Hybrid energy war in the Baltic

The recent damage to the Estlink 2 electricity cable running between Finland and Estonia has highlighted the precarious nature of power supply amid increased fears of a hybrid war with Russia.

Finnish police are investigating whether a ship with links to Russia was involved in sabotage, with the cable – set to be offline for months for repairs – thought to have been damaged by the vessel’s trailing anchor.

In response, Nato has enhanced its military presence in the Baltic Sea, while Estonia has sent a patrol ship to protect the remaining Estlink 1 power cable.

This week’s pod discusses the spate of cuts to data and power links that could point to such nefarious activities, the market impact and the volatile political situation in northern Europe which evokes memories of the Cold War.   

Host: Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel.
 Guests: Prof Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki; Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo; Olav Vilnes, Nordics Editor, Montel News.

Podcast editor: Bled Maliqi

Transcript

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 0:06

Hello listeners and welcome to the Montel Weekly podcast where we bring you the latest news, issues and changes happening in the energy sector. Our focus today is on the fine balance between energy supply and defense security. Finnish police are currently investigating whether a Russian ship was involved in the sabotage of the Estlink two electricity cable running between Finland and Estonia. It's believed the anchor of TGA damaged the cable. NATO says it's enhanced its military presence in the Baltic Sea, and Estonia has sent a patrol ship to protect the remaining Estlink one Interconnector repairs to Estlink two will take many months. Estonia's power supply is now dramatically reduced, and prices in the country are likely to be significantly higher this year due to the outage. It's the third incident less than a month in the Baltic Sea. Will there be more, or is it a question of if or when there'll be a response to this new form of hybrid warfare? Whether it's data cables or power links being cut, it all highlights a volatile situation in Northern Europe. Setting the scene in this episode is Montel's Nordics editor, Olav Vilnes, Olav? What happened on Christmas Day and why did it spook the markets?

Olav Vilnes, Nordics Editor, Montel News: 1:27

Yeah, it's something that you probably didn't notice at once. Everyone were off having their Christmas dinners, and then suddenly we saw on this, the messages on the different news channels that there was something happening with, with the power cable in the Baltic Sea and I just checked in, went in there, I saw on the NordPol site, and I saw that this two cable was cut off. And you think, oh, once again! Reminding back to what happened to the gas pipeline one year ago and also to the telecoms cables several times over the last few years. So you get that reminder and then of course you start investigating what is this? And you got a sense of the seriousness when you saw the market message from the Finnish TSO saying that this cable could be out of operation for six months into the August. And that's still the best guest they provided. And also when reading about what happened there, they finished police quickly. Took action, went out there, they bordered the ship, they steered into finish waters where it is now confiscated while they're doing examinations. I think they've been praised for that the swift action, taking the ship before they could do more damage. I think also it's it's interesting that this ship was registered in the Cook Island, but is also believed to be part of of Russia's shadow feed of of tankers that, ships owe a lot of Russia and false flags. And of course it looks very much this is at least what, when you hear from Estonian from Finnish authorities, that this is deliberate act from someone most likely Russia. And the market impact is also quite visible. If you look at the power prices in Estonia, they have risen quite strongly relative to finished prices. Since this cable went offline, it represent roughly 40% of. The Baltic regions import capacity from the Nordic region, and given that the Baltic region is a net importer, it inflates prices there and it, and looks cheaper power into Finland. So while, for example Finland can then expect maybe eight euros lower price in the first half this year than it would've had with the cable operation. Estonia could ly prices rise 20 euros according to some analytics forecasts.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 3:29

Thank you Olav. There are clear echoes of the Cold War. Joining me, Richard Sverrisson is Professor Paula Kivimaa, research professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki. A warm welcome to you, Paula.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 3:46

Thank you.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 3:47

And to give us his expert view from an energy markets perspective is Fredrik Bodecker founding partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmø. A warm welcome to you and welcome back Fredrik.

