Making Climate Law Work
Exploring how legal tools shape climate action in practice, from the Energy and Climate Change Law Institute and qLegal at Queen Mary University of London.
Making Climate Law Work
International law and state obligations: who enforces them?
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"The energy transition is a force that's unstoppable."
States have made sweeping promises on climate. But what happens when they don't keep them? In this episode, student hosts Julieta Herrera and Manuela Motta Zini sit down with climate barrister Harj Narulla to interrogate the gap between ambition and accountability. From NDCs to net-zero targets, they unpack what states are actually committing to and whether any of it is legally enforceable, or simply a system built on reputation.
Link to our guest's social media accounts: LinkedIn: Harj Narulla, linkedin.com/in/harj-narulla-249651293/
Over the last decades, the global climate crisis has become undeniable. Rising sea levels, extreme heat waves, and wildfires are no longer distant, they are a reality. Many of the countries that have contributed the least to global greenhouse emissions are today the ones facing the greatest climate-related losses, from disappearing coastlines to agricultural collapse and irreversible cultural damage. This imbalance brings us to a central question. What responsibilities do states hold for harms related to climate change and on what legal basis? And at the center of all this lies the energy sector. Fossil fuels have powered economic development for over a century, while simultaneously driving global warming. As states transition toward renewables, the question of responsibility for past emissions, capacity to act, and obligations to vulnerable communities has become one of the most contested issues in global climate law. Welcome to today's episode of Making Climate Law Work, a podcast exploring how legal tools shape climate action in practice from the Energy and Climate Change Law Institute and Q Legal at Queen Mary University of London. In this episode, we will focus on international state obligations in the context of energy and climate change, and how these obligations are evolving as the world's move toward net zero targets. I'm Julieta.
SPEAKER_01Emanuela.
SPEAKER_02And we are so honored to have in our today's conversation a special guest that works on energy law and energy transition. So Harsh Narula. He's a barister specializing in climate law and litigation. Harsh has been involved in world-first climate litigation before national, regional, and international courts. And for that, he will help us understand how states interpret their climate obligations and how they shift toward net zero. So, Harsh, we are so honored to be here. So thank you so much for accepting our invitation.
SPEAKER_00Thank you so much. It's great to be with you.
SPEAKER_02Thank you. So our first topic, as I already mentioned, is about obligations and the responsibility of states. So just to have like these terms very fresh for our audience, when we talk about climate action, we often hear about ambition, we hear about transition, we hear about decarbonization. And just to remember this, we have different international treaties as the UNFCCC, that it's an international treaty that establishes principles as common both differentiated responsibilities, and we have the Paris Agreement. So for this, the international community agree about the national determined contributions, about these emission reduction targets, adaptation strategies, etc. But Harsh, considering all the background about these international treaties, when we talk about these international climate commitments, we hear about these targets, pledges, but how we can turn those commitments into real action inside our country, especially in places where development priorities and emissions are still growing?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so that's a it's a great question. And I think it's really goes to the heart of climate action, right? Which is, you know, we have quite a robust international framework with the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, which combined with developments in international law through the ICJ and other advisory opinions, which has strengthened into a really robust regime around mitigation and adaptation obligations. But your question is essentially about what do states do to comply with those international obligations and what does domestic implementation look like across um across the world where you have very different sets of challenges when it comes to the energy transition. And so, you know, you you're kind of getting into the terrain of essentially the capacity and capability of different states to deal with both mitigation and adaptation, and then to support other states as well to decarbonize. So I think it, you know, necessarily it's going to be more challenging in developing country contexts as you identify. Um, and that's where the principle of CBDR RC that you you mentioned is is so vital because it it speaks to the historical responsibility of developed states for climate change and their obligations to provide climate finance, to provide technology transfer, to provide capacity building to developing states so that they can meet their mitigation goals as reflected in the NDCs, but also importantly adapt to climate change. Um and so there's a really important climate justice element to um the international obligations that that developed states have. So yeah, it's a it's a big challenge. It really depends on on the energy mix in each individual um country, and we can get into talking about you know what are the actual kind of policy measures that the states take. But um, yeah, it's quite a complex picture.
