Dispatch: Péter Dósa on the Election in Hungary and Why Americans Should Be Paying Attention

Viktor Orbán received a George Soros scholarship to study at Oxford. Years later, he regulated Soros’s university out of Budapest.

The irony tells you most of what you need to know about the system he built — and why it’s worth understanding before it becomes more familiar than it already is.

Péter Dósa was born in Budapest in 1998, nine years after the fall of communism. He left with his family at eight and, though he grew up in Ireland and Barcelona, never stopped watching Hungary. He founded The Hungary Report to do what most outlets don’t: explain Orbán’s system in depth, for an international audience that now spans more than 110 countries. Péter doesn’t come with a think tank title. What he has is rarer — he understands the system from the inside.

We spoke the week of Hungary’s 2026 election, which Politico Europe called the EU’s most important of the year. But our conversation wasn’t really about that election — it was about a set of tools for dismantling democracy, tools that have been field-tested for sixteen years in a Central European country and are now being deployed at scale elsewhere. Péter explains how the system was built, how it bends rather than breaks the rules, and why regulated-out-of-existence is harder to fight than banned.

He cast his ballot by post from Barcelona before we spoke. It was the first time in his adult life he thought his vote might actually change something.

Photo: Bjoern Wylezich

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Credits:

Host: Meredith Ogilvie-Thompson

Sound Editing: Dax Krishna and the team at SpeechDocs

Music: Ilya Kuznetsov

Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

If Orban wins, it will be a global proof of concept for elected autocracy after 16 years of state capture. So I think it will be highly important and it will show that a regime can hollow out neutral institutions, dominate media, tilt the map, and still convert that into renewed legitimacy.

SPEAKER_00 0:23

Welcome to all that I have met. I'm Meredith, and my guest today is Peter Dosha. Peter was born in Budapest in 1998, nine years after the fall of communism. And though his family left when he was eight, Ireland first, then Barcelona, where he completed a master's in democracies and multiculturalism, Peter never stopped watching Hungary. Recently, he founded the Hungary Report to do what most mainstream outlets don't: explain orbit systems in depth for an international audience that next more than 110 countries. Peter doesn't come with a thing-click title or television criticism. What he has is where you understand this system from the inside and has spent years writing about it with unusual clarity. And Sunday, having voted by post from Barcelona, Peter will find out whether for the first time you don't like his vote I actually changed the date. Peter, welcome.

SPEAKER_01 1:20

Thank you so much for having me here, Meredith. It's a pleasure to be on your platform.

SPEAKER_00 1:25

Well, it's great to have you. Thank you for making the time. So before we get into the nitty-gritty of this week's elections in Hungary, I want you to give listeners just a factual arc. If you can talk about who Orban is, how he came to power, and just give us a bit of background.

SPEAKER_01 1:47

Of course. So Orban began as a symbol of Hungary, Hungary's future. He became a public known figure in 1989, where he was the face of democratic renewal in Hungary as communism was falling, as the Iron Curtain was falling. He seemed like the new face in politics. He wasn't that well known back then. But he was actually, it's important to note he was very anti-communist, he was very anti-Soviet at the time. And what he promised for Hungarians was a European future. And then eight years later, he became prime minister in 2010. And in that eight years gap, he reestablished himself as a new kind of leader.

SPEAKER_00 2:36

You've described a man who has changed over the course of his leadership. How is he very different today?

