Does the EU energy transition need China?

It’s been 10 years since the Paris Climate Agreement entered intro force. Yet, tariffs, trade wars, and the reversal of the US’s climate policies are putting the global energy transition at risk. 

 Where does this leave the relationship between the EU, the US, and other global trading partners? And should Europe’s solar and wind developers shun Chinese products?

 In this week’s episode, Richard speaks to Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission about carbon pricing, the cost of the energy transition, and China’s influence in the future of green energy. 

 Presenter: Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News
 Contributor: Cem Bektas - Carbon correspondent, Montel News
 Guest: Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission
 Editors: Bled Maliqi, Oscar Birk
 Producer: Sarah Knowles

Transcript

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 0:05

Hello listeners, and welcome to Plugged In - the Energy News Podcast from Montel, where we bring you the latest news issues and changes happening in the energy sector. What happens to the green energy transition when the world's two major producers of global emissions are at odds? This year marks 10 years since the Paris Climate Agreement, a landmark commitment that countries, including the US and China took to tackle climate change, but our tariffs, trade wars, and a total reversal of carbon policies in the US putting the global energy transition at risk. In this episode, I'll be speaking to the chair of the Energy Transitions Commission and member of the UK's House of Lords, Lord Adair Turner. But first, I'm joined by our carbon correspondent Cem Bektaş. Cem, a warm welcome to the podcast. I think this is your first appearance.

Cem Bektas - Carbon correspondent, Montel News: 1:00

Thanks, Richard. Yes, indeed. It is.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 1:02

Excellent. I let's start by talking about US President Donald Trump. Now he's made his stance on climate change very clear. The US has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and introduced plans to scrap limits on its carbon emissions, as well as being quite anti winds. What impact is this on reversal from the United States having on relations between the us, the eu, and other global trading partners?

Cem Bektas - Carbon correspondent, Montel News: 1:31

Well, the US is a major emitter of greenhouse gases. It's emitted almost 6 billion tons of greenhouse gases in 2023, accounting for 11% of the global total. So the Trump administration of reversal of climate policies definitely has far reaching consequences. The EU has expressed concerns about the potential for a weakened global climate effort if the US were to withdraw from the Paris agreement Again, however, it's also focused on some climate goals and its efforts to increase investment in clean energy technologies and industries. That said, the recent EU US deal on trade and tariffs has left the EU in a somewhat difficult position on climate, at least in the short term, a key aspect of that deal. Committed Europe to purchasing $750 billion worth of US energy products over the next three years, including LNG Oil and Nuclear. And Critics of the deal, such as the European Environment Bureau argue that the pledge to buy US fossil fuels and nuclear energy is fundamentally incompatible with the blocks 2030 climate targets. President Trump's Liberation Day, universal Tariffs also led a trade spat with China earlier this year, which was a result with a temporary truce until the 12th of August. While a deal is not yet being agreed between the two countries, and it remains to be seen how it will impact China's climate policies.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 2:54

I mean, it's a fascinating time Cem. It's, there's a lot of turmoil in global markets. And I'm certain that we will cover this EU US deal in more detail in, in, in a podcast very soon that occurred after my chat with Lord Adair Turner the main guests of this week's podcast. Where does this leave the EU? Will it have to just press ahead with its green priorities without the US.

Cem Bektas - Carbon correspondent, Montel News: 3:21

Well, European Commission official recently told Montel that the trade deal with the US doesn't undermine Europe's medium and long-term climate objectives. And indeed, the block has several climate and carbon policies, current and upcoming that aims to dry down its emissions. These include a current EU emissions trading system alongside upcoming measures such as carbon border adjustment mechanism. The second EU emissions trading system for buildings and road transport. There have also been efforts this year work towards linking the emissions trading systems of the EU and the UK. Beyond that, I think the EU is also actively engaged in bilateral climate agreements and partnerships with several other countries and regions. For example, it holds high level dialogues with countries like China, Japan, India, to accelerate the implementation of the power agreement.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 4:12

Moving on to China here, Cem where does China currently stand on its targets to reduce carbon emissions?