SPEAKER_01Thank you very much, Haraj. I think uh very good to hear about how the international framework works. But uh when we take essentially dependence agreement, which is I would say the most important climate agreement that we have in force, some of the main obligations, the words it's put down, it's should. So for example, uh developed countries, as you said, they have this uh important role to provide technology to help those developing countries to be protected by climate change externalities. And uh by their Paris Agreement, developed countries should continue taking the lead by undertaking economic-wide absolute mission and reduction targets. And uh, what takes my intention is provision, it's again about the word should. So it could create a kind of pathway for those developed countries to skip or make softer that kind of obligations. And my question that comes especially from the US less movements. So, as we know, US is one of the main players in climate change, one of the bigger emitters. And uh the US has already withdrawn two times from Paris Agreement, and most recently, I mean last week, Mr. President Trump he revoked the greenhouse gases emission limitations in the US. Therefore, Harsh, in your experience, uh how the international frameworks are threatened by this kind of news, and could the international community still have hope on those climate commitments?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, no, definitely. I mean, I think you know, the question of what the US is doing in the climate sphere is obviously reflective of what they're doing across the rules-based international order, right? Which is retreating from um international law and the idea that there is an international accountability for the US. You know, I was at COP last year and there was a bit of hand-wringing and concern before we got to the conference about what it would mean for the US to be absent from it. And yeah, I've got sort of a few thoughts on that. I think the first is that, you know, the there's a question of international obligations and compliance with international law, but I think the energy transition transition is also fundamentally a question of economics and a scientific reality as as well. And at this point, it's it's an unstoppable force. You know, uh at the moment, I think at the last year, there was$2.2 trillion of investment that went into renewables, less than half of that went into fossil fuels. Um and that reflects the fact that you know solar is the is the cheapest form of electricity in in history. So the weight of the global economic market is behind the energy transition. And then regardless of what the US tries to implement domestically or or even exerting its power um diplomatically in bilateral and multilateral agreements, it can't undo that that reality. So we're we're in, you know, we're in a in a process which I don't think can be um unwound. And it's simply a question of how quickly we implement the energy transition and also whether or not we do it in a just way. So I think I sort of take the long, long view with the US in particular and see that the market has shifted, and that changes ultimately, I think, the political realities. So whether it's the next administration or non-state actors or at the state level, you might have seen that the California signed an agreement with the UK to do with renewables. You're continuing to see different parts of the of the US, you know, sort of moving forward. So, you know, that that gives me cause for optimism. But your question was about what happens when international law reaches its limit with states that are not acting in in good faith or in conformity with their obligations. And the short answer is that you know you don't have a lot of other alternatives, right? Um, there is no global police force that implements international law, and you're looking for these other routes as well, right? Looking, looking at political pressure, trying to look at uh market forces and so on. Um, so yeah, so I think it's it's kind of a it's a mixed picture in terms of the role and significance of the US, but one where I think that ultimately they'll show up to the party, but it just might take a couple of years.
SPEAKER_02Thank you, Karsh. So we are so grateful to hear about this optimism because we see so many news about the negative part of it. And what about when these countries like make these kind of decisions? Uh obviously, we can take the example of US because it's very recent, but we can see, and as a lawyer, we know that when we have obligations, we we need this responsibility or this liability or this kind of sanctions if you choose to not comply with that obligation. And we can see about the international treaties that normally are not that binding, and that's why we see so many shifts from countries or companies, etc. And also because in many cases we see that countries are making these decisions not only for the legal obligation, but as you also mentioned, about the pressure or can be to this credibility for investment in their companies. But when we talk about these sanctions, liabilities, responsibilities to countries, is there any reputational concern that can drive a national behavior? Not only about the sanction, but do you think accurrently in this modern world uh the reputational concern is also very important? We can consider it as a sanction, or how do you see this perspective in the climate litigation?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think definitely. Um, you know, what your question is is highlighting is the the multiple ways in which law and in particular international law functions and achieves its goals. The you know, the main one that everyone focuses on and the kind of famous issue and tension with international law is the enforceability question and the question of you know essentially how do you ensure compliance with binding obligations. But I think that ignores the other impacts of of law and international law, which is it as a norm-setting body uh or or set of institutions. And so to take the Paris Agreement um as an example, when the Paris Agreement was signed in in 2015, the world was on track for more than four degrees of warming. And as of last year, we're now on track for between, I think, 2.2 and 2.6 degrees of warming. It's catalyzed huge amounts of investment in renewables, as I mentioned. The cost of renewables has has gone down uh rapidly, and that's that's exceeded all sorts of expectations. Uh, so I think that that is a framework which until recently has been very explicitly one that is not about creating binding and specific emissions reduction targets, which states would be held to in the same way that the Kyoto Protocol operated. And yet, through this bottom-up approach, the NDC approach, it has managed to collectively catalyze a huge degree of climate action and mitigation in the last 10 years. So I think that points to the ways in which law has a very powerful operation, international law, beyond just its capacity to impose binding obligations on states which are enforced through court proceedings. Essentially all of that change has been driven not by international courts forcing individual states to act, but their own voluntary behavior. So I think that norm setting is really crucial when it comes to international law. And that's because it enables a bunch of things like creating market certainty, uh, you know, giving signals to corporate actors and um and others that there is essentially an energy transition that's being facilitated by the government and that'll be backed by international institutions. So, yeah, so I think it's it's kind of important to think about international law in a multifaceted way.