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 3:58

Thank you. Good to be back.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 4:00

If I can start with you Paula what do you make of this latest incident affecting, yeah, not just power, but also data lines in the Baltic Sea.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 4:10

I think what's obvious is that this shows that the security of critical infrastructure is facing more risks from intentional actions from other actors than before. And I can refer back to the beginning of 2020s. When I conducted interviews with many experts on the energy and security feel that at that time many experts believed that the time of physical risks and wars is over and that the energy infrastructure is mainly facing cyber, hybrid, hybrid risks. And of course, we can now all see that this proved not to be the case from 2020. From 2022 onwards and the recent years shows in a way, both physical incidents as well as an increased number of attempted cyber attacks on the energy sector. And I think it's very clear that the sabotage of energy infrastructure or the data cables is becoming a means of geopolitical influence which we, which needs actions. And I also the mean think that this means tightening connections between the defense and energy domains. And at least in smaller Northern European countries than I best know of, such as Estonia, Finland, and Norway. Such connections have been rather small. There've been some joint exercises and drills, but this was really not a key issue before. And this energy defense connection is a rather new one. Although for instance, NATO has done work on energy security and research and alternative fuels. So I think, these kind of increased risks of disruption to the critical infrastructure mean of course increased costs of protecting this infrastructure. And ultimately, of course, these costs trickle down to consumers via tax spending and additional charges in on eligibles.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 5:57

But do you see an increased then, or? An urgency about increasing the link between energy, infrastructure and defense as in light of these incidents.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 6:07

I think this, collaboration is already, or has already intensified. I think we, we see partly in the meeting organized by the Finnish president, Alexander Stubb this week in Helsinki. But also I, I think there's been a lot of interaction. Of course. Then the question is, okay, this, have we may now see political signs of this, but have institutional. In institutional frameworks now created for this collaboration? I think this is still an open question.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 6:34

Absolutely. Fredrik? How, what's your view here? How has the market reacted to these incidents?

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 6:39

Yeah, I think it's of course quite obvious there that it's a tougher situation for the Estonian market and and if we look at Finland, yeah it's, they will lose an opportunity to export, let's say, excess wind. Lower prices and perhaps more negative price prices that Finland really don't need more or the rest of the Nordic market. But I would say with that said, it seems like okay, it's a short term event. We have seen these several times before, not where say large cables or production traction means disappear. I don't think that we've yet seen any longer term effects on this. And as said, traders seem to shrug these things off and then they move on the business as usual. But if this, let say should continue and we see more of these of course the, there will be I would see that the longer curve would also come up,

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 7:26

but it's, as you. The risk is for lower price in Finland and higher ones in Estonia. To put it very crudely Fredrik. I mean, you've put it better, but Yeah.

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 7:33

Yeah, I would say so. That of course that trickles over to other markets also somehow, but. But there are also many uncertainties on the short short term. It could be super cold or it could be very warm, it could be less wind. So it's very hard to say something in before we actually see the, how the weather develops.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 7:53

Exactly. That's a key element here, the fundamental factors such as the temperature and winds. But Paula, if I return to you how frequent have incidents like this been? There seems to be occurring more and more regularly in, in recent months. Over the course of 23-24?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 8:09

We've had some technical disruptions before to electricity interconnections. I, and I think the most recent example is actually Estlink one damage, which occurred last January. And they kept I think it was fixed only in, in early September. And at least to my knowledge there is, this is some sort of technical fault, but certainly if one looks at the frequency. In which these incidents are now reported, indicate that there's more kind of intentional damage to this kind of critical infrastructure that we need to be concerned about.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 8:44

And is it just the Baltic Sea potential Paula, or is it beyond? Are we, could we, are we, should we be worried about all the the power interconnectors between countries in Northern and southern Europe?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 8:55

I mean, I haven't followed that so much but I think I've heard that there have has been some, at least attempts in other parts of Europe. But I also think that this is, even if most of the events have occurred on the Baltic Sea, I don't think this is just a question for. For Nordic or Baltic countries, because if we actually look at the European energy market, we're talking about kind of an interconnected electricity market. That has been the goal of the European Union. And it in a way, indirectly, even if we're not talking about market prices, the kind of these kind of, critical infrastructure damage harms. The whole idea of an integrated European market

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 9:35

And an integrated European market is absolutely crucial for the energy transition or if should the energy transition be successful so that you share both an oversupply of potential renewables and also you help your neighbors when they have less. That's the idea anyway, but Fredrik, if I can turn to you, Sweden has a slightly different outlook on, on, on security when it relates to critical infrastructure. I know we've seen with the TSO Svenska Kraftnet has not revealed details on, on, on the available capacity in its grid. Is this now an advantage, would you say, for Sweden?