SPEAKER_01 2:44

He was a 26-year-old university student in 1989. He seemed to be liberal, progressive, pro-European, the opposites of what he is today. So he came to power a second time in 2010. And in 2011, he adopted the fundamental law in Hungary, meaning the constitution stopped being neutral ground and became part of the political project. Soon after he introduced new cardinal laws in the parliament, which are translated into the two-thirds laws. So basically, I think one of his main missions was from early on to consolidate his power. And he knew how to do this from the outset. And another law he did, which helped him greatly, is expanded the constitutional court from 11 to 15 judges, which helped him reshape the referee in Hungary. And another act which is important to mention is in once again in 2011, he one of the biggest changes that we've seen in Hungarian politics is that he changed the parliament from 386 seats to 199 with a new electoral map and a one-round electoral system, basically meaning that it was easier to turn plurality into domination. And to put that into numbers, I he basically he did win a supermajority in 2010 with 52% of the vote. But and that translated to 68% of the seats in the parliament. But in in 2014, so after all of these law changes and electoral changes, Fides and his party only received 45% of the list vote. But that actually then translated to 133 seats out of 199 in the Hungarian parliament. So he got less votes than in 2010, but he gained supermajority quite easily. So I think that is a clear example of how he had a plan from early on and he knew what to do, and he did it, not illegally, actually through the courts, because he had the supermajority. And ever since Fides Hasp and him, they had so much power in Hungary.

SPEAKER_00 5:09

Right. So I mean what you're describing essentially is a soft coup, a nonviolent coup. He didn't need a coup, he had a plan and achieved a supermajority. So I want to kind of look at what this system did in practice. A lot of what you said in terms of his consolidation of power is strangely familiar at the moment. We'll get into that in a minute. But what does this system look in like in practice? He consolidates his power electorally and by reshaping the constitution or redefining its reach. In practice, let's start with institutions. Can you talk about his attacks on academia?

SPEAKER_01 5:51

So I think the best example and the most known example is the case of CEU, Central European University, which was a brainchild of George Soros. And in 2017, a law called Lex CEU. They didn't even really try to hide the name of what it was. It was adopted in 2017, and only a few days later it took effect. And on paper, it looked like a technical regulation for foreign universities, but in practice it was a targeted political strike against CEU and everything it symbolized. So Soros, openness, intellectual autonomy. And I would say that Orbán was smart enough to recognize that liberal higher education was a threat because universities produce independent elites and autonomous spaces that the regime cannot fully script. So I think he was a part of that space when he was young in 89. So he really recognized that he needs to cut out liberal universities before they become a problem. So he was, we can say, smart enough to get rid of the problem before it became a problem.

SPEAKER_00 7:07

Well, smart because as you told me, I didn't know, but in speaking to you on during another conversation, he received Soros scholarship money to attend Oxford. So he was looking to destroy the very institutions that that shaped his thought originally.

SPEAKER_01 7:24

Yeah, exactly.

SPEAKER_00 7:25

So what happened to CEU?

SPEAKER_01 7:28

Yeah, so then by 2018, it had effectively been pushed out of Budapest and they had to move to Vienna. You know, you cannot say that Orban straight out kicked them out, but he maneuvered the laws in such a way that became very hard for CEU and independent institutions, third-level institutions in Hungary to function. So they had to leave, and to this day, CU is in Vienna. You know, I think they're hoping to hopefully go back to their campus in Budapest. But I think what's important to note is that CU wasn't banned outright. It was regulated out of meaningful existence. And pressure often comes through regulation, accreditation, funding pressure, and culture war politics. And I think here we can see a direct parallel to the US and perhaps to what Trump is doing, you know.

SPEAKER_00 8:26

Yeah, absolutely.

SPEAKER_01 8:27

With Hybrid and other universities in the US.

SPEAKER_00 8:31

So let's look at the media now, because by 2018, some 500 or more Hungarian media outlets transferred to pro-government ownership. We're seeing that happening in the US with the purchase of CBS, CNN, other consolidation. Public broadcasters were essentially gutted in Hungary. Can you talk about how that happened?

SPEAKER_01 8:55

Yeah, of course. So uh I think I will start with what happened because it's so important to note and the stats are kind of shocking. But by late 2018, 476 outlets were consolidated into KESMA. It's a company very close to Orban's elites. I think today the status around 80% of media is state controlled in Hungary. And one of the best examples of how it directly affected Hungarians and what happened in the country's the biggest online newspaper in Hungary, Index, it got taken over by pro-government loyalists. And 80 journalists and the founders of Index resigned on the spot and they created a new opposition online news outlet, which it is called Telex. And it has become impossible almost to get funding for independent media in Hungary other than direct reader support. So even an example is my mom used to listen to a radio in Hungary called Club Radio, and one day it just got censored off air, and my mom could only listen to it online. So, you know, I think people started to it was one of the instances where Hungarians started to notice that you know the government is actually censoring and they might be in control of what Hungarians read and listen to.

