4.7 Updates on Iran

This week on the BRSL Weekly Brief, Professor Andrew Reddie answers questions about the Iran war, what could come next, and the impacts of the war on civilians, other Gulf countries, and the rest of the world. This podcast was recorded on Tuesday April 7, 2026 at 1pm. 

Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:06

Welcome back to the Berkeley Risk and Security Labs podcast, the BRSL Weekly Brief, where we bring you the latest information on current events from our lab experts. I'm the lab's communications manager, Vivian Bussew Skinner, and I'm here with BRSL faculty director, Professor Andrew Reddy, to discuss the latest developments on the Iran crisis. Hey Andrew.

SPEAKER_00 0:25

Hey Vivian, thanks for having me.

SPEAKER_02 0:27

Thanks for being here. So first let's address Trump's threat to wipe out a whole civilization. That's in quotes. What does this mean for civilians in Iran? And how does it how real is this threat?

SPEAKER_00 0:39

Oh, it's a it's a good question. And it's just entirely, as you can see in all of the headlines uh from today, I'll just note at the outset that we're recording at 1 p.m. Pacific time, 4 p.m. Eastern on Tuesday, April 7th. Um and as of this morning, you would have seen any number of headlines in all of the newspapers around this quote from over the weekend, um, which went alongside an expletive Leyden rant uh from the president um threatening Iran should they not open up the Strait of Hormuz. Um and, you know, and and obviously the tickers have been updating all day around this news as well as they approach a 8 p.m. Eastern time deadline to reopen the strait. Um and if they don't, the administration has threatened attacks on critical infrastructure. Um and I think the first thing that I would point out is that in the conduct of international affairs or international relations, this type of rhetoric is relatively unprecedented, uh, particularly in the context of a U.S. uh sitting president. Um and that's been reflected, and I'm sure we'll talk about some of their domestic political reactions to this as well, um, when we kind of deal with the kind of the Iranian response. Um, but I think that um that's kind of the first thing worth noting. In terms of uh to the second part of your question around what it means for uh civilians in Iran, I think there's a great deal of trepidation. Um, and you're seeing that uh when you do get uh news bulletins that are able to draw on kind of first-hand accounts of the Iranian populace, there's a lot of querying as to why the US um is uh making a threat to attack civilian infrastructure and also reflections on the various different episodes of uh collateral damage that have already happened over the last month in the country as well. There's been examples of uh bridges that have been destroyed by Israeli strikes, right, U.S. strikes leading to civilian casualties in a school. Um just over the last couple of days, we've seen an attack that ended up um hitting a synagogue in Tehran, um, which obviously, right, none of those episodes are necessarily on purpose, uh putting aside the bridge, um, but um that's another piece of it as well, in terms of like the the civilians that are hurting uh on the ground in Iran itself.

SPEAKER_02 2:56

Yeah, um and I mean you were talking about the bridge that has already been um attacked, but one of the things that Trump said was that he was going to attack uh or destroy every bridge and every power structure in the country. Um and you know, defense officials have said that that's not even actually possible in the time frame he's suggesting. But aside from that, isn't that constituting a war crime? And I guess talk a little bit about the whole idea of like dual use of um spaces like this and how they might how the tr administration might try and say it's not a war crime and what it actually means.

SPEAKER_00 3:34

Yeah, so I mean very clearly um an attack on civilian infrastructure that explicitly is targeting civilians would fall afoul of international humanitarian law, which gets internalized in the laws of armed conflict for uh U.S. service members and as a part of the um laws of war manual that ultimately they're they have to uphold. And of course, right, we can talk about the Geneva Conventions if you if you'd like as well. Ultimately, that's what it kind of goes back to. Um and so civilians are a protected class in warfare. Now, there have been some efforts in the past together a little bit creative with the definitions of what constitutes a civilian. Um so in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military took the position that military-aged males were legitimate military targets, um, and that led to all sorts of conversations um regarding IHL commitments and the laws of armed conflict um there as well. Um to be to be honest, there just hasn't been a lot of conversation or signaling from the Department of War um as to kind of how they think about uh this particular targeting regime applying or not to IHL. There have been some conversations about immediate pardons of U.S. troops that would be conducting um operations on the basis of orders like this. Um but I think that, again, you know, to the to get back to the domestic politics point that I kind of foreshadowed earlier, that's where there's been a lot of consternation, uh, primarily coming from the left, but also to some extent from the right around um whether this type of threat is even an appropriate one for a sitting U.S. president to make.

SPEAKER_02 5:12

Aaron Ross Powell Yeah, and how is Iran um reacting to these threats too? I mean, do they also it seems like they also realize that this isn't something that is actually feasible for the U.S. Aaron Powell?

