escalated. And in Ukraine, just now we saw Anthony Blinken in Kyiv. He says, oh, maybe US weapons should be used to. Be firing at Russia. And I dunno what the Russian reaction will be to that, but it will be a reaction. It's constant further escalation, which, it's a slippery slope and at some point before you know it, you are actually in an outright regional war, rather than a bilateral conflict. And do, it wouldn't take much for that to happen, do you think to trigger that? That's the tricky question because this constant step-by-step escalation has yet to lead to that conflagration, regionally. And we do actually think most conflict parties, let's start with the Middle East Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States they desperately want to avoid a regional war. And Israel probably as well, although prime Minister Netanyahu is doing little to, to deescalate in Gaza and in, in, in Ukraine. I don't think Russia wants a war with nato. NATO doesn't want war with Russia either, but it's not out, out of the question. And that's the scary part.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 3:17

Absolutely. It's very frightening. But if we then Henning say, what does that mean for, if we tend to, to the energy and what it means for, maybe there's, people's lives are at stake, so it seems a bit, flippant to talk about but about the impact on gas markets here. But that's what. That's what this podcast is about. If you can talk a little bit about what the consequences of that kind of escalation could mean for for global gas markets. I mean, we've talked before about, you know, potentially the, a closure of the strait of humus. Is that looking more likely now?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 3:47

It's part of the same scenario. And as you say, if the straits of hormones close and or we have a much escalated war in Ukraine, then indeed probably oil and gas prices are not what we are most worried about, but it's still a valid point to. Be concerned about. And so we don't think that straight reforms will be totally shut down because Iran gets virtually all its revenue from selling out of it. So does Saudi Arabia, but it's, again, it's not outta the question if, and all that needs to happen is a single tanker to be attacked. And then you see the headlines and the images of a burning tanker. And then what you would maybe see is a US Naval convoy escorting all ships through, through hormones and massive delays. That's not a shutdown of straight of hormones entirely, but it will cause incredible delays. And then we will be talking about oil prices in the hundreds. Your guess is as good as any mind. I don't know, $150 a barrel. And that's, and it, the global economy isn't particularly strong and that would push things into recession. It's a bit similar in Ukraine, although not quite as drastic anymore because Russia can't cut off much more gas to Europe. It can a little bit. There's LNG flows from Novatech is still going to Europe. There's still some transit gas through Ukraine that could both. But that would not cause in our view at least winter shortages in Europe anymore. The preparations there are underway, but it would cause another spike in prices this winter. Maybe not as crazy as two years ago, but. Still really high. And again, it's Europe is literally crawling out of a recession. And that would potentially tip it right back in. So it's these are, this could be attacks on all refineries. On pipelines or just a cessation of flows. There's many options and I think energy markets are blase is maybe a little bit too arrogant, but it's the. The energy markets and the media and public have gotten used to this. Oh oh there's these conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. It's really tragic, but the world has adjusted and it has adjusted. But that doesn't mean it'll continue to adjust, especially since we're seeing this constant escalation.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 5:43

So Henning, are you an optimist here or are you a bit more of a glass half, half empty person at the moment?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 5:48

I've always been in the last two years on the optimistic side, and so far touch wood, that's been warranted. But this creeping sort of escalation creep really is a bit worrying. But I'll stay glass half full. We'll somehow get there.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 6:02

Fingers crossed. But this week we've seen a couple of sort of key events. First of all was the death of the Iranian president. What's Eura view here? What happened? Do you think this is just a tragic accident or whether other darker forces at play?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 6:14

We, we're not on the ground in Iran, so we don't know at least team. Says under our our sources in the US government in particular, they say, looks like it has, was an accident. And that's what's Iran's messaging is that it's an accident. And, but the timing is terrible. Okay. It's not the, but you know, it's not entirely impossible that it wasn't an accident there. It could be international players at hand, but there could also be domestic players at hand. RISI was very unpopular in Iran. There'll now be an election. We don't think it'll totally destabilize Iran. But it's worth keeping in mind that Iran has actually seen pretty strong public opposition and riots against the leadership over the past, actually decade, quite frequently. So it's not outta the question that this happens again. But at the moment we think that the elections will go ahead as planned and announced and produce a new leader within the current regime.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 7:04

