Ukraine 4 years on: Destruction, Resilience and decentralisation

This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine - a war which has unearthed new hybrid warfare tactics and the targeting of crucial gas and electricity infrastructure  in the country. 

What has changed this winter for the people of Ukraine, and will Putin's mission to "freeze Ukraine”  and brutally destroy its energy work? 

In this episode, Richard speaks to guests in Kyiv about the daily realities that the people of Ukraine have experienced this winter without access to heat and power, and the scale of the repair and recovery that energy workers are doing on the ground every day. Listen also to the broader implications of ongoing war on Europe's energy security, and why energy infrastructure has become a prominent war target.

Host: Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News

Guests: 

Yuriy Onyshkiv from - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group

Oleksiy Povolotskiy - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric

Editor: Oscar Birk

Producer: Sarah Knowles

Subscribe to the podcast on our website, via Apple Podcasts or Spotify

Transcript

0:07

The situation in Ukraine really is brutal. They're freezing. When we've spoken with cybersecurity firms in Ukraine who spoke of literally millions of attacks on infrastructure since the war began. I don't think it's ever happened that a nation actively takes out the entire civil energy infrastructure of another nation. They've taken out 40 thermal power stations, all the compressor stations, all the grids. They've attack the gas storage sites and the gas production side. Ukraine is currently experiencing in the future of warfare and the future of conflict. I think that we won't get easily towards a piece in Ukraine because so many players could gain from a ceasefire instead of a piece.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 0:49

Hello, listeners, and welcome to Plugged In - The Energy News podcast from Montel, where we bring you the latest news issues and changes happening in the energy sector. This week marks the four year anniversary of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, four years of brutal attacks against Ukraine's people, its cities and its energy infrastructure. And this latest winter, there's been a cruel demonstration of Putin's war tactic to demolish Ukraine's power systems and freeze the country. As thousands of people have been left without heat, power, and even internet and then water in some cases. Where are we four years on from the start of the full scale conflict. What does the daily fight for energy look like on the ground? How is the power up system being rebuilt? Why will this winter play a significant role in deciding the future of the conflict? Later on in this episode, I'll be speaking to the Secretary General of Eurelectric about the new hybrid warfare tactics that have emerged from Russia's war in Ukraine and the impact the last four years has had on Europe's energy security. But first, I'm speaking to our first guests who join us from Kyiv. Oleksiy Povolotskyi, the head of recovery at DTEK. A warm welcome to you. Oleksiy.

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 1:57

Hello. Thank you.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 1:58

And Yuriy Onyshkiv a senior analyst from the London Stock Exchange Group. Welcome back to the podcast, Yuriy.

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 2:03

Thank you. Happy to be back.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 2:04

Oleksiy, this week mark's four years since Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine. What has changed or not changed over these four years?

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 2:15

If we speak about NG sector, a lot have changed and we experienced different tactics of Russians during these four years of the war. Initially in 2022, 23, they started with shelling of transmission system operator infrastructure and DSO infrastructure. In 2024, they started targeting deliberately power generation. In 2025, they started shelling gas production enterprises. And in the end of 2025 when a ceasefire finished in September, since October 2025 until now, they started shelling like complex shelling for on energy power generation, distribution, transmission, gas, everything. We understand that they're not very progressing on the battlefield, and now this is the war against energy infrastructure, critical infrastructure and big story buildings in the big cities.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 3:08

What does this mean in real terms, Yuriy, and, you know, in terms of, how often are the lights on? Do the lights go off in terms of the internet, in terms of, you know, heating both from power, gas, et cetera, for the people of Kiev and of the Ukraine more generally?

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 3:21

I think that there has not been any locality in Ukraine or anyone that has not been affected by the blackouts, the outages. I mean, in alone, which has been, I think this winter, the hardest hit because it was hardest targeted. The lights still go off every day for a few hours. It has been worse in, in January. Because that's when most of the targeting took place. And when the winter was, the coldest so far was in January. I know we could go offline for up to several days sometimes without, no, no lights on. So far it has improved slightly. First of all, because there has been some recovery from the energy companies. Also the weather has become a little warmer. The day of the light, the day has become longer. Still, we have some time. Power is off. For some homes I think heating is still not back on. So it's still as a struggle and I think it will take a lot of time to return back to normal when you know you can switch on the line anytime day you want.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 4:22

As Oleksiy mentioned, it's a clear tactic to, to brutalize to try and demotivate the people of Ukraine. But Oleksiy, you are head of recovery at DTEK. What does that mean in real terms? You're saying there's a targeted approach first at the transmission level, then general infrastructure from distribution to substations, to power generation and also the gas infrastructure. What does that mean for you in terms of rebuilding? And how often does that have, does that, is that a daily, hourly hourly occurrence? What happens in, in real terms, Oleksiy, can you talk us through that?