SPEAKER_00 5:23

Um Well, we'll I mean we'll see. So the Iranians have withdrawn from the indirect talks that were being brokered by the Pakistanis and a number of other countries um in the region. Um and so, you know, the the progression of talks was why the US kept kind of kicking the can down the road vis-a-vis them actually conducting um this type of attack on energy infrastructure. Um and so it was it was progress in those talks that led to them kind of pushing it off, and now you're seeing these latest threats leading to uh the Iranians pulling out. And so it makes it more likely, I guess, all else equal that the U.S. would do something when that 8 p.m. Eastern deadline is hit. The degree to which it actually will look like the way that the president's been pretending and the Secretary of Defense have been pretending online remains to be seen. Um I know at some point you want to ask a little bit about whether these threats are credible or not, and I think this continual kicking of the can down the road has led to a little bit of um loss of credibility in the context of whether these threats will actually lead to meaningful military operations.

SPEAKER_02 6:32

Can you talk a little bit about how the negotiations have gone so far in this conflict and what kind of could be expected next?

SPEAKER_00 6:41

Um Yeah, so they're as I mentioned before, they're indirect. Um and so um effectively you've got intermediary countries taking messages and shuttling those messages back and forth between the Americans and the Iranians. Um the United States apparently put a ceasefire on the table. Uh the Iranians said no, that they wanted something more lasting and durable and weren't willing to sign up to a ceasefire. Um ultimately the U.S. wishes have remained relatively constant. So they want to arrest the development of nuclear uh enrichment in the Iranian state and also want to confiscate the nuclear material that's already inside of the country. Um it ostensibly they've managed to achieve the regime change that apparently that they were after vis-a-vis the attack on uh that that ultimately um led to the decapitation of Ayatollah Khameni at the beginning of the conflict. And you've seen the continuing uh targeting of military leaders in the country. Indeed, there was the the latest uh military leader was actually killed over the weekend. Um and so um that piece of it, I think, you know, the the administration appears to want to say job done. Now, of course, if regime change was the goal, this is a case where they're apparently willing to work with the regime that's still in power. Um, you know, harks back to the conversations we were having about Venezuela a few weeks ago. Um but I think that, you know, but the fact that the Iranians have withdrawn themselves from the table at this time uh suggests that we're you know heading towards a lower ebb here rather than um you know an ability to actually get these negotiations over the line in terms of creating a meaningful um a meaningful end to the and end to the crisis. Of course, it's also worth mentioning that the US doesn't you know get to make these decisions entirely on its own. Israel is the other party to the conflict gets a vote. Um and indeed they've been carrying out their own military operations, some of which the Americans approve of, and other ones which they probably all else equal wouldn't have approved of, and so um that's a that's a kind of a thorny piece of it as well, um, the degree to which the Israelis are kind of willing to kind of do things that the Americans might not be happy with.

SPEAKER_02 8:56

Yeah. Um can you talk a little bit about kind of the impacts on other Gulf states and how or you know how other countries are seeing the impacts of this and how involved they are?

SPEAKER_00 9:06

Yeah. So I mean so the third countries of the conflict, so the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, um are erstwhile allies in global affairs, right, or the British, the French, etc., are all looking at this ratcheting up of the rhetoric and are incredibly concerned. Um the European and states in particular are not very happy with the notion that you will be breaking international humanitarian law, um, and of course, um are in the midst of their own kind of bilateral conversations where the Trump administration is communicating their displeasure with um our our allies and partners um in the region and beyond. Um so we'll kind of see how that plays out. In terms of the the Gulf states, the fear is that if the Americans andor the Israelis were actually to start conducting these types of countervalue type attacks, so attacks that are ostensibly focused on civilian civilian uh targets, um, that the Iranians might respond in kind. There's been a lot of conversation about what the Iranians still have in their locker, um, indeed a lot of surprise that the Iranians were able to shoot down American planes, right? Um the F-15 and also the A-10. Um and of course we had that over the weekend as well in terms of the rescuing of uh the two pilots and then eventually the weapons officer that the administration was touting yesterday. Um and so um I think the Gulf states have reason to worry that the Iranians still have the ability to hit them. And of course, you have a broader um the the broader disposition of missile defense assets that they rely on to protect themselves from Iranian missiles and Iranian drones is getting depleted. Um now, of course, the drones and missiles are also getting depleted, but there's a big question of which kind of gets depleted first. And so I think that if you're um Dubai or the Emirates or Bahrain um or Saudi Arabia, you're worried about um about this. Um and of course, you also have the broader um regional dynamics. Of course, I know in the past we've talked about the Houthis um in Yemen. You've also got um a you know, effectively a full-on war in Lebanon at this point between Hezbollah um and Israel, leading to all sorts of civilian displacement. And so, you know, I think again, there were there was some hope that this might have been kind of petering out, but really this rhetoric suggests that we're heading in the opposite direction, uh, which is um not good news if you're one of the countries in the region.