SPEAKER_01That's fantastic, Hajj. Uh, just uh something that you said before in the previous question about climate justice and uh try to bring that in the context about all the state developer obligations under the Paris Agreement. And uh we find in Paris Agreement a provision that uh the developer states they had to provide financial resources to develop countries. So the question that comes from me is uh how do current framework, international framework, balance this fairness with urgency in the climate change? And I'm speaking from a Latin American country. Uh we face a lot of in the past last year, as you said, after the Paris Agreement was signed, we have faced a lot of uh climate change externalities, floating, etc. And uh we are not seeing that financial resource arriving to control and to adapt for those future externalities that of course we are going to face it. ITCC's already dyed shown us. So, how the international framework balanced that, how they provided uh truly and fairness way the financial resources uh to developing countries.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so you know, as you've said, the Paris Agreement has very clear obligations when it comes to providing climate finance from developed countries to developing countries, both to deal with mitigation and adaptation obligations. And it has specific obligations as well in relation to technology transfer and capacity building as well. But the question is whether or not developed states are complying with those obligations, what are the institutions that are being built, the multilateral or bilateral institutions that are being built to deliver that finance and how we get it to the scale that is required. And it's been a you know a pretty mixed picture if you look at COP when it comes to finance. It's something which um continues to be very uh contentious. The NC NCQG uh discussions and the targets around mobilizing uh appropriate levels of finance were you know hotly contested by developed states and you know, high-income developing states as well, high-emission developing states like China and India, the the Gulf states and so on. So I think there's no ambiguity about the nature of those obligations, but there's a question about how you you get developed states and others to actually cough up. And that's where I think litigation has a role as well, and the future of interstate litigation, I think, implicates some of these questions of climate finance and potentially provides one route in terms of accountability when states don't provide sufficient uh climate finance as part of their international obligations.
SPEAKER_02Thank you, Harsh. And regarding that last part that you answering right now about this climate litigation, we saw about the ICG like advisory opinion that was last year uh issued. But one of the most like uh important things that they mentioned it was that states have common interests to protect global climate. So in this case, do you think that this kind of opinions from the International Court of Justice can speed up the transition for these developed countries or like to fulfill these kind of obligations in the international perspective?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think it was a massive development in climate law and and in climate change in general, the ICJ advised your opinion. And I don't just say that because I represented a country, um, but I think it was kind of recognized as a really vital and sort of generational moment where the world's highest court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, was assessing the obligations of states under all sources of international law, um, not just the Paris Agreement. And then thinking about, you know, the second question they were asked to provide an answer on uh was about what happens when states breach those obligations under those different areas of law. And that's a question of compensation and reparations fundamentally. So I think that the ICJ uh has catalyzed a few things. One is obviously it's it's provided a huge amount of support to domestic, regional, and international climate litigation. So it has kind of brought together and concretized um a lot of the developments we've seen in the climate litigation sphere for the last 10 years. And it provides essentially the highest level of international legitimacy for people like me who are bringing, you know, claimant-focused climate litigation, public interest climate litigation against governments or against corporations to try and focus on a whole range of different climate policy issues, right? Whether it's mitigation, it had very strong statements around um setting 1.5 degrees as the temperature target and not two degrees. The fact that effectively the cumulative emissions of states needed to be compatible with that 1.5 degree target, and that creates a fair share standard for each uh individual country in terms of their mitigation obligations. So that's a more stringent set of mitigation obligations than we had previously. They made some really amazing statements around fossil fuels. So it spoke about the fact that uh fossil fuel production, consumption, licensing, and subsidies could all be unlawful under international law, which to me is is really the legal death knell of the fossil fuel industry. It spoke about the responsibility of states to not only reduce their emissions, but the emissions of non-state actors, so corporations within their jurisdiction as well. So if you think about the UK, for example, that means that the emissions from BP and Shell, not just in the UK, but everywhere, they're the responsibility of the UK, which creates a huge amount of pressure on the UK and other governments to start regulating those companies properly. There's a real um proliferation of things that come out of that decision in terms of climate litigation and accountability through the courts. But also I think that has changed the terrain in terms of the international and domestic governance of climate change, because you've essentially moved the parameters around legal accountability and that has to flow through into the other branches of government. Yeah. So I think that, you know, it's it's been a real step change and a real landmark moment for international climate action.