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 10:08

Perhaps but my thinking is that connecting to what you said about the development of renewables here that it doesn't have to be negative because what this shows is the need for distributed power production and the. I'm gonna say a strong believer in how the batteries battery storage will say change the whole market. And if you see a near future with wind batteries, wind solar batteries, you have this a perfect distributed power source. So these worries could actually be positive for the development of renewables. Maybe not the coming months, but over, over a couple of years. But to get back to your question. Yeah. I'm sure that there is a lot of extra capacity that, that we are not told about. And that's also part of their assignments to, to protect us for these things. That's I am I recall, or actually don't recall because it's 1992 and I recall when it happened but I was not active in the market. I was this, I think it's called the strainer incident at the Barba nuclear power plant where some isolation got caught in some some somewhere. So cooling did not work, and that meant that they had to close down five nuclear power plants immediately because so Barba one, two Oscar Sam, one, two, greenhouse one was closed. Five UK power plants in Sweden. Closed due to the risk of this thing. So the system, at least at that point, was very resilient to huge events. And I think we've seen similar occurrences before that we can take this. It's it affects prices, but it's not a. It's not an end of the world event. We need, and I think we need to put this into relation to what we see in Ukraine, for example, where people are struggling and a terrible situation. And we are worried that we are losing a couple of hundred megawatts or a thousand megawatt.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 11:55

Yep. That, that's a good point, Fredrik. And I think I also like the point of that, this is an incentive also for more local solutions. Whether it be, batteries and wind or solar. In, in, in regional or local areas. I think that's also very interesting. But Paula, I think, I think it's also clear to, important to emphasize that there's been no claim of responsibility. The finger does tend to point at Russia. What's your view here?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 12:19

This is the case. While we of course, cannot completely overrule that, the fact that other actors with specific interests would also do this, either states or. Or other types of actors. But I do think that the timing of the sabotage links quite conveniently to the desynchronization of the politic countries from the electricity system of Russia in the start of February, 2025. So one could think, is this kind of a sign to. Threaten this process. For those not aware of this it's basically the desynchronization is happening because after the Bal countries became independent from Soviet Union there was an agreement signed between Belarus, Russia, Estonia, la, and Lithuania. It's called brail for short, and this kind of agreement formalized that the country's electricity system operates. Synchronously with the Russian electricity system. And then there's been a really long-term process to synchronize the Baltic countries with the Central European electricity network and Desynchronized from the Russian power system. And this was already announced I think in 2007. And the reasoning behind this has been national security. Of course, but also the, what the integrated European electricity markets that we've talked about. And this process has also been supported by the eu, so of course, one, but this is. More speculative, but of course the timing is quite fitting for this desynchronization to be completed.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 13:49

Absolutely. Do. What's your view here, Fredrik? Do you think this is a kind of a warning shot?

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 13:53

I think that's to say the, what is called CCAs race or where you should find the most, let's say easiest explanation or I think it Yes. Yes. It, it points towards that. Once again we love to find these explanations. And we've seen that over many years. How, one, one explanation that seems super plausible at the time. Five years later, we get the real story and it was something different. That's the I'm recalling one incident when I started as a trader. This was 1996 or 1997. We're a Danish fishing boat. Pulled the cable between Sweden and Denmark. And there were a lot of lot of stories that, okay, that Danish fisherman had positions in the market and and so he would benefit from rising prices on one side. But then it turned out, I know, I don't know if this is a tall tale or not but after they repaired the cable, the same fishing boat pulled it once again, it actually was pulled twice, but it so that kind of story was killed.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 14:48

But I take your point. It's you, we should. Be wary of jumping to conclusions before the evidence is on the table and the facts on the table. But of course, it's, given the sun the current geopolitical situation it's, it, there's no surprise that pink fingers point in certain directions. But Paula, obviously security supply, we're in it is very important. We're in January we're in the middle of the winter. How much planning goes into plan B for when a major power link goes out of action? What's there as a backup?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 15:17

I don't have details on this. I'm not part of these discussions in Finland, for instance, but my understanding is that there's a lot of free planning and preparedness taking place in the. Energy sector, particularly the electricity sector and by the transmission network operators such as ingredient inland or alerting in Estonia. And this is already for reasons that production and consumption of electricity much must match each time. So they're prepared for different type of circumstances. Sometimes it could also be that there's a technical fault and a nuclear power plant kind of drops off the grid and then instantly you have to. Be able to replace one or 2000 mega so I think this kind of natural for the sector. But I think what has helped Finland t tremendously in, in this kind of specific events also is a long-term collaboration across public and private sector organizations. So there's kind of a long history of this. And one effective instance is what's called power pool collaboration. It operates under the National Emergency Supply Organization. It has sort of participation from civil servants, a lot of the energy companies, and basically they do drills and exes exercises. For different types of events and on also exchange information and this collaboration also in, in involve the defense forces. So I think having had these kind of long-term mechanisms in place well before 2022 has also helped. To tackle different type of crisis situations which I'm sure they might have had these cases before, but I don't know. I'm not an insider to these discussions.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 16:54

No. And I think Fredrik, you made a, the good point, where the situation, we're not the situation which is in the Ukraine, which had its energy infrastructure completely, is targeted by the Russians. And gone through several phases of destruction, has had to rebuild constantly. Yeah. What are you confident in, the system that it's safe? That the under, if it came under a, an attack, if there was a view on a substation or a offshore wind plug or cable that had a, that had a larger effect than a couple hundred megawatts, are you confident that the system could cope with that? That we are, we're in a set degree of readiness for such a, such an instant.