SPEAKER_02 11:39

Yeah. So I know we wanted to talk a little bit about kind of the impact of this conflict on global um supply chains, I guess. Yeah. When you look at things like oil, I mean obviously that's something that people see the impact of immediately in the States. But what about um like other things like helium I was reading about is another big thing. Yeah. Yeah. How are these how long do you see these impacts lasting and kind of for who?

SPEAKER_00 12:09

Uh they have an incredibly long tail. I mean, there's actually a really good argument that if the conflict were to miraculously end today, that the supply chain disruption would be felt for months down the line. Um and it is the case that the supply chain disruption doesn't necessarily impact the US per se. Um so for example, our oil and gas industry is inoculated uh by virtue of the US being a major producer, but it certainly impacts the prices. Um if you're in Southeast Asia and East Asia, South Asia, um you are actually getting impacted by supply chain disruptions directly. Um so uh urea used in fertilizer, sulfur used in mining and manufacturing, um, and then of course oil and gas, if you're a net importer like China, for example, um, although of course they've spent handily on green technology, and so maybe it'll impact them less than some of the other countries in the region. Uh, but there you will actually have shortages. Um and there are there is a trickle to that, right? If factories close for lack of energy, the global the supply chains are globally integrated. Um, and so you may see uh some shortages across the globe in in general as well. Um and you know it'll it we've got examples from COVID and various other natural disasters that have impacted uh supply chains, a lot of the monsoon weather in Southeast Asia, for example. Um and it takes a long time to kind of untangle that. Um and this has now gone on long enough that it's no longer kind of a flash in the pan where you know you've got enough stockpiled material, right, and strategic reserve of any particular asset class or other producer that can ramp up to replace. Um now you're talking about some of these disruptions having a long-term impact. And so if you're the Federal Reserve, for example, you're really worried about this being a return to pretty significant inflation risk. Um and so a lot of hopes that the interest rates would fall is going to be tempered. Indeed, at best case, they're gonna remain the same. But if you get runaway inflation, they're gonna have to creep back up again. And so um, you know, it's gonna impact um a lot of different countries in a lot of different ways. Um but you're absolutely right. There's a lot more than an oil and gas story here, which tends to be the thing that takes up a lot of the oxygen in the room.

SPEAKER_02 14:23

Yeah. Um and I'm sure a lot of those things are also still lasting impacts from things like the pandemic and other conflicts that yeah, I'm just keep continuing.

SPEAKER_00 14:32

Yeah, so it's interesting. I mean, the broader um kind of reshoring of um of industry and the use of industrial policy tools really kind of came from that COVID era and was coupled with this growing geopolitical competition between China and the United States. And so arguably China and the United States are more ready for this type of episode today than they might have been in 2019, where really it was a globally integrated supply chain and we're all relying on just in time production. Um, but really, you know, it's still the case that if you're if you're a business and you're expecting raw materials from this region and now all of a sudden they're not showing up on your doorstep because the traffic from the Straight of War Moose has entirely gone to zero, um, you can't sidestep that impact. Um and so you know, I think it'll be really interesting to see in the years ahead, and obviously this is something that the lab works on, how this type of episode leads to more industrial policy, more reshoring in the future, both for the United States, but also for countries around the world, as you kind of worry about your reliance on other parts of the world for your raw materials or manufactured goods. Um and so, you know, here it's a lot of a lot of our population here in the US probably didn't even know what the certifuse was right before the crisis. And now, right, you really see all of these downstream consequences of the choking off of this. And ultimately, it's that choke chokehold that the Iranians have been able to get over the strait that has led to all of these attempts by the Trump administration vis-a-vis these threats to actually get them to release, right, and allow tankers to travel right for all of these products that we're talking about. And that's why it's so important because obviously the administration's watching inflation increase, stock prices decrease, oil prices increase, um, and so the cost of living is starting to impact their rank and file.

SPEAKER_02 16:34

Yeah. You were mentioning a little bit earlier how there there might be some changes in who's controlling how things are moving through the Strait of Hormuz, I think. Um how are Trump's kind of threats of certain attacks like things on the power grid going to impact how things are moving um through there? And then also what are the kind of like contingency plans, I guess, that are in place?

