Putin's Gamble and the geopolitical chess game

Prof. Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Dublin City University is back in the concluding part of our wide-ranging and important discussion.
This WEEK on "The MOST Important Thing Podcast"...Discover how these power dynamics shape the conflict and influence global stability.
And if you think Geopolitics still doesn't matter, it's time to wake up!

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

Well he was very scarred. In Dresden, you know, he was there was the Stasi, which was the East German secret police, and then there was the KGB element of which he was a part. And, you know, as the popular mobilization, the democratic impulse took hold. I mean, is NATO enlargement, as the Kremlin would maintain, is that the cause of Russia's imperial actions towards its neighbors? Or is it Russian imperial actions towards its neighbors that leads to NATO enlargement? Because, you know, when Russia expands, it expands through invasion and occupation. When NATO or the EU enlarges, it does so usually because a country petitions to join. There is a process, you have to get the consensus of all existing members, and it can take years in the case of the EU.

SPEAKER_02 0:44

Welcome to the most important thing. The podcast where leading voices in finance, economics, investment, and geopolitics share the one idea they believe matters most. Renowned broadcaster Ivan Yeats and finance expert Dr. Alan O'Sullivan will uncover for you what actually matters. In a noisy world, clarity is power. Here, we focus on the principles and insights that endure long after the headlines fade. This is the most important thing.

SPEAKER_01 1:14

I recently spoke with Professor Duncan O'Baccoin. He is a professor of politics at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. We had a very wide range in conversation. Part one of that interview took place last week. And the second part of the interview, we covered a wide range of geopolitical topics focusing on the shifting dynamics of global power. We discussed the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world, highlighting the decline of the US and the rise of China. We explore the ambitions of leaders like Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping, and emphasized their desire over for spheres of influence. And this has become even more important when we hear the likes of Mark Kearney talking about middle powers. We then delve into the complexities of international relations, including the Chicago Trap, which is this notion of rising and declining powers clashing. We discuss Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's ambitions in Taiwan, and the role of drones in modern warfare. We touch on the political landscape in Europe, particularly in Hungary, after the recent election win for Peter Meyer's party. We concluded the interview with a reflection on the importance of democratic values. Geopolitics has been a common trend so far in this podcast series, and that reflects the changing dynamic world which we live in, and we need to have an understanding of international affairs, geopolitics, this new multipolar world, if we are to profit in relation to our portfolio construction, in relation to our investment ideas. Hope you enjoy the interview, and more importantly, I hope you find it useful. In terms of broadening out the conversation a bit then, Donekia, in terms of we hear a lot about these uh multipolarity now, uh we're moving, transitioning away from uh a bipolar world where we see a decline in in the US for a whole range of reasons. Uh debt, uh trade, uh just society societal issues, and we get into this kind of spheres of influence uh positioning where it seems that Putin has an ally in terms of that uh outlook with Donald Trump and perhaps Xi Jinping as as well, which is a bit worrying to say the least.