SPEAKER_00 10:33

Right. The economy. Independent economists have estimated that Orban's inner circle now controls a significant percentage of Hungary's economy through a network of loyalists. Do you have any breakdown of this?

SPEAKER_01 10:48

So I think it's hard to put an exact figure on it, but the safer truth is that Orban built a patronage state in which politically connected networks dominate public procurement, construction, media, banking, tourism, energy, anything that you can name. A good example that I read recently from Financial Times is there was a reporting that stated that 13 businessmen linked to Orban secured about 28 billion euros in government tenders from 2010 to 2025, including about 12 billion in EU-funded contracts.

SPEAKER_00 11:31

Well, the EU obviously had the same concerns because Hungary's had over a billion euro in cohesion funds frozen by the EU over rule of law concerns, money that should be going to ordinary Hungarians that's not getting there.

SPEAKER_01 11:44

Yeah, exactly. So I think it was in 2022 when there was a big uproar in the EU about the state of Hungarian democracy, and Hungary basically was not in line with EU standards on a lot of things. So about 8 billion of EU funds were frozen, and to this day, I think parts of it have been released, but most of it is still there waiting to be delivered to Hungary. And the truth is that it really hurts Hungarians because we have become one of the poorest countries and nations in Europe, in the European Union, and the average Hungarian can really feel this. People do blame Orban for this, so that's important.

SPEAKER_00 12:32

Absolutely. I want to just turn this a little to the personal for a minute. Your parents, who obviously lived under communist rule, and they made a conscious decision after Hungary joined the EU to move. No doubt they've been watching all of this unfold from a distance. What are they noticing? And are they speaking to friends and family still in Hungary? Can you talk about what your family outside of Hungary has gleaned about all of this?

SPEAKER_01 13:04

Of course. So, you know, I think it's a very complicated, you know, it's a very complicated everyone has a, in a way, complicated relationship with their country, mostly if you move abroad. And I think my family is not the only one, but it's more of a mutual feeling of many Hungarians that have left that you notice the atmosphere before you notice constitutional change and theory. So the country, you felt that the country became more tribal, more suspicious, more exhausted. People learned where the boundaries were, they were careful at work, care more careful in public. You would be not saying what's on your mind around certain relatives because there would be stigma attached to it if you didn't support Orban. People would say, you know, you're not patriotic enough, you don't love your country, you prefer EU and Ukraine. So things like this filter through to everyday life, and it has separated families, you know, even within my own family. I still have relatives back home in the countryside, and you know, we we have major differences on how we view politics and even everyday life in Hungary. And I think 16 years of living under Orban's power has affected basically everyone in the country, maybe a small percentage of them positively, but it seems like coming up to this election that most people are just not happy with what's going on anymore, and they're not happy to hate on their own neighbors or on the opposition, on Ukraine. I think when the media narrows and institutions are politicized, self-censorship does the part of the work. So democratic decline is often the slow normalization of caution rather than one big chaotic event happening.

SPEAKER_00 15:08

Absolutely. That's very true. You touched on Ukraine, and I want to pick up on that. Recently, there has been disclosure about Hungary's foreign minister being caught on tape saying, quote, I am always at your disposal. And he was saying that to Sergei Lavrov. He was working to delist sanctioned Russian oligarchs. Lithuania's former foreign minister says every generation has a chem phobe. So, you know, this has been going on for a while, but it's really come to the surface more recently. How do ordinary Hungarians understand? How are they processing the full extent of what their government has been doing inside the EU on Russia's behalf, all under the guise of being told that they're living with the Ukrainian threat? And will this somehow meet out in the elections?