SPEAKER_00 16:56

Yeah, so it's interesting. You saw over the weekend a few um vessels attempt to take the Omani side of the strait. Um so um the traditional shipping lane goes effectively sweeps up and under the the carg island that's been the subject of all sorts of um attacks from uh the Americans. Um it's also a really important uh terminal for the Iranian oil industry. And so that's the kind of the agreed-upon shipping lane, if you will, that the Iranians have more or less exquisite control over. Um if the Americans were to do things like run convoys through the strait, I think that you'd have a pretty significant fear that an Iranian military asset would be able to destroy a US Navy vessel or maybe the tanker, right, that's being transported. So they there was an attempt to kind of do a run only in Amani territorial waters rather than Iranian territorial waters. Um that's not happening at scale, so that's kind of a piece of the puzzle. Um effectively, the Iranians still control the strait by virtue of having at least a perceived military capability to take out those those military and civilian vessels that they don't want to pass. Um of course, if you're a major logistics company, you don't want to run the risk of putting your tankers, right, that are mat like orders of you know tens of millions to hundreds of millions of capital assets, right, you don't want to put them in danger. You've already seen the insurance premiums for those types of assets go through the roof. Um and so there's also reticence on the part of commercial um entities who are not going to want to run the risk of actually becoming a military target. Um I think that that's kind of been one of my stories of potential escalation throughout, where if the US pushes without Iranian agreement that um they want to get assets through the strait and ultimately a US naval vessel um is hit, leading to casualties um on the American side, that might that might be the change that would lead to American boots on the ground, etc., which would be a massive escalation of the crisis. I mean, I guess that's one thing that's worth pointing out. Amidst all of this kind of rhetoric and what have you, the threat has not been to put U.S. troops on the ground because that's viewed as being uh you know unpalatable on the part of the administration. Um and of course it occurs against the backdrop of the both the Secretary of Defense and the President in the past saying they weren't interested in getting the U.S. embroiled in another forever war.

SPEAKER_02 19:33

Yeah. Um I want to go back quickly to what we were talking about in terms of kind of the civilians in the whole region. Um Trump had said something about how he had heard that civilians wanted him to keep bombing, essentially, is what he said. Did you hear about that? And what do you think about that?

SPEAKER_00 19:53

Yeah, I mean, so there's uh ultimately at the outset of the conflict, if the US were to be able to actually conduct regime change, it was on the back of a series of protests that occurred about two months prior um that led to a significant Iranian crackdown. Um and so those are pro-democracy protesters that are, you know, were in the streets kind of protesting the you know relatively authoritarian and regressive Iranian regime. Um at the beginning of at the outset of the um of the missile attacks um and the bombing runs by the Americans, there was uh an attempt to avoid the areas where those those protesters might be living. And indeed you saw the news stories about those pro-democracy um, those that kind of wanted the Iranian regime to fall, cheering right the first kind of wave of attacks of the Americans on what were primarily military and political targets in the country. Um of course, as the crisis has gone on longer and longer, because you've got the Iranian Revolutionary Guard using civilian enclaves to shelter themselves, you've had bombings inside of civilian enclaves. And so, you know, uh some number of those, you know, relatively those that supported the mission in the beginning on the civilian side are probably are are no longer supportive, right? They're seeing things like all of the collateral damage, the civilian death toll, et cetera, um, and saying we'd much rather this not be happening. Um I'm sure that there are still some number, right, that are hoping for regime change um inside of the of of of Iran itself. But you know, it's it's hard to say sitting here. I mean ultimately that uh regime appears to be relatively well institutionalized. They've have succession planned down relatively um deep um into their um into their various different bureaucracies, and so um you know there there there appears no imminent threat to the Iranian regime um in the way that I think probably. At the beginning of the conflict, the uh U.S. administration was hoping uh might occur. And of course, they were feeling emboldened by what had happened in Venezuela. Um but you know, here I think you're getting reports today that um uh the the president of Israel, Netanyahu, kind of went to the White House and kind of outlined uh the the path forward to to perform a decapitation strike and then the regime would fall. Clearly that hasn't happened. Um so that's kind of where we are today.

SPEAKER_02 22:31

Yeah. Well, it's certainly a lot to think about, um, and I'm sure it's gonna change uh very quickly.

SPEAKER_00 22:37

Eminently, yeah. I was gonna say this will be out of date in like four hours, but you know, hopefully useful to have the information out there.

SPEAKER_02 22:43

Yeah. Um and we'll try and get this up quickly and then I'm sure we'll revisit. So make sure you subscribe so you don't miss the next one.

SPEAKER_00 22:50

Perfect. Thanks, Vivian.

SPEAKER_02 22:52

Thank you.