SPEAKER_00 3:46

Oh, absolutely, and I I think you hit the nail on the head there uh that you know all those three leaders that you mentioned, uh to varying degrees and with different tactics and strategies and perspectives and temperaments, uh converge on this desire for a sphere of influence. Um so Donald Trump has said, you know, he wants Canada to be the 51st state, he wants Greenland, and indeed has made all sorts of threats to Denmark and indeed you might say Europe collectively and his NATO allies, uh, who he constantly refers to as them or they, it's not we. Um he talks about getting Panama back. Um, you know, he is certainly looking for at least hemispheric in uh you know dominance, and you know, they constantly emphasize that they are the preeminent economy, they have the largest military, so that hemispheric dominance is a prerequisite for global dominance in many respects. And this comes, of course, as a time, as we know, when the US economy has been in relative decline for some years. So you might say this is a desperate gamble on their part, uh, alienating allies and adversaries at the same time. Um China is is the is the economy on the rise. Um there is a uh kind of a theory in international relations or a notion of what they call the the Thucydides trap. Uh it was formulated by Roy Allison. Essentially, one of the dangerous times uh of any situation is when you have a rising power and a declining power. Uh, both of them think that they can take the other. Um certainly the US still thinks it's pre-eminent. China certainly is playing a long game, but quietly thinking that it's uh going to be pre-eminent soon. And then you have Russia, which as I said is not a major economy, um, but is uh a major supplier, of course, of China fossil fuels. Uh in relative terms, I should add, because I I I'm old enough to remember when the Russian economy and the Soviet economy was was greater than the Chinese one. In fact, during the Cold War, it was quite clear that China was the junior partner if indeed there was a partnership. Now China's economy is ten times greater than Russia's. Um and and so but Russia has, as I said, it's also an ambition, maybe a more clearly articulated ambition, of uh dominating its neighborhood. And of course, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is just a clear illustration of that. But you know, there are other countries in the neighborhood who are also uh fearful. I mean, I I interviewed Maya Sandu, the president of Moldova, for example, and and she's adamant that were it not for Ukraine, uh, you know, Moldova would have been next. They would, if they'd made their way to Odessa, for example, where uh you know they are on record as saying repeatedly they consider the Russians, I mean, they consider it to be a Russian city. If they've made their way to Odessa, they were just two or three hours away from Kisinow, the capital of Moldova, and they already have a separatist uh region in Moldova that they could have uh uh annexed as well. So and then of course, with China, you have you know Xi Jinping's regime, you know, muscling into the South China Sea, you know, uh the Vietnamese are worried, the Filipinos are worried, but of course, most importantly, perhaps the the Taiwanese are worried. I was in Taiwan uh in January of this year, and uh they they also see this as a very unpredictable time because of course the US was traditionally I mean it's the the level it was willing to support Taiwan has always been unclear, but I think it's it's I think they're less sure now than they ever were that the US would would would help if China were to invade. Uh that level of ambiguity perhaps is gone. Indeed, in many respects the Americans are blackmailing the Taiwanese, getting them to to invest more in America as a kind of a a way of um giving America vested interest in supporting Taiwan. Um and so yeah, I mean we we live with those kind of three major powers and and three leaders with, as I said, despite that they having different temperaments, all willing to concede to a certain extent spheres of influence to others as long as their interests are acknowledged by their peers.

SPEAKER_01 7:40

I I interviewed uh Louis Vincent Gav of GavCal Research uh a few months back, and we it was around the time of that infamous meeting of um President Um Belensky and Selinsky, sorry, uh, and uh Trump in in the Oval Office. And we all know what happened, but essentially the security blanket that the the US was offering the likes uh of its European allies has been uh removed and it's all transactional now. It's like okay, you want protection, well, have you got we want your mineral rights? It's just blatant, uh not hiding it. Perhaps we see other US administrations, Iraq, it obviously had to do with oil, the black stuff, but Trump is a different uh character. Um in terms then of I can't let you mention Taiwan, and it's fascinating again that you were actually on the ground there, Donica, but has the recent US activity in the Middle East, the blatant aggression with Iran and the Israelis as well involved in that, um increased the chances of a Chinese move on Taiwan?