SPEAKER_02Thank you, Karsh. And because the energy system requires legal, economic, infrastructural transformation, and it's not that cheap. And it's when we start to hear about this net zero or decarbonization targets or pledges that we can see from 2030, 2040. In the case of China, it's 2060. I think in the case of India, it's 2070. And it has becoming, you know, the central feature of this climate planning for all the countries and the companies. But we think that as a challenge, we can see that setting the targets is not the same as implementing this unstoppable force, as you mentioned, that is the energy transition. So, one question that often arises about this is what is net zero? What is decarbonization? Like it's a whole country, it's a whole company. And when the countries develop their legal strategies to pledge this transition, what do you consider are the specific matters that they should uh be integrating to make it uh to implement these pledges?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so it's a it's a great question. So looking at it from the perspective of states, obviously the um net zero targets or the emissions reduction targets that that states are coming out with are coming from their obligations under the Paris Agreement. Um, and that obligation is to set what are called nationally determined contributions, NDCs, um, which is essentially the idea that states have some degree of discretion in um setting the level of mitigation ambition that they will communicate to the other states' parties. But there are some important parameters around that as well. It has to represent their highest possible ambition and be in line with best available science. And there's obviously a ratchet mechanism where new NDCs are set every five years and they need to represent a progression on the previous NDCs. So uh, you know, domestic net zero measures or or the framework legislation is about. Respecting and implementing those international obligations. And there's a you know a significant degree of discretion again around what that actual pathway looks like. That the destination is set by the NDC, but the pathway to get there is something which is constrained by obligations of due diligence, which have been set and identified by the ICJ. But questions around, for example, which sectors you focus on, you know, when you focus on different types of gases, what the energy mix is, the timing of all of that. These are things which the law is not super granular about, and certainly international law is not super granular about it at this stage. But I think that's the type of climate litigation we are we're getting into now. It's about the sufficiency of net zero plans. Are they detailed enough? Are they credible? Do they actually comply with a 1.5 degree temperature target? There have been judicial reviews in the UK, but also in many other jurisdictions interrogating the sufficiency of net zero plans. So, yeah, there are a whole range of different factors that kind of go into credible national level plans and the types of things you look for are, yeah, are they sector-specific? Do they look at transport? Do I look at agriculture? Do I look at fossil fuels? Are they transparent about their assumptions when it comes to things like offsetting or the development of technologies? A whole raft of different factors that you need to look at to hold governments to it to account.