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 4:54

Let me describe in one saying, this is Dutch saying, but if you translate it into English, it'll means that you are moping the water on the floor. But the crown is open, the tap is open, the water is running out and you are moping the water on the floor. And this is the situation in which we have been doing during this four years of war. Russians they're shelling us, destroying our objects and we recover then again, destroy our objects and to we recover. So this is unfortunately the constant situation during this four years of war. We do our best to recover as fast as possible. The current challenge the biggest challenge is the state of energy system. You can imagine that every new attack has multiplying effect on the energy system. And of course if we had some stock equipment, reserve equipment, now we don't. And in order to rebuild high voltage substations, power generation, you need different types of transformers, different types of generators, switch gear equipment, and this is quite costly. The lead time is also very long for you to understand that to produce high voltage transformer would take you at least nine months. And this is in the situation if you have the money and your your order is placed. Unfortunately, these days we have the situation when in order to wait when your order is placed, you need to two years sometimes.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 6:16

Yeah. And obviously that's unsustainable when you need to keep the lights on and the country running. Oleksiy are you getting help in terms of critical infrastructure from Ukraine's Western neighbors?

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 6:26

Say Yes, we do. First of all, we as DTEK, we try to finance and we do, or finance a lot at the same time, you should understand that the scale of attack and the scale of destruction is so huge that nobody in this country can cope on its own. That's why we are working together with our government with the Minister of Energy who has a special task force. This is the working group on humanitarian and technical aid. The ministry considers applications from different energy companies, approve them and transfer them for to be financed by the donors. The biggest donor at this moment of time is Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Also, we cooperated with USAD and now USA, they have SPARK Project which is run by TetraTech company. So we do obtain equipment from these donors. And thanks very much to all governments who contribute to these funds, all our partners, and the allies for the tremendous help. Without this help, it would be impossible to recover the scale destruction that we have at this moment.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 7:29

That also include old infrastructure from power plants, say in Poland, Germany other areas of Europe.

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 7:35

Indeed, if you take into account the situation that we had this winter, as Yuriy rightly said this was the coldest winter in last 15 years. We experienced temperatures like minus 20, minus 25, and lots of shellings. Since October till February, we only as DTEK, our five power stations experienced 11 massive attacks. So you can imagine how many pieces of equipment were damaged destroyed. And in order to recover, of course, you cannot wait for the financing of new equipment. For the production of new equipment. The best situation here is to find used equipment in the neighboring states. And we do found several pieces, spare parts, equipment in different Eastern European states and Baltic states. And thanks everybody who helped us during this winter.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 8:23

Thank you Oleksiy. Yuriy, can you talk us through we talked a little bit about the power infrastructure and the attacks on the power system. What about on the gas side in, in Ukraine? What's the situation there? Has that experienced the same kind of brutal level of attack and focus on destruction there?

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 8:37

Absolutely. I think Oleksiy has already mentioned a bit of it that the gas production sites have been targeted and I think, that early in 2025, I think that the estimated impact was the 40% drop in gas production and daily gas production after attacks in, I think February, March last year when we had a little bit of a cold spell back then, although the winter was not the coldest on in general. I think did they do a specifically surgically targeted when the gas was needed the most. And it had that impact. And then such targeting of gas production sites have followed up last autumn, and it was also reported that there was a massive impact. Of course, there was some recovery through the summer, and then again there was massive impact on gas production side and it slashed a lot of gas production. However, through this winter, I think one of the things that we haven't heard much about is about the gas deficit. I think the Ukranien energy sector has learned the lesson. It has started to stockpile gas first of all, through the summer, a lot quicker than it previously did. But also Ukraine continue to import gas through the winter when gas tends to get a little bit more expensive usually. And that allowed as now to be much safer in terms of stockpile of natural gas in the country when you compare the withdrawal rates from the storages. This winter was the lowest compared to the previous several meters, although the weather was the coldest, and this is because a lot of gas was coming in, which usually doesn't take place. Not in that magnitude as it did this winter. So now in terms of gas storage, we are not doing great. We're doing much better than we did, I think a year ago. So this is like a more safer space in, in the context of the entire energy system. However I should say that we will continue to be dependent on imports because domestic production is much, much lower than it used to be. So I think that's a, that's also, that's a cost issue that we'll have to import the gas, which is normally much more expensive than domestically extracted gas. So that in terms of costs will continue to chip in, into the entire balance of things.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 10:53