SPEAKER_00 8:55

I don't think it has necessarily increased or decreased because China's playing a much longer game than Trump has patience for. Um and uh and this is where I think they differ from from the Kremlin and Putin. Uh he is you know a gambler, um, and he has gambled over the years, but he's kind of he has been up until you might say the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Um I wouldn't say a cautious gambler, but a gambler who knew how much he could bite off. Uh so Chechnya was, of course, his first war. It was relatively manageable, it was popular at home. Um and then, of course, you had the intervention in Georgia in 2008, uh, which again was a five-day war, it was popular at home, achieved his strategic objectives, minimal cost. Uh, you had Crimea, of course, in 2014, and and the stimulation of conflict in the Donbass region. Again, it was considered a success from his perspective. There was minimal response uh or repercussions from the West. So the lesson he learned is that this kind of gamble paid off. Um, and as I said, he went a step too far, of course, as he now knows, uh, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But China uh tends to be different in that respect. And I think what we see with um uh the Chinese objectives with Taiwan is that they are suffocating Taiwan. Um, it's a slow strangulation uh of them politically, diplomatically, economically, militarily. I mean, they are testing them continuously uh with these military exercises. I mean, Taiwan is a country of 20 million people. Geographically, it's smaller than Ireland. Uh, it's spending a huge proportion of its economy just to be what they call a porcupine or a hedgehog. They want, they they they know, of course, that they are not a threat to anybody else, but they want to, um, because they're in Ireland, of course, and they're they're a good hundred kilometers plus off the coast of China, they want to give the impression to China that it would be very costly militarily um for them to invade Taiwan. Uh, but that costs a lot of money for the Taiwanese. They have a demographic that's declining at one of the lowest uh birth rates in the world. And that's of course a concern when your adversary is um, you know, with India uh the most populated uh region of the world. So it's it's um I I don't think that it's it's going to be necessarily linked to this uh war in the Middle East. As I said, I think it's more uh connected, um, I see certainly this is how the Taiwanese see it with with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, because this is a clear attempt to acquire new territory. I mean, the US is trying to, well, it's sometimes very unclear what the US is trying to do in Iran, and and they're they they they revise their own uh objectives daily. Um, but if we are to take the the uh other regimes at their word, um, you know, the Russians are trying to acquire territory um in um in Ukraine in a way that will say the United States is not trying to acquire in Iran, but China is trying to acquire uh additional territory, uh, it is trying to uh uh uh acquire uh Taiwan. How the war ends in Ukraine uh I think will have a bigger influence on um China's calculations. Because if Russia you know manages to come away from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine with additional territory, uh and of course the people who live in that territory, we can't forget that, um, it will send a signal, it will certainly create a precedent where you know you can revise uh borders um by force and you know suffer you know minimal consequences to the regime, assuming the Kremlin survives and and Putin survives. That was never, of course, always uh clear. Uh we've seen, of course, it's now forgotten the Pragossian Rebellion of June 2023, when it seemed during that uh momentous Saturday that uh the Kremlin was going to uh be overwhelmed by this invading force uh coming from the south. Um war is always dangerous for dictatorships. It's a point I often make um because you know, democracies generally have a certain consensus uh when they go to war. Um that's where Trump is a bit of an outlier, by the way. He he didn't get kind of uh an electoral mandate of any kind uh for this war, and he certainly didn't go fighting in Iran with the majority of Americans behind him. Opinion polls demonstrate that. But for dictatorships, they're particularly dangerous. Uh as the Argentinians discovered when they uh attacked uh the the Malvinas, the Falkland Islands in 1982, the regime collapsed when they uh suffered military defeat. Because, you know, when a when a dictatorship loses a war, it loses also that perception that it has a monopoly of coercive power, which is an essential ingredient for any dictatorship. Um and and that's why I think the Chinese would be cautious. They will wait until, as I said, Taiwan looks extraordinarily vulnerable after they've been weakened by a thousand cuts. Uh Russia um, you know, made the gamble with the full scale invasion of Ukraine. It's already suffering as a result, but the regime is is still intact. But uh but Donald Trump, you know, he seems to have uh the only thing that's you know, because I know he has a policy of uh uh against diversity and equality and inclusion, the only thing that seems to be inclusive about him is the range of countries he's willing to consider uh applying pressure to and and intimidating in one form or another. So that's that that is one of the reasons why yes, we live in a in an unstable world, one in which you know none of the major parties um they've made it clear adhere to international law, even even to genoflect in this direction.

SPEAKER_01 14:16

So you mentioned uh Ukraine there, uh Dunika. I mean there there are ports, and you you're closer to this than than than I am, but that the the drone warfare that the Ukrainians are utilizing is uh providing good results on the battlefield in terms of massive uh Russian casualties. Um But i are we seeing a bit of a turn or w where what is the status at the moment in terms of this attritional war that we're seeing?