Cem Bektas - Carbon correspondent, Montel News: 4:20

China emitted almost 16 billion tons of greenhouse gases in 2023, accounting for nearly a third of global, of the global total. That said, it aims to reach carbon neutrality for 2060 confirming that only CO2 emissions are covered. So not all greenhouse gases but the independent scientific group, climate action tracker, rates China's climate policies and targets is highly insufficient. Indeed, China is the world's largest producer and consumer of coal and coal power coal accounts for more than half of China's power generation. And last year the country actually began building over 94 gigawatts of new coal power capacity. However, China is trying to diversify its energy mix with renewable sources. Around 38% of its power was generated from low carbon sources last year, which is just below the global average of 41%. The country also counted for almost two thirds of global electric vehicle sales last year with nearly half of its domestic car sales being electric.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 5:22

It's a bit of a mixed bag. Thanks very much, Cem. Thank you. So it is China now the eus closest ally in the global energy transition. I'm pleased to be joined by Lord Adair Turner, chair of the Global Alliance, the Energy Transition Commission. A warm welcome to the podcast.

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 5:38

Thank you.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 5:39

So Adair, what do you currently see as the biggest threats to the global energy transition. Is it money, is it technology?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 5:46

Look let's be clear. We've talked about this energy transition, it is beginning to gather speed, but it hasn't done it at a pace that can limit global warming to 1.5 degrees centigrade. We are not gonna meet that target. We could still limit it to a, you know, well below two degrees centigrade, and it's essential that we do in a sense, the biggest threat has already crystallized that we haven't moved fast enough. And that reflects the fact that, some countries and companies don't want there to be change. There hasn't been enough investment early enough to drive this transition. On the other hand there is a continual development of the technologies reducing in cost far faster than we previously thought was at all possible, which give us a greater confidence that we can limit to well below two degrees centigrade and we can get to zero emissions by, let's say, across the world by about 2060. So it's a combination of. The emissions are not coming down yet. Let's be clear. Global emissions this year of greenhouse gases will not be below a 2045 level and we've got to a 2024 level, and we've got to start them on a downward path if we've got a chance of limiting global warming to well below two degrees centigrade.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 7:01

And what do we need to do to accelerate this?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 7:03

Well, a lot of this is not so much now in the developed countries. It's incredibly important that Europe and the UK meet the commitments that they've made. But if you look at all the cumulative emissions that are gonna come from Europe and the UK in the period before we get to net zero by 2050, that's order of magnitude 33, 35 gigatons. Whereas. If China just meets its current commitments peak by 2030 zero by 2060, if you calculate the area under that curve, it's about 265 gigatons. So let's be clear whether or not we meet. It will be determined by the pace of change above all in China. India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and some other major developing countries. That's not to blame them. They've got an absolute right to, to grow and they have to grow their energy. Used to deliver prosperity to the people. But that's where the big numbers now are and what that means is that an acceleration of progress, of the great progress that China has already made is probably the single biggest factor, which will determine whether we meet even a well below two degrees centigrade target.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 8:17

And what's been the success for China here?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 8:20

The successful China. Is, it's a success but a challenge. China has developed the technologies which can solve this problem faster than anybody else. They are the absolute cutting edge of battery technology, EV technology, solar pv, wind turbines, hydrogen electrolyzers, all of those are available. Equal or higher quality, much lower cost. In China, they're way ahead of the rest of the world in the rollout of wind and solar. And they are electrifying their economy faster than anybody else. The challenge is that so far there's still 55, 60%. Of the electricity is coming from coal and so far what has happened is every year wind and solar delivers, let's say another 300 terawatt hours of clean electricity and total electricity demand goes up by 300 or 400 terawatt hours. So actually the coal burn until last year kept on going up, even though as a percentage of the total it was coming down. Now it looks like. 2025 may be the peak year. And if it is, that's a very important factor. And what we need in China is to even redouble the pace of rollout of wind, solar, hydro to the extent that they can nuclear and really begin to start reducing that coal burn while still leading the world in the electrification of the economy. 'cause there's only. There's only one major strategy, which gets us to a net zero economy or one dominantly important strategy. And it's electrify as much of the economy as possible and decarbonize electricity supply, and you have to pursue those imbalance.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 10:04

And I think abs, I mean the, the progress as you state in China has been absolutely mind, but phenomenal in terms of the technologies you've mentioned. But on the other hand, China does have a very different political and economic system that does in, that provides the context for this rapid development. And in other parts of the world, that's not the case.