And do you think there'll be any consequence at all for energy for gas supplies in the region? The Iran is planning an LNG export terminal as well. Would that be in any time Affected by instability in the country.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 7:16

The Iranian LNG export terminal has been talked about since before I started looking at energy markets, and I think Qatar will suck the north field empty before that happens. Okay, fair enough. Yeah. But that's not to say, they could build a pipeline. They could I don't think the Iran. Election and leadership contest now will actually impact energy supply much. But that said, they are part of the wider conflict in the Middle East, which do have the potential to impact things. There's a lot of things that can happen here. It's like we, we, in the past, we've seen the houthi attacks on tankers in the Red Sea, which have shied or died away because the shippers that were being targeted by. The Houthis have rerouted. And, but you could still see Hezbollah becoming active in Northern Israel. And that's not really an oil story, but it's an escalation story. You could see militant sort of Iranian proxy militants attack Western oil facilities in Iraq. That's actually one of the bigger concerns. And like I mentioned earlier, sort a potential attack or an incident in the state of hormones could also happen. So this is that's the issue. There's a lot of little things that could still happen in this conflict. And as long as the conflict continues to escalate, this likelihood is there. And markets are quiet at the moment, but that doesn't mean that they'll remain quiet. It's a very shaky situation that we're in.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 8:33

Yeah. And if we move a little bit further, if we talking Iran and going further west to, to Israel and the crisis in the Gaza Strip we've seen, over the past seven days arrest orders being issued for both the Netanyahu and the leader of Hamas or keep. Key players in the Israeli government, also Norway, Spain, and Ireland coming out to recognizing a Palestinian state, is this a part of the same kind of creeping escalation that you're talking about, Henning? Or is this an attempt to deescalate it?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 9:03

No, I think this is part of the problem of continued escalation. Now I don't wanna accuse Norway Island. Spain of this, neither really the ICC the International Criminal Court. They are doing their job. And and I'm not a lawyer, so I can't really judge the cases, but the issue is here, and this is why it's part of the escalation. You can make a credible coin point on both sides of the argument in each case. So if you start with the I ccc, if you let's say are supportive is of Israel you would say this is proof that the i CCC is being used opportunistically because why is is state leader a democratic state leader as Netanyahu being accused here? If other leaders, government leaders in the past who have started wars with many casualties have not, now you can flip this around though quite easily, saying 35,000 dead civilians. Humanitarian catastrophe. Even the US has put some sanctions on parts of the IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces. And it is warranted. Okay? The problem is here though this makes things really. Awkward. And just imagine for instance, countries that recognize the ICC and let's say Israeli leadership is invited to a state visit let's say Germany. And what would the Germans have to harass Netanya because they've signed up to the ICC, and so they either have to ignore the ICC which is awkward because they're signatories to it and modified it, or they have to, not invite him or rest him. And so this is, that's part of the complication. It's part of the escalation. It actually supports Netanyahu in Israel as well. His popularity is being supported by this because the Israeli public is furious about this. Whether we're outside of Israel, we like this or not, is irrelevant. That's the public view. And then if you talk to the or about the recognition of Palestine, if you are anti-Western inclined and you look at a global map of countries that have recognized Palestine, you see a gaping hole in North America, most of Western Europe, Japan, Australia. So the west with. Three very recent exemptions now. But this is, it really is, the map is quite shocking. I find, and you can use that in saying here, this is proof that the west I, especially the United States and the u essentially, and maybe UK never really had the two states solution on their mind. They were always in in, in line or in the bed with the Israeli politics in this, and it was never a credible solution. You can flip this around, of course, and say. No. The only way toward a two state solution is to recognize that Palestine is an is an authority and an independent state better just do it. And arguments saying yeah, but Hamas is in power. It's a terror regimes. Like I can understand that, but you can recognize the Fata leadership and in West Jordan and other countries with what we, in the west call terrorist governments are recognized as well. I mean, Afghanistan, the Taliban, that's it's yeah. It's part of the escalation, but it did, these recognitions that you mentioned yesterday, these recognitions that you mentioned yesterday, they they really put pressure on Israel. Norway, Ireland and Spain are not exactly countries known for opportunistically. Meddling in geopolitics. Really not. It, it puts pressure on as Israel without a daf.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 12:07