SPEAKER_00 14:45

Well, we have seen some um positive results for Ukraine, the Ukrainian military forces in the last couple of months. But if you're to take a longer view, uh which I tend to do and try and identify trends, what we really have is is is a military stalemate. Um and you know, if you look at the amount of territory, for example, that Russia has as annexed or uh is in occupation of in Ukraine, um, it's more or less the same percentage of Ukraine, about 19% as it was in the uh the late spring, early summer of 2022. So that's four years uh when Russia hasn't advanced. So it's really you know half full, half empty. On the one hand, you know, Russia is still uh you know attacking Ukraine every night. I was in Ukraine last summer, for example, in an area that wouldn't be as exposed to missiles and and drones as much as others. Um, but still, every night, you know, 500 missiles plus were coming in uh with drones, and and uh there were alerts to to tell people where to go and what to do in those circumstances. Now that's often more than a thousand tonight. Um but the Ukrainians have uh also adapted very well, and they are now world leaders um in drone technology. I mean, and about 80% of battlefield casualties, uh I'm told now are on both sides are caused by unmanned systems. And indeed, those those recent successes that the Ukrainians have enjoyed apparently are a result of drones uh and unmanned vehicles essentially um moving forward. Uh I've even seen Russian soldiers being arrested uh by, again, technology essentially, unmanned uh technology rather than actual people. So warfare has changed. And that in fact, that's one of the reasons why, um, one of the many reasons, why Trump didn't get that quick military victory that he was hoping for in Iran. Um, you know, Iran was producing those Shahi drones and supplying them to Russia for their invasion of Ukraine. Um, and there was, of course, the conflict which almost nobody remembers, brutal one in uh Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That was the first real test, testing ground for drones in many respects, back in 2020. Uh 2023, it concluded there was around two, um, 150,000 people uh were ethnically cleansed from the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Um But the the what was remarkable about that again was the importance of drones. And these were at the time uh the the Bayakht R drones from Turkey. Um but as I said, the Iranian drones are important, the Russians and Ukrainians are now producing their own drones, so it has transformed warfare in a way. Um and we are left with this stalemate. Uh, unfortunately, Russia has so shown no signs that it it wants to give up on its objectives to acquire as much of Ukraine uh as as it can. Unfortunately, it's been emboldened by the um administration of Donald Trump, who has uh tried to coerce uh the Ukrainians to hand over territory which the Russians have not been able to acquire, you know, despite trying for 12 years, because really the first invasion uh goes back to 2014, and there are cities uh like Kramatorsk, for example, uh in the Genex region, which they've been trying for 12 years to acquire, and they haven't been able to. And Donald Trump is saying, you know, if you're interested in peace, you should hand these over uh to Russia. Um uh but the Ukrainians know, uh, apart from the fact that there are people living there who don't want to be part of Russia, and they've seen what happens to people when they are forcibly uh occupied uh by Russia, they also know that strategically it would be uh a killer blow for Ukraine because these are fortress cities which protect Russians from further advancing, and after that you have relatively open planes, uh it would make it much easier for Russia to simply you know use a ceasefire to re-arm, to regroup and and then to uh move beyond uh those fortress cities. So uh there it it's it's really depressing. Uh and I know that when I talk about this, you know, we talk about drones and technology and territory, it's so impersonal. Uh we we we lose sight of the people's lives who have been affected uh in in in so many ways. Um, you know, I can't.

SPEAKER_01 18:50

I know the idea of the casualties, uh Doneke, because I get a lot of figures. I hear a lot of figures, I mean, and I agree with you, like we we kind of we kind of look at this stuff very coldly, but I mean, have you any idea of the casualties on the Russian side and the Ukraine side? Deaths?