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 10:23

No. At one level, parts of the China's political system parts, which indeed we may not like, have made the transition easier. Easier. For instance, you look at land acquisition much easier in China than in, you know, democratic, argumentative. India. That's one of the joys of India. But it does mean that getting land available, accumulating land, buying land, dealing with legal challenges, much more complicated if when you're developing a solar farm in India than China. Having said that, some other countries are beginning to make significant progress. India in particular, I think, is now beginning really to accelerate its renewable development, both wind and solar. An innovator of contract forms, which get the developers to put together combinations of wind and solar and batteries and pump storage to make contractual commitments to deliver electricity almost all hours of the year. These are what they call the round the clock renewables, auctions, very important contractual innovation. And then you see an interesting country like Pakistan, where something extraordinary happened last year, which the government didn't plan. The World Bank didn't plan. There was just a huge explosion of rooftop solar. People just started trucking in, or shipping in solar panels. And as long as you had a friend who knew how to wire something up. Up it goes on the roof and you start doing running your house or your small business off that. And one of the great things about solar is it is now got to the stage where it is so cheap that I think we are on the verge of a sort of democratization of solar where it's gonna start. Popping up on roofs throughout the world, we'll still need large scale utility scale as well. So yes, China has some advantages in the ability to, just drive change through quickly. But there are other countries beginning to deploy at a significant scale.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 12:13

And that there's a lot of discussions if we stick with China for the time being a lot of discussions around security issues using Chinese built turbines solar panels and the whole machinery that goes with that. Is that a valid concern, do you think, godda?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 12:28

Look, I think on this issue about. Security of supply. And if we're talking literally about, software control systems, one's gotta recognize a spectrum of different types of technology. If you were asking, Huawei to be the provider of the central control. Software of your national grid, you'd probably wanna ask your security and intelligence services whether that's a good idea and they probably cautiously say no. I have to say that at the other end of the spectrum, I think the idea that there are listening devices or control devices in solar panels is not true. And it's perfect. It's very easy to stop them being there. Solar panels are. Bits of hardware they're dumb bits of hardware. They do not have complicated software attached to them. So we simply have to be intelligent about this spectrum. And by the way, you can have regulations which a draw divisions. For instance, Chinese owned battery companies in the US for some time have been allowed to sell battery packs, but not. Total battery management systems, the software that does remote a diagnostics, et cetera. So you can draw those distinctions and I think it is very important to draw our distinctions because if we don't use some of the benefits of the very low price that China now has for the, some of the fundamental building blocks, solar pv, batteries, electrolyzers wind turbines. If we don't do that, we will significantly increase the cost of the transition here in Europe, and then it could swing a against us politically. Politically it is hugely important in Europe. Let me give you an example that we have. Cheap EVs for the masses, what I might call the e Volkswagen, the People's Wagon. We need the equivalent of that. And unfortunately, so far it's beginning to change with Renault and Volkswagen itself. But until now, most of the EVs that have been brought forward by the European manufacturers, some of them beautifully engineered, but they're premium priced, therefore upper income people. 30,000 euros, 40, 50,000. We've got to have product below 20,000 euros, ideally even below 15,000 euros. And at the moment, the only people producing that in the world are people like BYD from China. The security risks, as I say, you've gotta recognize, first of all, you've gotta break down what you mean by security between different categories. There is, as asset were. Intelligence, security, the, the stuff to do with software that can switch off the the system that's security and intelligence security. There's another thing that people talk about economic security, but they often talk nonsense. They say, oh, being reliant on Chinese solar panels is just like being reliant on Russian gas. Actually, it's just exactly not like being reliant on Russian gas, because if you end up in a. Geopolitical pursuit a dispute and ultimately maybe a war with Russia and you don't have any gas. You are cold. 'cause there's no gas, you've got no energy. If our relationship with China broke down so much that they wouldn't sell us any solar panels. You've got all the solar panels that you bought in the past. There's a real difference between relying on somebody to buy a capital asset, which once you've got it produces a zero marginal cost out for the next 30 years, and relying on them for a pipe to supply of something which is important to your residential heating and your industry. In the month after it's cut off. So we've just produced at the Energy Transition Commission a report on global trade issues and the energy transition and the, we deal with two issues in that. One is the whole issue of carbon pricing and CBAMs, but the first issue is all of these issues to do with, what do we mean by economic security? How do we have an intelligent relationship with China, which we believe should also include welcoming Chinese companies to invest here in Europe so that yes, we should want employment here in Europe. In battery manufacture an automotive. But if that is done by having Chinese companies invest here, we should welcome that.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 16:43