SPEAKER_01That sounds great, Hajj. And um, like I really want to go deep a little bit in the NEDCs because basically it's the instrument that we have in force to have some ambitions in this carbonization agenda, the net zero one. And uh so by your experience, uh, because I mean in the Paris Agreement, when they address uh about the NEDCs, again, the provision comes with the should be ambitious NEDC. And uh from the legal perspective, it doesn't sound like a hard obligation, sounds a little bit soft one. So your perspective, uh I know that we have the climate litigation as a way to enforce those countries to be more ambitious, but how the ambitious uh it's being interpreted by the international community, and more than that, uh how the countries are building their own NEDCs. So, which is the main sectors, by your experience, they are considering to put in those NEDCs that it's being reviewed by five years uh in a row.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so you know, you you've put your finger on one of the biggest issues, right? Which is no state is going to stand up and say that we're breaching our international obligations. So they'll claim that their NDCs represent highest possible ambition or progression on the previous one, um, that they're in line with best available science and so on. And so the question for the law and for climate litigation and legal accountability is how do those claims match up with reality and how can you essentially force compliance so that um the state is actually consistent with what they're required to do under international law. And this is where the ICJ advisory opinion is really helpful because they're basically validated all of the arguments that have been made by climate litigators like me all over the world. And they, as I said before, established a fair share um standard essentially by saying that all of the different NDCs that states make, um all those commitments need to collectively add up to 1.5 degrees. And the only way in which that can be done on a just basis is if each state is is taking their responsibility for their fair share of the emissions budget, the the remaining carbon budget. These are kind of one of the key questions that's that's being litigated in government framework cases. That's the term to refer to cases that are challenging the national level mitigation policies of governments. And these arguments have been playing out for years now in those sorts of often human rights cases challenging mitigation targets. In terms of the kind of the sectors that are being targeted, that often depends on the energy mix or the domestic politics of different countries. So, you know, uh, I'm from Australia. Um, it's a country that has huge export emissions, big reliance on the fossil fuel industry. Uh, and so there's a big kind of uh existential battle over decarbonising um those fossil fuel-related sources of emissions. That's a very different picture to a country like the UK, where coal is is effectively gone. Um, we're at the very end of the oil and gas industry here, and so decarbonizing in the context of fossil fuels is much more straightforward from a technological and political and economic perspective. So the types of sectoral strategies that different states pursue reflect their different levels of development, their different energy needs, and so on. And so, therefore, the patterns of litigation also reflect those different realities. You have a lot more cases in Australia challenging individual projects than you do in the UK, where it's yeah, more of these types of cases focused on things like the sufficiency of the net zero plan in general, or focusing on harder to abate um sectors like agricultural um methane emissions, for example. I worked on a case focusing on that. So yeah, it's it's a long way of saying it really depends on on the country in terms of the sectors that are focused on in their NDCs.
SPEAKER_02Thank you, Harsh. And regarding these points that you were uh highlighting, what about these kind of important matters as well as the greenwashing that could happen with these NDCs? And also because there are so many companies that currently are setting these targets as the same as the country or are pledging to 2030, uh we are going to mitigate all our scope one, two, and three emissions. But you see, after two years, they were not even achieving the first scope. So we see there are so many companies and countries that they are not achieving what they are uh setting. So, do you think the future of climate planning should require countries to present mitigation targets, adaptation plans for it? And in your experience, what would it take uh to make this loss and damage prevention a standard part of national climate policy?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so I'll answer those questions uh in one at a time. So, you know, on that question of greenwashing, um I think that there's I think the main issue with greenwashing is in relation to the the behavior of corporations as opposed to the behavior of national governments. The reason for that is that you haven't really seen many states that have come out and made uh really unrealistic um NDC commitments, which they've then failed to meet. And I think that's because of their understandable and appropriate concerns about international legal accountability. Um, if anything, it's the opposite uh dynamic where you have lower levels of ambition, and in some cases, like China, deliberately lowballing their NDCs and then exceeding those NDCs quite consistently. So I think you know the main kind of greenwashing concerns and greenwashing litigation is focused on corporations because there's essentially a less robust and less well-developed set of uh regulations and and legal accountability to prevent greenwashing behavior. Yeah, so I think the this is a really good question about the balance essentially between the competing interests of uh mitigation and and adaptation. And again, the the demands around that look very different depending on the the country you're you're operating in. Obviously, for most of the developing world that is on the front lines of the climate crisis, adaptation obligations and adaptation is really the thing that is front of mind. And that's what we see in the COP process. We see very strong demands for support from developed countries to deal with adapting to the worst dimensions of climate change. But for states that um are in a different position, developed states, um, where there's essentially greater financial capacity to deal with both mitigation and adaptation. There's a question about how you find that balance and what's appropriate. And that, again, ultimately is a justice question. There are you know coastal communities in the UK that have already been displaced due to due to sea level rise. There are you know different areas that are going to be more or less affected. And those communities need to be adequately supported by the government and provided with the adaptation measures that are needed to protect them. So I think it's often presented as an either-or choice. Paris Agreement is clear in international law, it's clear that states need to do both. Um, and so it's, I think, a uh, you know, sort of a political economy question often for how it is that governments can actually meet both those different needs um with the finite resources that they have.
SPEAKER_02Perfect. Thank you, Kharj.