SPEAKER_00 19:08

The the figures that uh are often by you might say trustworthy sources put out there is that the Russians in terms of casualties doesn't mean deaths, it means also people who are you know unable to uh serve militarily again, um, so they're could be killed in action, could be hospitalized, could have lost a limb. We're talking about one million plus. Um and again, it's it that's the that's the minimum is one million, it's it it it could be as many as as 1.2 million. The Ukrainians have lost less for a variety of reasons, but still the figures would be something in the region of maybe half a million, four hundred thousand, five hundred thousand. They do have the advantage of the defender. Um, they are, of course, a different type of soldier in many respects. I mean, the the the Russians have uh put together an army which is uh less voluntary, you might say. I mean, it's it's Pragoshin was uh in particular adept at emptying the prisons, offering people uh an amnesty uh for whatever crimes they'd committed in pr that brought into prison if they would fight in Ukraine and survive after six months. After six months of fighting in Ukraine, they were giving an amnesty. So, of course, the the more serious your crime, uh the bigger an incentive you had to take up that contract. But I I I'm just back from you know Central Asia, uh, and large numbers of people, you know, from Central Asia, they're economic migrants in Russia, um, their own economies don't do that well. Uh, Russia provides all sorts of opportunities to work in menial jobs, but many of them go to Russia on the understanding that they're going to work in menial jobs, and then they are pushed into fighting uh in Ukraine. They're often offered citizenship, uh, and then they're told that the first uh duty of citizenship is to fight in Ukraine. And then you have all those ethnic minorities within Russia that we often don't hear about. The the the the the people of Tuva, for example, uh the people in Boyatia, you're much more likely to die fighting in Ukraine. Uh if you're from Boyatia, uh place I visited many, many times, uh Boyat people, they're Mongol people essentially, Russified Mongol people who are Buddhist traditionally. Um, you're much more likely to die fighting in Ukraine if you're from that far eastern region of the Russian Federation than if you're from Moscow or St. Petersburg.

SPEAKER_01 21:10

Um, just a fascinating insight because uh a lot of us less informed would be looking at this, seeing huge casualties, and just assuming that this can't go on forever. I mean, at what point do the rush Russian society say, you know, enough is enough, but but it seems that it's much more complex than that, and that the pool of potential fighters that Putin has is vast and deep. Is that is that fair?

SPEAKER_00 21:38

I mean, usually you have diplomatic negotiations that might lead somewhere when you have a mutually hurting stalemate when both sides have uh a reason to negotiate. Uh as of yet, I mean Ukraine has said, uh you know, more or less from the moment Trump first put forward the idea, uh which is now more than a year ago, that there should be you know uh an immediate ceasefire. That was Trump's major. Ceasefire, then negotiations. The Ukrainians from the beginning have said yes to ceasefire, yes to negotiations, and the Russians have said no to ceasefire, which is the very first step. They said we we we we continue the killings. Uh when you want to negotiate with us, fine, but we'll we'll continue killing in the meantime. And and they've made it clear that the starting price for any meaningful negotiations are more or less conceding, as I said, what uh in advance, what Russia has not been able to acquire militarily after many years of trying. You see, it's again, it's important to stress the difference between a democracy, which and we're used to thinking in that way, where you know uh our government prioritizes housing, health, education, transport. We of course always argue that it never spends enough, never does enough, but they are the priorities. In a dictatorship such as that governed from the Kremlin, the priorities are not the same. The main priority is staying in power. And the supplementary objectives are projecting power. Um, you know, so whereas Mi Hall Martin or, you know, Simon Harris, when they retire, Leo Veradker is already retired. I mean, they look forward to lecture tours, you know, uh spending more time perhaps with their family and friends, writing memoirs. Uh with dictatorships, it's very different. Um you stay in power until you die because you can't trust anyone to devolve power to. And and and that you and you you're you're isolated from the people because you don't rely on external aid, uh, you don't rely on domestic taxation. The fossil fuels that Russia generates, I mean, 77% of Russia's in Siberia. Siberia is one of the earliest areas colonized and conquered by by uh the Russians. Uh, that's where all the raw materials and the wealth comes from, and it goes directly into the Kremlin's coffers. So they have a certain insularity from democratic pressures, as we would call them, that you don't have in consolidated democracies. That's number one. That's not to say that there aren't patriotic Russians who genuinely uh believe uh in the cause that this special military operation uh involves. And and of course, there is also that element um that, you know, when my country's at war, I don't want my country to lose. Um it's always hard to get, by the way, an accurate sense of what Russians are thinking, because uh, you know, you can't carry out normal opinion polls. I mean, you can't stop somebody in the street or call them up via telephone and say, do you think the war in Ukraine is a good idea? Do you do you think Vladimir Putin's doing a good job? People will there's not an there's not sufficient trust there for people to give their honest answers. So we we we we rely on different barometers, which, you know, and and one interesting one for me, I mentioned briefly already Evgeny Pragoshin's rebellion of 2023, a remarkable um time. Uh what struck me and my abiding memory is that he managed to conquer, or not even conquer, take Rostovon Don, one of the top ten cities in Russia, without a fight. Uh this was the headquarters of Russia's military operation uh for fighting in Ukraine. And then he he marched 800 kilometers through Russia in a single day without resistance. You know, so it was like the whole Russian nation was sitting on the couch uh waiting to see how things would pan out. They didn't seem to feel they had a vested interest in taking a side. And Putin must know that when he goes to bed at night, that you know, he doesn't have that affection, um, that loyalty, that people ultimately, if a if a more powerful person can dislodge him, people will more or less accept that as the new reality and acquiesce to it.