As you say, Europe has struggled to produce its own batteries. It's also there's a struggle to produce a low cost electric vehicles. I have an electric vehicles and solar panels and they didn't come cheap. Yeah, they do that. No, but but if, are you concerned as well about what's happening? It's a very volatile turbulence time. The global situation that we are in at the moment protectionism, tariffs, tradewars. Is this, how was, would this affect the well at one level transition?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 17:13

At one level, the biggest things that's happened is Donald Trump became the President of America. He's made it plain that America has no interest. It denies people around him, and he denied that climate change exists. They're no longer committed to the reductions in American emissions they're no longer gonna be a real driver of the development of clean technologies, and that's bad news because it would be good to have several polls of leading development around the world. We don't want to just leave it to China. We'd go faster if we had several. And they've also made it plain that they have no intention of providing. Climate finance as it's called financial support for low income countries where they need flows of capital at a reasonably low cost of capital in order to seize the technological opportunities. Now, put all that together and it's bad news. The way I put it is looking at what has happened in America over the last six months. I've added, let's say. Point two degrees centigrade to my subjective estimate of where the world will be in terms of global temperature by say, 2060 or 70. And that 0.2 degrees centigrade is gonna kill some people in more vulnerable countries that don't know how to adjust to it. So that is bad news. And protectionism is also obviously a confusion. So look what has gotta happen and it's gotta happen at Cop 30, the conference of the parties 30 in Belem in Brazil, in November, is the rest of the world has gotta realize that America is, the US is not only not gonna help with this, but it wants to be a drag anchor. And the rest of the world has gotta grow up and make progress without American leadership. And it's gonna be a crucial test as to whether they're able to do it. I hope that even if there are big, disputes between countries, even if there's arguments about trade, et cetera, that we can somewhat carve out this area of the energy transition and climate and say this is a challenge that we've still gotta drive forward with international cooperation because it hasn't gone away.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 19:16

Would you say then that the US is a bit of a lost cause here, that it's gonna actively work against what's happening in terms of global energy transition?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 19:24

Yes, broadly. It's obviously not a lost cause forever. It wasn't a lost cause last year. It wouldn't have been a lost cause if one and a half percent of Americans had voted differently in early November last year. At one level, it was a, a knife edge result American elections are. But what we've realized is the way that, it fell on the knife edge. Has had a big consequence and at least for the next four years, and even if the Democrats get a majority in the House of Representatives at the end of next year I think that for the next three and a half years America, and you've said it rightly, it's not just that they're not putting their shoulder to the wheel. To try and solve this problem. I think they're almost, deliberately trying to slow down the rest of the world's action because there's a, there's an element, there's an intriguing element of denialism going on where, because they don't want to admit that this is a. A problem. And that's unuseful for some interest groups there. You've actually seen some extraordinary things like, cutting off research into the climate, cutting off data flows, for instance, that tell us what's going on in Arctic. Summarize. I think it is not just an absence of a positive, I think it's a negative.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 20:35

Yeah, absolutely. I think and it's very concerning globally. I'd to, you mentioned CBAM or the carbon border adjustment mechanism. Yep. I'd like to move and talk, discuss that as well as, carbon pricing. What do you see as the main barriers to implementing carbon pricing in developing emerging economies?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 20:55