The storage sites, first of all, they must be targets for this, for attack as well. Yuriy?

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 10:57

Storage sites were targeted. However, Ukrainian storages are located deep underground, because these were the previously gas reservoirs, natural reservoirs, and then once they were depleted, they were used as storages and most of that located in Western Ukraine. And they're deep underground, so they're very difficult to reach. What can be reached is some of the power equipment that allows the gas to be extracted and injected. That has been targeted, but I wouldn't say that it prevented Ukraine from building up the storages and then using them through the winter for, per consumption.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 11:32

Okay. That's an important point there. Oleksiy. And in terms of, interconnection Ukraine and it, and its Western neighbors, has that also been targeted? In terms of transmission, distribution, cables, mainly transmission cables with neighbors.

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 11:45

Yes. As I said in the beginning, Russians, they're trying to target high voltage substations for our transmission system operator. Our TS operator has 700 feet and 330 KV stations, and all this equipment is under a constant attacks. So the Russians, they're trying to heat our power generation as well as transmission lines so they don't heat our nuclear power stations. But at the same time, the heat transmission facilities and this is the key reason why we didn't have electricity in the city of Kyiv for many days in a row. And the same situation was in the big cities all in central part and eastern part of Ukraine.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 12:25

What do you think the goal here, the targeting, the Ukraine's power and cutting people off from heat, water, electricity, internet, et cetera? What's the main goal here? You said they're not winning on the battlefield and now they're choosing the energy infrastructure.

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 12:36

What the gold a terrorist has in our situation, they simply try to hit our infrastructure, which ultimately have a direct impact on the population. If you can imagine how to live in the big story building and the city of Kyiv. Let's say 25 story building. No heat, no electricity, no water, no internet. And we saw many footages on the TV when a young mom with used to two kids climbing up on the stairs because lift is not working on 20th floor and have heavy bags. And this was our, a normal life during January and February, unfortunately. This is quite difficult, to be honest, to live in such conditions when you have freezing temperatures inside when you feel that outside is much warmer than inside. And at the same time, we understood that this is the hit on Ukrainians. This was the attempt of Russians to put chaos in the Ukrainian society. They failed. We stay strong.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 13:41

Unimaginable conditions there. Absolutely. Oleksiy, so what do you think Yuriy, do you share Oleksiy's view?

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 13:45

Absolutely. I think Oleksiy has laid it out very well. They can't win on the battlefield, therefore they try to pressure the civilian population in flick as much damage as they can possibly. To kind of force Ukraine to capitulate, to to maybe accept those maximalist concessions that Russia, wants to have in this conflict. And despite the, this hardest harsh conditions I don't see the civilian population is, ready give up because everybody knows where this is coming from.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 14:13

Yeah, absolutely. What I think is fascinating have, just as an aside, have, renewable in facilities also been attacked, say solar or wind turbines. So they also been under barrage.

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 14:23

Yes, Richard, you're right. Renewable facilities were also attacked. If you're talking about solar power stations, it's quite difficult to attack every single solar panel. Russians they attacked power stations which transmit electricity from power stations to the grid. If you're talking about wind we had several examples when our wind power power turbines were hit by drones. What is important to understand here, and this is the question about decentralization of the energy system in the future, you can hit one blade. You can hit one turbine, and in this situation you will lose lose six megawatt. But if missile hits power station, you can in one short lose 200, 300 or more megawatt. So this is the real answer that, energy system in Ukraine must be decentralized as soon as possible. And the renewable objects is the key here. And we as DTEK, we invest even during the war into the renewable objects, we built wind power station, which will be 500 megawatts. And we going to continue the station this year and we started investing into the station in Mikaleav region just 80 kilometers from the act war zone in 2023. And we were only one company which invested in Ukraine that time because we understood that this region lacks of electricity people suffering from not having electricity, heat supply. And we built in 2023, the first stage of the station, 114 megawatts.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 15:51

It's fascinating this move from a centralized to decentralized energy system. How do you think, what are the lessons that can be learned for other parts of Europe in terms of, for example, energy security Oleksiy?