SPEAKER_01 25:27

Yeah, it looks really, really interesting, Donica. Uh I'd like to finish up maybe um looking, and you mentioned it's all very depressing in fairness what's going on in in in in the Russian-Ukraine war or the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to put it more correctly. Uh, but looking at perhaps a bright spark, uh we had what would we describe as the illiberal democracy of uh Viktor Orban in in Hungary, and we're recording this on the 17th of April, and we were a week since uh Peter Magar, I think you pronounce his name, uh won the election in Hungary, his TISA party. But what struck for me was that there was a huge turnout, 80%, something like 80% turnout, number one, which was really impressive, and number two was the scale of his victory. Uh so there's two things that jumped out for me. What's your reading of it?

SPEAKER_00 26:24

Yeah, I mean, obviously it was the result that we were hoping for in a two-horse race. Nobody uh, I think, in in Democratic Europe wanted to see Victor Orban returned uh for another term. Um, but I wouldn't be as optimistic and euphoric as many of the commentators and political leaders have been. Um I mean Peter McGee is is is not uh a liberal uh opposition figure in the traditional sense. He joined Friday Orban's party when he was 21. He has spent his entire adult life a member of Fidej. He left it only two years ago. Um so his political maturity was very much and and loyalty and he in and he thrived in Fridej. I think that he probably made a rational assessment of his prospects within Fridej. Um I can't speak about his, I guess, personal motivations with with any degree of conviction. He's still a largely unknown quantity. His own objectives are quite uh modest. Uh so for example, I think he'll remove the veto that Hungary uh had applied to the 90 billion package uh going to Ukraine. I mean, that's the least that could be expected. But Hungary won't contribute or participate in that uh loan uh itself. He, on many fundamentals, is uh at one uh with Orban, for example, on things like migration. He's talking about, of course, reversing some of those democratic, that democratic backsliding that had occurred under Viktor Orban. Of course, that's in his own interests. For example, for example, he gave a speech on state television uh last night or the other night, uh, where he more or less said that state television was going to be completely reformed, it was fake news essentially, and that it had been conspiring against him, it was like North Korea. You know, that's great to hear because state television was indeed a propagandistic tool of the regime, but at the same time, it's also in his interests to reform in that way. So I don't see him as kind of like a major um you know icon of the democratic movement. I think we're we're we are still in a very precarious situation. We have many, mini Trumps in Europe, and they are, you know, Russia has been supporting them for many years, um, financially, politically, diplomatically, and now we have a US administration which is reaching out to, like, for example, Alternative for Deutschland uh in Germany, the the the very far right party, and and of course they tried to help Orban. That was one of the silver linings. But but just going back to the election result just briefly, I think also that we can't underestimate that people want to change after 16 years and and that it was natural that they would look for an alternative that you know wasn't a huge risk, but wasn't more of the same. But uh the global picture is is still rather dark, the European picture is rather dark because we've seen the damage that a country like Hungary can um can inflict on the European Union project by the use of the veto. Uh in my book, for example, I g I I give the salutary lesson of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth uh of the 18th century. Um this was you know a very powerful regime uh stretching from the Baltic Sea almost to the Black Sea. Uh and they had a very democratic, for its time, uh political system, which allowed a veto for any parliamentarian uh in the same, which was the name of the parliament. And and what happened was, of course, is that the Russians began to buy individual parliamentarians, the Prussians also, but the Russians were particularly good at it, and they would veto uh the legislation and it paralyzed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. And then through a number of annexations in the late 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was no more. It was divided up between the rival uh dictatorships, the the empires, the Prussians, the Austro-Hungarians, and the Russians. Now, the European Union, you know, with this kind of need for unanimity and consensus, surrounded by Trump's US, Putin's uh Russia, and of course Xi's China in the background, you know, will have to consolidate. I mean, there's a lot of power in Europe, but I