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Hamilton - Federalist Paper 70 - The Executive Department Further Considered
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In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong, energetic, and single executive (unitary executive) to lead the U.S. government, rather than a council. He asserts that a single president provides necessary accountability, quick decision-making, and secrecy, ensuring effective governance, protecting national security, and upholding the rule of law.
Kelley and Max break this document down into 24 easy-to-digest segments and offer short commentary after each segment to further understanding. This is part of the Spectral Summit's Literary curriculum.
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Today we are reading part of Federalist No. 70 written by Alexander Hamilton for the Executive Department, further considered from the New York Post packet Tuesday, March 18, 1788. The Federalist Papers were arguments written to persuade the states to approve the new U.S. Constitution. So here Hamilton argues why we need a strong president, not a committee or a group of co-presidents to protect the nation and make sure laws are enforced. As we go, I'll pause to explain the key ideas and why Hamilton believed that this was an important part for a republic like the United States. Max Grimm will be reading the parts of the Federalist Papers, and then again I will be giving the commentary.
SPEAKER_00The enlightened well wishers of this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation since they can never admit its truth without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks. It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.
SPEAKER_01And also as a reference, the term republican used here is in the sense of creating a new republic. So here Hamilton is saying that some people think a powerful president is dangerous to a democracy. But if that were true, then democracy itself would be in trouble. He believes energy, meaning action, strength, and decisiveness, is essential in a leader. Without a strong executive, the country could be attacked. Laws wouldn't be enforced, property wouldn't be protected, and liberty itself could be at risk. So Hamilton, he doesn't want a king, but he does want a leader strong enough to stop chaos, corruption, and threats inside or outside the country.
SPEAKER_00Every man, the least conversant in Roman history, knows how often that Republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man under the formidable title of dictator, as well as the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny and to the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
SPEAKER_01He's arguing that even republics have learned when things get dangerous, you need one leader who can move fast. But, and this is the key, Hamilton wants a leader chosen by the people and limited by the Constitution, not a permanent dictator.
SPEAKER_00There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution. And a government ill executed, however it may be, in theory, must be in practice a bad government.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton's point here is simple. If the president is weak, the whole government becomes weak. And what good is a system that sounds great on paper but fails in real life?
SPEAKER_00Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive, it will only remain to inquire what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute the safety in the Republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by this convention? The ingredients which constitute this energy in the executive are first unity, secondly, duration, thirdly, an adequate provision for its support, fourthly, competent powers. The ingredients which constitute safety in the Republican sense are first a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton lists what creates a strong presidency: unity, one person in charge, duration, enough time in office to do the job well, support, the proper salary and resources, and then powers, real authority, not just a title. This structure allows the president to lead effectively.
SPEAKER_00Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former and have regarded this as the most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have with equal propriety considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to consolate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests. That unity is conducive to energy, will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number. And in proportion, as the number is increased, these quantities will be diminished.
SPEAKER_01A group might argue endlessly, but one leader can make decisions and respond fast, which is especially important in a crisis.
SPEAKER_00This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority, or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part, to the control and cooperation of others in the capacity of counselors to him. Of the first, the two councils of Rome may serve as an example. Of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the states, New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only states which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to a single man. Both of these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans, but the votaries of an executive council are most numerous. They are both liable, if not equal to, to similar objections and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton warns that splitting power between multiple executives, whether equal partners or a president controlled by a council, makes leadership less effective. Rome tried two leaders at once and it didn't go well. Hamilton is pointing out that splitting executive power, either between co-leaders or a president limited by a council usually creates problems. Even states that tried it learned that it could weaken their leadership.
SPEAKER_00The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the Republic from the dissensions between the consuls and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted for the consuls, but it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal is a matter of astonishment until we advert to the singular position in which the Republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state and pursued by the councils of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebans for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities. The councils who were generally chosen out of the former body were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to the motive of union, after the arms of the Republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the councils to divide the administration between themselves by lot, one of them remaining in Rome to govern the city and its environs, and the other taking command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rival ships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the Republic.