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 17:33

Yes. Yeah I'm very confident I would say I'm an electrical engineer in my background, and it's a fantastic machine. It's the, so it's constructed to, to handle these events and. It's also a little ironic I think that what Russia did to, to Ukraine that raised the power prices, gas prices first, and then power prices to these incredible levels we saw in 2022 that has actually prepared us for this. So it has. It has given, I would say a lot of people ordinary people that never thought about electricity before. They've seen high power prices and they started to think about this. Can I switch off my, I don't have to cook a steak and be in the jacuzzi at the same time, or whatever. So I think that is ironic. Yeah. That, that perhaps it has prepared us in a way. What is, what worries me more is that. These scariest words, there are, I'm from the government, I'm here to help you. That's that, that will, let's say, destroy the markets and the market signals because at a point like this, I think it's more important than ever to have clear market signals that, that shows where are the vulnerable vulnerabilities in the system. If we try to fix this somehow with with policies I know it's a balance but I'm a little afraid that we will. Put on policies, put that kind of hides these signals that we really need to show where are the weaknesses in our system.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 18:58

If I may continue, I think actually I'm a quite a big fan of spot market pricing also for consumers. Not of course to everyone not for those who don't want it or hit their houses with electricity, but in other terms, I think the fact that individual consumers can choose. To be responsive to prices massively improves energy security because also it means we have a system demand response based system that when something happens, people are already used to this idea that I'm actually heating up my sauna like they're doing the Nordic countries or using oven or washing my clothes at a time. And of course, when you're talking about a large number of people, this will have a significant impact on the sort of consumption. Critical times too.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 19:41

Absolutely. These price signals are very important. I think that, that's crucial in we're in this market dynamic, but I think Fredrik are you then, if I can interpret you correctly, are you afraid of an overreaction from the policy side, from governments to say, we, we know best and we know how to fix this kind of exposure to geopolitical risks?

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 20:00

Yeah. Yeah. I think that's a good way to put it, that. We've seen, let's say several times before, let's say good intentions. They it tends not to be optimal because to have a few people decide what is the best I think the having price signals is much, much better. This is. This I see this is the typical as a Gray Rhino case. We know that it's, there, there is a risk that someone destroys cables or substations and all that, and we know it at High impact. And we are okay. We look away from it. We have to live with it. But by showing. That we are resilient, that every person do not go down to the sauna when the prices are high. Perhaps that is the deterring effect to do these things.'cause we have shown that it doesn't have an effect. You can take off a couple of cables, you can blow a substation for us, but it doesn't affect us that much. It'll affect you more because you will get sanctions and X, Y, Z.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 20:56

Yep. I think that's a fair point. But but Paula yeah, if you have a reflection on what Fredrik said there, or?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 21:03

Yeah, if I can quickly respond I disagreed to a little, to some point because I had looked at this energy and security interface from around 2019 and what happened, in countries that there were countries that believed that markets will deliver energy security the best. And this happened in the United Kingdom, partly to Estonia. Of course, I'm now referring more to gas and electricity. But what was found actually that there's still a place for traditional gas storages in this respect. And these countries have now reinstate gas storage. Like purely relying on markets for energy security has also its own risks. And I do think that we do need public interventions, but it's the, it's of course finding the right balance is the tricky part.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 21:45

Absolutely. I think it's also creating that architecture, that infrastructure and the background for markets to be able to react is also important. But Paula, I was just gonna say there's been several instances as we've highlighted. There hasn't really been of this hybrid warfare, of cutting both internet cables and power cables, but there hasn't really been a response. Can when and when can we expect a response, if at all? And what kind of response could that be?