SPEAKER_01 16:01

So, you know, I think some Hungarians understand the scale of the Russian issue, but the problem is that many do not, and it's hard to put figures on it. You know, I would say it's 50-50 in Hungary. It's a very divided society as of today, another parallel with the US. Um, that I think half of Hungary almost relies on state media, and other half does not rely on state media at all. And uh it becomes skewed how you view topics like what's going on in Ukraine and with the Russian interference. I think the media environment is too distorted, and after years of scandal, people become numb. So I think uh it was the consortium report that was published in just this year in March that they obtained and confirmed recordings of of this Sierto and Lavrov conversation. They were discussing sanction delisting, so it's very sensitive material. And I think for international audiences that's explosive, but for domestic politics, it's a bit more complicated and a bit more subtle because I think most Hungarians are almost used to it and numb to the whole Russia situation, they are so over overfilled with information that it's it's not even that yeah, you know, you're not trying to find the truth anymore. It's more like you're just so tired of too much information, too much AI being out there. And I think many Hungarians are are just tired, and it's hard for them to find the truth.

SPEAKER_00 17:44

Yeah, that sounds very familiar, actually. So I want to now focus on parallels. Heritage Foundation's Kevin Roberts in 2022 said about Hungary quote, it's not just a model for modern statecraft, but the model and confirm that Project 2025 studied Hungary directly. The playbook in parallel, you've talked about the courts, the universities, the media, the electoral map. And while it's not identical, there is a direction of travel that's the same. Recently, the sitting US Vice President JD Vance was in Budapest. What does that visit signal to Hungarians who are watching?

SPEAKER_01 18:26

Yeah, so I think once again, there's two realities. So let's say the Hungarians that support Orban and have been big believers in him, for them, I think it looks like a political signal that there is strengthen in the far right still in the world, and authoritarians will come for your help. And I think for Fidesz and Orban supporters, it's a sign of strength, maybe not as big as they wanted, because I I read that Trump was supposed to go to Budapest, but he did not show up, so he sent JD Vance. But for people more on the opposition or thinking about voting for Tissa and Modyar, this does not look like a routine diplomatic stop. It looks like uh Orban wanted visible outside validation late in the campaign. These are the independent polls, and if we are to believe them, Orban is set to lose big. So to many Hungarians, this seems like desperation, you know, one last try combined with all the other things, thrown in the mix to try to get that win through. But also, I many politicians in Hungarians have noted JD Vance's visit to Budapest is not likely to sway many undecided voters. So he's he doesn't have the significance that I think Orban and maybe people on the more on the right think that he does.

SPEAKER_00 19:58

Right. So let's talk about Mejar for a moment. He's former Fidesz insider, he's a lawyer, he was married to Orban's former justice minister. He broke publicly in 2024 after the presidential pardon scandal involving a child abuse accomplice. Can you talk a little bit about who he is?

SPEAKER_01 20:20

So I think Major Major Peter is a liberal answer and it's sobering rather than romantic. I think that's how we view it. I think more liberal Hungarians they think of Peter Major as not a dream candidate, but he's the only available breach in the wall. So, you know, I think Hungarians accepted that they don't need perfection, they just need a change. And and while Peter Major, many people also seem to think that he's not the real deal, or he might be playing the two sides. I think he seems like the clear, clearest option. And he I think people believe in him because even though he has come from Fidesz and as one of Orban's allies and closer people in the government, I think this actually gives him credibility because he knows how to dismantle Fidesz from within. He knows much more details than I think also he is available to let through right now because he knows how the system works, he knows how Orban works. Madjar is very witty about the way he goes about it, he's very charismatic on in his speeches across Hungary. He knows how to attack Orban, he knows his weaknesses, he knows about the corruption. So I think you know, if to people who don't trust him, I think those are we're never gonna trust him, but because they are just so separate. From other parts of society. I think his background makes some liberals uneasy, but it also gives him credibility with voters who wouldn't never rally behind a more conventional opposition figure. So I think he is very centrist at the moment because he's trying to capture as many people in Hungary. But he seems to be talking about Hungary's real problems: poverty, education, the state of the healthcare. You know, hospitals are literally crumbling in Hungary right now. Young people are moving away. So Madhyar Peter, I think, understands Hungarian society much better than Orban. I think Orban, in the 16 years of power, he has become so separated from normal Hungarian life. He's so disconnected from reality that he doesn't see the struggle of everyday Hungarians. And Madhyar Peter is campaigning on these struggles.