Let's be clear. There are some sectors of the economy where we will need, not just temporarily, but on the long term carbon pricing or equivalent regulation. So if you were to look at, for instance, electric vehicles. Electric vehicles are soon gonna be cheaper to buy upfront than an internal combustion engine and cheaper to run. So we're gonna get after a transition to the stage where that is a costless transition and people are gonna benefit from it. But if you go to how do we produce aviation jet fuel, how do we use for instance ammonia or methanol in ships rather than marine fuel? How do we make steel maybe with hydrogen in a zero carbon fashion that is gonna have a cost. And as far as we can see ahead, maybe there'll be technological breakthroughs that make that green cost premium, as we call it, go away. But as best I can tell, for two or three decades, there's gonna be a significant cost premium in that areas, which means you are not gonna get companies moving to the zero carbon solutions unless you have carbon pricing or regulation. And it also means that if one. Country or group of countries like the EU and the UK is very close to the EU on this goes ahead with an emissions trading scheme, which sets a serious carbon price. You are gonna have to have a border carbon adjustment because otherwise we'll get emissions reductions in Europe, but only 'cause all the. You know, the production moves elsewhere. So let's be clear. And I see this absolutely bluntly to Indian and Chinese policy makers. The CBAM is non-negotiable because it's not got to be non-negotiable. There is absolutely no way that Europe can meet its commitments to decarbonize its heavy industry and it's shipping an aviation without a CBAM, but what we need to persuade. China and India and Indonesia and Vietnam is not to keep on saying this is protectionist because it's not. And in our report that we've just put out, we explain clearly why it's not. But to understand that they will, they should introduce carbon prices, because let's be clear. We will end up imposing a carbon price on a ton of steel made in India and imported into Europe. We don't want to do that. We want the Indian government to have that tax revenue, not the European Union. So that's what we're saying to them. Please, to put your own domestic carbon tax on, and then we can have free trade. Now here's the good news. I think we're winning this argument. In discussions I've had with China, I have had heard senior Chinese policy makers and business people, and also with some Indian people the other day saying, look, if Europe's gonna have a carbon price in a CBAM, we should just have our carbon prices and, drive the decarbonization of our industry. And that will then enable us to continue to export free of tariffs into Europe.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 23:45

Do you see, I've heard some voices within industries, some industrial sectors being very concerned that actually that will destroy the industry or the location of the industry.

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 23:55

Look within Europe let's be clear. Obviously, if we have a carbon price without a CBAM it would destroy our heavy industry, right? So you've gotta, we've gotta have a carbon price to Decarb drive decarbonization. And we've gotta have a CBAM and what we want. And by the way, that CBAM should include rebates for exports, which was foreseen in the EU steel and metal action plan, which it announced about three months ago to tighten the definitions and rules within the CBAM that should be, that there should be rebates on exports as well as tariffs on imports. What is true? Is that if even if we end up with a completely level playing field of a equal carbon prices across the world, it may be that the cheapest place to produce, for instance, zero carbon iron in 30 years time is not gonna be South Wales, it's not gonna be the rural valley, it's gonna be Morocco or Mauritania or Chile, because that is where the cheapest solar and wind power and therefore green hydrogen is going to be. Now I have been with a major Korean a island steel maker, you know, three years ago who basically said. We are committed to decarbonizing our iron and steel production. We will only make iron with hydrogen by 2050. We will close all our cooking cold blast furnaces, but it's an open issue as to whether that hydrogen iron production will be in Korea or whether it will be in Australia, because why would you import from Australia? Iron and oxygen. Plus hydrogen to make iron in Korea rather than just import iron from Australia. Though I do stress iron, very important in the iron and steel industry, I think it is possible that the logical low cost location of zero carbon iron. Primary iron making in future is not in the developed world where it's been in the past, except places like Northern Sweden where there's a lot of very cheap hydro, but is in what we call the global sunbelt. But that doesn't necessarily mean steel. We may separate the production of Sponge Iron from all the specialty steels the EAF the secondary steel making, et cetera. And actually that may mean that the majority of jobs still stay here because iron making is a very capital intensive business. It's not a big employer of people.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 26:23

So what's. What's the future for Europe here in terms of industry? We are talking, I hear this in various parts of Europe, rightly or wrongly, whether there's certain industrial demand has been falling for energy that is and com companies, factories are closing. So where's the future question? In Europe?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 26:40