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 22:10

Yeah, that, that's a bit of a tricky question of course. And I dunno what goes on behind closed doors. Certainly, as I mentioned earlier, I was surprised by the lack of. Formalized interaction between energy policymaking and defense and security policymaking before 2022. And I hope this has increased, but I guess it has also focused quite a lot on kind of questions of security of supply or critical raw materials and such I don't know what's happening or if enough action is happening on the defense side. Of course, now we've read the latest news on 14th of January on how nato. Will increase its presence on the Baltic Sea. So I think we can expect some actions but I guess it's been, yeah the maybe enough hasn't happened in the last three years that we've had this increasing risk.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 23:03

Fredrik, in terms of prices, we, this is one element in the equation where we see massive amounts of uncertainty huge amounts of volatility, prices soaring at times of no wind in the dark and cold weather to hugely negative prices. Have for a number of reasons this, obviously this. Geopolitical incident or this hybrid warfare instance increases the sense of unpredictability and potentially the volatility. Have you ever known markets to be this volatile? You have a long history as a trader. Is this something that is new or is this something just that you've seen before and it's just something that you guys have to deal with?

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 23:42

Now there this, I think that, or this is new. It's even if we just say cut out the 2022 with a, with insane price levels there, it's this volatility. I haven't seen this before. It's we, what we, what used to hit us before was if there were a long weekend and the weather drastically changed over a long weekend, and the Easter weekend is the typical ex typical example where weather forecasts are a little uncertain. And I've seen that a couple of times in in, say, in my career, how, or markets completely turned around that are huge volatilities. But that is that is nothing to what we see now. But to come. Due to this balance of having protective measures and letting that there be a free market in the winter. 22, 23 two, no, sorry, 2002 two 2003. We had very high power prices. There were not so much snow and not so much water in the hydro reservoirs. It was very cold and prices really went to the sky there. And this, let's say, triggered so many. Say, innovations and ways to find power production. There were people trying to get hold of nuclear icebreakers to connect them to the Nordic systems and that and everything. So I will come back to that, that it's this will mean that we will find ways to manage this. But yeah, to answer your question, no, this is something special.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 25:05

This is a new situation. Paula, does this have ramifications also for new cables being, potentially if they're planning sing three or if there's a connection between Sweden and potentially, parts of the Baltics or even Poland. Does this, would this would be a major factor in that kind of, in both the economic and the political calculations into if it makes sense or not.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 25:30

I haven't heard yet anything about that topic as such. Of course, one idea to safeguard sort of transmission across borders would be to build more interconnections, but then that would cost more money. So it's also which would of course then go to consumers electricity bill. So I think that's an open question. How do you secure it? Because all, I think all options are quite costly, either. Constructing more secure in a more secure way, then I would guess that besides construction costs, than any technical assaults would be harder to access and fix. And this sort of surveillance on the Baltic Sea by, by the Defense Forces is also quite hostile. But I would hope, certainly, I think from the perspective of really advancing the energy transition and the electrification that we will still see. Plans in the future too.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 26:22

And Fredrik was a final question for you as well. I think is there a danger here that we see a backlash against interconnected markets? There's this food to feed the populists who say, no, we keep the power prices within certain countries. Let's not export our powers to our neighbors. That's to make sure that we have the best and cheapest possible prices for our own population first and foremost.

Fredrik Bodecker, Founding Partner and CEO of Bodecker Partners in Malmo: 26:45

I think we are already seeing that and we let say with some Swedish politicians holding back Interconnectors. Unfortunately but this is the way it has been. Let say all my career we run in one direction and we see that as the only direction for the foreseeable future. And then suddenly we don't, we run in the other direction. So I think it's very dangerous that that we are now going in on this path because we need more interconnectors. We need, I'm also thinking about all the offshore wind farms. But yes, they have been stopped from the Swedish defense. And this is a, strengthens that case that they can't be built because they're interrupting radars, but also they are vulner vulnerable for the interconnectors out offshore wind farms. So there are it seems like we, we will go in this direction now for a couple of years until the next thing happens.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 27:34

Until we change the action again, maybe. And a final comment from you, Paula.

Paula Kivimaa, Research Professor at the Finnish Environment Institute in Helsinki: 27:37

I just wanted to say add to Fredrik's point. That's also a costly option is not to build interconnectors because it means that each country, the more separated you are from the joint markets, the more reserved capacity you have to have, which cost money and especially during peak, to meet the demand for electricity during peak ti, peak times, and also energy or electricity investments need require quite large investments. So when they see a broader market that to which you can supply that of course also speeds up the investments. So I think both options, in a way, are expensive, but in different ways.

Richard Sverrisson, Editor-in-Chief, Montel: 28:12

Perfect. Paula and Fredrik, thank you for a fascinating and very insightful discussion. Yeah. Thank you for being guests on the Montel Weekly podcast.