And what kind of impact could it have on energy, do you think? If any at all. It's just part of that, that trapping up of the situation. Yeah.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 12:14

Yeah. It's not in itself. It has zero impact on energy or power, price, gas, oil prices. But it is part of what I'm what I what we worry so much about. It's like little step by step and it by itself, single steps. Don't mark a dangerous escalation for oil markets or for the war itself. But it's one of those things, suddenly you're taking 10 steps and before you know it you are in a situation where you f you find yourself very difficult to reverse. And then, the outcome can be, doesn't have to be outright war.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 12:39

And as as we've talked about already, Henning, there, there are very few steps being taken or signs of deescalation here and trying to calm the situation down, which is the wise.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 12:51

That's precisely the worry. There are many steps that are as small as they are that escalate, but there's virtually none that point towards can we sit down and deescalate. I, yeah, there's no major initiative on it's underway at the moment, and that's a bit worrying.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 13:04

Absolutely. Let's turn to Europe. Now, Henning, I know that I'm sure Eurasia has looked into detail about what's happening in the European elections, both for you parliamentary, but also in terms of the new commission. The seems to be, it appears that the far right or the far right maybe is gonna make gains. What, how do you see that?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 13:23

So here we are more optimistic. The European parliamentary elections look like they, they will. Produce a shift to the right from the center left to the center right, but not to the ultra right. The ultra right across most of Europe has lost traction, some traction at least recently. A FD Germany it's actually across Europe. It's it's deflated a little bit. That doesn't mean that it's not a long-term threat to Europe and democracy as a whole and not just in Europe, but this parliamentary election we think will. Genuinely produce a moderate center right wing European parliament with the consequence of the European commission, which we actually think might not be entirely bad. I don't wanna get into the partisan, or that gives me, is a center right wing. It's just it. It produces we know there's been a lot of talk behind the scenes between the current parliament and those who think they will be in parliament, right? So there's actually a lot of constructive debate at the moment to prepare from this parliament to the next so that it provides European Union with some regulatory and some policy con continuity, but also some proactive reform that actually improves things. I'm cautious and optimistic here.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 14:33

Excellent. And what, so there, there were fears or concerns that the energy transition could be slowed down or the breaks that we put on, or even like a full on backlash. Do you think that's likely to happen?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 14:46

No, I do not. I don't think there'll be full on backlash at all. In fact, this is part of this dialogue that's happening. Which I think is quite constructive. I talk about this a lot and maybe I over, I'm over killing that cat a bit, but this aner declaration from February is really important. It was signed, in late February in Antwerp. And it had very few signatories at the time, but also Fond Linein was there. Belgium Parliament Prime Minister was there. A lot of heavy industries were there. And if just a few months later, it's got well over a thousand signatories. It's got cross partisan support and that support is talking about Venn diagram overlap. You have progressive politicians, so lefties basically, and greenies who are saying we need to decarbonize heavy industry in order to a decarbonize because it's green policy. And also because those are unionized jobs, steel chemicals, they vote. Progressive by normally. But now you have conservative politicians who are previously a little bit opposed to this, who are saying, actually we think this is a good idea as well, because these heavy industry steel making, chemical making, cement making are really important strategic assets. For increased defense spending for reshoring, French showing, and all of that sort of stuff that's going on. They're actually planning to put a policy into place that continues the green the green transition just puts a industrial policy on top of it. It won't be as snazzy as the IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act in the US because that's tax breaks, which the European Union doesn't have authority over. But we do think once the new parliament comes in place. They all get to meet each other, which takes forever. But towards the end of this year, there will be an industrial initiative. And I think that's a positive sign because it combines sort of energy security with energy transition and you can combine them. They are actually part of the same issue. It's I say this a lot, if your fossil fuel imports have become prohibitively expensive and unreliable politically and economically, the Cigna is pretty. Pretty clear here. You invest into domestic clean energy assets. And I think that's the overlap.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 16:41

No brainer really, Henning. Here, but is this part of the Net zero Industrial Act as well, is that part of the same kinda initiative or one of the legs of that led piece of legislation?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 16:50