SPEAKER_01Looking at history, Hamilton notes that having multiple leaders often cause conflict. Rome's councils argued with each other, which sometimes hurt the republic. Even when multiple leaders seem balanced, Hamilton argues, differences in opinion can slow decision making. Later presidents like FDR had to act decisively, showing why Hamilton favored one strong executive.
SPEAKER_00But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates in reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the executive under any modification whatever.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton sets aside examples and says on pure reason, one leader is far more effective than multiple leaders sharing power. This is a key point. Strong, unified leadership can respond faster in a crisis. While later presidents face different kinds of challenges, Hamilton's reasoning still explains why the Constitution gave power to a single executive.
SPEAKER_00Whenever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always a danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is a peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity from either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical emergencies of the state.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton emphasizes that dividing executive power creates conflict. Arguments among leaders can slow or even block critical government actions, especially in emergencies. In a situation like Harding's administration or FDR's wartime leadership, a single strong executive can act decisively. Hamilton's point: too many leaders share power. The government may stall during a crisis.
SPEAKER_00And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who compose the magistracy.
SPEAKER_01So again, multiple leaders can divide the public too, with different groups supporting different executives, which can cause chaos and weaken trust in government. Hamilton's warning connects to how presidents like Harding and FDR had to maintain public confidence. Unified leadership helps keep citizens focused on common goals rather than splitting loyalty.
SPEAKER_00Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indisputable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor and by all the motives of personal infallibility to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton again is noting a human tendency that people resist ideas simply because they didn't create them. This is even worse when leadership is shared. People may constantly argue and obstruct.
SPEAKER_00Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking with horror to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may in its consequences afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice in the human character.
SPEAKER_01Even good, well-meaning people sometimes let pride or stubbornness get in the way. Hamilton warns that personal ego can harm the public if too many people are in charge. He asks us to see the harm that stubbornness and vanity cause in government. It's not just a theory, it affects real outcomes.
SPEAKER_00Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature. But it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious.
SPEAKER_01So some disagreements are okay in Congress because debate helps make good laws. But Hamilton argues that the executive should not have these problems. A strong president needs to act without constant internal conflict.
SPEAKER_00In the legislature, promptitude of decision is often an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct statutory plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law and resistance to it punishable.
SPEAKER_01Hamilton explains why debate in Congress is good. It encourages careful thought and prevents rash decisions. Once a law passes, everyone has to follow it. So delay isn't always bad.
SPEAKER_00But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive which are most necessary ingredients in its composition. Vigor and expedition and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything must be apprehended from its plurality.
SPEAKER_01Disagreement in the executive office has no upside. It only slows down or blocks action and it weakens the president's ability to lead effectively. Hamilton's reasoning helps us understand why executive authority mattered so much and FDR's wartime leadership. Too many conflicting voices could have endangered critical decisions. This connects with how FDR needed unified power to act during World War II, a lesson Hamilton laid out more than 150 years earlier.
SPEAKER_00It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is to the plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form enumeration. The sect, but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary that operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tinture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and deliberatusness.
SPEAKER_01Hamilton is warning that even a well-meaning executive council can slow action. This reinforces why the Constitution gave a single president the authority to act decisively, as later seen in Lincoln and FDR's presidencies.
SPEAKER_00But one of the weightiest objections to the plurality in the executive and which lies as much against the last as the first plan is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man in public trust will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible amidst mutual accusations to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity and under such plausible appearances that the public opinion is left in suspense about its real author.
SPEAKER_01Think of this in terms of presidential legacies. A single executive makes it easier for history to judge their choices. From Harding's Teapot Dome controversies to FDR's wartime decisions. Hamilton explains that if multiple leaders share power, blame is often dodged. People argue over who caused the bad outcome, leaving the public confused and frustrated.
SPEAKER_00I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point. These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task if there happened to be a collusion between the parties involved? How easy is it to clothe the circumstance with so much ambiguity as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties? In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council that is in the appointment to offices, have seen the mischiefs of it. In the view now under consideration, scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant that all parties have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination, while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests may have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals I will descend to particulars.