think there's not a lot of confidence. Uh, and it's it's um I think the social contract, uh, this goes back to why people are elected and why we why autocrats are doing well around the world and democrats and democracies are perhaps in decline or in uh they're on the back step, is that the social contract is changing, the fundamental social contract is changing. Um, you know, if you if you go back to the the 19th century, for example, um, you know, when uh social democracy uh was first being developed as a potential solution to the problems that existed. What did we have? We had uh a huge reservoir of the unemployed, we had people desperate for work, we had, you know, as Karl Marx was the first to not the first, but one of the main ones to be pointing out, we had um, you know, bourgeoisie who were able to say to workers, workers would come in the morning and they would say, I'll take you, you, you, you, the rest of you know work today, maybe come back tomorrow. And how did we get uh around that? How did we create a system which delivered for the majority, not for the few? We created a strong nation state. And then, of course, after World War II, uh a welfare state was established where people had basic uh rights, rights to health, right to education, right to kind of security in work, security of tenure, all those kinds of things. That social contract is beginning to, and not only beginning, it's it's it's coming undone. Um, and now international global corporations are able to wield the same power that those people did in the 19th century. They're able to go around in to individual countries uh and say to like, I'll take you Ireland, I'll take you the Philippines, uh, I'll take you Morocco, uh, the rest of you, uh, no, no investment for you, no work for you. And they they are competing like those individuals were in the 19th century. And and therefore the only solution, the only way you can take on these strong um international elements, as I said, which are stronger than individual nation states, is as you cooperate. Uh, and that's what the European Union project, I think, uh is about. That's where its greatest potential lies. It's the only collective force um that can withstand those pressures, potentially. Uh, and that's why, by the way, um, it's a target for Putin's Russia, it's a target for uh Trump's America. Both of them loathe the EU. Both of them say quite openly that they prefer the EU doesn't it wouldn't exist, and they try to undermine it in every way. Uh they prefer to meet the leaders of individual nation states within Europe rather than the EU institutions, uh, because they realize that Europe, uh the European Union is the only potential um institution which can withstand their pressure. So this is where we're at. I mean, obviously the result in Hungary, you know, was a welcome result, but I I wouldn't uh collapse uh in a sense of relief. Uh the the the this this is a a punctuation mark, uh, but the story goes on, and uh, you know, we we could end up with a situation as I sometimes fear that liberal democracy is kind of a fleeting moment in history. You have to remember that most of human history is the power dominating, the powerful dominating the weak, the strong dominating the weak. It's very Darwinian, it's very Habesian, um, it's very unfair. And we have tried to create international orders, legal orders, rules, international rules to to restrain that kind of natural dynamic from taking place. But I think what we're seeing now is that's unraveling and uh where we end up, well, we don't know yet.

SPEAKER_01 33:33

I think our our lived experience, this so-called global peace dividend, arose from you know, the misery and disaster of World War II and all the institutions that were created there. They were created as a as a consequence of all that misery, and we we often forget that. And just the point I'd make on your social contract, you talked about Trump. I always say to the students that President Trump didn't emerge in a vacuum. You could go back to China's ascension to the WTO, all this hollowing out of the middle class that happened, you know, you we followed the rules, it just didn't it hasn't worked out for us. We want to try something else, and that you know, populism thrives in that type of environment, I think. Uh populist politics. But just a final point. I share your pessimism on on Hungary, uh uh also, Dodik, uh, because just for something that might get your opinion on, finally, is that am I right in saying that Hungary is very reliant, number one, on cheap Russian energy? That's the first thing I I I would say. And what another interesting point I would say is that Orban fulfilled a very interesting and useful role for perhaps some of the European countries that weren't as enthusiastic about Ukraine. He perhaps was a mudguard as such. That mudguard now is gone. So it might reveal some interesting uh consequences over the next couple of months.