SPEAKER_00 22:58

Let me ask you about his campaign because I've read that he has not appeared on state media. And you said earlier that the media is 80% state-owned. How is Medjar getting his message out? How do you operate in an environment where essentially political opposition has been so silenced for so long, and then conventional platforms for political candidates are closed to you?

SPEAKER_01 23:26

I think you have to you have to think on your feet that, you know, and we're in a very digital age. Right now, I think that's to Modyar's benefit. It would have been much harder in the past than people relied on the radio or cable news. But I have been watching Modyar Peter for the last few months. He has been reaching people, I would say, the old-fashioned way. So he has been campaigning throughout Hungary in big cities, in medium-sized towns, to the smallest villages across Hungary. And Fides and Orban has never really done this, even though they tend to get the biggest voter shares from the countryside in Hungary. But Madhyar Peter is actually talking to the people in the towns, he's listening to the people. He has created organizations basically in every part of Hungary and in foreign countries too, to see what the problems are and how we can fix them. And let's listen to people's everything he does is live stream on YouTube. He's very active on Instagram, on TikTok, Facebook. So I think he has a very good digital thing behind him.

SPEAKER_00 24:38

Yeah, and you're describing a classic grassroots campaign, which can be extremely effective. I want to ask you a question. You touched on it a minute ago, the structural issue, the diaspora vote, which is quite high for Fridez in every election since postal voting was introduced. But 16 years of state capture means polls don't necessarily tell the full story. Can you talk about the diaspora stats and why they're significant?

SPEAKER_01 25:06

Yeah, so the diaspora stats are quite shocking in the last four elections. So since Orban has been in power, it has been over, I think in the last two elections, over 90% for Fides and for Orban, which is extremely high. People are presuming that this election is gonna be different, and it has been confirmed that there is gonna be more votes from the diaspora than ever before. And I think change in the air, so Fides could possibly win the diaspora vote, but we also have to note that most of these votes tend to come from the neighboring countries of Hungary, mostly Transylvania and Romania, where there is hundreds of thousands of Hungarians who are legally allowed to vote. And I think you've seen it too, but there was this vote-buying documentary. And I think that kind of captures what is going on, that it's not a not a fair playing field in the diaspora vote. I I would recommend people to watch the documentary, it's very insightful. But the price of the vote, it basically said that around 500,000 people are targeted, and basically that you can buy a vote for around 10,000 Hungarian foreigners.

SPEAKER_00 26:29

And what is that in Euros or dollars?

SPEAKER_01 26:32

Around 25 to 30 euros. So, you know, to the Western word, that's very small money. But that's the thing that Fidesz and Orban, once again, I I will put it in hypotheticals that they're smart because they know who to go after, they know Roma people, yeah, they know where the weakest people economically, socially, financially. So they have been targeted by disinformation campaigns, and it really shows I think that poverty, dependency, and the political machinery can be fused into an electoral control. And the broader democratic lesson is that formal voting rights mean little if the power decides who can vote freely and without coercion. You know, in Budapest, big cities, the story is straightforward, but I think this is what many people are missing. What is going on, maybe in the lesser-known areas of Hungary and in the countryside where people are basically being approached for their vote for Fidesz, they're being coerced, people in Transylvania are being systematically bussed and into polling stations, and you know, when the truth comes out of what has been going on, I think you know it would be big news.

SPEAKER_00 27:52

The election is on the 12th, and let's say, for argument's sake, that Major wins. The buildings still stand, and I mean that metaphorically. You have a 16-year campaign to capture all the different aspects of government and major institutions in Hungary. The loyalists will still be in the courts, the civil service, the media. How long will it take to reverse 16 years of institutional capture? And what's the first thing that Majar needs would need to do to start reversing the hold that Orban has affected on Hungary?