It's part of it. Yes. Green deal. And then there's, national initiatives and I, but I think there'll be another one. I, that's the cautious optimist to me. I've given it probabilities, maybe 60% likelihood that some new industrial initiative will come out of Europe before the end of this year or at the turn of the year. That's just on top of everything that we've had already, in fact. Beyond the Antra Declaration. There's another one, this thing called reboot Europe. It's a sim. If you look at what they're looking for on the web on their homepage, it's very similar demands. It's just, it's got a little bit more support from Central and Eastern Europe. And it, so that again, is, it means you have the Antra declaration, which is like a Northwest European thing, and then the Reboot Europe thing, which is more central and Eastern Europe. But they're both calling for the same thing. And that's, I think, that's quite positive.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 17:32

Although, there is still a lot of opposition, in certain center, right? Populist parties against wind, onshore wind. Yes. And we see now in Italy as well with the ban of solar and agricultural lands. So these are also aspects that have to be taken into account here.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 17:47

Yes. That's why I said cautious optimist, 60% likelihood, which means there's a high risk that nothing will happen because yeah, indeed. Onshore wind Poland is lagging here. You mentioned Italy. Italy, unfortunately as a whole is lagging behind other big EU economies in terms of the green transition, whether it's wind, whether it's solar, whether it's hydrogen if you compare that to Spain just next door. They're really a world leader now, Germany France always does this thing slightly different, or the UK and it's not in the EU anymore, but unfortunately lagging a little bit behind.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 18:18

Let's then turn to Germany. Henning we've seen. Dramatic fools in both power and gas demand. Is this a trend that is set to continue? And if we can put some numbers to it, that'd be great as well. I think I've heard something 15% drop in power, 20% gas. Has that switched at all or is this appalling demand set to continue?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 18:39

Your group we're currently reviewing this a little bit because until kind of a few weeks ago, we were of the firm view that power and gas demand and Germany would continue to decline for several reasons. Mostly positive efficiency gains that, whether it's household or industrial efficiency gains, it's been really it's a, it's an insane success story. What's happened here. And I think industry and governments don't get enough and households don't get enough credit for this. Fuel switching away from gas, a lot of fancy offshore wind that's happening. We talked about negative prices with you recently. So it's, yeah, also, but also recession. Bit of loss of heavy industrial output, especially ammonia. But there's there are a couple of cautious signs of a return of demand power and gas. Now on the gas side. I really do not think. Europe or Germany and particularly will bounce back to anywhere near pre-crisis levels. So 2021 levels. This is permanent so that, that ammonia production in Germany, I don't think it's gonna come back to this Germany does not need ammonia production to be a wealthy economy. It's really not part of, it's a couple of companies that make it and it's lost for them, but they can import, substitute, we have managed in Germany to come through this energy crisis at the cost of a 0.3% recession, which is pretty low. And record employment, which means other investments have been made, whether it's in orders, whether it's in battery making. So there's the, there is success here. And that means that we don't need as much gas overall in Germany. Or Germany doesn't need as much gas overall anymore as it used to. And that I think is permanent and that's, it's actually willingly made. In order for German energy to become cost competitive again, or its industry to be competitive, we need slightly cheaper energy than it is now. We don't need it to be vastly cheaper anymore because we still want investment, but but the thing is what what, what is required? Is the less gas in the system, so that won't come back. But power I'm not sure about because this defense spending increase in, in Germany and actually all of Europe is mostly materializing in Germany, parts of the Netherlands and parts of central Europe. And that's, can I say energy intensive stuff? That's chemical, steel, ammunitions, explosives tanks it's energy intensive stuff that you need here. And that's really. Becoming quite noticeable. And then of course the economy itself is, it's nowhere near booming, but it's not in recession anymore, so it's a marginal improvement and you can see that in power consumption already. And in fact in Germany, gas consumption in April this year was higher than it was in April last year. And I think that's quite a strong leading indicator because obviously we're not in winter heating anymore and it wasn't particularly cold. And then you've got all the data center and AI stuff and electrification of transport. Who knows, maybe that will increase power demand again standing against that rooftop solar that takes millions of households off the grid. And these efficiency gains that are bang on all the time. We're reviewing this, I don't know. But I'll put it this way. I think in the power side, the demand destruction of the last two years looks like it's bottomed out. And the question now is whether it actually sort of increases now or sort of flat lines. I'm not sure.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 21:34