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 16:02

First of all this is air defense. This is clear that to hit missile or drone in the air is much cheaper than after hit of the power station to remove debris, to analyze the state of equipment, to order new equipment, to replace, to rebuild, et cetera. So the key here is Ed defense. The second I would say the passive protection of power stations, of power generation. This is costly, but probably everybody in Eastern Europe at least should think about it and start building such structures already now. Of course you need to have a stock of reserve equipment, probably not at the sites of the power generation or power stations, but maybe aside, just in case if there is an attack you reserve equipment survive.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 16:49

Yuriy, I'd like to turn to you now and there's been talks, we've mentioned ceasefire, peace talks seem to be ongoing. Are you hopeful for peace this year, this decade? What's your view here?

Yuriy Onyshkiv - Senior Gas Analyst, London Stock Exchange Group: 17:00

Think that we were hopeful about some version of peace early last year when the ceasefire talk started, and I think now one year on after President Trump stopped and can push for these peace talks and Ukraine, glad be accepted to take part in that. They have not gone anywhere. And this is mostly because russia only would accept Ukraine's capitulation. It would not have a consensus or something feasible. It only accept the capitulation and that, so the peace stocks have not gone anywhere. They started with the us asking to do a ceasefire and conditional ceasefire. Ukraine has agreed to that ceasefire. Russia never did. So it went nowhere. This year, actually, the last kind of 12 months have been some deadliest the Ukrainian civilians, and this is when the peace stocks were ongoing. So I think Russia is using the peace talks in order to push through. Its agenda both through the peace talks and through the targeting of civilians and then through the, so the kind of fighting in the war zone. So I don't see any willingness from Russia to kinda settle down this year. And it has the ability to continue targeting Ukraine. It'll do so in the end, I think it's not, what if we believe when this will end? It's when Russia will stop having the ability to hit Ukrainian cities and civilians and continue the war. So it, it won't stop until it is stopped. And as of things are looking now, I don't see much of a slow down this year. Next couple years maybe, but it doesn't look like anytime in the near future. This is Russia will slow down.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 18:50

That's quite a depressing thought there, Yuriy, but what's your view? Oleksiy?

Oleksiy Povolotskyi - Head of Recovery Office, DTEK: 18:55

I think that, first of all, we need to protect our air. At this moment of time we are not protected. If you're talking about ballistic missiles, 80% of Ukraine is not protected from ballistic missiles. And this one of the key targets and also cruise missiles and drones, and this is one of the strategic targets of Ukraine as the state. Secondly we must have more ammunition, more different equipment in order to fight on the battlefield. And of course we should be prepared for the next winter which is very important because as you reset, nobody knows what will happen when the war will be finished. If the war is not finished this year we must be ready to overcome winter 26, 27, which may be theoretically even more harder than this one. And in order to do that, we must recover as much power generators as possible. And here the call from energy companies from energy sector of Ukraine to our partners and allies help us immediately with financing, with placement of orders. The equipment must be in Ukraine let's say in the end of summer. Beginning of autumn. This will enable us to install and to be ready for the next winter.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 20:07

That's a clear call for assistance for those out there who can help Ukraine in it, in its defense against the brutal Invader. Gentlemen, i'd like to finish there. Thank you very much for some quite harrowing tales, but also some amazing storage of courage and bravery in the face of sort of these attacks. So thank you for your insights and your thoughts. I know you know, it must be extremely difficult to living where you're living, but all the best and thank you for joining the podcast. So what's the targeting of energy infrastructure in war today mean for the future of energy and the security of our systems? I'm pleased to welcome Kristian Ruby, secretary General of Eurelectric back to the podcast. Good to see you again, Kristian.