SPEAKER_01That uh takes my attention about uh basically those agreements, the basis that's about cooperation, transparency uh among all those players, which is states, they have their own service on their uh national policies in general. And uh what what we want to hear from you, Hajj now, it's basically we know the international uh community is been facing some transformations from the last years. And uh we we want to to hear for your experience and uh what we have work on that, how the international framework is cooperate between them and try to, let's say, fix it, uh, those climate agreements, those climate goals, and uh also that living could be some developing or developing countries. Uh, what we can expect for the international community. It's uh any hope and change for the for the the the moment?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I mean I think we're at a really interesting time when it comes to climate action globally, because I think we all recognize in the climate movement that there's been a loss in salience around climate action. It's slipped down the agenda in terms of the types of issues that states are dealing with in multilateral fora. But I don't think that's a that's necessarily an entirely bad thing. And I also don't think it was realistic to expect climate to stay at the top of the international agenda indefinitely. And what I was saying before about the unstoppable nature of the energy transition, I think that the moment of international and domestic salience that we had around climate action, probably four or five or six years ago, was sufficient to essentially rewire the global economy, rewire our institutions, rewire our society so that we're on this path now to decarbonisation. I think there's obviously a lot of work to still be done. Um, there's a lot of work around how just that transition is. And I think that we're really pivoting, at least in the climate litigation space, into more explicit questions around compensation uh for damage, whether that's reparations or uh from states or at the at the sub-national level from the the companies most responsible. But I think that, yeah, we're in a we're in a different era for sure. And that naturally places the spotlight on things like the COP process or other multilateral fora and raises questions about are they fit for purpose? How can they deal with the withdrawal of the US? You know, is consensus-based decision making still going to be effective to get meaningful progress on the issues where we need progress? I think the very short answer to that is of course, it still has really important relevance to continuing to push along the machinery of climate action. And a lot of that work is technocratic. It's not really about very visible political moments. And a lot of the kind of norm setting that needed to be done, I think has been done already. And we're now in an implementation phase essentially with the COP process, where, you know, not everything has to go through a big consensus process. And one of the kind of key things that's emerged from COP in in recent years is doing things outside of the scope of the negotiations, where you have smaller coalitions of states coming together, um, whether that's you know off the back of the action agenda from the COP presidency, or just using COP as a platform to announce a new coalition focused on a particular issue. And I think that that is really appropriate for the types of challenges we're dealing with now. And I'll give an example. You know, if you're trying to decarbonize uh the steel sector, for example, you don't need 200 countries to agree to the pathway for doing that. You just need all of the big steel producers to sign up to an agreement and change their practices. So you get China and India and Japan, you know, in a coalition that's dealing with decarbonizing steel, and that's achieving your goals. You don't need to force it through the COP process. So I think you can use COP to bring together coalitions around those types of you know, sectorally or issue-focused uh areas and use it as a platform for that type of action, in addition to, of course, still trying to get the wins through the kind of the mainstream consensus-based uh process as well.
SPEAKER_02Thank you so much, Harsh. It was a very insightful interview today. I don't know, Harsh, if you want to give us a final statement or something to recommend to our audience regarding these state obligations.
SPEAKER_00Thanks so much. Um Yeah, I mean, I think just in terms of a parting word, uh, you know, as I was just saying then, I think we've entered into a new and interesting area when it comes to climate litigation in particular, which is focused on, you know, holding the companies and the states responsible, holding them accountable. So I think, you know, for people who are interested in climate litigation and thinking about what's coming down the road in the next few years, you know, I anticipate we'll see reparations claims um brought by states in the global south against developed countries. There'll be more cases, transnational cases, brought by communities in the global south, um, against companies most likely in Western Europe or in or in North America, the fossil fuel companies. And the law has developed to a point now uh where those types of claims are possible. So I think that that's a really important sort of pivot. And to me, again, marks again a moment of terminal decline for the fossil fuel industry because um there's now an economic incentive to start filing cases against them to seek compensation. So I think it's a it's an exciting time for climate litigation and and an interesting phase when it comes to thinking about what climate justice looks like through the courts.
SPEAKER_02Thank you so much for being here, for accepting our invitation. Uh, we were so honored to interview you. And thank you so much for the audience to joining us today. So we hope this episode uh encourages you to reflect on the part of each of us are playing in this sustainable energy future. And thank you for listening. Uh, we look forward to continuing the conversation in the next episodes. So thank you, Harsh. Thank you so much.
SPEAKER_00Great, thank you so much.