And the implications there for renewables, rollouts are quite clear, aren't they? There needs to be more renewable, more green energy. And, but at the same time you have we've talked beforehand, he about negative prices and that's also hampering a little bit of those investment signals or maybe creating some hesitancy amongst investors, would you say?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 21:55

I'm not sure because, so I, when we talk to investors like for instance, pension funds who actively look at this sort of stuff, they often say actually we're counting the negative electricity hours by country and where they're increasing the most. That's where we invest into storage solutions. Because that's a direct signal for a battery ele electrolysis unit or power cables, the unsung heroes of the last two years, I, I maintain this it's become a bit of a fat of mine, but it's the Europe's really good at building power cables and it's much better than, North America. Australia's it it's one of the main reasons why there weren't power outages or rolling, outages load shedding over the last two winters was that Europe is masterfully connected with power cables and it's increasing. It's getting better. I know Monte wrote about this as well, that Germany continued to export electricity to France in 2022. While its gas system was collapsing, France now exports electricity back to Germany because Germany shut down its nuclear power. The stations, there's now a Viking link between Denmark and the uk. This is a really big assets. China's invested into this as well, and it really helps because if you can build over capacity of renewable assets, then build storage facilities close to that over capacity, and then build power cables that connect everything that then you have a stable grid and it, Europe has a good and stable grid. It's, I think it's a massive successful story. The EU electricity market, and they look at the United States, they don't have that. That's why Texas, I mean, they've got oil, they've got gas, they've got renewables, they've got absolutely everything. Wind Australia, the same thing. They have electricity outages all the time because they don't have interconnection lines.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 23:25

So that's a very important point. And I think also, you know, the flip side of negative prices is providing incentives for storage and batteries.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 23:32

Absolutely.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 23:33

That should surely, yeah. Should, should be should accelerate that kind, that side of the market. But Henning just finally, Germany, if you see that power demand, maybe bottom it out, potentially rising as well. Does that, what implications does that have for the country's plans to build new capacity? It's, there's talk of big centralized gas units, which are hydrogen ready. Put that into quote marks. But is that gonna happen?

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 23:58

Germany will need something as backup as much as I'm in favor of all these offshore wind parks and hydrogen and battery solutions and power cables. But you do need some form of asset at the back. The French have nukes. Britain will have nuclear power stations. As, I mean they cost insane money, but once they're there they work. And Germany has decided not to do that, which Okay, fair enough. It's they can do that if they want. But they'll have to do something 'cause they've got the coal phase out coming 2030. And I think that's where the 10 gigawatt of gas assets comes in the hydrogen readiness. And they didn't even say how they're gonna get them hydrogen ready or a low carbon solution, whatever, I think. So they're gonna have to do something. And I. Okay. That's one way to do it. But I really think they're gonna struggle to get those to near net zero or low carbon solutions because the problem with natural gas is it is a fossil fuel. And that means it, you have, Germany has to import that fossil fuel. And so the cost of import, and then you have to add on top of that a, a a price either for CO2. Or for decarbonizing that fossil fuel. And so it's a double cost. We might as well just invest in something different. That's so I think they're gonna be economically challenged and I think the CCS thing only works in areas with really cheap natural gas, like The United States where, gas is virtually free. A, you can add the CCS cost on top of it and it'll probably work. But I'm not sure about Germany. I guess Norway has a chance to really support this through all the pipelines and stuff. That's the plan. But as of now, it's only a plan. It's not a reality.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 25:23

Absolutely. But Henning we could talk for hours on these topics and we have done when we meet up. But I think let's, hopefully we can meet again talk again later in the year and where there is, signs of deescalation of some of the geopolitical tensions. Fingers crossed.

Henning Gloystein, Director for Energy, Climate and Resources, Eurasia Group: 25:38

That'd be great. Thank you. Yeah.

Snjólfur Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 25:39

Thank you Henning. Thank you for being a guest on the Montel Weekly podcast. Always a pleasure.