SPEAKER_01 28:35

That's a question and a half. You know, everyone is wondering about this. You know, how long could it potentially take to build a democracy back up again after 16 years of demolition? And the answer is not the best to hear, you know, what political scientists, what even Madhyar himself is saying that it's not gonna be fast. You know, the the as you say, the building still stands, the constitution still stands, loyalists are in every institution within Hungary, the bureaucracy is shaped by Fidesz and Orban, the media is controlled by Orban and Fidesz. So, you know, every aspect of government is highly intertwined with Fidesz at the moment, and it's not gonna be an easy fix. It's gonna take years, you know, not months, years. And also, I think it's very important to note that it also depends if Tisa and Major Peter are able to achieve supermajority because absolutely.

SPEAKER_00 29:39

That was gonna be my next question because the supermajority means that if he wins and Fides retains supermajority, you have the lamest of lame duck governments in a way. So let's just look at the possibility of Orban winning. If Orban does win this election, what is it saying about democratic systems and how or if they can protect themselves? What does it mean for the wider movement, for President Trump, for the far right across Europe?

SPEAKER_01 30:09

If Orban wins, it will be a global proof of concept for elected autocracy after 16 years of state capture. So I think it will be highly important and it will show that a regime can hollow out neutral institutions, dominate media, tilt the map, and still convert that into renewed legitimacy. So it would embolden the fire right across Europe, whether that's very close to Hungary and Slovakia or in France, where they're trying to make a comeback, but everywhere. And I think it would reinforce admiration in parts in the Trump word for sure. And the possibility matters even more because I think it would also make us question how much the structure itself is shaped by the results. And I think the message to the US and Americans that it would send, and to the far right and to Trump, is that democracy decline often looks banal, legal, procedural, temporary, even boring. But for example, the US still has a press that can investigate and courts that can push back. But the mistake is really assuming that those things protect themselves. I think what one thing we will be able to say for sure after the election on Sunday is that really I think the answer will be that people need to protect the institutions. And if Orban wins, I think it looks stark. I think for Trump and for the far-right word, it will be a confirmation that you can really hollow out democracy slowly over 16 years, puzzle piece by puzzle piece. So do if you do it the smart way and not and not by a military coup, then I think it will send the message that you can disassemble a democracy and make it into an illiberal democracy, which Orban himself calls hungry and seems to be proud of that word. It will send this message.

SPEAKER_00 32:17

So I want to end on what you think Americans should be aware of. If you had to cite one or two things that we are getting wrong at the moment, what should we be paying attention to?

SPEAKER_01 32:32

I think the important thing to note for Americans, but anyone watching across the world, is that this election, it might be a small country, just in the center of Europe, less than 10 million people. You might not know much about it. But I think this is the ultimate stress test. And if Orban wins and he survives, I think it paints a stark picture for the future of Hungary, potentially Europe. But on the other hand, if Madhyar wins and Orban's rule comes to an end after 16 years, I think it can really show that we can turn it around. And I think it would give hope to many Americans that even though when a system is so entrenched and has so much power, you can still fight back and do something. Another lesson I think to know is that it's never too late until it's too late. And Hungarians feel at this point this is the last chance we have for the foreseeable future to save democracy. And I think it's tired to look at the big picture, but we have to. One by one, for example, you can say what Trump is doing mirrors orban, the courts, the freedom of speech, media, all of this, one by one. Maybe it looks like he's not doing drastic things, but then one day you will wake up and you realize what has happened to your country. You know, you don't recognize it anymore. And that's I think modern authoritarianism is that you do it more subtly, bit by bit, see how you can get a how far you can get away with things, keep checking and keep doing things until someone says no to you, but then you have changed the laws, so you're always ahead of the game. And I think we have to really look out for this in the US to see these important patterns before they become entrenched for the foreseeable future.

SPEAKER_00 34:38

Well, I think that's a good place to end. It's such a pleasure to speak with you, Peter, and we will be watching on the 12th and looking to see what you have to say about all this on the 13th. I'm sure this won't be the last time we speak. Thank you so much.

SPEAKER_01 34:55

Thank you so much, Mate. It's been a pleasure.

SPEAKER_00 35:09

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