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 20:48

Thank you very much. Good to be here.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 20:50

You recently put out a report about resilience and preparedness for Europe's electricity sector, and I'd like to talk about that a little bit later. But first I'd like to ask you about a recent visit to Ukraine where you visited a power plant following a missile attack. What did you see then? How did that make you feel?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 21:08

Yeah. Around one year ago I went to Ukraine to see what life is like for our colleagues over there that basically lived through this terrible war every day and try to keep the power systems online to make sure that people have electricity for their cooking for their smartphones, for their payment systems, et cetera, et cetera. And it was a very moving experience, I have to say. We were in the southwestern part of the country. I came in via Poland and and we were driving to the power plant, a big thermal plant in the countryside. And right on the arrival at the plant the airstrike alarms go off. And and we can see on our apps that mid 30 ones have left from an air base somewhere in Russia and with ZA missiles. And might be headed towards that plant we're at. So we rushed to the bomb shelter. And on the way we encounter this convoy of pickup trucks with roof-mounted air defense guns that are taking their positions getting ready to shoot down missiles and drones that are coming. And yeah it's a very different experience from anything else that that a person like me experiences when going to work every day. So we basically huddle in the bomb shelter together with the staff until the alarm is called off and we can go in and see this plant, which is basically like walking into a post apocalyptic science fiction movie. You got this old plant that is basically been hit tens of times with direct kinetic impact. The, the roofs and the roof was missing over part of the generators, windows and walls, blown out, replaced with plywood and everywhere people had tried to set up these MacGyver solutions to, to make the plant still work. People on the floor sweeping rubble away, trying to weld things together to make it work again. It was, it is really moving and impactful to see just how severe this damage is, but also to see the courage firsthand of people that go to work in such an environment.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 23:03

Absolutely. Incredibly dramatic there. Kristian, I think it's clear that Russia's been very aggressively targeting Ukraine's infrastructure as power plants, its substations, et cetera, as you highlight in the report. And so energy security has really been thrust to the fore, not just in the Ukraine, but elsewhere in Europe. Now, what do you think we have learned in Europe from the war and about how to protect European infrastructure?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 23:27

I think the first lesson is that a really vicious attack on our civilian infrastructure is not fiction. It's a very real scenario. And with the neighbors, we have this, unfortunately might be the reality for Europe as well. In fact we are already seeing not only in Ukraine, but also in several European countries, direct physical attacks, sabotage, hybrid warfare strategies being exercised against utilities and our infrastructure. So I think that's the first learning that, that this is real and this is something that we need to prepare for. Then. Our learnings from Ukraine are really about what does that look like? What does preparedness look like in such a situation. And here we can probably distinguish between sort of a direct hot war and lower levels of escalation that we're currently seeing in, in our parts of Europe. But essentially, preparedness starts with the very individual in the company. It starts as a company culture where everybody knows that we are in a different historical era. We are in a different situation where you need to have your eyes open, have your ears alert and have a different type of situational awareness when you operate power systems. And then there's a whole range of consequences for how you operate as a company, how you work with authorities, and how you essentially exercise and prepare for such situations. Both when it comes to the standard operating procedures on the ground, but also in terms of how you have the necessary equipment ready and how you work with all of the utilities. And and basically let's say stac preparedness throughout different governance levels of society.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 25:13

Absolutely. So it starts with the individual, basically at company level, having a secure password, for example. But it goes right up to the top of policy at the European the commission level or national government level. Absolutely. I think what struck me Kristian in the report is this. You mentioned 219 acts of hybrid warfare. That was between 214 and 2024, so that's not even including last year. And anything from direct physical sabotage of subsea infrastructure to drones and to cyber attacks. I think, to dam in Norway being emptied and these kind of incidents. And I think what's interesting here is you, you're seeing it your report mentioned as well that being done by ai now both the attack and the defense. Could you give, provide some details about what, what's happening on that level, Kristian?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 26:01