SPEAKER_01Hamilton gives real examples of leaders hiding behind councils. This makes it easier for a leader to avoid responsibility and for the council to avoid it as well. It undermines public confidence.
SPEAKER_00It is evident from these considerations that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power. First, the restraints of public opinion which lose their efficacy, as well on the account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall. And secondly, the opportunity of discovering with faculty and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust in order either to their removal from office or their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.
SPEAKER_01Hamilton explains that if executive power is shared, the public loses two key protections. The ability to judge the leaders' actions clearly, and to the ability to hold them accountable for mistakes or corruption.
SPEAKER_00In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate, and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace that he is unaccountable for his administration and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for any advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department for an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.
SPEAKER_01So Hamilton contrasts the British monarchy with a republic. The king can act without being punished, so a council is needed to provide some accountability. Even with a council, the king has ultimate power and can ignore advice. Hamilton shows that true accountability only exists when one leader is responsible in a system where people can judge him or her.
SPEAKER_00But in a republic where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American Republic, it would serve to destroy or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.
SPEAKER_01A council in Britain works because the king isn't personally accountable. In the US, adding a council would weaken accountability, not strengthen it.
SPEAKER_00The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of Republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If that maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be deep, solid, and ingenious, that the executive power is more easily confined when it is one, that is far more safe there, should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people, and in a word, that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
SPEAKER_01Hamilton acknowledges that states often used executive councils because people feared one person having too much power. But he argues that dividing power actually makes it harder for citizens to keep that power in check. A single leader can be watched more closely.
SPEAKER_00A little consideration will satisfy us that the species of security sought in the multiplication of the executive is attainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than to the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power therefore is placed in the hands of so small a number of men as to admit of their interest and views being easily combined in a common enterprise by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused than if it be lodged in the hands of one man who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected as to who cannot unite so great a mass of influence and when he is associated with others.
SPEAKER_01So in our system of government, Hamilton acknowledges that we have the executive branch, the president, then you have the legislative branch, which would be Congress, and then the judicial branch, which would be the courts. So he warns that if multiple leaders team up at the executive branch, they could have more power than a single executive, and it would be harder to check. A lone president can't hide behind others, and the public can easily identify wrongdoing.
SPEAKER_00The Demivers of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any one of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than the body. From six to a dozen have been suggested for the numbers of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination, and from such a combination America would have more to fear than from the ambition of any single individual. A counsel to a magistrate who is himself responsible for what he does are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense, though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of the government would form an item in the catalog of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal unity. I will only add that prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the states who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the unity of the executive of the state was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.
SPEAKER_01Alright, so in the end, Hamilton uses a Roman Empire example. When ten leaders joined together, they became more dangerous than one ruler alone. Hamilton also notes that practical issues cost delays and hiding of mistakes. This reinforces why the founders rejected a shared presidency. It could enable conspiracy, weaken action, and make it difficult for the citizens to hold anyone accountable. Lessons that echo through later presidencies. Thank you for joining us as we explored Alexander Hamilton's argument for a single energetic executive. When he wrote this in 1788, the United States was still an experiment, twelve years old, a preteen. The framers didn't yet know whether a republic this large could survive. Hamilton believed that if the nation wanted both liberty and stability, the presidency needed to be strong, but also accountable, and that's key. His warning was clear. When leadership becomes divided or unclear, the people suffer. When responsibility is united in one office, the public knows who to praise for success and who to question when things do go wrong. Today this debate continues. How strong should a president be? What powers are necessary to protect the nation, and what limits are essential to protect our freedoms? Hamilton's ideas help us understand the balance we are still striving for between energy and restraint, security and liberty, leadership and accountability. As you listen to the presidents in our upcoming episodes, Harding defending normalcy, an FDR arguing for progress during a crisis, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, keep Hamilton's words in mind. The Constitution expects presidents to act boldly when needed, but never without responsibility to the people. Thanks for joining us and stay curious. History has a lot to say if we're just willing to listen. Thank you.