SPEAKER_00 35:05

No, no, very true. Um there were countries perhaps hiding behind uh Hungary, as people did behind the United Kingdom uh before before Brexit. So the European Union, as I said, it's its greatest strength is its diversity and the fact that it has 27 members and that it's democratic in character, but that's also its greatest weakness. It's it's it's it's Achilles heel. And um so the I think that this gives us, I think, a moment for reflection, uh, what worked in Hungary, what might work for for the rest of Europe, um, because uh without sounding too dramatic, um, I think that if if Europe doesn't consolidate and and protect the values, the democratic values, I mean Europe has many imperfections, but the fact that we still choose who will govern us is a very fundamental thing that makes us different from most of the world's population. If we can't protect that and protect similar like-minded countries like Taiwan, I mean, in this globalized world, it's not just geography that matters, it's values, and values are also globalized, uh, and therefore, in many respects, Taiwan is a neighbor of Europe uh in a way that will say Russia may be geographically a neighbor, but politically is on the other side of the world. Um, that if we don't protect those and find ways to uh enhance uh our own standing and and uh our own place in in the world, I think that we may go into irreversible retreat. It has happened before in human history, and we have had very dark days in in Europe when we haven't been able to withstand uh authoritarian leaders who, as I said, wanted to impose their will and their way of life uh on others. So the stakes are are very high. And um, you know, hopefully, as I said, we've been at this crossroads before. Ultimately, we came out at the right end of it with the the European project. As you say, it was a product of World War II, as was the United Nations. Hopefully, we'll find our way back on that main road again because we have taken a very uh worrying detour.

SPEAKER_01 37:01

Uh before we finish up, uh Donica, you you you have uh your latest book, Unfinished Empire, uh examines, as I said, Russian imperialism, the war in Ukraine. I will put links to that. You're a prolific author. I mean, you've done written books about the Kennedys, uh obviously lots of work on Irish politics and and other international uh political topics. Um how can people follow you? Uh I I know you're uh professor of politics at Dublin City University, but uh is is that your latest book? Is are you working on any other projects at the moment? Because I know people will want to follow your work.

SPEAKER_00 37:40

Yeah, I am. Uh I have a few in the pipeline. I'm not kind of uh I'm always wary of publicizing them too far in advance because then uh people uh are are if you if you don't meet your own internal deadlines, uh you know, it it kind of uh can can seem like uh you're under delivering or whatnot. So I have I have uh actually three book contracts uh that I'm working on somewhat simultaneously, uh, and I'm hoping to put together a documentary uh uh in the coming year uh more or less focusing, yes, on on kind of the state of of global affairs. Uh that's that's with the an independent documentary maker. So I I have yeah, uh a lot uh in the pipeline. Fortunately, if people want to find me, it's it Google is is is enough because uh for better or for worse, uh I never have a right to be anonymous because my name is unique, uh Donaco Bachhoin. Uh I'm not a Brian Murphy or a John Kelly. Uh I have many friends with those names, and uh so I'm very easy to find and locate. Uh that might that might be a a curse if I get into trouble later in life, but uh at the moment uh it's easy to find me and for all the right reasons.

SPEAKER_01 38:43

You've been very generous with your time, uh, a real expert uh in this area, and we really appreciate you giving us your expertise. Uh thanks again, Donica.

SPEAKER_00 38:54

Thanks for the invitation, Alan. Pleasure to talk. Great conversation.

SPEAKER_01 38:58

But thank you for listening or watching on YouTube. I sincerely hope you found this episode useful. This podcast is about slowing down the conversation, of focusing on first principles and long-term thinking and the ideas that shape outcomes over time. Because when everything feels important, knowing what matters the most is your edge. It is the most important thing. It should be said and important to say that this podcast is for information and educational uses only and does not constitute financial advice. All views expressed are those of the guests and the hosts. Although I am a qualified financial advisor and I am a certified financial planner, everyone's circumstances are unique. So before you make any decision in relation to your finances, investing, or financial planning, please seek a qualified financial advisor. There's loads more to come on the most important thing, and we can't wait to see you next time. Thank you.