Yeah that's a really fascinating dimension of this. We're in this incredible acceleration moment when it comes to the digital technologies where part of society is really stuck almost in the stone age and where the most advanced levels are really in, in a very rapid acceleration towards high levels of intelligence. So on the one side of this exponential bend, you have. People that operate a critical utility for water, for instance. And they have the password, 1, 2, 3, 4. And on the other side of this exponential bend, you got extremely advanced and refined cyber attack strategies that involve Trojan Horse entering into a system, trying to find its way. And when it encounters a firewall or something, it will basically ping an LLLM the WLAN internet connection and ask for advice for how to take down this firewall. So that's essentially the breadth of what we're dealing with. And I think that the basic learning for utilities is that security is a must and security needs to be on top of every executive's agenda and be part and parcel of every strategic executive discussion in the power sector these days,

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 27:17

the executives, you mentioned utilities, you mentioned DSOs, TSOs, do they understand and accept the urgency of the situation? Are they actually making rapid steps to towards that level of preparedness and resilience that is required?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 27:31

So one of the findings in the report is that the levels of preparedness across Europe, they, they differ quite a bit. That has to do with geographical situation of individual companies. That has to do with their place in the value chain. And it has to do with the size of the company and of course also the culture. But it's a theme that's really dawning on people, but it's also a theme that we feel is important and therefore, one, we are very consciously and strategically pushing towards companies to, to to make sure that we build this awareness and that we are a good and constructive partner for public institutions to deal with and to basically help at disseminate this and develop this security mindset.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 28:13

You also mentioned the sort of some con in the report some concerns of technology supply chains. For example, you mentioned keel switching and bugging equipment, for example and solar inverters. Is this a concern as well in terms of, as we're seeing the massive rollout and the need for the energy to push for the energy transition? Is this a major concern?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 28:32

Let's be very clear. Supply chains. Are a major concern when it comes to energy security. I think the very start of this conversation about energy security was a supply chain issue. It was a supply chain issue related to gas. You will recall that even before the full scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin was making a very targeted effort to empty out the gas storages in Europe with a view to building leverage as part of his war preparations. So that was a supply chain weaponization and unfortunately we are seeing that more and across all energy supply chain relations. So that's the first important point. The second important point is that we need to distinguish between the types of supply chain. There was a mantra in this debate for a while that was, let's not replace one dependence with another dependence understood as let's not replace fossil fuel dependence with materials, independence. And there's some truth to this. We must make sure that we have a diversified supply of these materials, critical components, permanent magnets raw materials, different types of kit. We don't want to be boxed in or dependent on one, one supplier of these materials. On the other hand, we also need to remember that fossil fuel dependence is different from electric dependence because we're talking about a flow of energy when we talk fossil fuels if you stop that flow of fuel, you have an immediate problem on the ground. If you stop the flow of a certain type of components, you still have the existing electricity system functioning for another 20 years. An electricity system is by definition more resilient and more secure than a system where we get the very fuel from the outside and where the supply of fuel can be switched off from the outside. That said, we need to work very targetedly to make sure that we diversify supplies of everything, that we build the capability of producing critical stuff in Europe, and also that we de-risk any piece of kit that we add to the power system. We know we wanna make sure that it cannot be accessed by bad actors from the outside. And that's going to be a critical feature of electricity system security going forward.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 30:53

Absolutely. That's absolutely crucial. How, but how do you go about de-risking key parts of the supply chain or the infrastructure of the Europe's electricity system?

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 31:02

I think one key element is to make sure that the operator can retain control over the equipment at all times. Both when it comes to what the machines do and also to the information flows related to the machines. One critical element is to ensure that bad actors do not have some sort of access, remote access to the equipment via Bluetooth or other types of access. And and that we need to make sure with all the equipment we install and that needs to be part of an integrated and systematic energy security strategy for this era, which is an era where electricity is increasingly moving to the heart of the broader energy system.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 31:45

Absolutely. And avoiding of course, passwords like 1, 2, 3, 4. I think that's absolutely crucial. Kristian, thank you very much for being a guest on the Plugged In podcast. Always great to have you on.

Kristian Ruby - Secretary General Eurelectric: 31:54

My pleasure. Thanks.

Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News: 31:55

And to you listeners, thanks for listening to this episode of Plugged In. If you enjoyed this discussion, please like, rate and follow to make sure you get the latest podcast episodes as soon as we release them every Thursday. We'd also love to read your reviews of the podcast. It helps us to keep up to date with what you, our listeners, think of the podcast and what content you want to receive more of. Finally, you can head to montelnews.com for more news and analysis from our team of journalists across Europe and beyond. See you next time.