Look, I think. Iron making may not be in Europe. Maybe some bulk chemicals will not be in Europe, but I'm sure that with good policy, battery making could be in Europe, ev making will be in Europe. Electric vehicles, we ought to be able to make them. This may include in joint ventures or inward investment from the Chinese as productively as the Chinese and where you have an EV factory, you tend to have a battery factory. Batteries are pretty heavy things. The best place to put a pack battery factory is right next to an ev factory. And I have an involvement myself in that through a Japanese company called ASC. We are building a battery factory for Renault in Doue in Northern France, where is it? It's 500 meters from the Renault ev plant. Similarly for Nissan in Sunderland. So there is a stickiness of the relationship between EVs and batteries, and if you get it right, a stickiness of the relationship between EVs and the local market. So that should a that should be maintained. So I think we've gotta realize we shouldn't believe that. We've gotta hang on to all the most energy intensive bits and incredibly capital intensive and incredibly light employment bits of the process. There's lots of other ways to continue to have high tech manufacturing businesses making, high quality product.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 28:01

And in terms of stickiness, there's also stickiness with green hydrogen and steel production. Yeah. As all which you mentioned Northern Sweden and other parts of the world. But a final question really if I can Adair what, decarbonization combating meeting net zero targets. It's not cheap. It's very capital intensive as you'd mentioned. And it all, renewable energy, batteries, grids that require a lot of upfront investment. What would you say to those who object to the cost of the energy transition?

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 28:29

Well, I'd start by saying the costs are massively less than the cost of not making this transition. If we just let rip, I mean the IEA. The International Energy Agency's calculation is that on the stated policies across the world will warm by about 2.4, 2.5 degrees centigrade by the end of this century, which is only 70 years, five years time. That's within the lifetime of children born today, hope just become a grandfather. I've got a granddaughter she'll be living at that time. She won't even necessarily be all that old. 75 may not be even old. You may have good 25 years left beyond that. 2.5 degrees centigrade, if we let that happen, will be a disaster. For future generations. And if we let that happen, we'll just be, people caught about talk about the millennium generation, the great generation. We better just call ourselves the useless generation if that's what we hand on to our children and grandchildren. So look, it is worth taking a cost, but the cost is not all that big. We do have to probably increase our. Investment is a percent of GDP investment is a percent of GDP by about 1% of GDP during transition. And then once we get to 2050 or 2060, the impact on living standards by that time is so trivial that you won't be able to see it. There'll be some things where people enjoy zero carbon a energy use cheaper than they do today. Road transport is one where consumers will be winners. The somewhere it will be a cost. There's a significant cost in switching your house over from a gas boiler to a heat pump. You'll benefit on an ongoing basis, but the upfront is significant. And then there are other ones which are interesting. The cost is significant at the business to business level, but they're minute at the consumer level. And let me show you what I mean by that. If in order to get ships to run on ammonia or methanol, not on the current marine fuel oil heavy heavy fuel oil, we had to double ship freight rates. The impact of that on a pair of jeans made in Bangladesh and bought in London will be way less than 1%, because shipping is such an extraordinary efficient thing that it's, increasing the cost of it will not have a fundamental change to consumers. Indeed, I have to, cons, shipping freight rates go up four times and four down 80% and nobody notices it. So there are some things where the impact is big at the business to business level, but disappears at the consumer level. But yes, there is overall investments that we have to make. There will be a small impact on our, not on GDP but on the consumption that we can afford in a period of transition, which will last about 20 years. But, if you don't wanna pay about 1% of GDP and you compare ourselves with our grandparents, our parents and grandparents generation who defeat Nazism, devoted 30, 40, 50% of GDP for six years to do that and considered the economic sacrifice so trivial compared with the sacrifice of lives that they wouldn't even thought about it, then we truly would be the utterly useless generation.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 31:37

And I would like to leave it. That's a very good point where to end this podcast. Thank you very much for being a guest on Plugged In - the Energy News podcast from Montel.

Lord Adair Turner - Chair of the Energy Transitions Commission: 31:44

Thank you.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 31:45

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